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Abstract. 
Concentrating on six plays in the 1610s, this thesis explores the ways 
theatrical visual effects described as “strange” channel the period’s moral 
anxieties about rhetoric, technology, and scepticism.  It contributes to debates 
in repertory studies, textual and material culture, intellectual history, theatre 
history, and to recent revisionist considerations of spectacle. 
I argue that “strange” spectacle has its roots in the materialisation of 
morality: the presentation of moral ideas not as abstract concepts but in 
physical things.  The first part of my PhD is a detailed study of early modern 
moral philosophy, scepticism, and material and textual culture.  The second part 
of my thesis concentrates on Shakespeare’s Cymbeline (1609-10) and The 
Tempest (1611), John Webster’s The White Devil (1612), and Thomas 
Heywood’s first three Age plays (1611-13).  These spectacular plays are all 
written and performed within the years 1610-13, a period in which the changes, 
challenges, and developments in both stage technology and moral philosophy 
are at their peak.  I set these plays in the context of the wider historical moment, 
showing that the idiosyncrasy of their “strange” stagecraft reflects the period’s 
interest in materialisation and its attendant moral anxieties. 
This thesis implicitly challenges some of the conclusions of repertory 
studies, which sometimes threatens to hierarchise early modern theatre 
companies by seeing repertories as indications of audience taste and making 
too strong a divide between, say, “elite” indoor and “citizen” outdoor 
playhouses.  It is also aligned with recent revisionist considerations of 
spectacle, and I elide divisions in criticism between interest in original 
performance conditions, close textual analysis, or historical-contextual readings.  
I present “strangeness” as a model for appreciating the distinct aesthetic of 
these plays, by reading them as part of their cultural milieu and the material 
conditions of their original performance. 
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A Note On Citations. 
 
Throughout, I use original Quarto and Folio spellings and editions of early 
modern texts, except where I also wish to address editorial issues resulting from 
those texts.  In terms of theatre history, alongside archaeological evidence, 
visual sources, reconstruction, and so forth, the original playtexts themselves 
are crucial in providing evidence for original meaning and staging; this matter is 
discussed in the Introduction, but it explains my preference for the early printed 
editions of the plays.  Furthermore, being mindful of the quirks of language, 
spelling, and punctuation that attend these early printed texts avoids losing any 
ambiguity or added meaning; it also helps to “perform the vital work of 
‘estranging the Renaissance’” (Hackel, “Practicing” 6)—a necessary task if one 
is to recapture the unique historical moment that gives rise to Jacobean 
“strangeness.” 
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Introduction. 
Jacobean drama’s complex moral spectacles offer an array of tableaux, 
engines, and devices that run the gamut from violent to bizarre.  A 
concentration of “strange” stage directions and descriptions—i.e. “Enter seuerall 
strange shapes,” “they vanish’d strangely,” “in the strange habite” 
(Shakespeare, The Tempest B1r; Heywood, The Brazen Age G2v)—and 
references to “strangeness” in the late 1600s and early 1610s prompts a 
reconsideration of theatrical spectacle in those years. The first decades of the 
seventeenth century mark a move away from tragedy as the modish genre.  
Shakespearean romance, Fletcherian tragicomedy, and genre-defying plays 
like Thomas Heywood’s Age plays introduce a popular drama that is 
characterised by self-awareness and spectacle.  This drama is also infused with 
“strangeness.”  The term appears with astonishing frequency in William 
Shakespeare’s “late plays” (a description discussed below) and more often in 
The Tempest (1610-11) than in any other play in his corpus (26 times).  It also 
appears frequently at the Red Bull in these years.  The word is often linked to 
scenes that showcase sensational stagecraft.  In 1600, for example, Thomas 
Dekker’s Fortunatus describes his ability to teleport across the globe as a 
device with a specific desired effect: “I would have it seeme straunge to you” 
(E1r).  In the following decade, Heywood’s Age plays (1611-13), John 
Webster’s The White Devil (1612), and Shakespeare’s Cymbeline (1609-10) 
and Tempest (1611) adopt Fortunatus’s soundbite as a governing conceit.  In 
these plays, “strangeness” features in stage directions and in characters’ 
attempts to process on-stage action, suggesting that the word is of crucial 
importance to the description of and response to visual spectacle. 
“Strangeness” in these plays prompts a reconsideration of theatrical 
spectacle in the early 1610s.  What exactly does the concept mean for visual 
display?  Why does it become a popular term for the description of and reaction 
to early modern “special effects”?  What challenges does it present to the 
rational and verbal comprehension of visual phenomena?  This thesis argues 
that strange spectacle has its roots in a materialisation of morality: the 
presentation of moral ideas not as abstract concepts but in physical things. 
The materialisation of morality occurs from the mid-sixteenth century, 
when “popular” print incarnations of moral philosophy are increasingly buffeted 
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by philosophical scepticism, protoscientific thought, technological 
developments, and global exploration.  Material objects offer a tangible means 
of assuaging the growing moral and visual aporia that attend the late 
Elizabethan and early Jacobean eras.  In practice, however—especially literary 
practice—the investment of morality in “things” reveals its essential 
uncertainties and ultimately amplifies doubt: physical matter is ephemeral, 
subject to mutability, and eventually melts into air.  Webster expresses the 
temporality of all that is solid at the end of The Duchess of Malfi (1614): “But all 
things haue their end: / Churches, and Citties (which haue diseases like to men) 
/ Must haue like death that we haue” (M3v).  Precisely such a concern with 
disease and death plagues moral-philosophical concepts as they are 
materialised into “things.” 
The Jacobean stage represents these moral anxieties through spectacle.  
Technological terms associated with the stage offer an etymological conjunction 
of moral, visual, and physical domains: the words “device” and “engine” hold 
both abstract and material meanings in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-
century England.  “Device” refers to moral symbols, emblems, and images, to 
rhetorical figures, and also to physical constructions like Barabas’s pulleys-and-
cauldron trap at the end of The Jew of Malta (1589-90); “engine” is similarly 
used to describe mental, intellectual, or ingenious plans and designs as well as 
being a term for “engineered” objects from weapons to masque-scenery.   
Having established and explained the materialisation of morality in Part 
One, the second part of this thesis examines the ways in which “strange plays” 
reflect upon these ideas and presents “strangeness” as a critical lens for 
understanding the period’s drama.  “Strange” becomes something of a zeitgeist 
word in early modern drama of the late 1600s and early 1610s, featuring in a 
host of plays in connection with elaborate visual display and aligning theatrical 
spectacle with philosophical and cultural developments.  This thesis explores 
recurrent explicit invocations of strangeness in these plays (far more frequent 
and concentrated than in previous or subsequent dramatic texts) to argue for a 
wider moral, visual, and rhetorical “strangeness” that governs these texts’ 
worlds and their playhouses. 
Shakespeare’s Cymbeline and The Tempest, John Webster’s The White 
Devil, and Thomas Heywood’s first three Age plays are all written and 
performed within the years 1610-13, a period in which the changes, challenges, 
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and developments in both stage technology and moral philosophy are at their 
peak.  Helen Wilcox’s recent monograph on 1611 reveals the “verbal energies” 
(3) released in a year that sees a startling concentration of significant moments 
in geographic discovery, travel, linguistic experiments, social and political 
troubles, and religious uncertainty.  This thesis positions these plays in the 
context of the wider historical moment, exploring both cultural and material 
context and texts in depth to show that the idiosyncrasy of their “strange” 
stagecraft reflects the period’s interest in materialisation and its attendant 
anxieties.  Dramatic spectacle in these years is associated with philosophical 
scepticism, technology, and wider elements of visual and material culture. I 
reinterpret the writing of Shakespeare, Webster, and Heywood to show that the 
epistemological uncertainty characteristic of their playworlds has a material 
basis in the theatres themselves—in the physical spaces, resources, and 
technologies of their early performances.  These plays are radical experiments 
in representation: they challenge the boundaries between verbal and visual 
description by imbuing stage technology with “strange” moral and philosophical 
significance and by employing stage devices to dissolve the line between 
illusion and reality and between certainty and uncertainty. Channelling 
scepticism through stagecraft, Shakespeare’s late plays, Webster’s tragedy, 
and Heywood’s dramas explore our contingent experience of the material world 
in which we encounter their performance, just as much as the fictional worlds in 
which they are set.   
This thesis is consequently separated from past approaches to 
“morality.”  While I adopt the term “moral” as opposed to “ethical,” I do not use it 
in line with earlier twentieth-century approaches to morality by critics including 
Robert Ornstein, Rees Ennis, or Alfred Harbage.  While the term has fallen out 
of preference in the later twentieth and the twenty-first century in favour of more 
complex, nuanced, and what might be perceived as less “loaded” descriptions 
of ethical conduct, I seek to reinstate its early modern significance.  I therefore 
use “morality” in an historicist sense; for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
England, “moral” has a range of meanings but it importantly has a significant 
practical bent, encouraging both absorption of moral values and, crucially, their 
active application to matters of the everyday—and beyond. 
The period’s probing and presentation of ethical issues is termed, in 
Thomas Elyot’s description, “the most noble studie of morall philosophy, whiche 
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teacheth both vertues maners, & ciuile policye” (The boke named the 
Gouernour G2r).  Helena Grehan adopts a useful distinction between “ethics” 
and “morality” by adapting Zygmunt Bauman’s definitions: “the moral is the 
overarching code by which one is judged.  Moral systems include the justice 
system, the legal system (etc.).  Ethics, on the other hand, is the process by 
which individual subjects make sense of these systems and how they apply 
them to their own lives” (Grehan, 176 n.2).  Writing about performance in the 
twenty-first century, it seems apt for Grehan to follow the “process” involved in 
ethical thought; in contrast, early modern men and women would have 
understood images, treatises, and plays such as those discussed below as 
doing moral work, and it is exactly with the way such forms work, are used, and 
have practical application that I am concerned.  Indeed, this thesis relies on the 
activity and “practicality” at the heart of early modern England’s understanding 
of morality: it governs my treatment of contextual information, primary sources, 
and playtexts.  While there has been recognition of this practicality in recent 
studies in intellectual history, there has been little incorporation of such 
scholarship into readings of early modern drama and its theatres. 
Furthermore, earlier treatments of “morality” in early modern drama 
sought to explore the moments in the text at which a given action or statement 
can be deemed “moral,” and Ornstein sets out his discussion by noting that a 
reader may not always “approve” of a text (3).  I am not interested, here, in such 
explicit questions of “right” behaviour or in applying personal moral standards to 
the play.  Rather, I avoid a “moral” reading of early modern drama per se and 
channel instead the contextual significance of the term to open up drama of the 
early 1610s.  Writing about morality, as this thesis demonstrates, does not 
solely address questions of right and wrong but takes in crucial contextual 
facets of philosophy and drama—notably print culture, visual culture, 
scepticism, and technological development.  Refocusing discussion on 
“morality” therefore means taking heed of a whole raft of practical questions that 
provide a new and timely means of advancing readings of plays and 
playhouses. 
My research is also separated from previous treatments of “strange” 
material, especially new historicist discussions of wonder, newness, and 
“otherness.”  Critics, notably Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Mullaney, and Emily 
C. Bartels, have treated “strangeness” as an example of “othering”—an 
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approach I discuss in Chapter Three.  Channelling Foucault, their studies have 
touched—very lightly—on the ways in which “strangeness” marks the newness 
or difference of alien cultures, and in their brief consideration of the term deem 
it a marker of marginalisation, exclusion, or separation.  While there is no doubt 
validity in these interpretations, I eschew “discursive” readings that rely on a 
theoretical framework or background in order to incorporate a much broader 
range of signification.  As with “morality,” I seek to employ a deeper, more 
historicist, source-focussed appreciation of the term “strange.”  I consequently 
maintain the historical term itself rather than absorp it within a critical or 
theoretical framework.  Staying true to the “strangeness” of early Jacobean 
England helps to recover its contemporary connotations and present a 
framework for understanding Jacobean spectacle rooted in early seventeenth-
century developments. 
This thesis therefore moves beyond the surface—and still current—
meanings of “strange” as “other,” something at work, for instance, in the 
description of Othello as “an extravagant and wheeling stranger / Of here and 
everywhere” (Ff4r).  The term rather has an array of meanings in early modern 
English that have not yet been adequately explored; Theseus’ remark about the 
action in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, “more strange then true” (O2r), indicates 
the complexity of “strangeness.”  I therefore move on from ideologically-driven 
readings of early modern drama to suggest that any treatment of the term 
“strange” must gesture to developments in a broad range of fields and across a 
variety of encounters (human and human, human and animal, human and 
technology, amongst others).  Indeed, a “strange device,” in this understanding, 
would not merely describe an unusual, new, or alien device but one that has 
varying religious, philosophical, technological, and moral connotations.  The 
concentration of the term in relation to theatrical spectacle between 1609 and 
1613 also suggests its close connection with wider philosophical, geographical, 
and technological developments in those years. 
Similarly, there has in recent years been welcome treatment of “wonder” 
in early modern literature.  Critics including James Biester, T. G. Bishop, and 
Peter Platt have suggested the way in which wonder pervades engagement 
with the visual world and finds its way into a variety of literature and literary 
descriptions.  Whereas as wonder, in these approaches, is something that 
escapes rational comprehension and articulation, borders on shock or awe, and 
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is often seen as pre-evaluative, I suggest “strangeness” is something related 
but distinct: a post-evaluative engagement with visual stimuli; an attempt at 
describing the ineffable.  By gesturing towards the closer relationship between 
strangeness and visual description, I suggest that, unlike wonder, strangeness 
sits at the intersection between the ineffable and the verbal, between 
abstract/moral and material description.  This thesis therefore seeks, in part, to 
recover strangeness from its relegation as a synonym of wonder, and to show 
the ways in which it is signally and significantly different from such related 
words. 
Linking these plays through proximity in time and their shared interest in 
strange spectacle offers a gloss on repertory studies.  That field, through the 
work of Roslyn Knutson, Lucy Munro, Marta Straznicky, Eva Griffith, Scott 
McMillin and Sally-Beth MacLean, and others, has sought in part to 
demonstrate that playing companies are distinct units of organisation for plays, 
styles, and interests.  That recognition sometimes threatens to create an 
artificial distance between different companies and different theatres; Mark 
Bayer has argued, for instance, that the Queen’s Servants, who performed at 
the North London theatre, were distinctly removed in repertory and acting style 
from the more “cerebral” aspects of performance with which the King’s Men 
were experimenting (230).  This thesis argues that “strangeness” serves to link 
repertories, companies, and playhouses during the late 1600s and early 1610s.  
Much like the way in which companies exploited offerings not only in their own 
repertory but also in the repertories of their competitors” (Knutson, Playing 74, 
61), “strangeness” reveals echoes across different repertories. 
I consider in comparative terms the Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull 
and the King’s Men at the Globe and Blackfriars.  Webster, Heywood, and 
Shakespeare are often popularly seen as three remarkably different 
playwrights—one a “jobbing” writer, who sells self-consciously “literary” or 
poetic drama to whoever is buying; the second a company man who wrote “low” 
status drama for the Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull; the latter a genius 
whose plays represent the intellectual and poetic supremacy of the King’s Men 
and their repertory in Jacobean England.  All three playwrights, though, 
generate worlds of visual and moral doubt through complex uses of stage 
technology rooted in “strange” devices.  I show that Webster, although scathing 
of the Red Bull in The White Devil’s “To the Reader,” wrote a play whose 
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performance aspects are perfectly suited to the Clerkenwell milieu and 
audience.  Shakespeare’s Cymbeline also famously mirrors a moment in 
Heywood’s The Golden Age, of Jupiter flying on an eagle.  The way I read 
“strangeness” in Heywood’s and Shakespeare’s plays suggests that the 
moment is not merely a singular shared special effect—an appropriation of 
sensation—but, in this moment of the early modern theatre, a joint interest in 
the way visual display elicits and responds to moral uncertainty.  In 1611, the 
court welcomed a double bill of Cymbeline (Globe/Blackfriars) and The Silver 
Age (Red Bull); I suggest that, returning the plays to their respective theatres, 
scholars ought to match the court’s implicit recognition that Shakespeare’s and 
Heywood’s companies share an approach to “special effects.” 
Finally, this thesis elides divisions in criticism between interest in original 
performance conditions, close textual analysis, or historical-contextual readings.  
Richard Meek recognises that a cultural-historical approach to Shakespeare in 
the past few decades has marginalised interest in the rhetorical and narrative 
aspects of early modern literature but that critical trends in recent years may 
indicate “the emergence of a new formalism” (7). This thesis does not attempt a 
formalist reading, but it does renew attention to aesthetic and formal factors by 
reading them in the light of early modern cultural history.  I read the distinct 
strange aesthetic of these plays from the 1600s and 1610s as part of their 
milieu and material conditions, in order to offer a more detailed cultural 
understanding of early modern drama—one that conjoins attention to literary 
and rhetorical style with appreciation of historical context and the materialities of 
Jacobean performance.  I historicise and contextualise aesthetic factors but 
believe that such work neither precludes the appreciation of form and style nor 
hampers close reading of plays (something I discuss at length in the final 
chapter and the conclusion). 
My research is therefore also aligned with recent considerations of 
spectacle.  Special effects have long been maligned by critics of early modern 
drama, to the point where plays that rely heavily on spectacle have been 
regarded as early modern B-movies or exploitation dramas that incite moral 
outrage and employ sensational violence in lieu of poetic talent.  In what 
remains the only book-length study of the period’s dumb shows, Dieter Mehl 
claims that the fascinating murder scenes in The White Devil are no more than 
“cynical demonstrations of two particularly interesting and ingenious methods of 
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getting unwanted people out of the way” (141).  However, visual and 
spectacular elements of the stage are more elaborate and intricate by the 
Jacobean period, with popular venues like the Red Bull making full use of 
flashes and bangs and Shakespeare—probably the playwright most associated 
with “poetic” and therefore non-spectacular drama—depending on highly visual 
effects in his “late plays” at the Globe and Blackfriars. 
Accordingly, critics have recently asserted the importance of spectacle 
throughout the period.  Jenny Sager’s The Aesthetics of Spectacle (2013)—
which makes direct parallels with contemporary films and applies the 
methodology of film criticism to early modern drama (and Robert Greene in 
particular)—has challenged the dismissal of visual effects to claim that 
spectacle, “rather than being devoid of meaning, simultaneously provokes both 
aesthetic delight and intellectual contemplation” (2).  Recent studies build on 
earlier scholarship, including Staged Properties in Early Modern English Drama 
(2002) by Jonathan Gil Harris and Natasha Korda and Andrew Sofer’s The 
Stage Life of Props (1994), amongst others, which bring welcome attention to 
important visual and material aspects of theatrical culture.  These studies 
position objects in a network of “material relations that are the stuff of drama 
and society alike” (Harris and Korda, “Introduction” 1); they go some way to 
reinstating the physical and material significance of stage properties often lost 
in textual analyses that reduce them to abstract symbols.  Indeed, this thesis 
builds on twenty-first century approaches that respond to new historicism’s 
interest in fashioning a human subject by looking at the inanimate: “a 
pronounced tendency in the new millennium, evidenced in the turn to so-called 
material culture, is to engage with objects” (Harris Untimely 1).  Yet I do not 
employ the deliberate interest in anachronism in Gil Harris’s approach and do 
not attempt here a “polychronic and multitemporal account” (24; see also Lucy 
Munro, “Shakespeare and the uses of the past” 111-12).  Rather, I address a 
brief period in the late 1600s and early 1610s and its underpinnings in a wider 
background of intersections between material culture and morality. 
In distinction from Harris’s new materialist approach, this thesis is not 
occupied with the journeys of things, but with the way in which early moderns 
used and encountered them: practically and actively, in both moral and material 
terms.  I hope to avoid freezing the matter discussed within this thesis in time 
(and time in the matter—see Harris, Untimely 7), however, by suggesting that 
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these moral-material intersections are part of a much larger philosophical 
evolution.  Going beyond immediate material engagements, I therefore connect 
objects like texts, broadsides, props, and technological inventions to 
philosophical thought, exploration, and prosody, to suggest that the historical 
moment itself can offer past objects exciting, fluid, and important fields of 
meaning.  Furthermore, “strange” devices are particularly concentrated in this 
early Jacobean moment, but their energies are felt before and beyond that 
small window.  As such, I share Harris’s wariness of reducing objects to the 
simply “physical,” by showing how the materials discussed in this thesis have a 
rich range of signification and significance beyond their physical facts.   
More recently, the field of early modern drama studies has engaged with 
theatrical material and its relationship to the verbal energies of playtexts.  
Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Performance (2013), edited by 
Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany Stern, presents the work of theatre historians 
who view “theatrical effects as an extension of textuality” (3).  Recent work on 
indoor theatres is also accompanied by interest in their visual significance, 
something evident from the varied consideration of spectacle and effect in the 
essay collection Moving Shakespeare Indoors (2014).  The research in this 
thesis forms part of this revisionist approach to spectacle and supports recent 
claims that there is “no binary between the materiality of theatre and the 
emotional, metaphorical and poetic registers of the plays themselves” (Karim-
Cooper and Stern 3).  Combining such an approach with wider materialist 
attention to objects, this thesis connects the cultural and philosophical 
resonances of things to their dramatic effects.  “Strangeness” itself is a concept 
in which the material and moral—and description and ineffability—are 
continually in tension.  The term offers a useful way to link stagecraft with the 
thematic, poetic, and narrative facets of early modern drama and to appreciate 
the resulting richness. 
Indeed, a model of “strange spectacle” combines recent materialist 
enquiries into spectacle with the rewards of intellectual, cultural, and 
philosophical history.  Theatre history continues to make advances, not least in 
studies that open up lesser-studied venues like the Red Bull, as with Eva 
Griffith’s A Jacobean Company and its Playhouse (2013).  Expanding the 
resonances of materiality beyond both playhouse and text and into the abstract 
questions and crises prominent in early Jacobean England affords a more 
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textured understanding of theatrical representation.  I consequently combine 
approaches that are too often separated: the material thrust and physical facts 
of theatre history—which feature so prominently in recent studies of early 
modern performance—and, specifically, philosophical scepticism and its related 
fields of study.  This thesis therefore builds on Douglas Bruster’s reading of The 
Tempest and Henry S. Turner’s multifaceted study of the period’s drama.  There 
have been studies of early modern drama’s philosophical underpinnings and 
experiments, and William H. Hamlin has provided an informed reading of early 
modern English scepticism in dramatic writing.  His study, however, does not 
situate scepticism in physical performance contexts or the space of the 
playhouse.  On the other hand, while Sager asks that critics acknowledge the 
“wondering” provoked by spectacle, her study does little to advance theatrical 
display’s philosophical and moral significance in early modern England.  This 
thesis offers a fresh contribution by matching recent studies in early modern 
spectacle and theatre history with more conceptual questions of moral 
meanings and contexts.  Viewing spectacle through a “strange” lens reveals its 
historical, intellectual, and cultural underpinnings by exploring both its physical 
and philosophical presence in early Jacobean England. 
The methodology underpinning this thesis is therefore necessarily wide 
and eclectic.  Addressing the material and the moral aspects of the drama 
together requires an enormous amount of context, but it is only by drawing 
together theatre history, moral philosophy, visual and material culture (including 
history of technology), studies of rhetoric, and close textual analysis that I can 
fully address the ways in which stage devices and spectacle put the period’s 
anxieties and developments on show.  Indeed, a close reading of Jacobean 
spectacle cannot be separate from a close reading of the texts themselves. 
Ultimately, a rich and diverse array of contexts are drawn together, in order to 
make sense of the original performance conditions of these plays and 
consequently to understand more fully their philosophical, intellectual, and 
moral power. 
This thesis also, through “strangeness” and its focus on the 1610s, 
inevitably engages with the means of reading and understanding 
Shakespeare’s “late-career” plays.  I am fully in mind of Gordon McMullan’s 
critique of the “discourse of lateness” and “the inadequacy of the idea of late 
style as a means of understanding a group of plays created in the conditions of 
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early modern English professional theatre” (Shakespeare and the Idea of Late 
Writing 5).  This thesis duly situates Cymbeline and The Tempest within those 
theatrical conditions, while also appreciating the qualities that distinguish 
Shakespeare’s “late style” as a recognisable form of poetic expression—
something I explore in detail in Chapter Five.  Where a “discourse of lateness” 
can associate the plays “with the aesthetic at the expense of the historical” 
(McMullan, Shakespeare 7), I show that these areas are inextricable, that the 
historical generates an aesthetic of “strangeness” in Cymbeline and The 
Tempest rooted in contextual developments—theatrical, material, verbal, and 
philosophical.  When I therefore refer to the “late plays,” I use inverted commas.  
This is not to categorise simply Shakespeare’s late-career plays as a “clear, 
separate, unifiable group” (McMullan, Shakespeare 256-57), though I am 
interested in the “strange” echoes across the plays (see the conclusion).  The 
label rather allows me to use a convenient chronological marker and to engage 
with wider criticism that insists on grouping them together, while acknowledging 
the phrase’s ideological and methodological baggage.  By considering them as 
works of art in dialogue with the contemporaneous repertory at the Red Bull, in 
fact, this thesis heeds McMullan’s call to consider the “commercial structures of 
the theatre” and “the interactions of repertories” (“What is a ‘late play’?” 21) as a 
means of understanding Shakespeare’s “late” or “last” plays, their contexts, and 
contemporaries. 
The thesis is split into two parts—Part 1: Contexts and Part 2: Texts.  
Part 1: Contexts concentrates on the intersections between material culture and 
morality and their representation on the stage to introduce my concept of the 
materialisation of morality.  The section includes a comprehensive survey of 
research and scholarship on moral philosophy, the moral role of images, and 
theatre’s relationship with the two. 
Chapter One explores the relationship of visual culture to moral 
philosophy and then to the theatre, with print images proving an important 
underlying source for the reading and understanding of stage spectacle.  It sets 
out a model of early modern morality’s practicality, stressing the various ways in 
which moral teaching is put to active use.  I begin by surveying secondary 
criticism and historical scholarship on the subject, to set out the different 
approaches, schools, and interconnections at work in both older and current 
scholarship.  I then assess primary sources from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
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centuries—conduct manuals, education treatises, essays, moral-philosophical 
texts—to illustrate their practical emphases and their interest in usefulness.  
The middle part of the chapter explores the ways in which images burgeoned in 
the period, being used to convey important moral messages and teachings; it 
covers, likewise, scholarship regarding visual culture as well as reading texts 
like emblem books and broadsides to suggest the imbrication of the humanist 
cultures of education and moral advice.  The chapter closes by relating this 
model of practical morality to the theatre; I explain approaches to morality by 
critics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and their difference from later 
criticism also interesting in mores, as well as setting out how this thesis differs 
from either.  Thomas Heywood’s Apology for Actors (1612) ties the chapter 
together by suggesting that the theatre, uniquely placed between abstract and 
physical representation, is a space for practical moral action.  The sense of 
practicality and usefulness laid out as a model for early modern morality in this 
chapter underpins the interest in material culture in subsequent chapters. 
Indeed, the second chapter sets out the “materialisation of morality” and 
focusses on the period’s moral anxieties as they are expressed through visual, 
print, material, and theatrical culture.  I start out by outlining the “crisis” of 
confidence in traditional moral values, concentrating on scepticism and science.  
I then outline the roles played by objects in countering such a lack of faith, 
arguing that metaphorically material objects in print provide a tangible means of 
assuaging moral doubts.  The argument marshalls a large body of broadside 
and pamphlet images to argue for the role that materiality plays in texts’ moral 
functions: a double usefulness.  I read, for instance, the multiple meanings of 
“spectacles” in admonitory texts and their images.  The chapter continues to 
argue for the household as a space in which texts’ material functions are 
explicitly aligned with their didactic intentions.  The final sections of the chapter 
attend to the ways the theatre fits into the model of materialised morality, 
connecting medieval performance to the developments of masque and pageant 
in the early Jacobean period.  Pointing to the importance of technological 
objects on the early modern stage, I show the influence of scepticism and of 
scientific developments in presenting stage action and their integration within 
the wider, abstract messages of a text—a conjunction that is particularly forceful 
in Thomas Dekker’s account of King James’s Magnificent Entertainment (1604).  
The materialisation of morality explores the connections between the abstract 
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and the material realms that is the background for a discussion of Jacobean 
“strangeness.” 
Part 2: Texts reads the plays themselves against a rich contextual 
backdrop to explore how “strangeness” reflects and engages with the 
materialisation of morality and is rooted in the moral philosophical and theatrical 
developments explored in the first part.  Chapter Three addresses the broad 
early modern contexts of “strangeness,” its meanings and its manifestations, by 
reading its role in spectacle in Heywood’s Age plays and in The Tempest.  It 
sets out the uniqueness of The Tempest and The Brazen Age as the only plays 
of the period to use the term “strange” in a stage direction, and explores what 
such a term might mean for theatrical display.  I introduce a range of 
contemporary materials, chiefly sermons, popular prints, and pamphlets of 
prodigies and “strange” occurences, to suggest the term’s full range of 
signification and its distinction from “wonder” while reading it against the Age 
plays: “strangeness” indicates truthfulness at the same time as it suggests a 
spurious, popish, or suspicious quality.  Likewise, the chapter concentrates on 
the way the term is used in place of physical description.  I argue for its role as 
a liminal concept between the material and the abstract realms—one that 
combines moral quality with appearance.  The second part of the chapter 
applies these contexts to The Tempest, showing its centrality in a play that 
moves between visibility and invisibility, moral and physical action.  I introduce 
some further important aspects of “strangeness”—new world discovery and 
scepticism—to suggest that a “shock of the new” and concurrent suspicion of 
the old is expressed through “strange” descriptions.  
The fourth chapter builds on the material aspects of “strangeness” at the 
root of The Tempest by showing how stage technology forms the crux of the 
play’s moral and sceptical interrogations.  Moving away from explicit attention to 
the term “strange,” it argues for a pervasive aesthetic of strangeness that can 
be found in the play’s theatrical materials: pulleys, ropes, sounds, and 
appearances.  I set out the close relationship between technology and moral 
thought (exploring technology’s place in early modern Europe as a branch of 
philosophy), before exploring the ways in which Jacobean playhouses 
themselves are closely connected to technological developments.  The chapter 
presents a reading of The Tempest that argues its practical stagecraft is part of 
(rather than distinct from—in any “naturalistic” or “fictional” way) the playworld 
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itself.  I therefore move beyond recent approaches that view technology as a 
“contribution” to the “textual” aspets of theatre (Karim-Cooper and Stern 1, 
emphasis added) by suggesting that the two are inextricably connected in early 
modern performance.  As such, I explore the relationship between ships and 
navigation, and the theatre—commonplace metaphors for the stage.  That 
relationship is read in the way Prospero uses his powers throughout the play 
and in Ariel’s association with numerous strange technological devices and 
allusions.  Ultimately, the chapter argues that Prospero be freshly conceived as 
a strange engineer—one who unites the playhouse’s mechanics with its fictional 
and moral labour. 
Chapter Five brings the different strands of the thesis together by 
considering the way “strangeness” acts as a rhetorical device.  Examining 
contemporary rhetorical theory and the moral anxieties provoked by verbal 
ornamentation, I explore the ways that “strange” speech has material 
dimensions in The White Devil and in Cymbeline, where rhetorical devices are 
transformed into stage devices.  Setting out rhetoric as a major touchstone of 
early modern England in terms of morality and education, I also discuss in 
depth contemporaries’ concerns about its power and the truth-twisting 
possibilities it engendered.  I introduce a notion of “rhetorical strangeness”: a 
means of contorting the syntax and other formal features of speech that 
achieves a stunning mixture of paradox and juxtaposition, conveyance and 
confusion, delay and gratification.  The rhetorical style of The White Devil and of 
Cymbeline therefore matches their playworlds’ visual, aural, and narrative 
“strangeness.”  As part of this reading, I use rhetorical manuals to show that the 
term “strange” was used as a desired effect in rhetorical elocution and 
composition.  The chapter then moves on to read the plays themselves in light 
of such “strangeness,” showing that in speech, as in action, there is a 
relationship between abstract and material realms.  Both playwrights generate 
“matter” that is both part of a rhetorical category and part of stage materials, 
especially in dumb shows and dumb-show-like scenes.  I go further than recent 
treatments of verse, noted above, to introduce a range of contemporary 
materials from geometrical manuals to emblem books, in arguing for the 
“strange” role of rhetoric these plays’ material worlds.  “Strange matter,” here, 
produces a sceptical uncertainty, but it also demands that rhetoric be read as 
part of the visual and material world of the playhouse. 
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Ultimately, this thesis argues that moral concepts, admonition, and 
instruction undergo a “material turn” in the early modern period.  Exploring 
stage directions, visual display, description, and rhetorical effect, I show that the 
growing material interests of moral philosophy are reflected and interrogated in 
the playhouse.  The attendant moral anxieties of materialisation are expressed 
through “strange” spectacle—most visibly in the six plays of the early 1610s I 
analyse. 
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1. Practical Morality: Philosophy, Visual Culture, and Theatre 
 
 . . . they do all best agree when they say, that virtue consisteth in action, 
and that the meditation thereof without practise, is as an unstringed 
instrument, whereon no man plaieth. 
---William Martyn, Youths Instruction (1612), D1v.   
 
This chapter presents a model of early modern morality drawn from primary 
sources and secondary readings, introducing its various facets and 
concentrating on its visual and dramatic strands.  It also gives a detailed 
overview of research in the areas that underpin this thesis.  I argue for a 
practical, active approach to morality in the period—one that pervades explicit 
moral philosophical writing (as detailed in surveys of primary sources and 
current scholarship) as well as in important visual presentations of moral 
admonition and teaching: moral images and the theatre.  By suggesting that 
practicality underlines a raft of morally-involved genres and forms, I show that 
use and usefulness is central to early modern conceptions of the moral life—a 
maxim that becomes important when reading print culture and the stage 
business of playhouses.  Previous studies of plays and playhouses have often 
neglected to connect the emphases of early modern moral philosophy—often 
consigned to intellectual history—to early modern England’s wider visual and 
material culture, so this chapter offers renewed and sustained attention to their 
interrelationship. 
I concentrate here and in the following chapter on the contexts 
necessary for appreciating the wider resonance of “strangeness” in the period: 
moral philosophy, visual culture, and theatre.  These three areas are crucial to 
understanding Jacobean “strangeness,” because the concept, especially in the 
early 1610s, is routinely ascribed to visual dramatic spectacle and represents 
both moral and visual description.  Moral philosophy, visual culture, and theatre 
form the basis of the period’s “materialisation of morality,” explored in the 
second chapter, which governs my reading of dramatic “strangeness.” 
My main interest is in how moral advice is to be “used” in a practical 
manner.  Emphases on usefulness and practicality lend early modern ethics to 
metaphorically material applications.  I begin this chapter by outlining the main 
areas of moral advice, admonition, and instruction in early modern England 
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through a survey of pertinent secondary criticism and an engagement with 
important primary works.  While attitudes to moral philosophy, moral teaching, 
and abstract thought were subject to intense scrutiny in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, here I set out discernible “models” of early modern 
morality, specifically with regards to moral philosophy and concepts of “virtue”—
concepts in some sense distinct from, though still interrelated with, Christianity.  
This survey takes in the major critical stances and research on that subject, 
before moving onto the primary texts—moral treatises and advice manuals—to 
give a sense of the way practical “moral” teaching worked in print in the early 
modern period.  I go on to address the importance of visual culture in 
disseminating and representing moral philosophy and advice before exploring 
the ways in which the early modern theatre functioned as a practical moral tool.  
As part of my discussion of visual culture, I consider, therefore, the moral 
importance of the sense of sight in the period, exploring how the eye is 
particularly sensitive to printed images and visual action.  In discussing drama, I 
am concerned with medieval and early modern ideas about its explicit didactic 
function.  The moralistic roots of the period’s theatre are often framed in 
explicitly physical terms, in early drama as well as by later Jacobean writers.  
Thomas Heywood, in his Apology for Actors (1612), presents theatrical 
representation as a unique medium, between the spoken word and the painted 
picture, able to bring to life and “embody” noble ideals, a notion that forms the 
basis of the materialisation of morality.  These ideas underpin “strange” 
spectacle’s moral resonances and serve as an important backdrop for the 
remainder of this thesis. 
“Morality” in early modern England 
As noted in the introduction, this thesis uses the word “moral” rather than 
“ethical”—hence “moral images” and “materialisation of morality”—because it 
offers the most historically accurate description of what these early modern 
texts and images are doing.  Randall Cotgrave’s translation of the equivalent 
(almost exactly so) French terms in 1611 offers a useful means of 
understanding the word’s early modern currency in English.  Moralité is 
described as “Moralitie; a morall sence, or subiect; also, a Morall, an Enterlude 
or Play of manners”; Moraliser is “To morallize, to expound morally, to giue a 
morall sence vnto; also, to act a Morall, or Enterlude of manners”; and Moral is 
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“Morall, belonging unto ciuilitie, or maners” (Hhh3v).  As a word that indicates 
either a double sense that requires unpicking or, in the latter definition, 
concerning “ciuilitie, or maners,” the term “moral” is to be associated with the 
question of “how to live” and, of course, how not to live.  Moreover, its close 
association with theatrical modes of display (and, by extension, visual 
presentation) appears in two of Cotgrave’s definitions.  The French words can 
be associated with the English “moral,” which can be used to describe a play or 
an element of a play.  Alan Dessen highlights the historical specificity of the 
term with relation to Nashe’s threat to Gabriel Harvey that “Comedy upon 
Comedy he shall have, a Morall, a History, a Tragedy, or what he will,” while 
also noting that it is often used to refer to characters within such plays, including 
the Vice (Dessen, Shakespeare and the Late Moral Plays 12).  The conflation of 
character with moral (“the old vice”; “the old morall”) endows the term with 
something more than what we consider its metaphysical meanings, meanings 
largely removed, as I suggest below, from early modern understandings.  As 
“morall” is almost always related to practical matters, its association with a stock 
figure or generic advice play ties the nature of its practicality into the theatrical, 
the visual, and the tangible.  It is this tangibility that I return to in the second 
chapter, but first I discuss the period’s understanding of “morals” and “morality.” 
 
To talk of “morality” in early modern England is to compass a number of 
interrelated elements.  Some of its components can be identified as distinct 
genres or concepts—the virtues, for example—whereas other forms of moral 
advice and moral philosophical writing creep into a surprisingly large range of 
literary and visual thought.  The early modern period sees a growing affinity 
between natural and moral philosophy, but generally the former is more 
concerned with aspects of the physical world, whereas the latter attends to 
human habits and behaviour.  Francis Bacon explains that “morall vertues are 
in the Minde of man by habite & not by nature” (Aduancement 2: Ss3v), and so 
moral philosophy deals with the human cultivation of moral good.1  Indeed, the 
                                     
1 Although this overview concentrates on moral philosophy, maintaining the distinction that early 
moderns upheld, it is impossible entirely to avoid some association between the two.  Galenic 
medicine and early modern conceptions of the body stress the power of affections, emotions, 
and passions over behaviour.  If moral philosophy, stemming back to Plato and Aristotle, 
concerns the rule of reason, then impingements upon that rule can also be seen as the territory 
of natural philosophy.  By the time one reaches Francis Bacon’s reform of natural philosophy, 
Stephen Gaukroger has demonstrated, it is possible to consider “the diseases and cure” of the 
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etymological root of the term “moral” links it to “manners” (from the Latin 
mores); though this sets the scope wider, it indicates how early moderns 
understand the term to connote, very broadly, ethical ways of living. 
New historicism has touched on these broad “ways of living”—and 
touched on them very broadly.  Literary critics in particular have seen ethical 
construction as part of “self-fashioning” and the development of an autonomous 
inward “self.”  For example, Stephen Greenblatt’s seminal Renaissance Self-
Fashioning (1980) and Katherine Eisaman Maus’s Inwardness and Theater 
(1995) both deal obliquely with moral issues by translating them into forms of 
power, display, and concealment.  They allude to notions of virtue, but are 
invested in the way such notions are interrogated and ultimately revealed as 
absent in the period’s culture, leaving in their wake “competing, 
incommensurable perspectives” (Maus 66).  Michael Schoenfeldt’s Bodies and 
Selves (1999) is perhaps more concerned with humanist and classical virtue, 
identifying the early modern body as a site of personal conflict in which issues 
of virtue and moderation are played out.  Similarly, Deborah Shuger’s Habits of 
Thought (1990) aims to modify earlier new historicist or cultural materialist 
approaches by rejecting the oppositions of “subversive” and “orthodox” and 
rather considering the conflicted and contradictory nature of society and 
selfhood.  Her study of George Herbert, Lancelot Andrewes, and Richard 
Hooker paints a fractured sense of morality and moral philosophy.  Yet 
Shuger’s description of Herbert’s “failure to demarcate ethical from pragmatic 
evaluation, moral from social precepts” (96), for example, suggests in a typical 
new historicist fashion that early modern ethics has a distinctly “separate” remit 
from “pragmatic” or social issues, thereby separating moral philosophy from 
what is often perceived as the more ideologically charged aspects of social and 
cultural production. 
Recently, such new historicist approaches to the moral construction of 
the “self” have come under fire by intellectual historians who, in Conal 
Condren’s words, see the “need for an inner psychological and moral agent” as 
an irksome, and by now a much echoed, anachronism.  Condren does not wish 
to deny that these studies have identified something important at work in the 
                                                                                                          
mind to be “important far beyond the moral realm”; “Bacon’s detailed account of the diseases 
and the regiment required for their cure is developed not in the context of moral philosophy, but 
in that of natural philosophy” (114).    
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period, but he claims that they use “historically inappropriate terms” (Argument 
139).  His quarrel with these scholars represents a turn (or perhaps a re-turn) in 
both literary and historical scholarship of early modern “morality” that seeks to 
resituate discussion of the subject in contemporary philosophical and historical 
terms.  Like new historicism, recent studies use both literary and non-literary 
texts as a means of exploring early modern thought, but ground their approach 
in specific branches of early modern moral theory.  Rather than prioritise “self-
hood” and interiority, they are more sensitive to the historical contingencies of 
early modern personhood and to the necessity of external, social factors when it 
comes to ethics.  Such methodologies therefore look to the specific elements 
that comprise moral thought in the period and their context, returning to the 
approaches and studies of twentieth-century intellectual historians. 
In this light, both literary and historical scholarship has begun to devote 
considerable attention to the virtues, the passions, and educational treatises.  
What is relevant to this thesis is the centrality of practicality and usefulness to 
these forms of thought.  Such scholarship has largely focussed on the 
importance of humanism in the early modern period, exploring its negotiations 
with medieval scholasticism, its tensions with Christianity, and the character of 
its engagement with Greek and Roman writers, especially Aristotle and Cicero. 
Classical thought informs much of the period’s understanding of morality.  
Any study of early modern ethics must consider, primarily, the virtues.  
Stemming from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (and, to a lesser extent, his 
other works), Aristotelian virtues are usually described as “dispositions not only 
to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways” (MacIntyre, After 
Virtue 147).  There is also sometimes a distinction between intellectual virtues 
and moral virtues—the former, following Aquinas, associated with sound reason 
and the latter associated with the desire or appetite that lies behind an action—
though often they are conflated in moral philosophy, as shall be discussed.  
Avoiding the complex specifics of classical approaches to the virtues (ranging 
from concepts of the ultimate good to the purpose of philosophy), it will suffice 
to state, here, that in Aristotle’s conception of virtue ethics, the end “is not 
knowledge but action” (9 [NE 1.3.6-7]).  He even compares the function of 
man’s ethical life to the function of a craftsman (53 [NE 1.10.13).  It is this 
practical approach that is so visible in early modern moral philosophy, ultimately 
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lending itself to more flexible and metaphorical modes of expression than the 
written word. 
Joshua Scodel has addressed Aristotle’s role in early modern England, 
noting the importance of humanism.  Because Aristotle is associated with the 
scholastic curriculum of the Middle Ages, much of humanist thinking seeks to 
distance itself from explicitly Aristotelian frameworks.  However, Horton notes 
that “his moral-philosophical writings retained much of their former importance” 
(57-58).  Certainly, Scodel has sought to emphasise how an Aristotelian 
conception of “mediocrity” or the mean was the preferred way of regulating 
one’s behaviour in early modern England.  Scodel’s wide-ranging study 
explores the moral philosophy that underpins notions of excess and mediocrity 
for English writers, addressing their negotiations between other classical 
models and conflicting religious demands. 
Historians and critics from Quentin Skinner to Condren have generally 
been more interested in the influence of Cicero on early modern ethics and its 
practical bent. Skinner identifies the roots of humanist moral philosophy in 
Petrarch’s revival of Cicero.  In his Tusculan Disputations, Cicero presents the 
notion of virtus, the single virtue above all others.  It is this concept of virtus that 
underpins the notion of what it is to be a man (deriving from the Latin for “man,” 
vir) but also to the practical importance of moral thinking to late medieval and 
early modern writers.  Skinner explains that “Cicero makes the study of moral 
philosophy central to the training of his character.  But he must also be capable 
of putting his wisdom to use, relating his philosophy to his life and fulfilling 
himself as a citizen rather than merely as a sage” (Foundations 87).  Cicero’s 
form of virtue is related to a man’s role in the commonwealth.  It is the 
importance of public office that underpins the notion that all moral teaching is to 
be used—something particularly important with regard to materialised and 
“strange” advice that is conceived to be physically, as well as philosophically, 
useful. 
More recently, Markku Peltonen has further interrogated the presence of 
Cicero in discussions of practical ways of living.  Peltonen demonstrates the 
popularity of this practical approach in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
He claims that it is the vita activa, or active life, and virtue that permeate 
educational and moral treatises.  The vita activa is associated with negotium, or 
work, and is traditionally the opposite of otium, or leisure and reflection.  By the 
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Jacobean period, the method of learning virtue for practice is entrenched, and 
Peltonen articulates its association with educational models: 
 
If the arguments presented in Jacobean England about the 
importance and desirability of the virtuous public life were 
essentially classical humanist in character, this was equally true 
when we turn to analyse the ways in which they thought this mode 
of life could be acquired in practice.  It was widely agreed that this 
could only happen through an extensive education in the studia 
humanitatis. (Classical 168) 
 
Moving away from the scholastic curriculum of the medieval period, the “stress 
on the utility of learning” (169) presented the humanities and the humanist 
curriculum as more morally efficacious.  Humanist textbooks by scholars, 
philosophers, and schoolteachers in the sixteenth century, as well as the 
widespread translation of courtier manuals, mean that this approach to learning 
is commonplace by the Jacobean period, as is discussed below.  In the first half 
of the seventeenth century, the notion of “practice” holds enough moral 
significance to warrant its own page-long category in Joseph Ayres’s moral and 
religious commonplace, comparing morality to a musical instrument (f.238).  
Practicality underpins materialisation and strangeness, both of which negotiate 
the various possible uses of moral advice and its non-abstract ends. 
Alongside Aristotelian and Ciceronian strands of moral philosophy, 
historians and critics have looked to Stoicism.  It is a philosophy characterised 
by a far greater “interiorisation of the moral life” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 157).  
Where Cicero “writes from the premise that humans are social animals before 
they are individuals” (David Wiles 53), much of Stoicism emphasises the 
negativity of social activity and displaces it from the moral arena.  Stoic writers 
place the burden on the individual’s “will” and endurance.  Michael Moriarty’s 
study on theories of virtue in French thought, for example, eloquently explains 
how Seneca, popular in early modern Europe, is far more pessimistic about 
society than Cicero or Aristotle: Seneca “insists that society’s values are 
corrupt, because social behaviour is corrupt, and the wise (or would-be wise) 
person seeking to establish a reliable basis for authentic moral values is 
thinking against the pressure of other people’s behaviour” (53).  The impetus to 
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withdraw from the active life, so antithetical to Ciceronian moral philosophy, also 
manifests itself across early modern England; it is an important undercurrent in 
scepticism—an integral aspect of strangeness, especially in the work of Michel 
de Montaigne. 
Peltonen has most fruitfully considered the resurgence of Tacitus in the 
1590s as part of this move towards Stoical moral attitudes.  He argues that the 
association of Tacitean and Senecan thought results in “an ethic of fortitude and 
endurance” in the period (124).  Peltonen associates the rise of non-Ciceronian 
approaches with political preoccupations, however, and questions whether such 
a resurgence marks a “decisive point in humanist political discourse.”  Although 
there are certainly marks of a “new moral outlook,” namely “ethical scepticism, 
the stoic attempt to enter into a state of apathy, as well as the principles of self-
interest and self-preservation,” Peltonen considers the rise of such hallmarks of 
the late Elizabethan and Jacobean periods as a modification rather than a 
replacement of Ciceronian practicality: 
 
. . .  neither the growth of royal absolutism, nor the legal accounts 
of the freedoms of the Englishman, invoked to meet the challenge 
of absolutists, nor even the Tacitean pessimism and its related 
insistence on the merits of the contemplative and private life, 
could completely outweigh traditional Ciceronian humanism and 
its urging of the merits of the active life. (Classical 134) 
 
Peltonen concludes, then, that “rather than seeing these new emphases, 
somewhat misleadingly, as the antithesis of classical Ciceronian humanism, 
such emphases should be interpreted as a part of the humanist political 
vocabulary” (134).  In this light, the 1590s and the early Jacobean period can be 
considered to usher in a combination of explicit utility in moral thought with 
Stoical and sceptical introspection. 
Indeed, J. B. Schneewind stresses the “practical approach” of writers in 
the vein of Michel de Montaigne, whose philosophy is distanced from the active 
life but nevertheless engaged with the “advice that European thought has so far 
offered” (47).  Francis Bacon, similarly, is deeply pragmatic in both his natural 
and moral philosophy, displaying a Stoic move towards interior considerations 
of will (perhaps an essential aspect of the essay form) while emphasising the 
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usefulness of that contemplation.  Rather than seeing negotium and otium as 
opposites, then, recent scholarship has begun to demand that they be seen as 
interrelated elements, the latter feeding into the former.  Stephen Gaukroger 
even suggests that Francis Bacon’s approach during the late Elizabethan and 
Jacobean period is “effectively . . . to transform philosophy into something that 
comes within the realm of negotium” (55).  Philosophy itself—traditionally the 
realm of otium—becomes a form of active work in the Ciceronian sense. 
The passions also have an important relationship with classically-inspired 
virtue ethics.  The passions are termed “perturbations of the mind” (B4r) by 
Thomas Wright in his Jacobean treatise on the subject.  They are physical and 
mental aspects that affect one’s temperaments, and the Edmund Spenser who 
features in Lodowick Bryskett’s A Discourse on Civill Life (1606) ponders the 
“lethargies, Phenzies, Melancholie, drunkennesse, and such other passions” 
that might afflict the soul (Mm4v).  These were seen to be governed, by 
reference back to Platonic and Aristotelian thought, by the rule of reason. 
Critics who have renewed interest in the moral role of the passions have 
identified the importance of Stoicism in early modern concepts of the rule of 
reason.  Unhae Park Langis’s recent study on the association of the virtues and 
passions in Shakespearean drama puts stress on the “reason-dominant ethics” 
that comes “through the writings of Cicero, Seneca, and others” and that 
characterised early moderns as “engrossed in the rational pursuit of human 
good and the guidance of passions towards this end” (2-3).  Langis also 
identifies the connection of the passions to early modern physiology, claiming 
that “the salient feature about Renaissance ethics is indeed the interactivity 
between body and soul” (4).  The early modern understanding that the passions 
were natural aspects of one’s constitution posits them as unavoidable objects in 
moral life.  For this reason, Wright claims that passions “inhabite the confines 
both of sense and reason” (B4v).  Although they are closer to the natural, 
physical realm of the senses, they can also influence man’s rule of reason and 
will, “inducing . . . to vice, and commonly withdrawing from vertue” as well as 
“prosecuting some good thing, or flying some ill thing” (B4v).  Bryskett too sees 
virtue “busied about these two passions of pleasure and displeasure” (Ee1r).  
Because they are generally seen as inevitable intrusions upon behaviour and 
thought, early modern thinkers often, in distinction from Stoic belief, encourage 
the harnessing of passions for the best possible ends.  Amy M. Schmitter 
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therefore notes “the practical approach most authors adopt to the topic” in the 
period (443).  This aspect of moral philosophy, it seems, conforms to the 
broader expectations of the genre. 
I must briefly outline here historians’ exploration of moral theology and its 
impact on the arguably more secular realm of early modern practical moral 
philosophy, because the interaction underpins the providential writing marked 
as “strange” and considered in Part Two.  Alasdair MacIntyre connects Christian 
morality with both New Testament texts and Stoicism, in its “interiorisation of the 
moral life with its stress on will and law” (After Virtue 157).  Medieval Christianity 
also introduces the concept of time to the virtues.  In Aristotelian thought, telos 
refers to the way life is lived and construed, a process in which “a variety of 
human excellences have to be achieved at the various relevant stages.” The 
lack of an end-point in the moral life means that the “notion of final redemption” 
is completely absent from Aristotle’s thought (After Virtue 163).  For medieval 
Christians, however,  
 
the narrative in which human life is embodied has a form in which 
the subject—which may be one or more individual persons, or, for 
example, the people of Israel, or the citizens of Rome—is set a 
task in the contemplation of which lies their peculiar appropriation 
of the human good; the way towards the completion of that task is 
barred by a variety of inward and outward evils.  The virtues are 
those qualities which enable the evils to be overcome, the task to 
be accomplished, the journey to be completed. (After Virtue 164) 
 
Consequently, “the virtues are . . . those qualities which enable men to survive 
evils on their historical journey” (After Virtue 164).  Medieval thinkers, most 
notably and influentially Aquinas, therefore update Aristotelian moral philosophy 
to fit a Christian framework. 
Michael Moriarty and Jennifer Herdt have focussed most specifically on 
those aspects of Augustinian and Thomist thought that remain pertinent to the 
early modern period’s understanding of classical virtue.  Both show that, while 
Augustine seeks to downplay the moral agency of humankind and is concerned 
with final salvation, Aquinas can still be considered broadly Aristotelian because 
he believes in the possibility of an autonomous moral realm for human beings.  
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Both writers, however, stress the essential role of God’s grace in in the moral 
life.  Ultimately, for both Moriarty and Herdt, tensions with classical concepts of 
virtue result in forms of secular moral thought in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Europe that are nonetheless constrained by the need for divine grace 
and by medieval criticism of classical pride. 
The Reformation brings its own issues with classical virtue, on top of 
those addressed by medieval theologians.  P. J. E. Kail’s explanation gives an 
indication of the tensions with Lutheran and especially Calvinist theology: 
“Virtue ethics opposes consequentialist and deontological approaches by 
putting at its centre, not consequences or dutiful action, but human flourishing 
and excellence” (363).  In contrast to a theology that insists on man’s ultimate 
lack of all true knowledge and his inability to attain the truth without God’s gift of 
grace, humanism and its interest in classical philosophy valued the possibility 
that man could become morally perfect, the essential aim of the vir virtutis.  
MacIntyre neatly summarises the moral philosophy of Martin Luther:  
 
The only true moral rules are the divine commandments and the 
divine commandments . . . have no further rationale or justification 
than that they are the injunctions of God.  To obey such moral 
rules cannot be to satisfy our desires; for our desires are part of 
the total corruption of our nature, and thus there is a natural 
antagonism between what we want and what God commands us 
to perform.  Human reason and will cannot do what God 
commands because they are enslaved by sin; we therefore have 
to act against reason and against our natural will.  But this we can 
do only by grace.  We are saved not by works, for none of our 
works are in any way good.  They are all the product of sinful 
desire. (A Short History 121-22) 
 
As with his theology, therefore, it is faith that inspires moral action and faith that 
matters—not the action performed.  Luther’s deeply pessimistic view about 
man’s autonomy and ability to act virtuously aligns him with Augustinian thought 
and distances him from the optimism of Aquinas.  Calvin, likewise, echoes the 
importance of faith and treats virtue as an instrument of God in the secular 
world.  Moriarty offers an eloquent description of Calvin’s Augustinianism: “In 
 33 
order to preserve human society, God restrains the perversity of human nature, 
not by grace but by the workings of natural passions.  Shame, fear of the law, 
the belief that honesty is the best policy keep many people from abandoning 
themselves to evil.  In other cases, the display of virtue is, so to speak, 
charismatic, as if designed to overawe the common herd into obedience” (96).  
Although they have differences, it is sufficient to note that both Luther’s and 
Calvin’s moral theology concerns the maintenance of human order. 
Paul Cefalu has therefore explored the conflict that results from such an 
anti-Aristotelian approach and examined “why Reformed theology exclaimed so 
loudly against classical virtue theory” (4) in relation to English Protestant writers.  
He identifies a spiritual realm and an earthly realm with moral forms in both: 
“social or civic ethics in the secular kingdom, and an ethics of neighbour-regard 
and forbearance in the Christian kingdom” (6).  Put simply, what Cefalu and 
studies by Shuger and C. F. Allison ultimately indicate is that English divines, 
most notably Richard Hooker, Lancelot Andrewes, Joseph Hall, and John 
Donne, possess complex and contradictory attitudes but share a Protestant 
scepticism about human moral perfection, a tension captured in “strange” 
expressions of morality that occupy a ground between the secular and the 
sacred. 
Arguably the most significant exposition of Anglican moral theology in the 
period is Richard Hooker’s The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593, reprinted 
1604), which is greatly preoccupied with issues of natural and moral law.   
Hooker displays a complex engagement with virtue theory.  On the one hand, 
Shuger has noted, his “spiritual psychology consistently makes desire rather 
than reason the epistemic ground” (44).  It is desire for God that gives us true 
insight.  Yet desire itself offers no security, because “one can feel very strongly 
and still be wrong” (44).  The Laws echo the Augustinian suspicion of both 
human emotion and knowledge, while also suggesting that “natural 
understanding” can show man how “to be beseeming or unbeseeming, vertuous 
or vitious, good or euill” (Hooker G1r).  Anglican moral theology therefore 
moves frequently into the territory of natural law, a subject debated fiercely in 
the early modern period (as in the medieval).  Considerations of natural law 
(and Hooker in particular) by R.S. White and Cefalu show that writers often 
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mediate and adapt classical virtue and medieval syncretism, borrowing and 
amending older understandings to fit post-Reformation purposes.2   
Overall, then, it is clear that early modern English writers use virtue 
theory in various ways.  The virtues and the concept of “virtue” are prominent 
parts of moral philosophy and other forms of moral thought in early modern 
England, but they are fraught with complex and contradictory meanings.  While 
there are elements of traditional classical use, treating the virtues as habits that 
need to be acquired, they are also Christianised.  Kail notes that “the presence 
or absence of dispositions of character” in virtue theory “play[s] an important 
role in what are explicitly Christian ethics” (364).  There are therefore slippages 
between the practice of earthly conduct and the way the received grace of God 
displays itself in behaviour.   
In this light, Blair Worden’s study of the impact of virtue on literary figures 
in late sixteenth-century England provides a concise and helpful conception of 
the period’s understanding of the term—particularly with reference to that 
famous defender of literature’s moral force, Sir Philip Sidney.  Worden explains 
that 
 
Virtue had a larger meaning for the Elizabethans than it has for us.  
It meant not only conformity to moral principles but the possession 
of divinely endowed gifts and powers.  Those properties, if 
cultivated by education, would carry the authority of example and 
could change the world. (23) 
 
His explanation brings to the fore the synthesis of classical and religious 
moralities as it appears in Elizabethan (and into Jacobean) England.  Indeed, 
Worden notes that Sidney’s conception is largely classical more than it is 
Christian, but God nevertheless plays a role in the “giving” of virtue, even if it is 
a God who “differs from his medieval predecessor in the demands he makes on 
individual action and decision-making and on something we can loosely call 
citizenship” and also “differs from his Puritan successor in the scope he gives 
to, and the demands he makes of, freedom of will” (23).  Worden neatly 
                                     
2 See Cefalu’s suggestion that Hooker integrates “not a system of character-based virtue 
theory” but “simply the language and rhetoric of virtue theory within his rule-centred system of 
positive law” (89). 
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summarises the strands of moral thought that have preoccupied historians and 
critics of the period, particularly with the difficulties of Christianising virtue. 
With reference to English writers, critics have also begun to look at the 
process of writing moral treatises and the desired end of advice literature.  Greg 
Walker’s Writing Under Tyranny (2005) identifies, in particular, Thomas Elyot’s 
The boke called the governour (1531), one of the period’s earliest, most 
famous, and most influential works of moral philosophy in English.  Walker 
identifies it as a response to “the political situation of the moment,” claiming that 
moral treatises and manuals for princes “sought to do vicariously” what the 
writer “could not do in person and ex officio: counsel the King on his personal 
conduct and the public policy of the realm” (128).  Alongside the political and 
moral efficacy of advice manuals, Robert Matz has also addressed the delight 
that literacy can provide and its importance in instilling moral precepts.  Looking 
at Elyot and his successors in moral philosophy as well as the popular courtier 
manual tradition, Matz claims these writers stress “that humanist literacy will 
provide more enjoyment than the traditional pleasure of the elite, as well as 
more profit” (21).  The genre of moral advice itself, therefore, becomes 
something both enjoyable and important.  Matz also echoes Walker in 
suggesting that Elyot (and his ilk) can rewrite “his exclusion from counsel and 
his office as assistant clerk by imagining a kingdom in which eloquence reigns” 
(38).  Studies including Matz’s Defending Literature (2000), Walker’s Writing 
under Tyranny, and Richard Halpern’s The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation 
(1991) have argued that the bureaucratic middle class, excluded from the truly 
power-wielding elite, sought to make humanist learning into its own form of 
power.  They thereby transform moral philosophy into a form of moral agency.  
Writing advice itself, then, is an office, a Ciceronian moral duty that contributes 
to the active life of the commonwealth. 
The notion of office is connected to the wider political and vocational 
importance of virtue ethics and of morality in general, which further emphasises 
the practical focus of the moral life.  Condren, as part of his critique of new 
historicist “self-hood,” has sought to establish a more accurate understanding of 
the period’s morality.  His study accommodates what might now be considered 
the “moral schizophrenia” of early modern conceptions of moral duty (Argument 
and Authority 139-40).  Indeed, in Argument and Authority (2006), Condren 
argues that an “ethics of office” is at work in the period; morality is not to be 
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understood as the actions of self-governing individuals, but rather as the 
requirements necessitated by different offices and the personae they generate.  
His focus on Shakespeare’s plays in “Understanding Shakespeare’s Perfect 
Prince” (2009) links this focus to literary concerns, arguing that “public” and 
“private” in the period concern actions and responsibilities rather than the more 
modern idea of separate spheres.  Condren’s important work insists that in the 
early modern period, spiritual, political, military, family, and all other elements 
can be understood as inhabiting “offices” with their own appropriate actions and 
moral responsibilities—responsibilities that are consequently both practical and 
pragmatic.  
Steve Hindle’s The State and Social Change (2000) and Michael 
Braddick’s State Formation in Early Modern England (2000) have also touched 
on the state’s role in the moral life, suggesting the explicitly practical sides of 
moral thought.  Both focus chiefly on the reformation of manners in the 
Jacobean period and the influence of court and local forms of justice and 
regulation.  Hindle explores the effect of state policing of morality, noting that 
“the late Elizabethan and early Stuart period was characterised by the 
widespread promotion of ideals of moral reformation, with attacks on 
drunkenness, fornication, swearing, blasphemy, gaming, dancing, revelling and 
profaning the Sabbath.”  The influence of the state resulted, Hindle explains, in 
“practical consequences” that include “the whipping of pregnant brides, the 
shaming of common drunkards, the fining of swearers and the sawing down of 
maypoles” (176).  Such an approach associates the late Elizabethan and 
particularly the Jacobean literary interest in moral codes and advice with 
national government.  It also allows us to associate the increase of images, 
tables, pamphlets, and treatises from the printing presses—a subject introduced 
below and explored in depth in Chapter Two—with political interference in 
ethics and crucially with the pragmatic and practical possibilities of moral 
philosophy. 
Recent scholarly interest in early modern “moralities” indicates, then, the 
chief characteristics of the period’s moral philosophical thought, which point 
towards a practical interest in duty, activity, and expression, alongside tension 
with Stoical introspection and Christian doctrine.  Work since the 1970s has 
been concerned with identifying the tensions between Christian and pagan 
ideas—pioneered by Isabel Rivers’s seminal study Classical and Christian 
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Ideas—but in recent years a more explicit focus on the reception of the virtues 
and its impact on human agency with regard to early modern Europe has taken 
the subject further.  Likewise, post-Reformation English approaches have also 
received discussions that note their complex and contradictory nature and 
emphasise the impact of Protestant moral theology on practical action and the 
secular world.  That secular world, too, has in the last ten to fifteen years been 
subject to a number of studies of its own, identifying the importance of offices, 
political intervention, and state policing in the moral life. 
Such a variation in approaches to the state of “early modern morality” 
indicate the breadth of its scope and the absence of a coherent “world picture.”  
Yet these studies also share a concern for the specifics of moral thought, 
reviving interest in texts of moral instruction and addressing particular aspects 
with full appreciation for their individual, political, and religious context.  Building 
on this rich critical background, this thesis treats the specific manifestations of 
“practicality” stemming from the period’s moral thought—chiefly, its coordination 
with ideas of “materialisation” that result from the crise pyrhonnienne (or more 
broadly the “crisis” of doubt stemming from Pyrrhonian scepticism), Elizabethan 
rhetorical style, New World exploration, and science and technology.  The next 
section of this chapter, accordingly, outlines the moral treatises of the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  How do they interpret and convey 
the classical emphasis on practical use? 
 
*** 
 
While studies have shown that moral philosophical and advice treatises 
in early modern England are engaged with practicality, they also hinge, in 
Aristotelian fashion, on practice.  Robert Johnson explains in 1601 how nobility 
often confers virtue upon successive generations, but only because “some 
families retaine proper customs naturalized in them” (B8v).  His sentiments 
echo Elyot’s Governour (1531), The Institucion of a Gentleman (1555), 
Baldassare Castiglione’s Courtier (translated by Thomas Hoby in 1561), and 
Roger Ascham’s Scholemaster (1570), to list only the most prominent.  These 
forms of manuals and essays, which have their successors in texts in the vein 
of Bryskett’s Discourse (1606) and The office of Christian parents (1616), are 
invested in emphasising the moral duties of stately or noble offices—
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Castiglione, for example, describes high birth as a lamp that shines upon good 
works and “enflameth and prouoketh vnto vertue” (C2v)—while insisting that 
virtue cannot be found in the blood.  In speaking directly to a reader’s monetary 
means and distancing it from that reader’s moral means, these writers instil their 
texts with non-commercial value.3  The Institucion most forcefully captures the 
distance of economic and social status from the power of virtue:  
 
He which bequetheth to his son his maner place, cannot therwith 
bequeth vertue unto him, for lands com to men by gifte, purches, 
inheritaunce, or such lyke meane, but vertue cannot so do: for 
nether may it with mony be bought, geuen to others nor claymed 
by succession. (C7v) 
 
Matz and Walker have explored the status of writers, notably Elyot, who are 
excluded from direct counsel to the Crown, and identify his moral writings as a 
vicarious form of influence.  Other texts in the tradition, too, follow suit.  
Gesturing to a burgeoning class of non-elites with high ambitions, the cultivation 
of humanist virtue is posited in these manuals as a democratic and ultimately 
more important form of honour than formal office or nobility. 
If virtue cannot be bought, given, or claimed, it can only be practised and 
perfected by habituation.  Advice books and moral treatises offer ways to that 
practice in their very form.  Indeed, authors are keen to dispel the idea that they 
as writers possess all or any of these virtues, yet the texts themselves are 
effectively forms of moral perfection: they contain multitudinous histories and 
examples of virtues, metaphysical and practical explanations, and prompts to 
action; they inhabit the culture of letters, noble society, and exhibit pleasant 
conversation (especially the dialogue form of books in the style of The Courtier 
and Bryskett’s Discourse); they merge Christian and classical virtue; they 
contain the best advice.  Thomas Hoby’s preface to his translation of The 
Courtier explains the function of these texts; they should offer 
 
To yonge Gentlemen, an encouraging to garnishe their minde with 
morall vertues, and their bodye with comely exercises, and both 
                                     
3 I return to this subject in the following chapter, addressing the materialising of humanist 
learning. 
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the one and the other with honest qualities to attaine unto their 
noble ende: To Ladyes and Gentlewomen, a mirrour to decke and 
trimme themselues with virtuous condicions, comely behauiours 
and honest entertainment toward al men: And to them all in 
general, a storehouse of most necessary implements for the 
conuersacion, use, and training up of mans life with Courtly 
demeaners. (A3v) 
 
In this sense, these authors have produced books that are separate from the 
writer’s hand but nonetheless greater than a “maner place”—and although 
Bryskett can modestly claim to have read “so little . . . in Morall Philosophy” 
(D3v), the text of the Discourse, as with other advice manuals, quietly 
establishes itself as greater and of more active importance than any inherited 
land.  The texts themselves are the perfect courtier and the perfect counsellor. 
Moral writing on these subjects contains a variation of forms.  Yet 
whereas essays and discourses allow a degree of idiosyncrasy in their 
arrangement, moral treatises and courtier manuals share a similar structure.  
(Proto-)essay collections—Leonard Wright’s A Display of Duty (1592), Bacon’s 
Essaies (1597-98), and Robert Johnson’s Essaies, or rather imperfect offers 
(1601)—take a scattergun approach to considerations of the moral life and 
practical advice related to it, an approach most likely rooted in the explorative 
nature of the essay form.  Both William Perkins and Joseph Hall, too, address 
notions of conscience and duty, yet their approach is closer to a sermon than a 
treatise or manual, with Perkins’s Discourse of Conscience (1596) nearing an 
almost scientific, anatomical investigation of the moral life and of mankind’s 
related physical and spiritual attributes.  On the other hand, moral treatises, 
educational manuals, and courtier handbooks tend to start off by introducing 
their subject—usually with withering remarks about the contemporary state of 
morality and nobility in England (or Europe)—before moving onto an outline of 
the issues at stake.   
William Baldwin’s much-reprinted A Treatise of Morall Philosophie (1547; 
expanded in 1610 by Thomas Palfreyman) is a popular and archetypal 
example.  It begins with an outline of the Greek and Roman history of the 
subject, and describes the three parts of philosophy: “Phisick, Ethnicke, and 
Dialecticke,” claiming ethical, which is moral philosophy, to be concerned with 
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“life and manners” (B2r).  Baldwin then goes on to discuss soul and body, 
governance and policy, virtues and vices in detail;4 he dedicates one chapter to 
“women” and offers a collection of “precepts & Prouerbs of moral philosophy” 
(Y4r).  The whole treatise is essentially a patchwork of quotation from classical 
(and occasionally contemporary) thinkers.  Elyot’s Governour has a similar 
structure, aided by the presence of a contents page, from the first edition 
onwards, which separates each element into clear, definable topics.  Elyot also 
puts greater emphasis on examples, drafting historical figures and noble men to 
flesh out each philosophical consideration.  His important work provides a 
model for much that comes after, and The Institucion of a gentleman follows 
Governour very closely in its debate over pastimes, as well as in its overall 
structure.   
Educational manuals, which likewise deal in moral philosophy, also use 
that structure.  Elyot (whose Governour spans these similar genres more 
comprehensively than most), Ascham in Scholemaster (1570), and Richard 
Mulcaster in his Positions (1581) all treat the state of education before 
addressing the practicalities of teaching: when to teach certain subjects, how to 
teach them, how parents should bring up a child.  An explanation of the forms of 
rhetoric and grammar is followed by praise of physical exercise, “the soule and 
bodie being coparteners in good and ill, in sweete and sowre, in mirth and 
mourning, & hauing generally a common sympathie, & a mutuall feeling in all 
passions” (Mulcaster D4v), going on to discuss more generally the place of 
education and its role.  These texts also talk to each other; both Elyot and 
Ascham, for example, address the importance of Castiglione’s Courtier, which 
amongst other things “doth trimlie teache” how best to “ioyne learning with 
cumlie exercises” (Ascham G4v).  The Courtier provides a slightly different 
format to Elyot and Baldwin, being framed as a discussion.  Such intertextual 
conversations form a network or canon of moral philosophical advice for 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English humanists, at once participating in 
a culture of letters and establishing itself as an important self-defined genre: 
after all, Annibal explains to Guazzo in Stephano Guazzo’s The ciuile 
                                     
4 Elyot’s and Baldwin’s treatment of the virtues is sprawling, gesturing towards cardinal virtues 
but actually encompassing a large range.  There is little distinction between Christian and 
classical virtues and the structure shows that one virtue begets another, one vice another, and 
so on, suggesting the vast interrelatedness of “virtue” and all forms of “virtues” for moral writers. 
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conversation of M Steeuen Guazzo, “conuersation is the beginning and end of 
knowledge” (trans. George Pettie 1581, D6r). 
All these forms owe an important debt to Desiderius Erasmus’s The 
Education of a Christian Prince (1516), as well as to Machiavelli’s Prince 
(1513).  Both are early mirror-for-magistrates texts that deal, in different ways, 
with the most expedient and (importantly and) virtuous methods of ruling.  The 
structure of Erasmus’s Education in particular—moving through upbringing and 
onto the practical aspects of governance through marriages, treaties, and 
wars—and his explicit Aristotelian references and aphoristic style undoubtedly 
influence later works.  Alongside his treatise on moral philosophy, for example, 
Baldwin also wrote part of the thrice-reprinted Myrrour for Magistrates (1559).  
The connection between these genres further associates moral philosophy with 
humanist exemplars, applicable advice, and practical action. 
Education forms the basis of the early modern moral impetus.  The new 
humanist curriculum, on its journey to replacing the medieval scholastic 
curriculum, is inextricably associated with moral philosophy.  Most moral 
treatises are forms of as well as marketing tools for humanist education; in 
Elyot’s words, “We instructe our children in liberal sciences, not because those 
sciences maie geue any vertue, because they prepare the mind, and make it 
apt to receiue vertue” (Cc2r-v).  Mulcaster, Ascham, and Elyot therefore 
promote the study of the liberal sciences as an important aspect of the new 
humanist curriculum—one that comprises grammar, logic, and dialectic (the 
trivium) and geometry, astronomy, music, and mathematics (the quadrivium).  
These educators seek to map out a course of learning from infancy to 
University studies into early adulthood, encouraging hard study, curtailed 
liberty, and a course of languages and texts.  In the sixteenth century, Roger 
Ascham proudly states, “the scholemaster is used, both for Praeceptor in 
learning, and paedagogus in maners” (E4v); alongside the teaching of practical 
skills and capacities that are required for offices of work and service, education 
taught mores: manners, or morality. 
An important element of this humanist education is also an important 
element of moral treatises: histories.  All of these works draw on exemplars 
from the past as a means of ethical illumination.  In his Defence of Poesie 
(c.1580, printed 1595), Sidney sees the historian as a rival to the moralist, 
claiming that 
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[t]he Historian scarsely giues leisure to the Moralist to say so 
much, but that he . . . denieth in a great chafe, that any man for 
teaching of vertue, and vertues actions, is comparable to him. 
(C4r-v) 
 
Sidney contrasts and separates the historian from the moralist, and indeed the 
opening clause of his portrait appears as the first example in the OED for 
“moralist,” where it is defined as “a teacher or student of morals; a writer on 
morals; a moral philosopher” (1.a.).  The dependence of moral philosophy on 
history, however, suggests that such a nice distinction is artificial.  Sidney is 
strictly referring to Platonic metaphysics, and he points out that such a 
philosopher “teacheth vertue by certaine abstract considerations,” unlike the 
historian, who can claim, “I onely bid you follow the footing of them that haue 
gone before you” (C4v).  Yet it is precisely the anti-abstract, practical application 
of virtue that moral treatises employ by way of historical examples and figures. 
Almost every virtue commended or vice condemned in Elyot’s Governour 
is supported by an historical anecdote.  Baldwin’s Treatise is more sparing, but 
nonetheless its reworking of sayings and statements from both philosophers 
and statesmen of the classical world proves a kind of history.  The Institucion 
most eloquently describes the function of histories, a description that gestures 
to the reason for their practical employment in moral treatises: 
 
. . . in histories are to be learned manye morall lessons to the 
vnderstanding of thinges paste, the ordre of thinges to come, and 
proffite of thinges presente.  By them we learn to know how 
princes and rulers of this worlde haue passed their liues, as sum 
geuen to knowledge of sciences, sum to see iustice truelye 
executed, other geuen to pitie, others to peace, quyetnes, and 
care of the commune wealthe. (K5r) 
 
Such learning affords the reader “a delicious taste of good thinges belonging to 
the knowledge of noble men, through pleasure wherof by readyng of histories 
they may increase there wisdomes” (K5v).  It is for this reason, then, that Elyot 
employs historical parallels and anecdotes to back up his assertions; not only, 
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he claims, are they more “plesant to the reader” (U5v), but they are associated 
with “experience” itself.  For Elyot, history is part of the very essence of moral 
learning.  It is 
 
wonderfull profitable, whiche leaueth nothing hyd from mannes 
knowlage, that vnto hym maie be eyther pleasaunt or necessary.  
For it not only reporteth the gestes or actes of princes or 
captaines, theyr counsayles and attemptates, enterprises, 
affayres, maners in liuing good and bad, descripcions of regions 
and citees with theyr inhabitants: but also it bryngeth to our 
knowlage, the forms of sundry publyke weales, with theyr 
augmentacions and decaies, and occasion therof. (Cc4r-v) 
 
The use of histories brings the “abstraction” of moral philosophy into the vita 
activa, mapping out precepts onto real life—evidenced by the Institucion’s 
reference to the “commune wealthe” and Elyot’s to “sundry publyke weales.”  It 
is exactly this use of history that appears in Myrrour for Magistrates, which lists 
the lives and actions of kings and prominent persons throughout history to 
provide pithy, sententious moral messages, delivered through poetry.  History, 
therefore, is not only an essential part of education that instils virtue; it also 
forms part of moral philosophy—not just in treatises’ urgent gestures towards 
histories but, so often, in its inclusion of them in their teaching.  The genre of 
moral-philosophy-cum-history proves interesting with regard to drama and 
especially to generically-confused (or confusing) historical- and mythological-
minded plays along the lines of Heywood’s Ages. 
The growing emphasis on the quadrivium5 meant a growth in the 
emphasis on other aspects of learning that might have a role in moral 
education.  Music, therefore, is given considerable treatment in all of these 
treatises, and so follows painting and dancing.  Educationalists treat them as 
part of exercise and pastimes.  Both dancing and music get due treatment in 
Castiglione’s Courtier because of their importance to court life.  They are 
praised as part of good grace, along with other forms of art, but later in the 
Courtier music is said to “make swete the minds of men, but also many times 
                                     
5 See Benjamin Woolley (12). 
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wilde beastes tame . . .” (I2v), associating it with virtuous dispositions and 
granting it some spiritual power.6 
In covering a range of aspects but characterising early modern humanist 
thought, moral treatises and advice manuals therefore exemplify the practical 
emphasis of the period’s ethics.  They present themselves as copious windows 
onto history and ancient thought, while being themselves the perfected 
counsellor, the perfected courtier, the perfected teacher—Elyot’s work is 
therefore duly titled The boke named the governour.  Not only do these forms of 
writing all reject inherited virtue and encourage the learning and practice of 
good manners—exercises in action—they also claim activity itself to be of moral 
significance.  Pastimes are accorded philosophical power, but only insofar as 
they can be found useful.  The emphasis on practicality and its relationship with 
the physical world is considered in depth in the following chapter. 
First, however, it is necessary to outline another aspect of early modern 
moral teaching.  Images are an essential aspect of the wider consumption of 
moral thought.  They convert the more verbal and philosophical (even as they 
are practical) treatises into a wide array of visual forms, presenting advice and 
admonition directly to the period’s most “moral” sense.   
The “moral image” 
“Reading good Bookes of Morality, is a little Flat, and Dead,” claims 
Francis Bacon in “Of Friendship” (1625) (The essayes or counsels X4r).  There 
is much that is surprising and entertaining in those moral treatises just 
discussed, but if one considers the formulaic nature of the bulk of their advice, 
then it is difficult to quarrel with Bacon.  He is making an argument about the 
counsel and admonition of a friend, but there are other forms of “morality” that 
might be considered more lively.  This section concentrates on the “moral 
image”—the visualisation of moral precepts and advice in a wide variety of 
images. By converting advice and teaching into visual form, moral images bring 
those aspects of early modern “morality” that might seem “flat and dead” to life. 
 
“As the sight among the rest of the senses is most sharpe, and pierceth 
furthest, so is it proued most sure, and least deceiued,” declares Henry 
                                     
6 In the hybrid moralities of the Elizabethan period, therefore, a character “daunceth as evil 
favoured as may be devised” (Fulwell, 1568 [C1v]) in order to indicate his association with vice. 
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Peacham in the 1593 revision to his rhetorical “style-guide,” The Garden of 
Eloquence.  It “therefore is very nigh to the mind in the affinitie of nature, so 
farre foorth as an externall sense of the bodie may be compared to an internall 
vertue of the mind” (C2v).  Sight was considered the most spiritual of senses 
and, as Peacham’s sub-description of “metaphor” indicates, it was therefore the 
closest, too, to “vertue” and its conceptions. 
Sight in fact becomes so confident and self-assured in its place as the 
primary sense that in 1607 it exerts an audacious self-confidence, provoking a 
contest amongst its jealous rivals; it appears as a character in the play Lingua, 
or the combat of the tongue and the five senses (1607), where it declares its 
noble stature: “I haue always beene accounted best” (C3r).  If Lingua’s Visus 
provides a popular conception of early modern sight, he also intimates its noble 
and enriching function: 
 
I hourely . . . conuay 
Matters of wisdome by experience bred: 
. . . Deepe contemplation, that attires the soule, 
In gorgeous roabes of flowering literature: 
(G3r) 
 
Sight argues that both things “corporeall” (G2v) and the attire of the “soule” are 
under the eye’s remit.  Vision is the early modern gateway to the physical world, 
yet the eyes are also esteemed as the organs of spirituality, connecting the 
earthly realm with higher truths, “that they may further of discerne” (Helkiah 
Crooke Zz4r). 
Such confidence comes from almost a century of moral information and 
advice proceeding from the printing presses.  Printers were busy throughout the 
early modern period producing didactic woodcuts.  The abstract incarnation of 
didactic teaching is also seen in the illustration of religious texts, such as John 
Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, or “Book of Martyrs” (1563; 1570; 1576; 1583), or 
in the imposing pictorial paratexts of Richard Day’s Book of Christian Prayer 
(1578). 
Among the most well-covered literary-visual aspects of early modern 
culture is the emblem, proliferating in England from the 1580s.  Emblems are 
visual and verbal allegories of moral truths (initially the Italian and continental 
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editions did not include pictures, but in all the later English editions they did).  
They are a fruitful source of metaphorical imagery and moral representation, as 
well as of violent and sometimes dissonant composition.  Following Rosemary 
Freeman’s seminal work on English Emblem Books (1948), there have been a 
number of studies on the English and the European craze for the emblem; 
Michael Bath offers a more up-to-date overview of the English emblem in 
Speaking Pictures (1994), touching on its salient features and acknowledging 
its influences and its impact.  Peter M. Daly’s work covers the literary emblem 
and the theory of the emblem in the period.  John Manning, likewise, links 
emblems to other visual traditions and his co-edited collection with Daly, 
Aspects of Renaissance and Baroque Symbol Theory 1500-1700 (1999), 
contains a number of interesting readings of the foreign and complex world of 
early modern pictorial symbols and puzzles. 
Recent history and criticism has started to focus on medical and moral 
concepts of vision.  Stuart Clark’s Vanities of the Eye (2007) addresses the 
complexities and uncertainties that surround sight in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Europe.  Clark’s study uses George Hakewill’s “demolition 
of Renaissance optimism about vision” (25), The vanitie of the eie (1608), as a 
lens, for want of a better word, through which to view developments in 
European thought.  Clark’s broad and ambitious study accordingly covers 
witchcraft, the Reformation approach to images and iconoclasm, theories of 
imagination, optical illusions, scepticism, and dreams.  He is concerned with the 
notion that “eyes were evidently the most spiritual and least material of the 
senses” (10).  Such a focus on the spiritual aspects of vision naturally leads to a 
sort of myopia, and, despite the vast reach of Clark’s study, it does not give full 
appreciation to the more physical aspects of sight.  In discussing scepticism, for 
example, there is an acknowledgement that “‘Ethical’ instability had spawned 
perceptual instability, and vice versa” (285), but, other than a discussion of 
fideism, little is noted about a more positive relation between the two 
phenomena.  Similarly, Clark sensitively discusses sceptical philosophy, 
contemporary tracts, and religious texts, but neglects the practical aspects of 
early modern moral advice discussed above, and so Vanities of the Eye is 
primarily concerned with abstract developments, losing sight, perhaps, of how 
humanist moral philosophy might relate in practice to changing concepts of 
vision. 
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Clark’s Vanities includes a chapter on Macbeth, but the last ten years 
have also seen critics focus more specifically on literary explorations of vision 
and early modern understandings of the roles and functions of sight.  The 
interest is part of a broader concentration on the senses.  Although vision has 
traditionally been prioritised by historians, critics have begun to think about sight 
as part of early modern medical thought more broadly, and Sergei Lobanov-
Rostovsky’s “Taming the Basilisk” in David Hillman and Carla Mazzio’s 
collection The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe 
(1997) charts the development of medical theories of sight.  Lobanov-Rostovsky 
posits a fascinating tension, emerging from the sixteenth century, whereby “the 
practice of ocular anatomy made the eye visible to itself, intensifying the 
traditional conflict between the eye’s material nature and its status as metaphor” 
(197).  Ultimately, though, he concludes that “the eye vanishes beneath the 
knife, rendering up its physiology only as evidence of its essential non-
materiality.  It remains an image of the soul, ruling over the visible world by the 
power of its gaze” (198).  Enforcing a hierarchy of spiritual over physical 
maintains an anachronistic opposition between material and moral sight, and 
again results in a concentration on abstract considerations over practical ethical 
action. 
Knowing Shakespeare: Senses, Embodiment and Cognition (2010), 
edited by Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman, goes some way towards 
remedying the division between material and spiritual notions of vision, with a 
number of provocative essays that consider their interrelation in Shakespeare’s 
plays.  Essays in the collection—particularly Sean H. McDowell’s on Macbeth 
and Bruce R. Smith’s on Cymbeline—begin to address particular aspects of 
both natural and moral philosophy and draw them into early modern psychology 
and physiology.  McDowell explores how “strong passions functioned both as 
transformers of reality, inflecting the sense of events, and as essential tools for 
personal agency” (38).  He notes that medical theories were not deterministic, 
gesturing to the importance of conduct literature in mediating between senses 
and action.  Smith’s essay examines the tensions between active and passive 
sight, and he claims that sight can be considered a form of haptic physicality, 
touching both viewer and viewed.  This notion opens up the possibilities for 
further readings of early modern drama, in which vision is seen as closely 
related to tangible bodies and objects—something this thesis builds upon. 
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There have also been a number of studies on the symbolic and 
functional properties of printed pictures from scholars including John N. King 
and Margaret Aston.  Further, a revival of interest in paratexts has led to 
conferences and a publication on the topic—Renaissance Paratexts (edited by 
Helen Smith and Louise Wilson, 2011)—inviting readings of non-textual and 
non-discursive aspects of printed books, and Thomas L. Berger and Sonia 
Massai have edited a collection on Paratexts in English Printed Drama to 1642 
(2014).  Juliet Fleming, who also has an essay in that collection, has explored a 
similar aspect of early modern print culture in Graffiti and the Writing Arts of 
Early Modern England (2001).  Granting significance to pictorial aspects of a 
text encourages attention to be paid to the wider influence of images and visual 
features on a text’s or object’s meaning.  Further approaches to the early 
modern image are treated in detail in the following chapter, but it is worth noting 
that an increase in attention to the early modern images has emphasised their 
diverse functions. 
 
 ***  
 
Both religious and emblematic texts encouraged the reading of visual 
messages as “general conceiptes . . . of moral matters” (N.W.’s Preface to 
Daniel’s The worthy tract of Paulus Iovius *7 recto).  Emblems address 
themselves to both the “inner” and outer eye, and the “mind’s eye” is therefore a 
familiar trope in the genre; George Wither defines it as a figure “by some . . . 
us’d, / When in an Emblem, they would signifie / A Minde, which on Celestiall 
Matters mus’d” (G2r).  The trope appears in many forms in emblem books: as a 
floating hieroglyph in Henry Peacham’s Minerva Britanna (1612) and embedded 
in the hand in Andrea Alciato’s much reprinted and translated Emblemata 
(1531).  In Alciato’s “sobriè viuendum,” the eye represents the inner mind that 
“credens id quod uidet” or ‘believes all it sees.’  Educating the organ, however, 
the emblem warns us against credulity and insobriety, stating that “Hi nerui, 
humanae membraque mentis erunt,” ‘these will be the nerves and limbs of the 
human mind’: 
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Fig. 1.  Sobriè viuendum:& non temerè credendum from Andrea Alciato’s 
Emblemata (Lyons, 1550; B3v). 
 
The image turns the physical organ of the eye into its moral incarnation in the 
mind.  Such emblems therefore speak directly to the moral importance of sight.  
N.W.’s preface to The Worthy Tract of Paulus Iovius, a tract on emblems and 
impresas translated by Samuel Daniel in 1585, suggests that “we loue the 
sence of seeing, for that by it we are taught and made to learne more then by 
any other of our senses” (A1v); the ultimate aim of moral iconography was to 
teach and by teaching to place moral messages in the memory.  Indeed, 
iconographical depictions are loosely connected with the period’s interest in 
memory arts—which Frances Yates has explored at length (The Art of Memory 
1966)—and so “there is often a relationship between emblem books and the ars 
memorativa,” as Michael Bath reminds us (34).  These picturae are designed to 
turn the mind inward in order to encourage interpretation and reflection 
alongside the internalisation of moral messages. 
Emblems often use a combination of classical and Christian ethics 
similar to the conjunctions employed by moral philosophers and conduct writers.  
The humanist bent of the genre leans towards a classicisation of virtue, 
exercised throughout Peacham’s Minerua Britanna, which places classical 
figures and virtues opposite religious images that depict Lucifer and discuss 
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obedience to God.  Moral images therefore unsurprisingly parallel the broad 
treatment of the virtues and vices by, for instance, Baldwin and Elyot, who 
similarly conflate Christian teaching with classical ethics and blur a distinction 
between cardinal and mental/intellectual virtues. Day’s A booke of Christian 
prayers surrounds its text with both illustrations from the Bible, memento mori 
images that include a coffin serving as a printer’s block at the top of the page, 
and classically inspired devices running the inside margins of the page: 
pilasters, vases, and vines propped up by figures in the unmistakable 
appearance of pagan Goddesses.  Stephen Batman’s A christall glasse of 
christian reformation (1569) likewise offers classically-inspired figures alongside 
floating, flaming devils.  Batman presents emblems of virtue and vice 
elaborated in terms of both the classical virtues and of Christianity in the 
accompanying “significations”—a visual and symbolic hodgepodge typical of 
printed moral images. 
Indeed, what is an apparent mixture of visual symbolism matches the 
moral image’s philosophical underpinnings in the Christianising of neo-Stoic 
philosophy.  Skinner notes how the “neo-stoic political philosophy” popular in 
sixteenth-century Europe had a common “point of departure” that was “supplied 
by the concept of Fortune, which they personify in typically humanist style as an 
inscrutable goddess, capricious and potentially overwhelming in power” 
(Foundations 278).  Images of emblems were able to “personify” abstractions 
visually, offering to fulfil in image what Peacham had described in The Garden 
of Eloquence as metaphor’s most morally efficacious form: presenting to the 
sight.  Emblems were therefore useful and very popular tools in synthesising 
Christian and classical moral philosophy.  The English scholar Gabriel Harvey 
wrote approvingly at the end of the 1570s that, all across Cambridge, students 
were neglecting Aristotle for Alciato, Aquinas for Jovius (78-79, c.1578-80).  
Emblems appealed to young University students who seem, according to 
Harvey, to enjoy the new humanist writings more than classical authors.  The 
fact that Wither’s collection contains a “playing-page” split up into books and 
sections and to be played like a board game or “Lotterie” suggests that, like 
literature in the early modern conception (see Matz), emblems served to teach 
and to delight.  It also underscores the practical aspect of these moral images: 
they are to be used in both metaphorical and literal ways.  
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Judging by Harvey’s letter, emblems were already very popular in 
England by the end of the 1570s.  Part of Harvey’s praise is for the new fashion 
of humanist learning, and he even lists Guazzo and Castiglione in his list of the 
“owtlandishe braveryes” (79) that have mercifully displaced the big names of 
scholastic learning.  Harvey sees both emblems and courtier manuals as part of 
students’ desire to be “more then schollers” and be “rather active then 
contemplative philosophers” (78).  In Harvey’s conception, emblems represent 
particularly well early modern moral philosophy’s chief aim of practical action. 
Emblems also include a particularly calculated iconography, meaning 
that engaging and understanding their meanings is inevitably active.  Manning 
has eloquently said of the emblem and its hieroglyph forebears that 
 
since the image does not make sense in naturalistic, mimetic 
terms, if it is not nonsense, it must make sense in some other 
way.  The image becomes a puzzle, which teases its putative 
observer into speculation as to its metaphysical meaning.  It would 
seem that such iconographic encoding was deliberately anti-
mimetic, or, to put it another way, poetic, moralistic, or doctrinal 
motives radically moderated mimesis. (xv) 
 
When an emblem, as always in England, is combined with an image, it is often 
done so in a calculated way in the sense of a puzzle. It is a conception, critics 
have noted, that can be associated with collections’ frequent reversion to 
analogies of cracking—what Daly phrases as “the topos of the kernel and shell” 
(“George Wither’s” 27).  The emblem is a calculated visual-verbal statement, 
and in this light “the primacy of the bookish and the verbal in the formulation of 
allegorical images was pervasive.  An implied or cited text will frequently form 
the key to unlock the mystery of some strange, unnatural visual construct” 
(Manning xv-xvi).7  In this sense, Wither’s “playing-page” simply makes the 
active and game-like aspect of the emblem explicit.  
Broadside ballads, often comprised of a woodcut and a song-text, are 
another and altogether different example of this visual moral tradition, an 
example that was even more widespread throughout the sixteenth and 
                                     
7 This is what Bath, in a similar discussion of the need for wide reading in order to decode an 
emblem’s meaning, terms “subreading” (31). 
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seventeenth centuries.  Broadside is a term for a one-sided single-sheet print, 
much like a poster, and the form was the cheapest and most widely available 
printed material of the early modern period.  Many of them were ballads, though 
they also came as “tables”—that is, single-sheet diagrams or instructions (see 
Chapter Two for further discussion).  They are often considered to be crucial in 
the development and spreading of new ideas.  Tessa Watt explains that “these 
ballads, woodcuts and chapbooks . . . blended the new ideas with older 
attitudes to religion and morality, just as they embraced existing oral and visual 
traditions” (8).  Being the most popular, simple, and cheap product of the 
printing presses, they were at the forefront of shifting moral issues and 
responses, from topical events to changing models of and approaches to moral 
advice. 
Broadsides and ballads were popular in terms of their sheer number as 
well as their audience: Patricia Fumerton and Anita Guerrini explain that “one 
could not travel anywhere in the city of London without hearing ballads sung on 
street corners or seeing broadsides pasted up on posts and walls.  Ballads and 
their broadside brethren thus touched all levels of society . . .” (2).  Perhaps 
more than humanist learning, then, it is the cruder and more accessible 
woodcuts of ballad sheets and broadsides that spread moral messages through 
a visual medium.  This “democratising” of humanist learning links the ballad 
woodcut with early modern drama, which, as I discuss below, also seeks to 
bring moral philosophical teaching to a wide audience through a popular and 
delightful medium. 
In contrast to emblems, ballads and broadside tables offer a much more 
incidental—even accidental—relationship between image and intent.  A number 
of the larger and more prescriptive tables have custom-built designs and some, 
perhaps, even custom-built images (like displaying the Ten Commandments in 
the form of gloves—an example discussed in the following chapter).  Others, 
however, are no less involved in the acts of moral approbation and 
disapprobation, admonition and instruction,8 but are both visually and textually 
different in their approach.  Ballads, for example, frequently recycle woodcuts, 
and consequently the relationship between image and text is often tangential or 
                                     
8 Tassie Gniady’s exciting reading of the “hog-faced woman” illustrates ballads’ complex 
engagements with discourses of acceptance and condemnation, and of moral and spiritual 
fascination as well as punishment.  
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simply baffling.  Even so, there is normally a correspondence of sorts, as the 
“excellent song wherein you shall finde / Great consolation for a troubled minde” 
indicates: 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Detail from An excellent song wherein you shall finde great consolation 
for a troubled minde (London, 1628).  STC 22918.7. 
 
The ultimate effect of the image, however, is to add to early modern England’s 
moral-visual culture.  Many Londoners would only be able to hear the textual 
content of the ballad when it was sung aloud, yet they could see its visual 
content pasted up in their own houses, in taverns, or elsewhere in public areas.  
Such visual importance makes a broadside’s image an important synecdoche of 
its moral message.  Even if the image is not necessarily conveying a text’s 
meaning in itself, its very presence serves as a reminder of the content, a 
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prompt to the memory, in a similar way to the more strictly mnemonic devices 
sometimes used in tables (see Fig. 4 in Chapter Two) or the emblem’s prompt 
to virtuous action.  The image above (Fig. 2), too, serves a religious aim of 
coupling the ballad’s Christian advice with a prompt to prayer.  The simplicity of 
the woodcuts, their ability to stand in and for themselves, as well as ballads’ 
affordability, meant that broadsides could offer “moral vision” to educated 
humanists and illiterate labourers alike. 
The moral image therefore has a wide range of uses, but they are often 
directed towards practical ends.  Increased critical attention to the role of vision 
in understanding medical theories and playtexts has opened up the diverse 
roles played by sight.  Emblems and broadsides show that the printing press 
could capitalise on the most morally-sensitive sense by presenting pictorial 
puzzles that spark viewers into action.  Broadsides offer a more popular space 
for the moral image, one not always bespoke or directly relevant but 
nonetheless not merely decorative.  These images combine delight with 
contemplation, something that aligns them with the work of drama—a medium 
that, according to Thomas Heywood, is uniquely able to combine different 
sensory experiences in the service of moral representation and illumination. 
 
Morality and the early modern stage 
“Morality” is in effect commonplace in critical discussions of early modern 
dramatic texts—especially in readings that seek to know more about the 
manners and mores of the culture, the historical period that produces a given 
literary text, and the power of words on the page to affect readers in a whole 
host of ways.  Indeed, “moral” in literature can consequently risk becoming an 
imprecise term that can indicate empathy for characters or situations, sensitivity 
to the broad issues at stake in the drama, or appreciation for an ethical 
“position,” outlook, or argument.  As noted in the introduction, “morality” is 
sometimes used in early to mid-twentieth-century criticism to indicate a personal 
position of approval or disapproval from the critic themselves (see Ornstein and 
Harbage below).  However, I am specifically concerned with early modern 
notions of moral teaching and admonition—something that features in part in 
some early mid-twentieth-century criticism but is largely lost amid the 
ideological concerns of new historicism and the material focus of some later 
 55 
criticism.  I seek here to rediscover early modern attitudes in a more thoroughly 
historicist sense in order to enliven and inform my readings of materiality and 
machinery below.  I therefore explain how the stage itself can be and was 
considered a form of instruction akin to moral images and conduct manuals. 
 
Mid-twentieth century critics have, in a somewhat conservative fashion, 
fastened their eyes on “moral” readings of the period’s drama.  Robert 
Ornstein’s The Moral Vision of Jacobean Tragedy (1960) interrogates the way 
dramatists shore up a sense of moral value in the face of a changing world.  
Dramatists are not, he claims, “torn between humanistic and antihumanistic 
views of man.  They are caught between old and new ways of determining the 
realities upon which moral values rest” (6).  His concern is to dispel humanism 
as a (or at least as the sole) lens through which to view all of the period’s art, 
thereby separating the great artists from the merely conventional.  His approach 
is sensitive to poetic quality as superior to the mere “ideas” expressed within, 
but Moral Vision nonetheless attends to the philosophical and religious 
complexities that such poetry addresses. 
Ornstein characterises, for instance, the Jacobean age as an era in 
which “the tragedian confronts the anxiety which the popular moralist would 
exorcise: the cynicism of Italianate tragedies and the pious faith of the Theatre 
of Gods Judgements are, as [The Revenger’s Tragedy] indicates, opposite 
sides of a single coin” (18).  Yet plenty of these Jacobean plays encompass 
both sides, and it is that tension and its outcomes that Ornstein is concerned 
with exploring.  Practical ethics also features in Moral Vision, though its direct 
influence on the plays is not explicitly discussed; Ornstein claims that the 
Church-centric conscience of the medieval period changes in Protestant 
England: “The Reformation shifted the burden of moral discipline to the 
individual conscience” (33), hence  
 
The Protestant spirit is manifest in the extraordinary Elizabethan 
taste for sermons and hortatory literature, for books of devotion 
and guides to moral conduct and godliness.  The desire for 
practical ethical disciplines was satisfied more intellectually in 
treatises of ethical psychology and moral philosophy . . . . (33) 
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Despite an unquestioned association of natural law with moral philosophy,9 
Ornstein sees the moral philosopher’s systematisation of codes of conduct into 
a “body of absolute imperatives” (36) as a key background to the stage’s 
exploration of moral conduct.  It is in contrast, too, to the influence of the 
passions, as we have seen above.  Consequently, the remainder of the study is 
concerned with assessing playwrights’ conformity to “traditional values” of the 
period and to the combat of reason with unreason. 
Moral Vision is somewhat sweeping in its historical claims and uncritical 
of the differences and specificities of different traditions of conduct literature.  
Scepticism, similarly, is only thinly dealt with, despite its important influence on 
the writing and reception of moral theories.  Yet Ornstein’s is a rare statement of 
how practical moral philosophy is a direct part of Jacobean drama (and early 
modern drama more generally).   
Other mid-twentieth studies take a similarly “moral” approach but with 
perhaps fewer historicist sympathies.  Alfred Harbage’s As They Liked It (1947) 
considers Shakespeare not an artistic moralist but a moral artist.  Harbage 
argues that Shakespeare’s work was deeply conservative, in the sense that it 
followed contemporary ideas without challenge and rather made its commercial 
success out of the existing beliefs of its Elizabethan and Jacobean audiences: 
“The play is as moral as the person who traverses its course, and exercises the 
good in that person to the limit of his capacities, but it intensifies his moral 
convictions rather than alters or extends them” (54).  Rees Ennis looks 
specifically at George Chapman in The Tragedies of George Chapman: 
Renaissance Ethics in Action (1954).  Ennis argues that Chapman’s heroes are 
evidence both of the force of poetry itself as a form of learning—thereby making 
drama an educative force—while also claiming that “Chapman’s justice, like 
Aristotle’s, is virtue in action” (27).  While likewise neglecting historical 
specificities, Ennis nonetheless gestures to the importance of practical morality 
in Jacobean tragedy.  Critics including Ornstein, Harbage, and Ennis, however, 
make broad claims about early modern drama and its moral aims, suggesting a 
“world view” or coherent response to ethical issues that often tends to fit with 
the critics’ own broadly conservative moral outlook.  
                                     
9 See above, and the early pages of Knud Haakonssen’s discussion of the relationship between 
natural law and moral philosophy in Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the 
Scottish Enlightenment (1996).   
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Such studies stand for everything that later new historicist and cultural 
materialist scholars seek to undress.  Jonathan Dollimore’s Radical Tragedy 
(1984), for instance, is concerned with demolishing any idea of a moral centre 
in these plays in an almost nihilistic, relativist fashion.  I have already 
considered the impulse towards individuality in works by Greenblatt, Maus, and 
Schoenfeldt, whose research concentrates on the construction of selves against 
and through society’s shaping forces.  If drawn upon by critics in these studies, 
moral treatises are most often considered for the way in which they are resisted 
by authors and are not frequently associated with the stage’s potential for moral 
education.   
Richard A. McCabe, in his study of Incest, Drama, and Nature’s Law 
(1993), does suggest, though, that playwrights challenged both moral and 
natural law through certain tropes—namely, incest.  With due treatment of 
reformed theology and sceptical thought, McCabe argues that “the incest theme 
may be employed as a focus for a wide variety of anxieties stemming from the 
paradoxical perception of ‘nature’ as both social ideal and moral enemy” (21).  
William M. Hamlin’s Tragedy and Scepticism in Shakespeare’s England (2005), 
too, treats the questioning aspects of the period’s drama.  He considers the 
“essence of scepticism” to be “an irrepressible spirit of questioning: an abidingly 
critical attitude towards all dogmatic or doctrinaire positions conjoined with an 
implicit and unceasing defence of open-minded enquiry” (5).  His argument 
therefore opposes Ornstein’s claim, for instance, that Webster’s drama upholds 
traditional values and is transparently moral.  Hamlin rather claims that Webster 
 
exhibits consistent engagement with doubt, showing interest in the 
tropes of epistemological scepticism, casting a wary eye on 
metaphysical suppositions, and demonstrating a distinct lack of 
confidence in any human ability to find moral coherence on earth 
through the exercise of reason or the testimony of experience. 
(212) 
 
The opposition between certain moral teaching and uncertain moral scepticism 
displayed by two critical readings is a fascinating one, and perhaps Webster’s 
plays occupy both territories—a subject I return to in the fifth chapter. 
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The focus on Jacobean scepticism as an anti-moralistic force in late-
twentieth-century and twenty-first century criticism indicates, perhaps, the 
concerns of both the postmodern Western world and early modern England.  
The Jacobean perspective is often compared to that of postmodernity, or the 
late twentieth century.  The filmmaker Alex Cox, for example, compares 
Middleton’s The Revenger’s Tragedy to the punk spirit of the 1970s: “1607 or 
1976, there is no difference.”  Yet while necessarily reflecting the spirit of their 
own age, critics Hamlin and McCabe acknowledge that Jacobeans write in a 
world very different to ours—one still dominated by religion and considerations 
of monarchical authority. 
Further recent criticism has begun to suggest the civic, educational role 
of theatre.  David Wiles’s Theatre and Citizenship (2011) reaches back into the 
classical world, touching on a number of figures whose influence extends to the 
early modern era, including Cicero and Machiavelli and moving through the 
medieval mysteries.  His chapter on Heywood and Shakespeare acknowledges 
that self-fashioning might be less relevant to theatre audiences who are rather 
involved in a process of “collective fashioning” (93).  His sensitive treatment of 
the contexts of both playwrights paints the picture of a world where theatre was 
political, commercial, and deeply moral—and ultimately he claims Heywood to 
be involved in a process of citizen-building, shaping and responding to an 
audience’s collective moral and social identity. 
David Bevington and Alan Dessen have also examined traditions of 
theatre, seeing the presence of earlier morality plays within the drama of the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  They both see early modern 
drama emerging from developments from the moralities and into the hybrid 
moralities, which “set abstractions and concrete figures side by side in the same 
play” (Bevington 10).  Both Dessen and Bevington read these hybrid plays—
discussed below—to recover a sense of the evolution of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century drama from its roots in moral allegory. 
Helen Cooper and Beatrice Groves have more recently identified the 
influence of the medieval mysteries as well as moralities on later incarnations of 
drama.  Groves links the spectacle of later Elizabethan and Jacobean plays to 
the visual emphasis inherent in Catholic mass (often surrounding the 
Eucharist)—a visual emphasis that translated into the mysteries.  Cooper is 
similarly concerned with dissolving divisions between the “medieval” and the 
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“early modern,” and in Shakespeare and the Medieval World (2010) she revisits 
the “history of moral allegory as inherited by the early modern world” (115) as 
well as paying welcome attention to the dumb shows of drama.  Unlike Mehl, 
who sees the transition into Jacobean drama as a decline of allegory in the 
dumb show, Cooper links dumb shows to the visual moral tradition.  She claims, 
for example, that emblem books 
 
gave visual substance to abstract concepts that were at once 
generalizing, ethical and allegorical . . . street pageants and 
tableaux had long drawn on an established set of such images, 
such as the well-governed state as a well-ordered garden; and the 
dumbshows of early-modern drama were likewise used as 
emblematic mirrors of meaning. (126) 
 
Acknowledging that “dumbshows themselves started as fully allegorical, but 
they rapidly came to occupy a position somewhere between emblematic 
pageant and literal action” (127), Cooper is more sensitive than Mehl to the 
moral resonances of early modern dramatic tropes.  Her analysis shows that the 
more complex dramaturgy of the Elizabethan and Jacobean period 
nevertheless has its history in moral didacticism.  I return to this discussion of 
dumb shows in the fifth chapter, which considers the way in which Shakespeare 
and Webster employ the device to raise a number of moral questions in 
material form. 
The moral role of the stage in the early modern period is therefore a rich 
seam, and criticism has broached its scope and its roots, opening up room for 
consideration of the stage’s material and moral interaction.  Thematically and in 
terms of content, of course, the list could be endless—Alexander Legatt’s 
Jacobean Public Theatre (1992) argues for the generalising tendencies of the 
majority of Jacobean theatre: “what matters is that a moral is drawn” (35).  Its 
direct or explicit moralising agenda, legal connotations and structures, dumb 
shows, and medieval inheritance have all been subject to critical appraisal.  
Recently, as Wiles and Langis have shown, there is a growing interest in the 
civic and moral philosophical role of drama in the period.  Building on this 
important work in early modern studies, I expand upon the moral potential of 
Jacobean drama to connect practical stagecraft with practical philosophy.  What 
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follows, then, to conclude this overview of the major themes underlying this 
thesis, is a discussion of the Jacobean stage’s role in moral education, charting 
its development through the Elizabethan hybrids and commercial stage. 
 
*** 
 
Hearken unto a Verser, who may chance 
Ryme thee to good, and make a bait of pleasure. 
A verse may finde him, who a sermon flies, 
And turn delight into a sacrifice. 
George Herbert, “The Church-Porch” (A1r) 
 
Morality in the theatre has a long history,10 and the most immediate point of 
reference for the early modern theatre is its predecessors on the medieval 
scaffolds, the moralities or moral plays.  The moral plays are an early example 
of allegorical drama involved in moral fashioning.  E.K. Chambers describes 
them as plays “in which the characters are no longer scriptural or legendary 
persons, but wholly, or almost wholly, abstractions, and which, although still 
religious in intention, aim rather at ethical cultivation than the establishing of 
faith” (151).  Examples of these plays survive in manuscript—most notably The 
Castle of Perseverance, Everyman, and Mankind—and were likely played by 
touring groups across the country.  Davidson speculates that royally-sponsored 
troupes, formed for festivities at court, would perform these plays.  Those 
troupes were free to tour when not required at the Court and so the morality 
plays reached a wide audience.  The aim at a wide appeal perhaps explains the 
mix of Latin sententiae and religious messages with abundant toilet humour (in 
Mankind this is especially prominent), as well as jokes about Latinate words: 
“Ey, ey! yowr body is full of Englysch Laten. / I am aferde yt wyll brest” (l.124-
25).  As popular plays that mix moralising with delight, then, these prove 
precursors to the quasi-allegorical moral impetus of later theatre. 
Dessen rightly displays an anxiety over appealing to the favoured texts of 
medieval mysteries, however, noting that “some of the moral plays most often 
cited by modern scholars never found their way into print in the period (e.g., 
                                     
10 See Wiles on classical and Renaissance ideas about the moral force of drama in Theatre and 
Citizenship. 
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The Castle of Perseverance, Mankind)” (4).  He is therefore reluctant to ascribe 
to these plays a direct influence over later Elizabethan developments.  
Dessen’s interest in the later incarnations of morality plays in moral interludes, 
in Shakespeare and the Late Moral Plays (1986), is important in reviving 
interest in less-discussed drama.  Yet the hybrid interludes of the Elizabethan 
period develop from a native tradition of theatre (one that is later blended with 
the “tone, form, and achievement found in the widely read Roman playwrights,” 
Dessen 4), and plays in the vein of The Castle of Perseverance and Mankind 
are some of the best examples of that earlier tradition.  Indeed, the impulse to 
perform a moral message seems to have deep roots in English cultural history 
(perhaps in humankind itself) and Helen Cooper notes that “writers for the 
public theatres wrote out of the same assumptions about the stage” as 
medieval dramatists: “They all shared the belief that anything was stageable, 
and that the function of a play was to act its action” (72).  Cooper claims that 
these early plays are not simply inferior prototypes for the later commercial 
theatre, but prove themselves “capable of surprisingly subtle analysis, not only 
of psychology, but of the interplay of psychology with theology, politics, and 
even economics” (106).  In their explicit allegorising function and complex 
psychology, the medieval “moral plays” (the most accurate term, for Dessen) 
form an important backdrop to the early modern commercial stage, its 
intentions, functions, and defence. 
They also survived long into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
Cooper states that “the genre enjoyed its heyday in the decades immediately 
preceding the rise of the public theatres” (106).  Neither did they simply 
disappear once the more recognisable forms of Elizabethan theatre had 
developed.  Contemporaneous with commercial theatre were what Dessen and 
Davidson call “hybrid moralities” or “hybrid moral plays,” which use both 
abstract and literal figures (Bevington 10).  Such a development was part of a 
long period of change in which, Cooper explains, “morality plays increasingly 
turned away from personifying abstractions to representing exemplary figures: 
an ambitious man, rather than Ambition in itself; a chaste woman, rather than 
Chastity” (107).  In the Elizabethan and Jacobean hybrids, then, the moral 
impetus remains but characters are often half-way between allegorical figures 
and actual human beings. 
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For instance, in these hybrids, something like a vice is fractured into 
recurring figures named Ralph Roister or Tom Tospot, who inhabit different 
aspects of immorality.  In Like Will to Like (Fulwel, 1568), it is the chief vice-like-
character of Nichol Newfangle who is at the root of the play’s viciousness, an 
apprentice figure who has trained under the Devil in hell.  These moral 
interludes remain patently allegorical texts, but they play up to contemporary 
tastes for “mirth,” as their prologues state.  An archetypal example is the 
prologue for Like Will, which acknowledges that the play is there not to bore in 
its didacticism but to entertain, while baldly setting out its allegorical objectives: 
“Heer in as it were in a glasse se you may: / The advancement of vertue and of 
vice the decay.”  The combination of these two aims is largely achieved through 
the alignment of moral message with dramatic spectacle, with plays including 
Enough is as Good as a Feast (Wager, 1560), Welth and Health (c.1554-55), 
and Vertuous and godlye Susanna (Garter, 1563-69) all displaying an 
investment in visual representation.  Susanna, especially, emphasises the 
importance of visual drama, with characters stating variously “we say but what 
we see,” “how plainly thy fault is seen,” and “your filthy lust is spyde” (C1r, E2r, 
E3v).  These remarks draw attention to the visible aspects of the dramaturgy 
and point towards the staging, with the trial scene—including the presence of 
divine figures—proving a visual allusion to the last judgement.  Such dramatic 
intent, though, also states the educative aims and wide accessibility of the 
theatre, with the prologue declaring that the play is performed “desiring that 
none heer at our matter wilbe perplexed” (A2r).  Like the medieval moralities, 
commercial hybrid moral plays should appeal to a wide audience. 
The educative impetus that moral interludes bring to the stage is also 
associated with the moral philosophical treatises discussed above, allying itself 
with the new curriculum.  After coming to their sticky ends, characters duped 
into vicious lifestyles exhort the audience to bring up their children correctly and 
to follow the right sort of education: 
 
If my parents had brought me up in vertue and learning, 
I should not have had this shameful end. (Like Will to Like E2r) 
 
They also dissuade parents from liberality and other perceived vices, thereby 
associating the interludes with education and advice manuals. 
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By the late Elizabethan period, the moral power of the stage is widely 
debated.  Early Reformists harness drama for propagandist ends, with John 
Bale producing plays that use the spectacle of medieval ceremony to denounce 
Catholic practices and advance Protestantism.11  Yet by the later Elizabethan 
period, more radical Protestants denounce the theatre—especially the newly 
established commercial theatre scene in London—as a place of sin and 
depravity.  These antitheatricalists claim that the sensuality of the theatre made 
it spiritually dangerous.  Stephen Gosson’s comparison of the poet and the 
cook in Schoole of Abuses (1579), a prominent and much-cited example, 
argues that theatre allures the affection and entices the appetite: “the pleasures 
of the one winnes the body from labor, & conquereth the sense; the allurement 
of the other drawes the mind from vertue, and confoundeth wit” (A8v).  These 
pious figures see theatre as a direct threat to virtue and feel that it promotes the 
body over the soul.  Antitheatricalists were making similar arguments from 
Gosson through to William Prynne—whose Histrio-mastix (1633) is conceived 
as a “plaister” for the sins and ulcers of the stage and its printed output, and 
beyond. 
Pro-theatricalists, though, were also vocal.  Most famously, Sidney’s 
Defense insists that poetry offers 
 
Delight to moue men to take that godnes in hande, which without 
delight they would flye as from a stranger.  And teach, to make 
them know that goodness whereunto they are mooued . . . . (11) 
 
Poetry, for Sidney, is more powerful than either moral philosophy or history, 
because the latter attempt to instil virtue in too limited a manner: “the 
Philosopher . . . and the Historian are they which would win the gole: the one by 
precept, the other by example.  But both not hauing both, doe both halt” (D2v).  
Although he is critical of the English stage’s disregard for the unity of time and 
place, he nonetheless emphasises that they are “as full of notable moralitie,” 
making comment of Gorboduc (1561) in particular (I4v).  Indeed, despite his 
quibbles about the English stage’s lack of classical sophistication, plays “are 
                                     
11 See Cathy Shrank for Bale’s use and repurposing of his pre-Reformation or “medieval 
inheritance” (192). 
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excelling parts of Poesie” (K3v)—an important facet of poetry, which naturally 
combines precept and example. 
In 1603, literate English audiences were offered another counterpoint to 
antitheatricalist arguments—one made on the same terms and perhaps more 
applicable than Sidney’s to the commercial theatres—thanks to John Florio’s 
translation of Montaigne’s essays.  In “Of the institution and education of 
children,” Montaigne defends public theatres.  He accuses those “of 
impertinencie, that condemne and disalowe such kindes of recreations” and he 
blames “those of injustice, that refuse good and honest Comedians, (or as we 
call them) Players, to enter our good townes, and grudge the common people 
such publike sportes” (I2r).  Indeed, the closing of the essay proceeds to argue 
that affection and appetite are the best forms of moral learning, alluding to the 
unavoidable passions that early moderns saw at the heart of human behaviour, 
but which, as explained above, may be harnessed to a virtuous end.  
Consequently, he claims “there should be Theatres and places appointed for 
such spectacles,” because there is 
 
no better way then to allure the affection, and to entice the 
appetite: otherwise a man shall breede but asses laden with 
books.  With jerkes of roddes they have their satchels full of 
learning given them to keepe.  Which to doe well, one most not 
onely harbour in him-selfe, but wed and marry the same with his 
minde. (I2r) 
 
This fascinating defence of the pastime makes theatre into a practical moral 
tool, and Montaigne’s arguments recall Bacon’s complaints about the “flat and 
dead” books of moral philosophy.  Moral precepts are nothing unless they are 
witnessed in action—and so theatre, Montaigne suggests, is like a history: it 
provides examples that show how moral advice may be applied practically to 
life.  Montaigne’s approach appears to be more accepting than Sidney’s of the 
varying forms of theatrical entertainment, the performances of mere 
“Comedians” or “Players,” and suggests that all these “publike sportes” have the 
power to deliver goodness.  If the knowledge offered by the most valuable 
books is to be “Chewed and Digested,” in Francis Bacon’s memorable 
formulation (“Of Studies,” 1625, Pp3r), then plays are the perfect sweetener. 
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In the early 1610s—at precisely the period in time at which “strangeness” 
becomes a feature of moral-visual action on the stage—the prolific playwright 
Heywood attempts to situate the moral correctness of theatre within antiquity 
and to establish the profession of acting as something morally efficacious.  His 
much-cited Apologie for Actors (1612) makes a comparison with both rhetoric—
an important source of moral formation and debate, as I explore in Chapter 
Five—and with painting, arguing that neither is as morally affective or effective 
as theatre: 
 
A Description is only a shadow receiued by the eare but not 
perceiued by the eye: so liuely portraiture is merely a forme seene 
by the eye, but can neither shew action, passion, motion, or any 
other gesture, to mooue the spirits of the beholder to admiration: 
but to see a souldier shap’d like a souldier, walke, speake, act like 
a souldier: to see a Hector all besmeared in blood, trampling upon 
the bulkes of Kinges. A Troylus returning from the field in the sight 
of his father Priam . . . Oh these were sights to make an 
Alexander.” (B3v-B4r) 
 
Heywood also makes a direct link with histories on the stage, echoing the 
praise of written histories by moral philosophers.  The practical element of the 
theatre—seeing things performed in “action, passion, motion—is linked with the 
performance of virtuous actions.  Such an association foregrounds the 
importance of spectacle in bringing matters to life, something in which 
Heywood, as a particularly spectacular dramatist, was certainly invested.  
He also uses the classical world to give esteem to the profession, linking 
moral philosophers (however tenuously) with theatrical instruction.  The 
Apologie claims that wise men in ancient Greece used “moralized mysteries” 
that had such an effect on the population that they soon “excelled in ciuility and 
gouernment” (C3r).  His language makes theatre into a courtier’s or magistrate’s 
manual as well as a means of moral philosophical instruction.  Frequent 
references to Aristotle and Cicero—those giants of early modern moral 
thought—serve to give authority to Heywood’s arguments, insisting that through 
the combination of performance and rhetoric, theatre is a powerful educative 
tool.  Ultimately, he is concerned with establishing the “true use” of theatre—just 
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as moral philosophers are with the “use” of their philosophy.  Although he deals 
directly with “Morals,” which are “to perswade men to humanity and good life, to 
instruct them in ciuility and good,” he also claims all other genres to have a 
hand in vice and virtue, from histories to comedies.  Generally, for Heywood, 
 
Playes are writ with this ayme, and carried with this method, to 
teach the subiects obedience to their King, to shew the people the 
untimely ends of such as haue moued tumults, and insurrections, 
to present them with the flourishing estate of such as liue in 
obedience, exhorting them to allegiance, dehorting them from all 
trayterous and felonious stratagems.” (F3v) 
 
These arguments sit in opposition to antitheatricalist claims about sensual and 
sensory corruption, arguing for the senses’ role in moral learning and 
associating theatre with important historical figures.  Echoing the language of 
advice treatises and claims about the moral importance of vision, Heywood, like 
Sidney and Montaigne before him, turns theatre into a form of moral philosophy 
that is already half put into practice. 
 
By the Jacobean period, then, theatre is established as a form with a 
long inheritance of moral admonition, exhortation, and learning.  Early modern 
England has a concern with practical morality that is rooted in its approach to 
moral philosophy; the revival of interest in Aristotelian and especially Ciceronian 
thinking emphasises the use of all learning and precepts and encourages 
participation in the vita activa.  By alluding to this moral tradition, 
protheatricalists and dramatists make a case for the theatre as a place where 
morality is shown in action.  Likewise, they build on the notion of vision as a 
spiritual sense, incorporating aspects of “moral images” into the heavily 
spectacular nature of English theatre, as it develops out of the medieval 
moralities and into the commercial stage. 
Yet this notion of the moral image, and its connection with the stage, is 
also under threat from a number of contentious issues in the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean periods.  The following chapter addresses these concerns and 
considers the role of images in reacting to the increasing moral anxieties of the 
1590s and early seventeenth century.  “Wee must to vertue for her guide 
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resort,” George Chapman’s Bussy D’Ambois tells the Jacobean era, “Or we 
shall shipwracke in our safest Port” (A2v).  The period’s drama is concerned 
with navigating this uncertainty.  One of ways the stage responds to the 
Jacobean moral situation is to exploit the practical nature of moral philosophy 
and the growth of moral images, and move towards materialising their wide 
array of conceits and teachings. 
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2. Materialising Morality from Image to Stage 
 
The introduction has set out the broad background to “morality” in the 
early modern period, its practical aspects, and its visual and dramatic 
incarnations.  This chapter plots the factors that challenge the certainty of 
practical morality—the “moral crisis” of the early modern period—and suggests 
that materialisation is a response to this crisis.  Here I am concerned with the 
material representation of abstract ideas.  I begin by outlining the 
precariousness of moral issues in the period before introducing the 
“materialisation of morality,” my description of the incarnation of moral ideas in 
practically usable material things.  This concept underlies my reading of early 
Jacobean “strangeness,” which, I argue in Part Two, is a term that mediates 
between physical display and moral description.  “Strangeness” offers a fittingly 
ambivalent moral frame for perceiving spectacle in a period of acute sceptical 
uncertainty.  
From later sixteenth-century England, the physical and visual elements 
of an image hold moral force.  In contrast to the now outdated idea that England 
was an iconophobic culture, I fall into line with studies since Margaret Aston and 
more recently with the work of Tara Hamling and Catherine Richardson, who 
have paid serious attention the presence, function, and significance of visual 
culture in creating everyday meaning.  I argue, however, that beyond mere 
visuality, images are important because of their physicality and tangibility, rather 
than in spite of it.  Whereas Huston Diehl claims that “the emblem reader . . . 
deconstructs images so that he can recollect moral and spiritual truths,” moving 
“from the image to a recollection of its significance” (58), I suggest that moral 
and spiritual truths are, alternatively, often embedded in the metaphorical and 
physical materials of the image itself. 
The transference of knowledge from abstract to material expression 
parallels Henry S. Turner’s notion of a “geometric turn” and of “topographesis” 
(12).  Turner’s model of changing early modern knowledge posits “a shift from 
dialogue to icon, or from a verbal and discursive method of analysis to a visual 
and diagrammatic one” (35) by examining geometrical studies, groundplots, 
spatial arts, and versification.  In this chapter, I explore cheap print images, 
broadsides, pamphlets, and stage devices to argue that visual representation is 
more pervasively present and more physical throughout the period than hitherto 
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considered.  Verbal and discursive methods move beyond even the 
diagrammatic in early modern England’s “material morality.”  I concentrate on 
“materialisation” broadly but focus specifically on the incarnation of moral 
philosophy, precepts, and admonition. 
By representing moral advice through usable objects, cheap print images 
metaphorically visualise the “practical” mantra of humanist moral philosophy.  I 
consider this combination in relation, more deeply, to late sixteenth- and early 
seventeenth-century England’s reception of scepticism.  Critics including 
Stanley Cavell, William H. Hamlin, David Hillman, and Ellen Spolsky have 
considered scepticism and its material impulses, but I seek to link it more 
explicitly to the surrounding print and material culture that has received such an 
increase in attention in recent years (see above and in detail below).  As such, 
this chapter sees sceptical interests as a more central influence on the objects 
and images of the popular moral tradition than has been considered to date, 
and consequently combines materialist enquiries with both print and intellectual 
history.   
I then address the importance of material morality in the household 
through images that figure themselves as part of domestic clutter.  The final 
section of the chapter examines material morality in relation to theatrical 
practices, addressing the artificiality of stage devices and the materiality of 
spectacle.  While images in cheap print offer the possibility of physical use, they 
remain metaphorical.  On the stage, special effects make metaphorical 
possibilities into material realities and as such can combine the moral potency 
of visual devices with actual physical use and display.  
Moral uncertainty: why materialise? 
There are a number of issues that trouble early modern understandings 
of morality.  These lead to the impulse to turn to material representation in order 
metaphorically (in print) or literally (on stage) to make moral concepts tangible 
or solid, and ultimately echo the moral and material anxieties that underpin 
stage spectacle in the 1600s and 1610s.  Here, I concentrate on doubts about 
time and custom, the emergence of “science” and changes in natural 
philosophy, and scepticism—all of which have an interest in materiality.12  
Virtue, considered in the period to be taught and practised rather than inherited, 
                                     
12 Rhetoric also significantly affects the understanding and certainty of moral philosophy.  This 
subject is discussed at length in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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is exposed to the whims of custom and to devouring time.  Roger Ascham 
explains that “to loue or to hate, to like or contemne, to plie this waie or that 
waie to good or to bad, ye shall haue as ye use a child in his youth” (E3v).  The 
pliability of one’s character in youth and the consequent importance of the 
educator in shaping it the correct way bolsters the perceived importance of 
Ascham’s office as a “scholemaster.”  Yet that pliability inevitably breeds doubts 
about the veracity of moral philosophy.  Almost all education treatises begin 
with a lamentation about the fallen state of early modern England—a harking 
back to a mythologised past.  While advice manuals and moral treatises 
necessarily posit their philosophy and advice as the “true” guide, they 
nevertheless express uncertainties about time—its decaying force—that 
inevitably result in doubts about truth.   
By the end of the sixteenth century, Montaigne phrases the chiding 
voices of advice manuals in an even more sceptical fashion.  Rather than time 
temporarily distorting the truth, something that much English moral philosophy 
claims to reassert, he questions whether any form of knowledge escapes the 
ravages of time: “What goodnesse is that, which but yesterday I saw in credite 
and esteeme, and tomorrow, to have lost all reputation . . .” (“Apology” Gg1r).13  
It is this more sceptical approach that I explore here.  While the aspects of 
doubt in advice manuals could be pursued in depth, I concentrate on the 
physical interests of sceptical thought and protoscientific writing, positing them 
as important underlying factors in the materialisation of morality and in the 
exchange between description and ineffability central to understanding 
Jacobean “strangeness.” 
Scepticism can be defined broadly, for the purposes of this thesis, as a 
searching for truth that forever suspends absolute judgement, a search that 
often seeks empirical proof and inevitably falls short, remaining suspicious of 
any claims to certainty.  It is a perpetual questioning of the material and 
intellectual world.  This broad definition is a useful starting point from which to 
evaluate the wide-ranging moral, intellectual, and artistic engagements with 
doubt and anti-dogmatism.  It is an engagement that pervades the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries, generating what might be termed an 
                                     
13 I maintain Florio’s translations throughout except where explicitly stated or compared to the 
French itself, chiefly because that is the copy early modern English readers would have read.  
Peter Mack has criticised Florio’s mistranslation of this passage in “Florio and Montaigne” (84) 
but the section here quoted seems to be near enough to the French. 
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“atmosphere” of scepticism that affects secular morality and sensory perception 
(chief concerns of this thesis), while not always necessarily being grounded in 
an explicit philosophical scheme or adopting a decisive philosophical stance.  
William H. Hamlin has offered the only book-length study of scepticism’s 
reception and appropriation in literary-intellectual circles in early modern 
England; he identifies “the last decade of the sixteenth century and the opening 
years of the seventeenth” as the period when “with ever-increasing frequency . . 
. scepticism enters the lexicon of English poets and intellectuals” (56).14  It is 
during this period that the public (and private) theatres flourish and that printed 
materials begin to display a convergence of material and moral instruction, 
suggesting that scepticism in the 1590s and the 1600s deeply influences forms 
of moral and artistic thought in the country. 
Two types of classical scepticism come to prominence in the sixteenth 
century.  The first is academic scepticism, stemming from Plato’s Academy, and 
the second is Pyrrhonism, laid out by Sextus Empiricus.  Academic scepticism 
was, perhaps paradoxically, certain of the impossibility of certainty.  It therefore 
sought to develop, in Hamlin’s words, “forms of probable knowledge based on 
the scrupulous study of appearances” (3).  Pyrrhonists do not go so far as to 
declare all knowledge uncertain, but rather remain in a state of questioning.  
Benson Mates explains that 
 
the characteristic attitude of the Pyrrhonist is one of aporia, of 
being at a loss, puzzled, stumped, stymied.  This state of mind is 
said to arise from the apparent equipollence of the considerations 
that can be brought for and against any assertion purporting to 
describe how things are in an external, mind-independent world. 
(5) 
 
It is a way of life rather than a set of beliefs.  By being permanently puzzled, 
one can achieve epochē (suspension of judgement) and eventually reach 
                                     
14 Hamlin sees 1603 as a “watershed year” for scepticism, during which “common sense 
scepticism” fuses with its “philosophically-grounded counterpart” (70).  Florio’s Montaigne 
translation is also published that year.  In this light, I consider the beginnings of Jacobean 
England to be characterised by a sceptical spirit—one readily detectable in the drama of the 
1600s, which combines epistemic curiosity with cynical doubt and moral complexity. 
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ataraxia (tranquillity of the soul).15  Pyrrhonism covers questions of values as 
well as questions of sensory experience, and demands an ongoing suspension 
of judgement.  In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Hamlin 
explains, Pyrrhonists acquired “a reputation as more thoroughgoing sceptics” 
due to their rejection of all forms of certainty—even the Academics’ certainty of 
uncertainty—but ultimately “the two traditions of scepticism were seen as 
fundamentally akin to one another” (3). 
Texts that date back to the early fifteenth century like Raymond 
Sebond’s Natural Theology (1430s) impact upon early modern conceptions of 
scepticism—and Montaigne’s celebrated essay “An Apology for Raymond 
Sebond” treats a number of sceptical claims in response to (and in response to 
responses to) this work.  Figures including Thomas More, Erasmus, and 
Agrippa demonstrate, as Hamlin has proved, familiarity with the scepticism of 
writers including Plato, Cicero in his Academica, and Lucian.  Importantly, 
Cicero himself plays a major role in the period’s scepticism—something 
particularly noteworthy considering his influence on Renaissance humanism; 
the sceptical aspects of his writing are closely associated with his role as a 
rhetorician, linking, as I explore later in the thesis, the “probability” of 
philosophical thought with the presentation of likely facts in rhetorical 
declamation as well as in attacking others’ arguments.  By the 1560s there is 
also demonstrable evidence of English interest in Sextus Empiricus’s work 
(John Wolley translated Sextus’s Against the Mathematicians, for example, that 
decade) before the later craze of the 1590s, which saw a now lost English 
translation of his theories, The Skeptick. 
Ultimately, England was a hotchpotch of sceptical influences.  Perhaps 
Hamlin’s broader definition of the term is most accurate: he posits scepticism as 
“an irrepressible spirit of questioning: an abidingly critical attitude towards all 
dogmatic or doctrinaire positions conjoined with an implicit and unceasing 
defence of open-minded enquiry” (5).  This spirit was certainly marked in 
England by at least the 1590s, and it already had a long history behind it.  The 
1590s and the 1600s were deeply engaged with sceptical thought, as indicated 
                                     
15 The original Greek terms are used because of the difficulties and complexities of translation.   
Mates, for instance, calls ataraxia “a state of inner tranquillity or peace of mind” (5) whereas 
Hamlin terms it “cerebral tranquillity, freedom from anxiety” (6).  Although not hugely dissimilar 
in meaning, most scholars tend to maintain the original terms, avoiding the nice distinctions of 
translation. 
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by works as diverse as Donne’s satires; a lost translation of The Sceptick; the 
text attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh (which copies wholesale passages of 
Sextus); and Marston’s characteristic quarrying of Michel de Montaigne’s 
essays. 
The period’s interest in scepticism synthesises concerns over education, 
rhetorical redescription, and scientific advances and adds a level of 
philosophical and epistemic doubt to considerations of conduct.  It emphasises 
both the necessity and the futility of sensory experience, puts the material world 
and visual perception under extraordinary scrutiny, and consequently draws into 
question notions of moral certainty. 
 
Science and Scepticism 
Scientific enquiry contributes and responds to the period’s reception of 
sceptical thought.  It is also an important technical and philosophical facet of 
stage spectacle: theatrical technology falls under the broad and embryonic 
rubric of early modern “science.”  Ostensibly an optimistic development—Irving 
Ribner calls it the “new scientific optimism of Bacon” (3)—changes in natural 
philosophy nevertheless affect the way early moderns see the world and 
encourage a prioritisation of external, physical fact.  The Elizabethan 
schoolmaster Richard Mulcaster notes that natural philosophy is characterised 
by “necesitie of a demonstrable subiect” and so “regardeth the matter only” 
(B1v). Although he is talking of deductive reasoning, his remarks also indicate 
that “matter,” in the sense of material, is of primary importance to the new 
scientific mind. 
Indeed, Reformist thinking questions previous conjunctions of intellectual 
and moral virtues while also ushering in a distinction between faith-based 
knowledge and rational knowledge.16  The questioning is especially acute with 
regard to Thomist thought.  Aquinas linked the traditional cardinal virtues 
(prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude) with the theological (faith, hope, and 
love).  He also, Peter Harrison notes, added “intellectual virtues” to the mix: 
wisdom, science, and understanding.  Because Lutheran and Calvinist 
                                     
16 Deborah Shuger explores this distinction in Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance 
(1990), in which she distinguishes between “rational consciousness” and “participatory 
consciousness” (the former privileging reason and the external world and the latter privileging 
the desire to believe).  
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theologies did not permit the sort of moral perfection implicitly accommodated 
by classical virtue and necessary in the “intellectual virtues,” which require a 
“contentious mechanism of habit,” a transformation begins to take place.  
Harrison identifies a move in the understanding of scientia (knowledge) away 
from “a mental habit” to become “something like the more familiar modern 
notion: a body of knowledge or set of practices aimed at bringing about a 
particular outcome” (216).  In separating “knowledge” from traditional moral 
philosophy in this way, the practical scientific method—empirical and ultimately 
external—can be seen to emerge over an extended period of time. 
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, though, the gradual 
separation of science from “morality” proper is countered by the scepticism that 
attends (and in part motivates) scientific knowledge.17  Intellectual historians 
mirror Harrison in identifying a major philosophical shift: a gradual move 
towards an empirical and proto-scientific approach to the physical world.  That 
approach has its visual and moral complement: that we might know what we 
see—the ultimate aim of scientific practices like anatomy.  Conversely, 
contemporary sceptics argue that one can never know with certainty what one 
sees.  The materialisation of morality (and the “strange” special effects 
discussed in Part Two) points to the unique historical moment that captures the 
gap between those conflicting attitudes. 
Indeed, while outside of theology Baconian developments in natural 
philosophy seek in part to isolate it from religious and moral considerations, 
making it a more “objective” discipline, it remains dogged by moral 
considerations.  Ornstein has eloquently explained how Bacon “assumed quite 
correctly that his contemporaries were prepared to accept the philosophical 
authority of a completely unmoral, unreligious concept of physical nature, which 
testifies only indirectly to the existence of a providential order.”  Although such a 
“separation of science and religion seemed to guarantee the sanctity of 
religious belief by eliminating possible conflicts between empirical reason and 
faith” (5), it also shook some of the foundations of moral thought.  Early modern 
men and women were left “caught between old and new ways of determining 
the realities upon which moral values rest” (Ornstein 6).  If the natural world is 
                                     
17 Particularly the 1590s through to the 1610s—something evidenced by the “strangeness” of 
visual spectacle on the stage in this period and on which the second part of this thesis 
elaborates. 
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held up as the source of knowledge, can ethical knowledge not be found there 
too? 
Such a turn to the physical, external world for both scientific and moral 
edification is represented by the growth of anatomy in early modern England.  It 
is characterised by what Ruth Gilbert terms “the impulse ‘to see and know.’”  
Although Gilbert sees the scientific, anatomic thrust of early modern England 
“symbolised and actualised by Robert Hooke’s development of the microscope, 
a device which visually probed and penetrated previously uninvestigated 
worlds” (151), such an impulse occurs earlier, in 1615, with Helkiah Crooke’s 
Mikrokosmographia.  Crooke’s text can be connected to a growth in visual 
enquiry in the period.  The historian of early modern vision Stuart Clark points to 
 
the ‘optical naturalism’ at work in much of Renaissance aesthetic 
theory and criticism (and genres like portraiture and landscape), in 
the emergence of new models of naturalistic, and supposedly 
veridical, representation in sciences like astronomy, anatomy, 
mechanics, botany, physiognomy, topography, and natural 
history, in the faith placed, in all these and many other sciences, in 
direct observation, and the practice of certain kinds of narrative 
realism in early modern literature. (19-20) 
 
Such a faith in “direct observation” is evident in Crooke’s text, which dissects 
the eye itself.  Indeed, the penetrative ends of anatomical science have been 
linked with the growth of scepticism.  David Hillman defines scepticism as “an 
attempt to deny the susceptibility of one’s interior to external influence; faith, as 
an attempt to deny one’s exteriority or separateness.”  Scepticism “derives from 
a refusal to accept the inherence of inner in outer (and vice versa); it relies upon 
an idea of a gap between causes or inner truth and that which is represented 
externally.  The sceptic rejects dogmatism, unquestioning acceptance of 
appearances, blind faith,” and in his pursuit of “empirical—and specifically 
visual—knowledge about the insides of the human frame” the anatomist proves 
himself “the sceptic par excellence” (28, 33).  Both anatomy and scepticism are 
predicated on sensory enquiry, and so developments in natural philosophy 
complement contemplations of epistemic and moral doubt already spreading in 
England by the mid-sixteenth century. 
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Crooke’s Mikrokosmographia is more complicated than a simple 
anatomy, however, and the book’s focus on both scientific and spiritual vision 
neatly illustrates how visual scepticism, anatomy, and moral uncertainty are 
closely tied together.  He deems eyesight a “spirituall Sense” (Nnn3r), given to 
us “that wee might pursue profitable things and auoyde whatsouer is hurtfull. . . 
.” (Sss2r).  Although there is a delay between seeing and perceiving, relaying 
images to the “iudging Faculty” (Kkk6r) of “common” sense, vision is described 
throughout Mikrokosmographia as the way “unto that which is profitable” (ZZ4r).  
Eyesight is inherently and anatomically moral, not least because the reception 
of immaterial species18 place it amongst those senses that “doe Perceiue their 
obiects not Materially but Spiritually” (Lll2v).  Indeed, Crooke notes that the eye 
“may very well bee compared to a looking glasse,” reflecting what is placed in 
front of it, but notes that it contains a crucial difference:  
 
. . . there is no virtue of the Soule in a glasse which can referre 
and transmit the image receiued unto any other thing as it were 
unto a Iudge. (Ll5r) 
 
Visual images may be like reflections in a mirror, but distinct in that they are 
transmitted to the mind to be reflected upon.  This decidedly non-anatomical 
definition of vision admits spirituality into science, but it is combined with 
detailed illustrations of the musculature of the eye and dissected eyeballs.  The 
combination of spiritual and scientific language—what Bruce R. Smith calls the 
“psychophysics” of Crooke’s optics (56)—both undermines the objectivity of 
natural philosophy and the spiritual certainty of moral judgement.  If the eye is a 
judge, in Crooke’s words, Mikrokosmographia seeks to know its reasoning in 
the muscles and materials of the human body even as it acknowledges that 
perception is immaterial. 
                                     
18 Drawn from Aristotelian theories in De Anima, and medieval theological commentaries upon 
it, vision was thought to be received by species (“images” in the form of rays or beams) emitted 
from “corporeall” objects, leaving a reflection, or more accurately a reliable representation, of 
that object in the eye.  Aristotelian theories of receptive sight stood in direct opposition to the 
Galenic or Platonic gaze, which contended that beams were emitted from the eyes towards the 
“things corporeall.”  Most of the period’s anatomy textbooks dismiss this latter theory.  
Addressing what Sergei Lobanov-Rostevsky has recently termed “the basilisk” (“Taming the 
Basilisk” 196), anatomists find alternative explanations for the “infecting” look and argue that 
vision could only be accurate and universal if objects themselves transmit their likeness.  Almost 
all English discussions of optics in the seventeenth-century, by Hooke and by Crooke, prefer 
Aristotle’s receptive organ. 
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Crooke’s anatomical search for “immaterial” truths—an apparent 
contradiction that borders on paradox—resists a separation of practical and 
spiritual knowledge.  William E. Slights argues, for instance, that a conjunction 
of scientific and spiritual meanings can be detected in the image and organ of 
the heart (The Heart in the Age of Shakespeare, 2008).  Similarly, Jonathan 
Sawday’s seminal work, The Body Emblazoned (1995), insists on the 
complexities involved in dissection: “anatomies were performed in public, then, 
as ritualistic expressions of often contradictory layers of meaning, rather than as 
scientific investigations in any modern sense” (Body 63).  Even anatomy, as 
demonstrated by Crooke’s work, can offer itself as a form of moral philosophical 
enquiry.  This exchange between the “scientific” and the moral or spiritual is 
central to my reading of the aesthetic of “strangeness,” which, as explored 
below, negotiates between mechanical and moral construction, abstract and 
physical representation, illusion and ostensibly “empirical” reality. 
Science and scepticism, then, have a powerful and often troubling 
relationship with early modern notions of morality, a relationship that very often 
finds its expression in issues of vision.  Ruth Lunney has identified in the period 
an “increasing emphasis on the visual as the key to making sense of reality” 
(43)—the resurgence and advance of classical images, cartography, 
perspective, and printed type ornament and illustration—but there were also 
suggestions that such documents were not reliable forms of knowledge.  
Scepticism puts physical and moral knowledge in parallel and challenges both; 
it questions the material and immaterial roles of the eye—an organ about which 
it is keenly concerned.  The reemergent scepticism of the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries used the material aspects of sight to challenge its 
spiritual power.  Montaigne, for instance, contradicts sensory empiricism by 
arguing that “things lodge not in us in their proper forme & essence” but “yeelde 
unto our mercie, and lodge with us according to our pleasure” (“Apology” Ff1v): 
visual experience is relative.  Indeed, the familiar relationship between 
“corporeal vision and spiritual enlightenment” (Clark 11) was complicated by 
numerous philosophical debates that parallel the period’s proliferating visual 
culture.  Clark explains that early modern Pyrrhonists opposed dogmatic 
models of cognition (the idea that species received through the eye guaranteed 
visual certainty) and “Scepticism therefore underlined the de-rationalization of 
sight” (266).  Many sceptical writers consequently explored notions of visual 
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aporia and the relativity of perception in the period. The process and the 
reliability of sight are steadily contested, almost to the point of collapse. 
 
Materialisation of Morality 
The sceptical moment throws both optics and ethics into doubt in early 
modern England.  That doubt is complemented by a scientific interest in 
acquiring “material” knowledge and a sceptical interest in physical experience.  
The materialisation of morality is a response to these phenomena (and to the 
relativist possibilities of rhetoric—see chapter five).  Faced with uncertainty over 
how to represent both moral and physical “knowledge,” England’s cheap print in 
the period often conflates the two.  Metaphorical comparisons of moral advice 
with objects of practical use appear in moral philosophy generally, as with 
William Martyn’s observation that “vertue consisteth in action, and that the 
meditation thereof without practise, is as an unstringed instrument, whereon no 
man plaieth” (D1v).  Pamphlets and broadsides emphasise the moral efficacy of 
such metaphors by visually representing advice and admonition as objects.  
Cheap print images transform moral ideas into functional, everyday materials, 
turning the early modern insistence on practical use into a physical possibility.  
As discussed later in this chapter, such a transformation is realised, as well as 
contested, in stage spectacles that interrogate their own modes of 
representation. 
 
Material morality in printed images owes much to the tensions between 
cheap print’s physical fragility and its content’s abstract aims.  In The English 
Gentleman (1630), Richard Brathwaite quarrels with the public availability of 
text represented by the early modern broadside, drawing into question its 
authorial reliability.  The book itself is surrounded by a considerable amount of 
prefaces and epistles, including an address “To the Reader” that outlines both 
the status of the physical book and its intentions, introducing “a Gentleman, 
who professeth the true and new Art of Gentilizing” (¶2r).  Brathwaite 
emphasises that his work is a book rather than a less solid form of print; the 
physical security of that format situates the author himself as instructive and 
ethically sound, in contrast with the 
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begging pedanticall Artist, who by a mercenary Bill pasted on 
some frequented gate, gives notice to the itching Passenger, that 
if any one be minded to learne the rare and mysterious Art of 
Brachygraphie, Stenographie, Logarisme, or any Art (indeed) 
whatsoever, (though he be a mere stranger to any) upon resort to 
such a Sign in such a Lane, he shall find a most illiterate 
Anacharsis, ready to bray his brains in a Morter to give him 
content. (The English Gentleman ¶2r-v). 
 
Exactly such a Bill survives in the Lemon collection at the Society of 
Antiquaries’ Library, London, where it advertises “the professors of . . . Artes &c. 
Readie to do their diligent endeuours for a reasonable consideration” (Humfrey 
Baker; Lemon 102; STC 1209.3): 
 
 80 
 
Fig. 3.  Humfrey Baker’s bill poster.  Such as are desirous . . . (N.p., 1590).  
STC 1209.3. 
 
As the extant example of Fig. 3 reveals, the cheap advertisement contains no 
borders, elaborate printer’s devices, or signatures; the text is metaphorically 
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“open.”  Brathwaite’s “Gentleman” and his authorial voice assume greater 
credibility by questioning this “openness” and undermining its legitimacy.  
Brathwaite distances his text from street-corners and posts, much as Ben 
Jonson does when he implores his bookseller not to place his “title-leafe on 
posts, or walls, / Or in cleft-sticks, aduanced to make calls / For termers, or 
some clarke-like seruing-man, / Who scarce can spell th’hard names…” 
(Workes Ttt1v).  The wealth of prefatory material in The English Gentleman 
grants the text moral and literary authority by surrounding with epistles, 
recommendations, dedications, and flattering prefaces.  Heidi Brayman Hackel 
recognises that the early modern preface establishes the idea that access to 
the words “was granted and could somehow be controlled” (Reading 86).  For 
Brathwaite, the words are not only homeless in their printed context—lacking 
what Brian W. Schneider calls the “framing texts” of a preface or epilogue and 
so without the metaphorical “walls” these devices represent—but they are 
rendered vagrant in their content: the pasted bill carries the text of a “begging 
pedanticall Artist,” not a scholar or a gentleman. 
Patricia Fumerton’s work on broadside ballads and the travelling poor 
has extended understanding of the broadside market and its relationship to 
vagrancy.  Ballads are of course distinct from the bill poster or advertisement of 
Fig. 3, marked by their “pleasing visual appearance” (498) and held as 
“cherished aesthetic artifacts.”  Even so, their public availability aligns them with 
the “open” texts that Brathwaite quarrels with in The English Gentleman.  
Fumerton has drawn parallels between the ephemerality of the broadside and 
the ephemeral spaces of early modern London, such as the tenement or the 
alehouse (496).  The composition of these ballads also associates them with 
poverty, with “itinerant woodcuts” and hotchpotch texts being “passed from 
usually anonymous author, to printer, to ballad-monger, to audience . . . and 
then often back again . . . to be reissued in a different key” (501).  Fumerton 
argues that the recycling, re-appearance, and migration of woodcut images 
grant the broadside ballad an “aesthetic of displacement” that is inherently 
“vagrant” (504). 
As fundamentally homeless texts and without the paratextual walls of 
prefatory material, the broadside ballad and the bill poster are associated with 
both material and intellectual poverty.  Brathwaite’s undermining of the 
intellectual credentials behind the poster parallels the reduction of the poster 
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itself to material terms; the quip about “the begging pedanticall Artist” aligns the 
material wants of the beggar with the form of the public broadside.  Fumerton 
suggests that broadsides are inextricably associated with their physical form, 
and her study emphasises their composition, circulation, and the very “fabric of 
broadside ballads” (502).  Although other authors in the period, from Ben 
Jonson to Thomas Coryat, scorn the perishable paper of print, the broadside 
(and perhaps the pamphlet) has a more palpable fragility.  Indeed, the tendency 
of many broadside ballads to advertise their prices and their status as objects-
for-sale associates them with the processes of material exchange inherent in 
any market economy.  The Cloak’s Knavery (c.1660) opens, “Come buy my 
New Ballad, / I have’t in my Wallet” (Wing C4721), at once alerting us to the 
ephemerality of the genre by emphasising its “newness” before referring us to 
the object of exchange, inside the seller’s wallet.  The ballad-seller’s “begging” 
in these opening lines echoes the way Brathwaite assigns vagrant status to the 
“open” broadside.  Similarly, Nicholas Bourne entered into the Stationers’ 
Register on the 9th March 1613 Good councell for a little money or the 
blindmans Guid to heauen (Arber 3: 543).  Though it has not survived, the title 
already ties the ballad’s advice up with the pricing of its physical form.  It is an 
object of material and market production. 
While the ephemerality gestured to by these ballads certainly 
undermines textual status, many broadside woodcuts use this more palpable 
materiality associated with their bibliographic form in order to strengthen their 
ethical credibility.  Woodcut images and broadside titles identify themselves as 
“objects,” raising their physical status from what Tessa Watt would term “cheap 
print” to the more solid material “clutter” of the early modern world. 
In The Winter’s Tale (1609-11), Autolycus appears as a pedlar who is 
associated with such “clutter” even as he attempts to sell love songs to the 
gathered revellers.  Autolycus inhabits a similar role to the speaker of The 
Cloak’s Knavery, comically playing on the “newness” of his ballads and their 
“certain” truthfulness.  The song of the usurer’s wife who gave birth to twenty 
money-bags is, he assures us, “Very true, and but a moneth old” (Bb3r), but 
Shakespeare also conflates Autolycus’s ballad-selling with his status as a 
“pedlar,” hawking his wares.  Like The Cloak’s Knavery, Autolycus’s ballads are 
conceived as material things, indeed as bespoke items.  We hear that “He hath 
songs for man, or woman, of all sizes: No Milliner can so fit his customers with 
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Gloues” (Bb3r).  Such accessories, though, were actually aligned with the 
advice of some broadside tables (see the section on household decoration, 
below, for the distinction between “tables” and ballads): 
 
 
Fig. 4.  [Some f]yne gloues deuised for Newyeres gyftes to teche yonge peop[le 
to] knowe good from euyll (London, 1560).  STC 23628.5. 
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The gloves in the broadside of Fig. 4 are figured as New Year’s gifts, much like 
a milliner’s tailored objects, but they are designed to teach how to distinguish 
good from evil and to function as a mnemonic device for learning the ten 
commandments.  While the poetry ostensibly aims “to encourage the viewer to 
look beyond the image and toward its higher, more sacred, meanings. . . .” 
(Engel 39), the broadside’s form nonetheless depends upon material metaphors 
for its success—not only as a memory image, but as a useful and useable 
broadside.  If one considers that the hand often appeared in “sixteenth-century 
emblem books, heraldry, genealogical charts, and ritual gestures” as a 
“preeminent sign for political and personal agency” (Rowe 280), then the “fyne 
gloues” offer fitting ethical protection from the cold winds of conscience and 
moral uncertainty.  At the same time, they offer to align the notoriously 
ephemeral broadside with a more tangible and durable item. 
Autolycus’s reference to the milliner and the “fitting” of an appropriate 
broadside implicitly draws out a pun on wares and wears, but the conflation of 
ballads with those other wares similarly conflates the possible “higher” 
meanings of a broadside with its status as a physical object, a tension that is 
visually present in the example of [Some f]yne gloues. . . .  Although Fig. 4 is 
the only extant example of a broadside figuring gloves, the joke in The Winter’s 
Tale seems a fine comparison, and it is of course quite possible that 
Shakespeare might have seen such a ballad in circulation.19 
The use of an object in a broadside in this way signifies abstractly while 
also readying advice for practical use.  Materialising the moral image moves it 
earthward away from the more symbolic representations that characterise the 
period’s emblems.  A more prominent example of the figuring of cheap print in 
this way, as both a practical and ethical object, is the use of “spectacles” as a 
visual trope that combines abstract, medical, and material interpretations of 
both word and image.  The “spectacles” title is popular throughout the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries for advice literature and is often used in polemic 
writing, as when John Floyd employs the term in his response to Sir Humphrey 
Linde, A paire of spectacles for Sir Humfrey Linde to see his way withall.  
During the Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century, the association of 
“spectacles” with the moral judgement of the eyesight is made clear through 
                                     
19 Perhaps the reference has the author’s personal touch, as Shakespeare’s father, John, was a 
glove-maker. 
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woodcut titlepages to cheap political pamphlets.  Three 1644 pamphlets 
illustrate their titlepages with objects related to vision, emphasising the 
importance of clear eyesight: 
 
 
Fig. 5.  A new invention; or, A paire of cristall spectacles . . . (London, 1644; 
titlepage).  Wing N650.   
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Fig. 6.  The Second Part of the Spectacles . . . (London, 1644; titlepage).  Wing 
S2316. 
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Fig. 7.  The Eye Clear’d; or A preservative for the sight (London, 1644; 
titlepage).  Wing E3935. 
 
The twofold visual emphasis—both as images and as images associated with 
vision—suggests that these objects of the eye have a privileged access to truth, 
drawing on the ethical superiority of the sense of sight.  Like the gloves of Fig. 
4, they use physical objects for their abstract intentions.  The Second part of the 
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Spectacles reveals a disembodied eye in the looking-glass, an appropriation of 
the familiar emblem trope from Alciato to George Wither that sees the eye 
symbolically placed in an image: 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Emblem 43 in George Wither’s Emblemes (London, 1635; G2r).  STC 
25900a. 
 
When read alongside this tradition, the eye in The Second Part of the 
Spectacles enhances the moral aspects of the pamphlet, which can also be 
associated with the familiar “looking-glasse” that is deemed to serve as an 
admonition in moralised stories from William Painter’s Palace of Pleasure to 
“monstrosity” ballads and pamphlets: “You see the miserable discourse . . . 
which ought to serue for a looking Glasse” (Painter U5r).  Indeed, the symbolic 
image combines with the material culture in A Nevv Invention to offer the user-
reader “speciall vertue” (A1r). 
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Spectacles and glasses have both literal and allegorical meanings, 
indicating that the texts are there for moral instruction—like the admonitory 
“spectacles” and “mirror” literature of the period—as well as offering practical 
uses.  This form of material morality can be traced back before Civil War writing 
through to Elizabeth’s reign, and the “spectacles” can be identified at least as 
early as 1589.  The Lemon collection contains the earliest extant example of 
these printed “spectacles” in a proof-sheet for a broadside.  Signed “Fulwood,” 
presumably the William Fulwood who wrote other legal and “monstrosity” 
ballads during the seventeenth century, the broadside is titled A Spectacle fo[] 
Pe[]iu[]e[]s: 
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Fig. 9.  William Fulwood’s A Spectacle fo[] Pe[]iu[]e[]s (London, 1589).  
Reproduced with permission from the Library of the Society of Antiquaries, 
London.  Lemon 90, STC 11485.5. 
 
Fulwood’s image inhabits a similar conceptual space as the later Civil War 
pamphlets, solidifying the text and suggesting the Marvel-like power of God-
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vision.  By advertising John Jones as a “spectacle” of and therefore a deterrent 
from perjury, the divine spectacles are momentarily offered to the user-reader to 
see clearly through to the true moral order of this example.  Yet at the same 
time as they lend God-vision to the viewer, they also represent God’s vision by 
containing a religious sententia that reminds the reader that Deus Videt, God 
sees.  The broadside combines a number of aspects of “spectacle” literature, 
exploiting the word’s meaning as something-to-be-looked-at, its charged moral 
meaning, as well as referring to the physical objects designed for medical use.   
The figuring of the texts as physical objects through these images 
heightens their textual status, making them doubly useful.  While images can 
serve metaphorically to solidify flimsy texts, they can also solidify the use and 
aims of printed material.  The moral tradition frequently encourages its readers 
to internalise its messages, applying them to their own lives: Estienne sees 
moral figures as designed “to instruct us” (B4v) and Wither’s emblems “may be 
made use of” (A1r).  If emblems can be made use of psychologically, the 
spectacles also have a physical use.  In the pamphlets, the reader is told that 
“right use of them . . . will recover his sight very perfectly” (A New Invention) or 
the vial will act as a “preservative for the sight” (The Eye Cleard).  Where Henry 
Peacham insists in his emblem book Minerva Britanna (1612) on a hierarchy 
that privileges the “inward ei’ne” over the “outward ei’ne” (B3v), the spectacles 
of the pamphlets and the broadside deny this division.  These objects’ practical 
capacity to assist the physical organs of sight—the “outward ei’ne”—is the 
figurative source of their advice, admonition, and instruction: there, like Wither’s 
emblems, to be “made use of.”  Precisely such an exchange between physical 
and moral use attends the “strange spectacles” of plays in the early 1610s, 
whose special effects advertise their materiality while insisting on their moral 
efficacy.  
 
Material Morality and English Scepticism 
The spectacles of the broadsides and pamphlets are visual metaphors 
that incarnate ethical thought in physical objects, making that thought 
“practical.”  They therefore bridge the gap between sceptical thought and the 
inculcation of humanist virtue.  Clark claims that the “eyes were evidently the 
most spiritual and least material of the senses” (10), but it is the material 
function of eyesight that is at the heart of sceptical enquiry, the basis of moral, 
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religious, and earthly knowledge.  In one of the staple arguments of early 
modern scepticism, the senses are said to be at the centre of knowledge, but 
that sensory knowledge is itself questionable.  Montaigne deems the senses 
our “maistres” (masters), claiming that our science and knowledge is dependent 
upon them, and, in Florio’s translation, “in them is resolved” (“Apology for 
Raymond Sebond” Ff4r).  Florio’s Elizabethan translation, however, signals an 
interesting shift in meaning from Montaigne’s original passage.  Francis Yates 
has claimed Florio’s work as a whole is “such a bad translation that it is nearly 
an original work, not Montaigne but Florio’s Montaigne” (228).20  The 
uniqueness of Florio’s approach and his rhetorical preoccupations and 
euphuistic indulgence (see Yates 232-34), combined with Montaigne’s 
scepticism, emphasise England’s trend towards material understandings of 
morality.  This change in representation is important to my argument about 
stage spectacle and strangeness, because visual display is increasingly subject 
to sceptical description and deconstruction. 
In Montaigne’s 1595 edition, the pursuit of verité (truth) and its “essence” 
is dependent upon empirical sensory experience: 
 
Qu’un homme endtendud, imagine l’humaine nature produicte 
originellement sans la veue, et discourse combien d’ignorance et 
de trouble luy apporteroit un tel defaut, combien de tenebres et 
d’aveuglemente en nostre ame: on verra par la, combien nous 
importe, a la cognoissance de la verité, la privation d’un autre tel 
sens, ou de deux, ou de trois, si elle est en nous.  Nous avons 
formé une verité par la consultation et concurrence de nos cinq 
sens: mais: a l’adventure falloit-il l’accord de huict, ou de dix sens, 
et leur contribution, pour l’appercevoir certainement et en son 
essence (Balsamo et al., 627) 
 
In this passage, Montaigne builds upon an almost identical argument in one of 
the central classical texts of early modern scepticism, Sextus Empiricus’s 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which has already been discussed above.  Pyrrhus’s 
argument, which surrounds the perception of an apple (102), is repeated 
                                     
20 Mack has noted that scholars tend to agree that it “nevertheless retains ‘the essential spirit’ of 
Montaigne’s book (“Montaigne and Florio” 81). 
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wholesale in The Skeptick (C3r-v),21 but Montaigne concentrates more 
abstractly and generally on “truth” itself, rather than using the example of an 
apple as a sense object.  Montaigne asks us to imagine a man created without 
sight, or hearing, and to imagine how much darkness and blindness that state 
would entail, both literally and figuratively.  By this, we can see that what little 
truth we can currently comprehend is produced by our five senses, but, for all 
we know, we may require the use of eight or ten senses, “pour l’appercevoir 
certainement et en son essence,” if we are with certainty to perceive it (truth) in 
its essence.  Even our five senses are not enough to understand the ethical and 
religious complexity of the world; they have “formé une verité” ‘formed a truth,’ 
but the “essence” of “Truth” is still in question. 
Florio’s Elizabethan translation frames the passage slightly differently, 
personifying verité not as the abstract concept “truth” but in visual terms, figured 
as “Verity”: 
 
We have by the consultation & concurrence of our five senses 
formed one Verity, whereas peradventure there was required the 
accord & consent of eight or ten senses, and their contribution, to 
attaine a perspicuous insight of hir, and see her in her true 
essence. (Gg4r) 
 
Florio’s rendering of the passage reduces all the senses to sight, and builds the 
whole argument in terms of vision.  Contemporary dictionaries allowed for the 
multiplicity of meaning in “appercevoir,” described in Jean Nicot’s 1606 French 
dictionary as “adviser, choisir . . . il est usité aussi pour se prendre garde de 
quelque chose, la descouvrir . . .”, “to choose” or “to discover” (Dictionnaires 
d’autrefois, “Appercevoir”), and, more idiomatically, in Claudius Hollyband’s 
1593 English-French dictionary as to “haue an inkeling” (C6v).  Rather, Florio 
emphasises its visual meaning as “voir” ‘to see’ (Dictionnaires d’autrefois), or “to 
perceiue, to spie out” (Hollyband C6v).  He demands to “see” Verity as one 
might certainly have done, wielding an open book above the earth, in an early 
modern emblem book: 
                                     
21 Sometimes attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh, the important thing to note about the text is that 
Hamlin identifies it as a translation of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines and provides a compelling 
argument for it being a very similar text to the now-lost translation circulating in England in the 
1590s (Hamlin 52-54). 
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Fig. 10.  “Veritas” in Peacham’s Minerva Britanna (London, 1612; V1r).  STC 
19511. 
 
Ironically, by reducing the argument to visual knowledge, Florio’s translation 
illustrates Montaigne’s claim that knowledge is always a material process, 
inextricably related to the senses.  Florio not only reverses Montaigne’s move 
away from the visual example of an apple used in Outlines and Raleigh’s 
Sceptick, but translates verité itself into the realm of vision, as an emblem 
figure, offering the argument to the reader through the visual trope of the moral 
tradition.  He elides the syntactic ambiguity of “son essence” by translating the 
passage as a form of personification: it is not “its essence,” the root of truth, but 
“her true essence,” full sight of the visual figure, that familiar image, Veritas. 
Florio’s pairing of “insight” and “sight” produces a similar effect to 
Brathwaite’s “illiterate” bill poster, inextricably connecting intellectual and 
material knowledge.  Rather than attempting to comprehend “truth,” he presents 
the more palpable image of Verity.  The relationship between abstract thought 
and material embodiment recalls the philosopher-critic Ellen Spolsky’s 
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insistence that “there is just not any such thing as an entirely intellectual 
assessment” (Satisfying 1).  Spolsky’s search for a form of Satisfying 
Scepticism (2001) in the early modern period reminds us that our brains are not 
only the abstract Western locus of “intellect” but are bodily matter, too.  They 
therefore require constant interaction with the physical and visual world in order 
to remain stimulated and satisfied: “knowledge is not only abstract, and is not 
always best expressed and communicated in words” (5).  Forms of 
nonintellectual scepticism can therefore be a positive and generative means of 
enquiry.   
The metaphorical “objectification” of images in broadsides offers a 
symbiosis between advice/admonition and, for example, spectacles—an 
empirical scientific object.  It satisfies the physical and bodily thrust that so 
characterises the period’s sceptical enquiry while providing spiritual sustenance.  
By investing knowledge in material forms, images like the spectacles discussed 
above offer both physical and intellectual satisfaction, at once directing moral 
advice to the external eye and internal eye, to the brain and the mind. 
Spolsky’s introduction to her later edited collection Iconotropism (2004) 
takes this point further, stressing the importance of images to our daily 
navigation of the world: 
 
. . . human beings feed on pictures, metabolize them—turn them 
into nourishment—because we need the knowledge they provide.  
We turn to pictures when they are available, we imagine them if 
they’re not, and we produce them if we can. (16) 
 
Providing nourishment for both body and mind, pictures are integral to abstract 
thought; they provide both the intellectual and physical “knowledge” essential to 
human thinking.  Even in that generically symbolic George Wither emblem—a 
part of that genre so often said to take the mind away from material form—there 
is a contradiction.  Although “the Minde should have a fixed eye / On Objects, 
that are plac’d on High,” the emblem is of course unable to present purely 
abstract ethical thought.  Despite its attempt to belittle the “outward eye” of 
physical sight, it is “On Objects” that early modern popular print concentrated in 
the hope of offering some nourishment—intellectual, physical, and ethical. 
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Spolsky’s emphasis on “nourishment” is telling.  Hillman has explored 
scepticism’s obsession with bodily functions in Shakespeare’s Entrails (2007) 
and acknowledges its material impulses: “the sceptic . . . experiences the world 
as if it were made up of insides and outsides radically opaque to each other, as 
if each object in it is split into a surface” (29).  Unable to look past the 
“knowledge” of the external body, the argument is again predicated on the 
sense of sight.  This chapter has so far shown that such philosophical 
observations as those noted by Spolsky and Hillman can be supported by 
concrete evidence from the printing press, and that such literary-philosophical 
criticism can be brought down to earth, literally and metaphorically, through 
interest in the material aspects of popular print culture.  Further, unlike existing 
scholarship on emblems (see Chapter One), a concentration on their material 
aspects affords a greater and more nuanced appreciation of their moral 
functions.  Where the “spectacles” of the early modern broadside use material 
images to satisfy ethical knowledge, ballads and tables also engage with the 
bodily thrust of sceptical enquiry. 
An entry in the Stationers’ Register on the 8th December 1610 attributes 
“A booke called, Thanotamy of a Christian man” to Bishop William Cowper, of 
which a 1613 text is extant.  In the same entry, the stationer John Budge also 
registered “a table of the same matter, beinge 2 diuerse copyes” (Arber 3: 450).  
Although no broadside of this title appears to survive, the Quarto text does 
include a two-page diagram that strikingly presents the “Image of Christ”: 
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Fig. 11.  Cowper, William.  The anatomy of a Christian man . . .  (London, 1613; 
B5*).  STC 5913. 
 
It seems likely, on the limited information in the Register, that the insert would at 
least resemble the broadside, which was to be sold separately.  The Anatomie 
broadside emphasises its visual status.  The very form of the text is predicated 
upon the body of Christ, as an anatomy. 
Like the “satisfying” materiality of object-images in the manner of the 
Spectacles, Cowper’s anatomy engages with physical forms of sceptical 
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enquiry.  Hillman’s description of “the anatomist” as “the sceptic par excellence” 
is useful when thinking of these images; Cowper’s “Image of Christ” synthesises 
empirical “bodily” knowledge with the ethical and religious, much in the way of 
Crooke in the ethical-anatomical enquiries of Mikrokosmographia.  Images of 
Christ remained contentious in this period (Aston, “Symbols” 23), and 
considering The Anatomie of a Christian advertises its ethical and religious 
aims while so deeply involved with the “sceptical” act of anatomy, it is difficult to 
accept that this is a picture of man very literally in God’s image or that it is 
simply another portrait of “a famous name from antiquity” (Williams 78).  Like 
the “iconotropic” emphasis in Spolsky’s work, the Christ-body situates the 
search for ethical truth within the search for physical knowledge.  It exploits the 
unprecedented emphasis on “Christ’s penetrability and interiority,” channelling 
what Hillman sees in the period as the “obsessive topic” of Jesus’s “wounds, 
blood, heart and bowels” (Hillman 37).  Cowper’s picture places ethical and 
religious truths at the centre of the “open body,” metabolising ethical thought 
through incarnation. 
Early modern broadside images frequently materialise thought in this 
way, as objects or bodies.  Although critics such as Williams and Diehl see the 
images of sixteenth and seventeenth-century England as part of the Protestant 
theological context, encouraging the viewer to “reject images which attract men 
to their physical and material qualities” (Diehl 55), it is those very qualities that 
ensure that the broadside image is fraught with moral power.  Cowper’s Christ-
like picture advertises its fleshliness and materiality in order to synthesise the 
period’s interest in physical knowledge with what would otherwise be a 
disembodied moral purpose.  “Material morality” responds to the challenges 
facing early modern England’s moral certainties by going some way to translate 
moral advice into metaphorically tangible, rational, sensually verifiable, and 
essentially useable terms—though this response has its own anxieties, not least 
those captured in the moral ambiguity of “strange” spectacle.  
 
Not for decoration onely: materialisation of morality in the household 
 
Each mans private Oeconomie ought to be a certaine Academie, wherein all 
sacred and morall knowledge is to be taught. 
--- Richard Brathwaite (¶2r). 
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The presence of the broadside in the early modern home demands that 
even closer attention be paid to its physical and material qualities.  Indeed, 
while some broadsides—usually “ballads”—can be seen as “vagrant” texts, 
many—usually “tables”—also align themselves with the household, available for 
decoration and declaration, as household prop and household advice.  
Household images parallel physical labour with moral advice, and craft 
becomes a means for both material and abstract construction—a means of 
representation that is mirrored on an early modern stage whose “devices” 
encompass a range of conceptual meanings. 
The reemergence of substantial criticism about and historical research 
on material culture has led to fresh understandings of early modern domestic 
life, and the printed picture is often physically a part of that life.  The “third way” 
of the cheap moral image—reconciling material and abstract thought—places it 
within both print and material culture.  In the early modern household, I argue, 
the broadside woodcut is as closely connected to the bed as it is to the book. 
Broadside prints are often termed “tables” in the period, especially in the 
Stationers’ Register.  Although some historians consider the terms 
synonymous, “ballad” invariably signifies the ballad format, with text and tune, 
whereas “table” generally refers to posters of advice and prints often associated 
with the household, as, for example, in Arthur Johnson’s entry for 7 December 
1612: 
 
Entred for his copie vnder thandes of master MASON and th 
wardens A table of Oeconomicall or household gouernment fit for 
euerye householder and his familie . . . . (Arber 3: 506) 
 
These tables of advice support Richard Brathwaite’s contemporary definition of 
the household as a place “wherein all sacred and morall knowledge is to be 
taught.”  They also fall under what Tara Hamling and Catherine Richardson 
would call “everyday objects” (Everyday Objects), even at the most basic 
semantic level, as “tables.”  Malcolm Jones notes that while “table” “could mean 
‘a broadside bearing printed text only,’ it could also certainly mean what we 
should now term a print, that is, an engraved single-sheet picture with or without 
text, by 1570 at the latest, and is commonly used in the Stationers’ Register in 
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this sense thereafter” (4).  Such usage of the word does not therefore indicate 
textual predominance, though associations with writing-tables might suggest so.  
The term can be seen to signify the practical uses of both writing-tables and, in 
the household, quite possibly with the physical uses of furniture, the semantic 
possibilities expanding alongside their visual imagery. 
William Cowper is clearly concerned with interior decoration.  The 
broadside registered with his Anatomie book may well have found itself on the 
wall of a house.  This household wall, then, was not merely a place for pretty 
pictures and decorative wallpaper.  In the epistle to his 1619 commentary on 
Revelations, Cowper imagines the walls of heaven covered in jewels.  He 
describes John of Patmos’s prophecy as a “precious stone,” given as a “great 
Present” to the Church (A3v).  These visual metaphors are hardly unusual for 
one of the most frequently illustrated biblical passages of the period, notably in 
Miles Coverdale’s 1549 New Testament,22 but the close association of images 
with both decoration and instruction is telling.  Although some have called the 
verses apocryphal, Cowper notes, “all the Lords Lapidaries, who haue seene 
the precious stones, wherewith the walls of Heauenly Ierusalem are garnished, 
haue easily perceiued this to be from heauen also.”  Picturing God’s kingdom 
as a walled city, he figures biblical writings as fallen heavenly furnishings.  
Revelations, like decorations on the wall of God’s household, “partakes . . . both 
in color and vertue, and serueth Saints, not for decoration onely, but declaration 
also of many secrets, which greatly concerneth their state” (A3v).  These 
speaking walls both beautify and edify, and indeed their colours represent 
different prophecies, “signification of things to fall out; eyther aduerse or 
prosperous” (A4r). 
In using the metaphor of the household wall as the basis for biblical 
exegesis, Cowper understands that early modern surroundings are never “for 
decoration onely.”  Colour and virtue are intimately connected, and the 
decoration of the home speaks morally and religiously to its everyday 
audiences.  The recent collection of essays Art Re-formed (edited by Tara 
Hamling and Richard L. Williams) and Hamling’s Decorating the Godly 
Household (2010) offer a reappraisal of images in domestic interiors, arguing 
                                     
22 The Geneva Bible is, in relation to other illustrated Revelations passages (like Coverdale’s or 
the Matthew’s Bible of 1537), “comparatively unadorned,” but there are examples of “the 
insertion” of engravings (see Molekamp 135). 
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that paintings of the virtues and Biblical scenes on walls or tapestries 
contributed to a Reformist imagination and aesthetic.  To prescribe religious 
limits to these decorative images, however, neglects their particular and 
unorthodox possibilities.  As Cowper recognises, the precious stones have 
special significance for the saintly residents of Heavenly Jerusalem, as they 
betray “many secrets, which greatly concerneth their state” while offering to 
impart generally “the truth of things . . .” (A4r).  Similarly, interior decoration that 
was not overtly religious in subject-matter was nevertheless not merely 
decorative.  The early modern domestic environment is inextricably connected 
to ethical vision, further blurring the boundaries between the material and the 
moral. 
While Cowper’s images are chiefly religious, a number of household 
tables figure themselves as practical objects within the domestic environment.  
Broadsides frequently demand to be placed in houses, suggesting that their 
physical presence is of equal efficacy to their verbal content.  A broadside, 
because it is relatively inexpensive, is able to substitute the richer “arras” 
paintings of wealthy households for the middling and aspiring classes and can 
also appear in taverns and poorer households (as their “vagrancy” may 
suggest); it therefore fulfils humanist advice on moral decoration without 
expensive and elaborate paintings. 
Notions of construction, artifice, and materialisation of virtue can be 
associated further with humanists’ social aspirations and with their 
democratising of virtue, discussed in the first chapter.  The preface to the advice 
manual Institucion compares the act of giving moral advice with the building of a 
house: 
 
And because in buildynge vp agayne thys house of worthy fame, 
manye men must beare office beside the maister Masons and 
chiefe Carpenters, I haue therefore on my parte (in wrytyng thys 
booke) most wyllyngly begunne to dygge, to beare morter, to cary 
tyle, and doo such other small offices as belonge to the repayring 
therof, referring the greater perfection of building to workemen of 
more might and better skyll. (*4r-v) 
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Moral instruction is explicitly framed as an act of artifice or of workmanship.  
Although later the Institucion opposes “vertue” and the inheritable manor place, 
the author here builds both simultaneously.  While the house metaphor is 
common for moral instruction, appearing as the House of Alma in Spenser’s 
Faerie Queene, for instance, the extended imagery of practical craftsmanship is 
telling.  If the House of Alma has an anatomical floor map that indicates “an 
aggressively materialist notion of a self” (Schoenfeldt 60), the Institucion 
presents a similar model for moral philosophy, creating a materialist advice 
manual that describes its work as physical labour.  Elyot’s Governour and the 
Institucion represent a union of moral philosophical instruction and physical 
construction. 
These material metaphors are made visually manifest in household 
images.  The clearing of Master Cranfords Text, for example, notes that it is 
“good to drive away evill spirits, being hung over the thresholds of houses, and 
pasted or hung up on the walls of Halls and Parlors, and all haunted places.”  
Despite its densely textual appearance, it is the physical act of “being hung over 
the thresholds” that provides protection for the house. 
Closely aligned with the practical running of a household, for instance, is 
the neatly illustrated 1635 ballad Come ye blessed, &c. Goe ye cursed, &c: 
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Fig. 12.  Come ye blessed, &c., Goe ye Cursed . . . (London, 1635).  STC 
6798.7. 
 
Visually striking in its decoration anyway, the ballad conceives of itself in 
practical, objective terms.  It claims to be a “Diall of Destruction to Doomes-day: 
denoting the Seauen deadly Sins, seauen dangerous steps descendant to 
destruction; and by their contrary opposite vertues, the Seauenfold ladder 
ascending to euerlasting Felicitie.”  The dial can be read through the pictorial 
emblems associated with each sin and virtue: 
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Fig. 13.  Detail of Fig. 12; “Chastitie.” 
 
Fig. 14.  Detail of Fig. 12; “Lechery.” 
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These persuasive and dissuasive moral images are familiar emblem 
compositions, leading to the hell mouth or the angels of heaven, offering the 
standard sententiae: “Why so? t’is better to goe to Heauen single / Then with 
the hellish multitude to mingle.”  Yet the pictures invite themselves to be used 
as well as read.  Like the printed “spectacles,” the images suggest that they 
might be of physical use.  As a “dial,” the broadside is an “instrument serving to 
tell the hour of the day” or indeed as a “timepiece or chronometer of any kind” 
(OED “Dial, n.1,” 1 and 3). 
Where other tables draw attention to their status as objects by declaring 
their physical benefits—cleansing the house of evil by sitting in a chamber—the 
“Seauenfold ladder” of Come ye blessed, &c. also figures the broadside as a 
moral household prop, one that is physically and psychologically available for 
use.  Metaphorically positing itself as a household stepladder, it is not only 
available in its practical sense and its decorative function—possibly pasted on 
the wall, as a furnishing—but in its moral intention of directing the mind towards 
“Felicity.”  Like the spectacles, the stepladder and the dial reconceptualise 
moral messages in physical forms, offering the metaphorical possibility of use.  
The ballad conceives of itself as part of Orlin’s “level of clutter,” part of the “fairly 
hidden history” of the early modern household’s fittings (112), while associating 
its symbolic meanings with emblem and advice literature. 
 
The Materialisation of Morality and Stage Spectacles 
The notion of material morality is present on the stage just as it is in 
print—acutely in the “strange” plays of the 1610s.  Unlike in print, the stage’s 
actual, physical props have the power to literalise the metaphorical possibilities 
of practical moral use.  Sceptical thinking in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries combines with anti-Catholic propaganda to decry illusion and 
spectacle, revealing them to be merely mechanical artifice.  Reginald Scot and 
William Lambarde consequently reduce all forms of legerdemain, contraption, 
and theatrical device to engines of practical use.  The stress on craftsmanship 
rather than spiritual significance accords with notions about the English stage, 
those playwrights whose profession is similarly occupied with artifice, craft, and 
construction.  Yet the stage also draws in a number of moral overtones to these 
devices, even as the mechanics of stage effects are made obvious.  In the 
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words of Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany Stern, “. . . there was no binary 
between the materiality of theatre and the emotional, metaphorical and poetic 
registers of the plays themselves” (3).  This section builds upon the work of 
Karim-Cooper, Stern, and and of recent materialist criticism by expanding 
material enquiry to the moral-philosophical contexts surrounding early modern 
theatrical display.  It argues that the jointure of material and moral use in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century broadsides is visible in playhouse 
performance, where the practical Ciceronian strain of early modern morality is 
combined with the stage’s practical craft.  As part of this discussion, I also 
acknowledge the affinities between medieval theatre’s explicit bodily interests 
and the spectacular displays of Jacobean performance; Scot and Lambarde 
both draw parallels and distinctions between mysterious pre-Reformation 
“display” and defiantly mechanical contraptions—between attempted illusion 
and acknowledged artifice.  Similarly, new and developing genres including the 
masque combine classical ideals with practical issues, and I build on the work 
of Stephen Orgel and Roy Strong to explore how masques rely both on abstract 
and material representation.  Both scepticism and the humanist ideals 
underpinning such genres as the masque add a renewed but critically enquiring 
interest in the materiality of performance in the late Elizabeth and early 
Jacobean period.  
There is a long history of mechanical artifice in English theatre.  On the 
medieval stage, the role of the guilds in the mystery cycles closely ties craft and 
theatre, associating stage props and their symbolic effects with practical 
occupation.  Helen Cooper has remarked of the mystery cycles that “it is no 
coincidence . . . that ‘incarnation,’ literally ‘enfleshment,’ the embodiment of God 
as Man, is inseparable from the plays that take their name from the feast of 
Corpus Christi, of the body of Christ” (“Mystery Plays” 30).  It is the central 
symbol of the cross—integral to late medieval Christianity—that dominates the 
closing plays of these mystery cycles.  V. A. Kolve notes how 
 
The cross functioned as a kind of earthly throne, rather than as 
the instrument of His dying.  In the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries . . . this image changed greatly, in response to new 
meditational modes, new theological ideas, new fashions in 
sensibility: Christ is depicted suffering on the cross, His body 
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broken and bleeding.  This transformation of Christianity’s central 
image affected all art forms, the drama not least among them: the 
Corpus Christi cycles show Christ ‘don on the rood’ in greater 
circumstantial detail, and with greater force and artistic complexity, 
than any other art form of the Middle Ages. (175) 
 
The enduring symbolic force of the cross is matched in the mystery plays by the 
curious practical details of crucifixion.  Christ’s passion is drawn out to such 
intimate and excruciating detail that the religious power of the symbol is 
inextricable from its material presence in the performance and all the grotesque 
physical details that accompany it. 
All Crucifixion scenes in surviving cycles merge symbolic imagery with 
physical action and most play on the role of the guilds in performance.  It is 
important to remember with regard to these scenes that the guilds can be tied 
to most mystery cycles and were closely bound up with the performance and 
organisation of Corpus Christi day processions.  The Early Banns of Chester 
state, in 1539-40, that “these be the craftys of the Citie the whiche craftys bere 
the charge of the pagyns in pley of corpus Christi” (REED Chester 31).  
Similarly, the Leet Book at Coventry records in 1494 how “dyuers charges haue 
be continued tyme oute of mynde for the worship of the same as pagantes & 
such other which haue be born be dyuers Craftes” (REED Coventry 79).  
Richard Beadle and Pamela M. King point out that “the craft-guilds were 
occasionally referred to as ‘mysteries’, and from the association of the crafts 
with the pageants of the Corpus Christi play arose the modern expression 
‘mystery plays’” (xv-xvi).   
The Crucifixion scenes, whether played or sponsored by the 
Ironmongers (Chester), Pynners and Paynters (York), or an unidentified guild, 
combine the practicalities of professional trade with the pageants’ symbolic 
intentions.  The pynners—nail makers—of the particularly violent York pageant 
complain about the mistakes of workmanship, driving a nail through Christ’s 
“bones and senous” that “failis a foote and more.”  The third soldier claims that it 
was wrongly marked, noting, “in faith, it was ouere skantely scored; / that makis 
it fouly for to faile” (352 ll.103-112).  After nailing Christ to the cross, the soldiers 
offer a familiar tradesman’s guarantee that “this werke will holde” (353 l.121).  
The ironmongers in the Chester crucifixion also provide “nayles good wonne / to 
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nayle him upon” (310 l.159) and the torturers make similar guarantees: “I dryve 
yn / this ilke iron pynne / that I dare laye will last” (312 ll.194-6). 
The realistic qualities of these props are confirmed by the Smiths 
Accounts at Coventry, closely relating the dramatic action to everyday trade.  In 
1462, they record “a peyre of new whelys, the pryce viij s; item, for nayls and ij 
hokys for the sayd pagiente, iiij d; item for a cord. . .” (REED Coventry 41), 
connecting the play of pageantry to the business of bookkeeping and material 
production.  In the Townley cycle, the visual cues for these props are present in 
the text, where commands to lift up the cross, hold Christ, and drive the nails in 
are clearly signalled.  According to Peter Happé, “we should bear in mind . . . 
that although much of the effect here depends on realistic detail painfully 
enacted, the iconic figure of Christ on the cross is also being brought about.  
This mixture of practical stagecraft and the evolution of iconic material is 
particularly effective as theatre” (98).  In fact, the striking combination of realism 
and religiosity is central to the materially-orientated drama that, as V.A. Kolve, 
Rosemary Woolf, and Clifford Davidson have separately acknowledged, owes 
much to the visual and physical importance of the host in late medieval liturgy.  
Davidson’s study of the guilds in York acknowledges that the plays are 
“specifically designed to emphasize sympathy for the object of torture and 
against the distortion of the legal system that brought Jesus to his sacrificial 
death—a death believed to be a benefit for all who are willing to take advantage 
of the system of salvation offered by the church” (17), but Davidson’s study also 
testifies to the symbolic purposes of the guild’s participation.  Each guild 
 
achieved a collective identity and place within the parade . . . from 
the Barkers, associated with the odorous process of tanning, with 
their Creation of Heaven and Earth, to the affluent Mercers.  In so 
doing, each guild maintained its role of presenting an essential 
fragment of sacred story, often a fragment also pointing to its 
social and economic role in the city as in the case of the Bakers’ 
pageant of the Lord’s Supper . . . . (20) 
 
Clearly, the presence of an “iron pynne” or “nayles good wonne” represents 
both contemporary trade practice and important components of the Biblical 
story, reinforcing “the collective memory of times past” and making them 
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“relevant to contemporaries” (Davidson 25).  Yet the fashioning of iconic 
symbols and Biblical history is rooted in the material basis of its construction, 
both physically and metaphorically constructing religious images. 
While the Reformation in England sought to distance itself, eventually, 
from religious celebrations like the Corpus Christi plays, the material morality 
displayed in popular print proves that images did not entirely abdicate their 
visual, material form and eventually came to harness it as a source of moral 
power.  The English stage can be seen to move along a similar trajectory.  
Where deeply allegorical plays and dumb shows characterise the early and 
mid-sixteenth century, a subject explored in the first chapter of this thesis, 
Elizabethan theatre can also be closely associated with the medieval mystery 
cycles. 
Critics including Cooper and Beatrice Groves have suggested that 
English theatre is closely aligned with pre-Reformation “embodied” drama.  
Groves explains that “the mystery plays, like the mass, had been a powerful 
spectacle, and the memory of both remained in many early-modern minds” (39).  
Consequently, spectacle is important for the commercial stage.  Notions of 
“classical decorum” are, Groves notes, “violated” in both medieval and early 
modern drama through “the presentation of violence on stage,” and in 
Shakespeare, for instance, it is possible to see “the violent power of the 
medieval theatre” (49).  “Hybrid” moral plays (see Chapter One) borrow visual, 
physical imagery from the dagger of lath to the hell’s mouth, while instances like 
Bajazeth’s beating of his brains on a cage in Tamburlaine (1587) and 
Gloucester’s blinding in King Lear (1606) echo the literal violence of medieval 
spectacle.  Philip Butterworth has shown, too, that many of the stage’s special 
effects have roots in medieval performance, both English and continental.  
The Jacobean period sees a further advance in stage effects, including, 
arguably, more subtlety and greater mechanical artifice.  Jenny Sager notes 
that  
 
by the end of the 1590s, the limited special effects of the 1580s 
and early 1590s—the ‘creaking throne[s]’ descending from the 
heavens, the overtly fake ‘giants, monsters, furies, beats and 
bugbears’ and the ‘pasteboard march panes and our wooden 
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pies’—were beginning to be regarded as a ready source of 
comedy rather than of wonder. (39) 
 
These effects did not disappear; John Melton’s comments about Dr Faustus, 
discussed below, suggest that commercial theatres maintained the tried-and-
trusted effects that drew in crowds.  Marion Lomax has characterised the 
seventeenth century as a period that places growing emphasis on visual-
dramatic effects.  She notes that “the roots of the development of spectacle in 
the public theatres have been traced to a strange mixture of soils—the medieval 
mysteries, civic pageantry, aristocratic tournaments, the masque, and the 
results of private theatre rivalry with eventual partial amalgamation” and argues 
that these influences “indicate a combination of old and new traditions and 
effects which can be traced in the drama” (19).  Nonetheless, Shakespeare and 
Thomas Heywood exhibit a particularly “Jacobean” approach to stage spectacle 
from the late 1600s.  Descending eagles, fireworks, tempests, and living statues 
dominate Heywood’s Age plays and Shakespeare’s “late plays.”  These are 
exactly the displays described as “strange,” making the word a possible 
description for their shared stagecraft and its effects. 
The move towards indoor theatre amongst adult companies arguably 
contributes to a growing visual emphasis in Jacobean theatre as a whole.  From 
the revival of the boy companies at the start of the century, there begins to 
develop an indoor-theatre aesthetic that is reflected in the content of their plays.  
Mary Bly explains that “boys’ plays persistently challenge the audience by 
referencing the artificiality of stage practice . . .” (147).  Drawing attention to the 
practices of theatrical effect, the boy companies emphasise the materiality of 
spectacle.  The attention to artificiality partly results, according to Bly, from the 
frequent gestures to the boy actors’ male body beneath his female garb, but the 
buildings themselves also draw out the material aspects of stage practice.  
Keith Sturgess describes the private theatres’ “end-stage,” which “favours 
tableau-like effect, such as the last two scenes of The Broken Heart, the Loretto 
scene of The Duchess of Malfi and the chess-game at the end of The Tempest: 
a succession of eloquent stage pictures best seen from the front” (54).  Indeed, 
engagement with the physical occurrences of the theatre is partly a result of the 
intimate, candlelit spaces that characterise smaller indoor theatres.  Matching 
candlelight to action and with the light of day streaming through the stone-
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framed windows, a theatre like the Blackfriars arguably demands concentration 
on smaller visual matters.23  Ralph Alan Cohen adds that “the visual impact” of 
theatrical moments involving lighting 
 
owes much to the largely fixed nature of the stage and the frons 
scenae.  Against that background even small changes can 
significantly influence the appearance of the room, and this kind of 
change applies as well to the use of such signifiers as torches, 
candles, and lanterns. (217) 
 
An early modern audience’s sensitivity to lighting, then, feeds into other visual 
aspects of the plays, as well as the lavishly decorated theatre itself. 
Outdoor theatres have their own tradition of special effects, however, and the 
Red Bull’s continued success with visually impressive drama suggests that 
visible effects are equally essential to the development of outdoor public theatre 
tastes.  Philip Henslowe’s diary details a rich array of devices, props, and 
material improvements to the Rose that reveal the theatre to be equally 
interested in display from its outset.  More pertinent to this thesis, the Red Bull 
theatre itself, host to the Queen’s Servants, acquired a reputation for being a 
particularly spectacular playhouse.  Indeed, there is clearly a growing interest in 
the nature of elaborate visual display in the 1600s and 1610s in both indoor and 
outdoor theatres.  The Queen’s Servants can be found playing alongside the 
King’s Men in 1611 for a performance of the Silver Age (Chambers 212).  Such 
collaboration draws Heywood’s public theatre spectacle and the King’s Men’s 
visually emphatic style close together, as subsequent chapters of this thesis 
explore.   
Marion Lomax debates whether effects like Jupiter descending in 
Cymbeline would have resembled the ridiculed devices of the 1580s-90s or 
have been impressive advances in stage technology.  Given that it costs seven 
times more to attend an indoor theatre; that engineering in masques had 
developed rapidly (discussed below); and that visual aspects come to dominate 
so many plays of the period, it seems likely to me that effects by the Jacobean 
period must be somewhat advanced.  Yet it remains safest to agree with Lomax 
                                     
23 See, for instance, Paul Menzer’s argument about filmic acting and the Blackfriars in Moving 
Shakespeare Indoors (2014). 
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“that the reality may have been a mixture of the two—both self-conscious 
artifice and awe-inspiring spectacle” (121).  That mixture would serve doubly to 
expose the material reality of spectacle and at the same time to enhance its 
effect—a strengthening of moral and visceral experience by pointing to the 
materiality of the moment.   
Material-moral stagecraft: Devices and Engines 
The stage, by exposing its material underpinnings, shows physical 
construction to be an important aspect of ethical enquiry.  This chapter has 
shown that early modern theatre was practical in its aims, objectives, and 
outcomes.  Like the moral advice of popular print, the “craft” of theatre was and 
is both verbal and material.  This final section examines how spectacle unites 
moral and practical force, concentrating on Jacobean spectacle in particular but 
taking context from the late Elizabethan period.  Investigating the practical 
stagecraft of the period provides necessary context for understanding “strange” 
occurrences in the plays at their most spectacular moments—moments that 
necessarily combine the practical and the moral, emotional, and poetic.  
The significance of material spectacle is teased out in the period by uses 
of the polyvalent terms “device” and “engine.”  The rich, messy orthography and 
the flexible semantics of pre-stabilised English are particularly instructive. 
“Deuise” is a remarkably polysemous word in early modern England.  The 
Oxford English Dictionary attests to the contradictory definitions current in the 
period: among its many meanings, it is both “something devised or framed by 
art or inventive power; an invention, contrivance; esp. a mechanical contrivance 
(usually of a simple character for some particular purpose)” and, 
simultaneously, “used of things non-material” (OED “device, n.,” 7a. and b.).  If it 
is at once a mechanically material and a “non-material” invention, the device—
whatever its form—seems to be peculiarly able to unite the abstract and the 
physical world.  Henri Estienne’s emblem theory, translated into English in 1646 
by Thomas Blount, indicates the “true Etimologie of the word” device: it is “by it . 
. . that we represent and discover humane passions, hopes, feares, doubts, 
disdaine, anger, pleasure . . . and all other motions of the soule” (C1v).  In the 
context of emblems, impresa, exempla and sententiae, the moral connotations 
of “deuise” are drawn to the fore.  Such a definition also links the material, 
mechanical “device” with printed moral images.  Yet William Bourne’s 
Inventions or Devises (1590) uses the term to refer to matters of engineering, 
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and his list of various devices includes winches and cranes and stretches from 
martial affairs at sea to the construction of in-land fortifications.  Indeed, for 
Turner, “Evidence from the Revels Office indicates that within a practical milieu 
the term ‘device’ could designate simultaneously an idea, invention or conceit; 
the actual show or entertainment itself; and finally the sketch, ‘outline’, or plat 
that was used in the process of realizing the conceit in its material, mechanical 
form” (129).  As such, the term connotes a number of (potentially conflicting) 
states or concepts, including the idea of a thing and the thing itself. 
The term “engine” contains parallel material-moral meanings, often used 
to describe tools or weapons but also associated with mental, intellectual, or 
ingenious plans and designs. Both “device” and “engine,” therefore, have close 
connections with the “material morality” of the broadsides: they merge moral 
significance and material object, visual image and practically-usable 
constructions.  They are part of the society’s technology as well as its culture, 
providing support to Kenneth J. Knoespel’s claim that “technology is not a 
spectacle that momentarily diverts our attention but a medium through which a 
culture defines itself” (120). 
The practical and material nature of stage devices leads English authors 
Reginald Scot and William Lambarde to seek to know the machinations behind 
visual illusions—as anatomists scrutinising the human body.  A sceptical 
impulse motivates their approach and puts the focus on material mechanics.  
Knowledge of illusion’s physical constructions offers some hope of moral 
edification.  Lambarde tackles the famous Boxley rood in his Perambulation of 
Kent (1576)—in which an image of Christ is said to smile or frown on its 
worshippers (once they have devoutly paid their dues).  Lambarde deconstructs 
these “pictures” by explaining the material workings behind them: the pictures 
were fixed “by means of a pyn of wood, stricken through it into a poste (whiche 
a false knaue standing behind, could put in, and pull out, at his pleasure)”: 
these (literally) crafty monks loosened the pin when they thought “folkes purses” 
were deep enough (Aa2r). 
Reginald Scot goes further in providing a visual and verbal 
deconstruction of public spectacle.  Where Thomas Beard’s Theatre of God’s 
Judgements (1597) collapses any distinction between elaborate visual 
punishment and divine providence, Scot’s Discoverie of Witchcraft (1584) is 
intent on exposing “the endeuor and drift of iugglers” that lie behind physically 
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realised images.  Illusions are there, he insists, “onelie to abuse mens eies and 
iudgements” (Cc1r).  His discussion of “iugglers” gleefully exposes the 
mechanical arts behind “supernatural” phenomena, including the means “to cut 
off ones head, and to laie it in a platter” (Dd8r): 
 
Fig. 15.  Image of artificial decapitation from Scot’s The discouerie of witchcraft . 
. . Discourse concerning the nature and substance of devils and spirits (London, 
1584; Dd8r).  STC 21864. 
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The diagram and text become a form of anatomy theatre that slices through 
illusion: it offers “the order of the action, as it is to be shewed,” and Scot uses 
emphatically ocular terms, concentrating on “shew” and “sight” and providing 
“necessarie obseruations to astonish the beholders.”  That visual emphasis 
turns the original spectacle on its head: the theatrical moment is not in the 
suspension of belief but in the assurance of materiality.  In using these sceptical 
impulses to attack visual display, Scot assures the reader that such spectacles 
are purely mechanical; he writes that they “are no supernaturall actions, but 
deuises of men” (Dd8r).  It is clear that material knowledge is both morally and 
theatrically valuable. 
Spectacle proves to be commercially useful in the theatres, but it is not 
without its dismissive critics, who gesture towards its illusory powers.  
Marlowe’s works remained perennial favourites at the Theatre, the Rose, and 
then the Fortune.  John Melton’s well-known remarks in his Astrologaster (1620) 
about Doctor Faustus show that some thirty years or so after its first 
performances, audiences were clearly still more than happy to 
 
behold shagge-hayr’d Deuills runne roaring over the Stage with 
Squibs in their mouthes, while Drummers make thunder in the 
Tyring-house, and the twelue-penny Hirelings make artificial 
Lightning in their Heauens. (E4r) 
 
These remarks refer dismissively to the material realities of Jacobean 
spectacle, revealing effects to be little more than sulphurous fireworks, 
drummers, and stage-hands.  Indeed, they are part of Melton’s attack on 
astrology.  He denies that astrologers can “fore-tell of Lightning and Thunder 
that shall happen such a day” when the only “Inflamations” to be seen are those 
at “the Fortune in Golding-lane” (E4r).  His witty comparison opposes theatrical 
effect to nature.  The immediate conclusion, “Who then will beleeue these 
Fortune-sellers?” (E4v) echoes the theatre’s name and further aligns the falsity 
of astrological prediction with theatrical effect; Melton implicitly parallels the 
false prognostications of the astrologer with the artifice of dramatic devices, 
treating both as forms of deceit.  His words echo Brathwaite’s complaints about 
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the “begging pedanticall Artist” (¶2r-v), whose flimsy and conspicuously 
“material” broadsheet deceives the passing passenger.  
Antitheatricalists in early modern England denigrate the stage by calling 
its actors and writers craftsmen; Stephen Gosson describes plays being 
“erected” (C1v) like the scaffolds they adorn.  “As well as being called ‘play-
makers’ and ‘poets’, playwrights of the early modern period were frequently 
known as ‘play-patchers,’” Tiffany Stern observes, and “the term was 
unflattering and designed to wound, as was ‘playwright,’ with its implication that 
constructing plays was a craft—equivalent to being a cartwright or a 
wheelwright—rather than an art” (Documents 1).  This practical approach to 
playwrighting/writing suggests, in Bernard Beckerman’s words, “an active 
interchange between player and playwright” (122-23).  Indeed, theatre 
historians and critics including Stern, Roslyn Knutson, and Douglas Bruster 
have shown that plays were deeply embedded in social and commercial 
contexts.  Playwrights disseminated plays in parts, wrote for specific actors or 
companies, responded to shifts in genre and repertory, and took theatre spaces 
themselves into consideration.  An important amount of a printed play, then, is a 
result of this broad, collaborative, and fluid interchange between playwright(s) 
and the theatrical world. 
Ben Jonson seeks to deny this interchange in his prologue written for the 
1616 Folio edition of Every Man In His Humour, where spectacular devices and 
engines are considered sensational and superfluous.  Echoing Sidney’s distaste 
for the mongrel plays of the English stage, careless of unity of time and place, 
Jonson notes “th’ill customes of the age” in making a child “shoote up” from 
swaddling cloth to a threescore bearded man in the same clothes.  More 
notably, he hopes for a stage where no 
 
. . . creaking throne comes downe, the boyes to please; 
Nor nimble squibbe is seene, to make afear’d 
The gentlewomen; nor roul’d bullet heard 
To say, it thunders; nor tempestuous drumme 
Rumbles, to tell you when the storme doth come . . . . (A3r) 
 
The prologue belittles the visceral effects of theatre, making fireworks a comic 
fright for ladies and descending chairs merely childish toys.  Jonson prefers 
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“deedes, and language, such as men doe use,” and his voicing of effects 
suggests that he even wishes to transform theatricality into a realist form of 
literary representation—the bullets “say” and the drums “tell you.”  The prologue 
transforms visual spectacle into descriptive and defiantly verbal narrative. 
Further, in The Devil is an Ass (c.1616), the name of Jonson’s character 
“Mere-craft” represents not only his gulling and scheming, but his familiarity with 
theatrical artifice.  He even echoes Hill’s pamphlet on the creation of artificial 
fire.  Hill explains that it requires “the pouder of the Willowe sticke,” a ball of silk 
filled with powder, and a quick coal inside, and that, “holding the same softly 
with thy teethe” and breathing out, one might exhale fire (D1r).  Mere-craft 
similarly notes, “A little castle-soape / Will do’t, to rub your lips: and then a 
nutshell, / With toe, and touch-wood in it to spit fire” (I1r).  The association of 
Jonson’s comedy-vice with dramatic special effect suggests further contempt for 
illusion, associating it with both moral and visual deceit—if simultaneously 
acknowledging its entertainment value. 
Yet “deedes and language” also suggest that performance is indeed 
necessary to theatre.  “Deedes” implies here the actions of great men, in an 
Aristotelian sense, but it must also be understood as the actions played by an 
actor.  As much as Jonson sometimes wishes to deny theatre its very 
theatricality, “language” alone cannot stage a play.  The inventories of 
Henslowe’s diary suggest that physical properties and devices were an 
important part of the economic life of a playing company.  Numerous scholars, 
from Beckerman to Andrew Gurr in his study of the Admiral’s Men, have shown 
the costs and benefits involved in procuring both playbooks and playing 
properties; items like a hell’s mouth, a cauldron, or a bed would be both 
economically and dramatically important. 
“Divers thinges” bought for the stage included a number of costly items—
especially in regards to popular Marlovian-style plays.  Many productions 
demand a number of expensive props in order to construct the necessary 
“devices” in the play (see the entries for the Jew of Malta, Henslowe 170, 320).  
Henslowe’s inventory suggests that material goods, from tailoring to “thinges”—
whatever that term might indicate—are essential investments.  Towards the end 
of 1598, the diary records a bustle of activity around the commissioning, 
purchasing, and furnishing of the now-lost Civil Wars of France tetralogy, by 
Michael Drayton and Thomas Dekker.  Roslyn Knutson sees these plays as part 
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of London’s pan-theatre cashing-in on Marlowe’s popularity, in which numerous 
theatres “duplicated, exploited, or in some sense answered” Marlowe’s 
Massacre at Paris (Marlowe’s Empery 32).  The Admiral’s Men were seeking to 
replicate the success of Massacre, and so the Civil Wars plays, Knutson 
believes, mirror Marlowe’s characters; in this sense, they prove to be, like other 
theatres’ equivalents, what we might now term “mockbusters” in relation to 
Massacre at Paris.  Importantly, the twenty pounds given to Robert Shaw and 
Edward Jewby on the 19 and the 24 November 1598 is a remarkably high total 
to “bye divers thinges for the playe” (101-02).24  Three years earlier, for 
instance, it cost seven pounds and two shillings for “mackinge the throne In the 
heuenes” (7)—a particularly spectacular property that evidences the ability of 
outdoor theatres to stage flying descents.  Furnishing the Marlowe mockbuster 
at this expense, then, allows one to speculate that physical props and the 
creation of forms of “special effects” were essential to these plays’ appeal, and 
that Drayton and Dekker might well have made visual dramatic display central 
to the writing and staging of these Marlovian-style crowd-pleasers. 
By the late 1600s, this form of visual “deceit” is not solely visible in stage 
effects.  Ann Barton has noted that, in Shakespeare’s late plays, “not only Old 
Gower [from Pericles], but the statue scene in The Winter’s Tale, the bear, the 
wet mariners and deceptive spectacles of The Tempest, the unexpected 
appearances of gods, all seem designed to perplex a theatre audience, at least 
momentarily, as to the existential status of what it sees” (“‘Enter . . .” 202).  
Spectacle begins to be infused within the fabric of the plays themselves, 
governing their moral and epistemic force.  Shakespeare’s late plays and other 
Jacobean public drama, as Part Two of this thesis explores, react to the 
period’s optical and ethical uncertainty with overawing visual effects, both 
questioning and asserting the power of spectacle.   
Indeed, by the Jacobean period, mechanical spectacle begins to be 
accorded significant moral force, becoming an essential but debated part of 
theatrical presentation.  Civic pageantry played an important role in urban life as 
well as in the careers of dramatists; Heywood, for instance, wrote a number of 
civic pageants.  Much of the pageant and its expenses surrounded not the 
                                     
24 The vague generality of the term suggests something other than clothes purchases, which 
are normally detailed explicitly.  For instance, in the 1601 Jew of Malta entry, “divers thinges” 
appears to be distinct from the payment that same day to the tailor, suggesting that the five 
pounds lent to Shaw and Jewby is for some other matter or materials. 
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textual composition but the sourcing of props, materials, and costumes for 
display (see the second chapter of Tracey Hill’s Pageantry and Power [2010]).  
Heywood confirms the visual emphasis of these pageants, when he 
acknowledges that many who attend “are better delighted with that which 
pleaseth the eye, than contenteth the eare” (Londini Speculum C2r). 
Much of the growth of interest in spectacle, though, can be associated 
with the rise of the masque, which David Lindley suggests only reaches its full 
form in 1604 (383).  In the Jacobean masque form, born from the collaboration 
between the poet Jonson and the designer and engineer Inigo Jones, spectacle 
and text combine to form a type of theatre with clear symbolic and moral ends.  
It has long been noted that Jonson’s aim in the masque is a moral one, and he 
summarises his approach in Love’s Triumph Through Callipolis (1631), where 
he claims that “all Repraesentations, especially those of this nature in court, 
publique Spectacles, eyther haue bene, or ought to be the mirror of mans life” 
(A2r).  Such a definition of masque and spectacle suggests their moral 
importance and associates “spectacles” with deeper meanings than mere show.  
His words echo the broadside A Spectacle fo[] Pe[]iu[]e[]s by associating “public 
spectacles” with the mirror that is so often used as a symbol of moral advice. 
The materials of the masque, though, are equally important in advice, 
instruction, and betterment.  “Jones’s aesthetics,” Stephen Orgel notes, “derive 
from good Platonic doctrine and have clear moral ends” (“Poetics” 50).  Rather 
than viewing poetry and spectacle as opposites, Orgel’s work has shown that 
there is an important philosophy behind the visual and material displays of the 
masque.  He links Jones’s work to Italian theories of visual theatre, from 
Francesco Robortello to Sebastiano Serlio.  These Italian writers, Orgel 
explains, took inspiration from Aristotle’s claim that theatre should evoke 
“wonder” or “marvelousness,” and that such effects can be found in spectacle.  
Similarly, “on the practical side, Vitruvius provided the necessary assurances 
that classical drama had employed scenic machinery. . .” (54).  That practical 
side is also complemented by the rise in machine technology and its 
representation in the sixteenth century and onwards.  In the new genre of 
machine-books, the artifice of the machines combines visual and moral enquiry 
in a similar manner to an emblem book.  Like the images explored above, 
though, it is in the material form of the display that the power is found.  
Knoespel has explored the rise of this phenomenon in the sixteenth and 
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seventeenth centuries, associating it with a move towards visual expression.  
He notes that the many “books that advertise themselves as theaters for 
machines and instrumentation—the theatrum mechanorum—and the others 
that represent machines are part of this cultural fascination with the visual 
staging of knowledge” (100).  Texts that share a model with Agostino Ramelli’s 
Le diverse et artificiose machine (1588) and Jacques Besson’s Théâtre des 
instruments mathematiques et mechaniques (1569), amongst numerous others, 
have been shown by critics including Orgel, Knoespel, and Jonathan Sawday to 
influence early modern English theatre-craftsmen, from Shakespeare to Jones 
(these texts are discussed in depth in relation to The Tempest in Chapter Four). 
Although “the actual engineering” of Jones’s own masques “must remain 
highly conjectural” (Orgel and Strong 20), these machine-books were popular in 
Europe and it is likely that Jones at least encountered them.  Possibly they 
contributed to his own theatre of instruments, which is characterised by 
spectacular stage effects and a practical approach to painted scenery; it is clear 
that he used machina versatilis, a two-sided scene that sits on a pivot, and 
scena ductilis, a series of grooves allowing backdrops to be drawn aside and so 
altered.  Jones’s masque designs feed the idea that illusionistic scenery could 
“make virtue’s triumphs more immediately vivid than could words alone—a 
positive potential for bringing ideals alive in the minds of spectators” (Strout 
235).  Although Strout and Orgel seem to disagree about the specific results of 
realism (as manifested in perspective settings), the imitation of nature 
nonetheless represented a form of moral artistry: 
 
It depended . . . on certain assumptions about the nature of the 
artist: that his power was the power to project illusions, but that 
these had meaning and moral force; that seeing was believing, 
and that art could give us a vision of the good and the true; that 
the illusion represented, in short, a Platonic reality. (Orgel, 
“Poetics” 66) 
 
Jones’s approach to engineering has, therefore, philosophical and conceptual 
weight, and is designed with educative and abstract aims.  It is closely related 
to book-of-nature and emblem theory, discussed in the introduction, and to 
notions about ut pictura poesis explored by, for instance, Jean H. Hagstrum in 
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The Sister Arts (1958)—a link with rhetoric explored in Chapter Five of this 
thesis.  Cooper has also shown that masquing involves an “interplay between 
actors and spectators” that goes beyond “theatrical device” and unites the 
playworld and the real world.  The effect is to heighten the allegorical 
experience and serve, in the same manner as morality plays, as “a reminder of 
the real existence of the abstract qualities concerned” (“Location and Meaning” 
137-38).  In this sense, the material experience of the masque—the visual 
power and tangibility of its spectacle—serves to sharpen its moral instructions.   
Jonson, as he does with the prologue to Every Man In, questions the role 
of materiality in the masque.  It took until 1631 for him to express fully his 
contempt for (or resentment of) the mechanical side of masquing, when he 
takes the competition between visual and verbal to an extreme.  In “An 
Expostulation with Inigo Jones,” he describes the material role of his partner as 
“the maker of properties; in sum, / The scene, the engine.”  Jonson rancorously 
observes, though, that “he now is come / To be the music-master; tabler too; / 
He is, or would be, the main Dominus Do- / All of the work . . .” leading to his 
ironic denunciation of spectacle’s (and Jones’s) popularity: “O! to make boards 
to speak! there is a task! / Painting and carpentry are the soul of masque” (118).  
This opposition between “the engine” and what Jonson sees as the 
“moral” poetic side of the masque is much more confused, however, in the early 
years of the genre, and often indistinguishable.  In the preface to Hymenaei 
(1606), Jonson does indeed contrast the “body”—what is “obiected to sense”—
with the “soul”—that “subiected to understanding”—already equating the 
material “object” with passive visual experience and opposing it to the actions of 
the “subjective” mind.  He stresses that the body is frail and sensual, that it is 
temporary and decaying matter soon to be forgotten.  Souls, though, are not so 
short-lived, and it is this remembrance that 
 
. . . hath made the most royall Princes, and greatest persons (who 
are commonly the personaters of these actions) not onely 
studious of riches, and magnificence in the outward celebration, or 
shew; (which rightly becomes them) but curious after the most 
high, and heartie inuentions, to furnish the inward parts: and those 
grounded vpon antiquitie, and solide learnings) which, though 
their voyce be taught to sound to present occasions, their sense, 
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or doth, or should always lay hold on more remou’d mysteries. 
(Gggg6r) 
 
Unlike his later carping at carpentry, though, the passage does not present 
such a clear-cut division between poetry and engineering.25  Jonson’s use of 
“inventions” undermines the separation of the material from the moral: he uses 
the term here both metaphorically and physically, suggesting that performers 
should desire “high, and heartie” spectacles, in both the body of the 
entertainment and in the mind.  Indeed, the preface expands the notion of 
“invention” in a similar way to the flexible term “device,” coming to mean both 
intellectual creativity and physical construction.  In the Masque of Queens just 
three years later, for instance, Jonson credits Jones with “the deuice of their 
attyre . . . with the inuention, and architecture of the whole scene, and machine” 
(Kkkk5v).  This description associates both device and invention with 
machinery, and a similar double meaning can be gleaned from Hymenaei, 
where the “more remou’d mysteries” lie in both meanings of the term 
“invention.”  The importance of spectacle in the masque’s moral work—and this 
is a masque typically full of engineered devices, including a scene of Clouds 
“made artificially to swell, and ride like the Racke” (Hhhh2v)—is compounded by 
the material metaphor in “furnish,” which suggests that the soul of masque is, 
really, a marriage of mechanics and metre.   
Jones’s engines, then, play an important moral role.  Samuel Daniel, in 
complete contrast to Jonson, goes so far as to suggest, in Tethys Festival 
(1610), that Jones’s visual materials are the essence of the genre: “. . . the 
onely life consists in shew: the arte and inuention of the Architect giues the 
greatest grace, and is of most importance” (E2r).  In one instance, he even 
appears to use the materiality of Jones’s invention as a means of praise.  
Daniel writes that “Mercury most artificially, and in an exquisite posture 
descends” (F4r), suggesting that the level of artifice is a point of particular 
delight.   
                                     
25 It is clear, too, from his posthumously published commonplace book that Jonson 
appreciated—even celebrated—the moral power of pictures: “Whosoeuer loves not Picture, is 
injurious to Truth: and al the wisdom of Poetry.  Picture is the invention of Heaven: the most 
ancient, and most a kinne to Nature . . . it doth so enter, and penetrate the inmost affection 
(being done by an excellent Artificer) as sometimes it orecomes the power of speech, and 
oratory” (Timber P2v).   
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The moral importance of materials in display is also shared by the city 
pageant.  Thomas Dekker, the writer of a number of civic pageants, offers a 
more explicit celebration of engineering-as-moral-artistry in his 1604 entry 
pageant for King James.26  The description offers an explanation of each 
“Deuice” that explains their narrative significance as well as their physical 
construction—again illustrating that the word attends both to moral symbolism 
and to physical construction.  Dekker offers an implicit hierarchy between poet 
and painter, claiming that “[t]he Soule that should giue life, & a tongue to this 
Entertainment, being to breathe out of Writers Pens.  The Limmes of it to lye at 
the hard-handed mercy of Mychanitiens” (B2v).  Yet his entertainment echoes 
the mystery plays, with their emphasis on everyday commerce and craft, by 
stressing the importance of practical engineering in poetic meaning—what 
Turner calls Dekker’s “geometric code” that has been “borrowed from the very 
communities who made up London’s political, economic, and social tissue” 
(151).  Dekker paints a picture of “Carpenters, Ioyners, Caruers, and other 
Artificers sweating at their Chizzells” in order to construct the set and claims 
that even “children (might they haue bin suffred) would gladly haue spent their 
little strength about the Engines, that mounted vp the Frames: Such a fire of 
loue and ioy, was kindled in euery brest” (B3r).  For Dekker, the chief part of the 
pageant’s moral force is the community spirit it generates, and here, with the 
various measures of heights, breadths, and distances, it is the mechanical 
aspect of the staging that brings London together both geographically and 
socially.  If it is the engines and artifice that generate love and joy, then the 
mechanics begin to appear essential to the “soul” of the entertainment. 
Indeed, referring to the dreadful plague year of 1603, Dekker exclaims, 
 
Hee that should haue compared the emptie and vntroden walkes 
of London, which were to be seen in that late mortally destroying 
Deluge, with the thronged streets now, might haue beliued, that 
vpon this day, began a new Creation, & that the Citie was the 
onely Workhouse wherein sundry Nations were made. (B3v) 
 
                                     
26  Jonson and Thomas Middleton also had a hand in the pageant (and Jonson printed a 
separate account, as did the architect Stephen Harrison).  The pageant was delayed for a year 
after James’s arrival due to plague.  It contained elaborate special effects and combined 
physical props with symbolic meaning and classical allusion.   
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Although ostensibly celebrating James’s arrival as a silver bullet, it is the 
Workhouse27 that dominates the rejuvenated London.  Dekker suggests that the 
ingenious mechanics of the pageant—which have erected “wonders of Wood”—
and the practical crafts of the city hold biblical power.  He presents the adorned 
cityscape as an early modern ark, and posits practical craft as the moral and 
physical regenerator of plague-ravaged London as well as the world at large.  
Dekker’s description therefore echoes the materialisation of morality found in 
the popular print of the period: some broadsides, as seen above, make use of 
their material potential to enhance their moral force; the spectacles of A 
Spectacle fo[] Pe[]iu[]e[]s gesture towards their (metaphorical) practical, 
physical use to substantiate ethical claims.  Dekker’s pageant effects the same 
move, turning to the materials and the mass-assembly of spectacle to make the 
products of community-engineering into “wonders of Wood”: a phrase that, in its 
context, suggests materials and their construction are socially, morally, and 
physically forceful.  
 
Early modern England sees a gradual materialisation of moral 
admonition and advice.  The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries underwent 
gradual and uneven philosophical changes, with interest in empiricism and 
scientific discovery increasing alongside a rediscovery of scepticism.  These 
factors encourage enquiry into the material facts of (both physical and mental) 
experience.  Consequently, the practical emphasis in much of the period’s 
moral philosophy—captured in Elyot’s insistence that “all that euer was spoken 
or written, was to be executed” (K5r)—can be harnessed by objects and images 
that metaphorically present themselves as usable advice.  Materialised morality 
in popular print images therefore provides a means of fulfilling philosophical 
cravings for tangibility and visual evidence, while conveying (and strengthening) 
admonitory or didactic messages.   
Material morality can have a wide application in the late Elizabethan and 
early Jacobean period, and its practicality translates onto the stage.  
Broadsides and ballads frequently align themselves with the “clutter” of early 
modern England, substantiating their moral claims by strengthening their 
                                     
27 I follow the OED and numerous examples of the word in early modern England, pre-1650s, 
that suggest the word means “factory” or, as the OED puts it, “A house, shop, or room in which 
work is regularly performed” (“Workhouse” 1.a). 
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figurative physical forms.  Images like the spectacles, which offer multiple types 
of “vision,” and the humanist household advice discussed in this chapter show 
that moral teaching is often inextricable from objects of print and material 
culture.  Ultimately, “material morality” offers to strengthen moral instruction and 
respond to sceptical enquiry with the promise of sensory satisfaction. 
In theatrical terms, scepticism challenges the spiritual significance of 
devices, but suggests that material construction can be morally illuminating.  
The range of evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the work of stage 
spectacle is embedded in wider philosophical developments, particularly those 
presented in popular print images.  As such, the stage can be read in the same 
terms as household bills, public broadsides, and amid the shared spirit of 
sceptical and scientific enquiry.  The result reveals sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century England’s complex presentation of and reaction to stage mechanics.  
Karim-Cooper and Stern state that “it was feared that plays could touch 
spectators both in reality and metaphorically—emotionally or morally—perhaps 
changing them forever” (7).  Antitheatricalists touch on this fear, but dramatists 
themselves likewise draw on the material-moral power of theatre.  Like the 
metaphorical materiality of broadside images, the stage can make palpably 
material spectacle a source of moral power, linking the physical and abstract 
meanings of “device.”  This chapter has shown the ways in which devices were 
employed on the early modern stage—and their development through late 
Elizabethan in to elaborate Jacobean engines.  Exploring the influence of the 
masque and the city pageant on visual display shows the moral underpinnings 
of material spectacle.  An interest in the mechanics, construction, and materials 
of theatrical display—as with the materials of printed moral images—fulfills 
anatomical sceptical curiosity but also charges those materials with moral 
significance. 
Often, though, Jacobean drama is ambivalent about the merits of 
material morality.  Part Two of this thesis demonstrates how plays in the 
Jacobean period negotiate between the materiality and morality of their 
“strange” spectacles, using that term to interrogate and reflect on spectacle’s 
moral efficacy.  
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3. Spectacular “Strangeness” in Heywood’s Age Plays and Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest 
 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest (c.1610-11) brilliantly interrogates the 
materialisation of morality described in Chapter Two by exploring stage devices’ 
potential for moral edification.  The stage directions in the play cannot be traced 
to a certain origin, but they nonetheless reveal the period’s (and The 
Tempest’s) keen interest in the description of spectacle and its moral effects.  
One such direction in the First Folio reads: 
 
Thunder and Lightning.  Enter Ariell (like a Harpey) claps his 
wings upon the Table, and with a quient deuice the Banquet 
vanishes. (B1r) 
 
John Jowett has surmised that the phrase “quaint device” is distinctly un-
Shakespearean, and W W. Greg claims that “it is descriptive of a thing seen, a 
compliment to the machinist” (qtd. in Jowett 108).  Regardless of whether 
Shakespeare, Nicholas Crane, or an unidentified hand is behind the stage 
direction, the identification of a “thing seen” in terms appreciative of engineering 
acknowledges both the visual brilliance and the artificiality of the effect.28  The 
staging of “miraculous” or “providential” signs clearly requires a suspension of 
disbelief—a suspension attacked by writers William Lambarde and Reginald 
Scot, discussed in the previous chapter—and an element of visual deception 
that complicates their moral function.  Shakespeare addresses the scepticism 
that often attends such spectacles, while also insisting on their moral 
possibilities.  Ariel’s “quient deuice” is glossed in the Norton Shakespeare as 
“an ingenious mechanism” for clearing the banquet (3098).  Yet as Henri 
Estienne proves, “device” can also refer to moral emblems, making the stage 
picture a form of instruction.  That dual meaning is brought to the fore when 
Shakespeare’s Ariel weds the “quient deuice” with a pronouncement of “lingring 
perdition” that prompts Alonso to admit, “it did base my Trespasse.”  The 
                                     
28 The earliest printing of The Tempest is that in the Folio, and a number of questions attend its 
stage directions.  Even if those directions are not reliable sources of original staging, they share 
a significant interest in “strangeness” with the play’s dialogue that makes them visual clues to 
the action; as attempts to describe spectacle, they provide curious and important theatrical 
evidence about the term “strange.”  See below for a discussion of stage directions and their 
reliability as performed cues. 
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mechanical stage effect and the moral combine in The Tempest to make 
redemption possible, making Alonso recognise his sins and creating the 
possibility of “hearts-sorrow, / And a cleere life ensuing” (B1r).  The stage 
“deuice” reveals itself to be there for both practical and abstract use—just like 
the “materialised” images of popular print.  
The exchange between materiality and moral efficacy is at the heart of 
the play, and it sits, tellingly, alongside “strangeness,” which dominates the 
language and aesthetic of The Tempest.  This chapter examines the role 
“strangeness” plays in the Jacobean period, in the light of Part One of this 
thesis, by reading Shakespeare’s island play and Heywood’s Age plays.  I 
concentrate on the way the term mediates between physical and abstract (or 
moral/qualitative) description, setting out its difference from “wonder” as 
something that is post-evaluative and that, unlike wonder, attempts description 
and expliciation.  Exploring popular print, I go on to suggest that strangeness 
has a taut relationship with moral “truth” and with providential signs.  I link the 
contexts of the term “strange”—rooted in popular print, religious writing, 
technology, and geographical exploration—to the notions of sceptical 
uncertainty introduced in Chapter One, suggesting that the stage directions of 
Heywood’s The Brazen Age, specifically the strange-heavy direction involving 
Medea, reveal an ambivalence about the moral power of spectacle.  Such 
ambivalence is especially keen in the early 1610s, under the heat of global 
exploration, discovery, scepticism, and Protestant popular print.  The chapter 
then closes by returning to The Tempest in the light of Heywood’s plays, to 
suggest that its “strangeness” marks an uncertainty about visual display—a 
manifesto for its power and a mark of man’s incomprehension of the visual 
world.   
In these plays, “strangeness” shows spectacle to be sophisticated and 
challenging.  It indicates the moral power of material or visual displays while 
complicating the connection between sensory experience and moral 
knowledge.  By positing strange spectacle as a “puzzle,” Heywood and 
Shakespeare emphasise its moral significance, but they also eschew 
didacticism by refusing to describe, explain, or gloss the plays’ visual and 
material spectacles in precise terms.  These “strange” plays are therefore 
testament to the moral ambiguities of Jacobean spectacle. 
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Ariel’s harpy scene in The Tempest is amongst the most “strange” in 
early modern drama, and the term in itself charges spectacle with a variety of 
meanings, from the sceptical to the technological. At The Tempest’s close, 
Prospero tells Alonso, 
 
Sir, my Liege, 
Doe not infest your minde, with beating on 
The strangenesse of this businesse . . . . (B4r) 
 
The remark suggests that Prospero has an even greater understanding of the 
island and the past few hours’ events than merely his knowledge of the plots 
and positions of the shipwreck’s survivors.  It implies, to a close reader of the 
play, that he recognises their responses to the visual displays, spells, 
deceptions, and murmurings—the “sounds and sweet airs” (A5v) and the quaint 
devices—that are repeatedly deemed “strange” by all the new island-guests.  
They have been “beating on / The strangenesse” of the business since the 
beginning of the play. 
What does it mean, therefore, to call something one sees strange?  The 
term abounds in that moment that opens this chapter—Ariel’s harpy 
performance, the final scene of act three.  The edifying possibilities of visual 
display and its uncertainties—the force of spectacle and ambivalence towards 
it—are captured in characters’ reactions to the stagecraft and in the First Folio’s 
stage directions. 
In act three, scene three, spirits enter to a “Solemn and strange 
Musicke,” and the stage directions describe them as “seuerall strange shapes” 
(B1r).  Jowett notes that this description “suggests the spectacle as seen 
through the eyes of the audience” (112), and so “strange” refers less to practical 
staging requirements than to a reaction to the performance or staged effects 
that indicates perceptual uncertainty.  Prospero hovers above, presumably on 
the balcony, “inuisible”—again, presumably to those on-stage characters 
beneath him.29  To enter invisible is, as has long been recognised, a bizarre 
contradiction in terms, but the puzzlement that attends that stage direction is 
perhaps part of the “strange” work of the scene: indeed, the shapes prompt a 
                                     
29 The paradox echoes one of John Donne’s songs: “If thou beest borne to strange sights, / 
Things invisible to see . . .” (Cc1v). 
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response from Sebastian, who claims that he will now instantly believe in 
unicorns and in the mythical phoenix.  Having delivered the banquet, the 
shapes disappear, and Francisco tells us that they “vanish’d strangely” (B1r). 
The whole scene plays with perception.  The stage directions, with their 
teasing suggestion of visible invisibility and odd descriptions of spirits, suggest 
that the action in some way escapes the tongue.  So too does Francisco’s 
commentary on their disappearance, which serves as a curious supplementary 
stage direction—an important aspect of stage-craft and directions that fits neatly 
into the category Mariko Ichikawa describes as “a verbal reference to a 
particular structure or thing” that can help to ascertain whether “the structure or 
the thing is actually there, being visible to the audience,” or, alternatively, 
whether “the structure or the thing referred to is not physically present and has 
to be imagined” (Shakespearean 22).  Here, strangeness seems to refer to 
both—covering the visual facts of the dramaturgy while gesturing towards 
something that is not and cannot be physically present: the intellectual or 
emotional quality of “strangeness.” 
Indeed, the stage directions already note of the spirits, “they depart,” and 
as such Francisco’s remark seems to gloss the manner of their departure at the 
same time as it comments upon the bizarre fact of the situation: being stranded 
on an island after a shipwreck, the royal party have just witnessed spirits in 
uncertain shapes (at least for a reader who cannot visualise them in any certain 
form from the description “strange”), deliver a banquet and then dissolve into 
thin air.  His words offer two simultaneous meanings: it is strange that they have 
vanished, but the manner of their vanishing is also strange.  The affair can tell 
us little of the scene’s “original” staging, but it does suggest that the spirits’ 
visual performance—what a strange manner of vanishing!—is of significant 
meaning to the scene and, I would suggest, to the overarching concerns of The 
Tempest, because that visual strangeness reflects a deep, questioning 
curiosity—how strange it is that they have vanished! 
The scene reflects the play’s concerns with epistemological uncertainty, 
with visual knowledge and its precarious relationship with moral knowledge.  It 
represents as “A liuing Drolerie,” in Sebastian’s words, the revelation of the 
characters’ moral selves, but they struggle to interpret the signs of the 
revelation.  They misread the display as a trivial matter of materiality, seeing the 
spectacle as the promise of food without connecting its materiality to morality: 
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the food of the soul.30  Alonso recognises that “such shapes”—those described 
as “strange”—“such gesture, and such sound”—also described as “strange” in 
the stage directions—are “a kinde / Of excellent dumbe discourse.”  He 
acknowledges that they mean something deeper, but he “cannot too much 
muse” (B1r).  The strangeness puzzles the will. 
This chapter seeks to unpick some of the pieces of that puzzle.  There 
has been to date some small critical engagement with “strangeness” as an idea, 
though it remains largely limited to new historicist readings that reduce the term 
to subversive “otherness.”  Stephen Mullaney discusses “strange things” in 
wonder cabinets and their exchanges with the new world and defines the term 
only insofar as it is “a category that in fact withholds categorization, that neither 
specifies nor defines but rather sets the objects to which it refers aside, grants 
them the freedom to remain as they are” (62)—something I consider an 
unhelpful, untextured, and anachronistic definition of “strangeness.”  For 
Mullaney, the term signifies “tokens of alien cultures,” but there remains no 
significant interrogation of the word’s historical, cultural, and social meanings in 
the early modern period.  Emily C. Bartels follows Mullaney, borrowing his term 
(in turn borrowed from Jonson and discussed below) of the “spectacles of 
strangeness” displayed in Marlowe’s drama to discuss “a landscape filled with 
strangers and strange lands” (3).  Like Mullaney, Bartels offers no sustained 
engagement with the term’s early modern meanings, taking it as a byword for 
the alien or other. 
I move beyond these “Other”-orientated readings of strangeness and 
attempt to recover some of the wider late Elizabethan and, chiefly, early 
Jacobean significance of the term.  Such new historicist considerations have 
treated strangeness not as a coherent concept but rather as one facet of 
developing colonialist, “othering” discourses.  This chapter centres discussion 
on the term “strange” itself, arguing that it offers an alternative critical framework 
to such theoretical approaches, one rooted in documentary evidence, cultural 
context, and early modern moral philosophy.  This broader historicist treatment 
of the term “strange” presents a concept that has a wider cultural purview and 
acknowledges its forceful moral aspects—something overlooked in criticism that 
                                     
30 Sebastian responds by dismissing the spirits’ departure as inconsequential: “No matter, since 
/ They haue left their Viands behind . . .” (B1r).  By misreading the significance of the material 
display, which Alonso has noticed is both physical and moral, Sebastian proves his statement to 
be true, and the food dissolves to “no matter” with Ariel’s quaint device.   
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moves away from moral interests and towards more narrowly politicised and 
perceived subversive ideological approaches (see the introduction and Chapter 
One).  This chapter therefore offers the first dedicated discussion of 
“strangeness” and its cultural connotations, offering broad, thorough contexts 
for the term and setting out its distinction from “wonder.”  The concurrent 
renewed attention to moral significance, as with Part One, is not a reversion to 
the conservative tendencies of twentieth-century criticism but gestures instead 
to the complexity, excitement, and energy surrounding ethical debate in early 
modern England—one brought to light here by a reexamination of the 
relationship between “strangeness” and scepticism. 
“Strange” connotes improper religious doctrine as well as moments of 
divine providence, descriptions tinged with sceptical doubt alongside the 
rhetorical power of verbal artifice.  The early 1610s are a period deeply 
concerned with the meanings of “strange,” as the Introduction has explained.  
Alan Dessen and Leslie Thomson’s dictionary of early modern stage directions 
draws specific attention to the term in only two plays: The Tempest—where it 
occurs as a direction three times—and Thomas Heywood’s The Brazen Age 
(1613).  Other uses are listed, but they are few in number and limited in 
description (often concerned with music or dancing).  I have already gestured to 
the interesting range of “strange” directions in The Tempest, as well as verbal 
stage directions that supplement the italicised descriptions, and this chapter 
accordingly examines the term’s relationship with visual and moral knowledge.  
Heywood’s The Brazen Age and the previous two parts of the Age plays are 
also steeped in strangeness—it is present not only in packed stage directions 
but also in the fabric of the plays themselves.  In both Heywood’s and 
Shakespeare’s plays, “strangeness” is connected, with an unusual force and 
frequency, to visual display and stage devices.  Why, in these works, is 
spectacle deemed to be “strange”? 
An examination of “strangeness” must take into account new world 
spectacles such as those Mullaney and Bartels discuss: there existed “an 
intensified desire for knowledge of unknown or partially known domains, a 
desire answered and evidenced by the energetic contemporary production of 
cross-cultural descriptions” (Bartels 4).  I consider the influence of “strangers” 
and strange animals, but I also show that “strangeness” is a keenly moral 
concept in early modern England, and that it should therefore be seen more 
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fully within the context of the philosophical, visual, scientific, and technological 
developments of the period—those factors that contribute to the materialisation 
of morality.  As a term that negotiates between the material and the moral 
world, “strange” shows how spectacle in the Jacobean period reflects upon the 
changing moral-philosophical world of early modern England by indicating the 
difficulties of fully representing moral ideas in material form.  “Strangeness” 
represents theatrical spectacle’s ambivalent relationship with material morality. 
“Strangeness” indicates, through popular performance, a philosophical 
moment: the crossroads between empirical, proto-scientific understandings of 
the world; faith in providence; and sceptical doubt about truth.  It points 
spectacularly and excitingly to the unique historical moment that captures the 
gaps between those conflicting attitudes.  This chapter accordingly outlines the 
moral resonances of strangeness and its relationship with visual and material 
representation by focussing on Thomas Heywood’s first three Age plays (1611-
13) and The Tempest.   
Heywood’s sensational trilogy is quite different in style and tone from 
Shakespeare’s island play: episodic, archaic, temporally and geographically 
vast.  Yet it nonetheless contains some telling similarities.  All four plays share 
an aesthetic of strangeness that associates them with moral display and 
representation in contemporary texts, while also sharing practical matters of 
stagecraft and visual display.  If The Tempest “bears the imaginative mark of a 
work written under the impact of Whitehall stage effects and theatrical 
conventions” (Demaray 93), so too do Heywood’s dramas (and The Silver Age, 
like Cymbeline and The Tempest, was also featured at court).  They also bear 
the mark of their own distinctive theatres—practical aspects of which are 
discussed in the last two chapters of this this thesis.  The Age plays contain a 
number of provocative uses of the term “strange” with regard to surprising 
spectacles that offer some insight into its connotations.  In this chapter, I 
therefore use the sensational visual effects in Heywood’s plays as a frame 
through which to explore the contextual associations of “strangeness” with 
machinery, popery, witchery, and monstrosity, connotations that abound in the 
popular print of the period.   
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Stage devices and Strangeness 
Jason and the Argonauts have been popular with audiences and readers 
since their mythical exploits were recounted by classical writers, most notably 
Euripides, Apollonius, and Ovid.  In early modern England, the story of the 
Golden Fleece was also popular and also spectacular.  Classical translations of 
the story were widely available in Latin, Greek, and, by 1608, Italian.  Thomas 
Heywood, the prolific dramatist writing from the late 1590s until 1641, treated 
the subject as part of his Age plays.  The Age plays, beginning with The Golden 
Age (1611) and moving through the Silver (1612) and Bronze (1613), followed 
some time later by the two-part Iron Age (dates), dramatise periods of classical 
history in an episodic manner, beginning with Saturn’s rule and moving through 
the major characters of the period, no doubt largely well known to early modern 
audiences. 
The Age plays are known for their sensational special effects, leading 
critics to be particularly dismissive of these “pot-boilers” (Holaday 16).  Although 
occasional articles have appeared on these texts, even Richard Rowland’s 
monograph on Heywood neglects to mention them but as a passing reference.  
Among the most sustained treatments is found in Marion Lomax’s Stage 
Images and Traditions (1987), where she notes that the play’s narrator “Homer 
constantly stresses his blindness—which not only excuses him, as narrator, 
from any responsibility for the visual elements of the plays, but also enhances 
the audiences’ appreciation of the spectacles by emphasising their privileged 
position” (21).  Lomax also notes that “no single source can be declared for the 
spectacular elements in the Ages: Heywood deliberately juxtaposes a variety of 
ideas” (28).  Stage directions like “fire-workes all ouer the house” (Silver K3r) 
show that Heywood’s drama relies heavily on visual effect—something that 
accords with his role, in the 1600s and 1610s, as the resident playwright for and 
sharer in the Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull—a playhouse, as chapter two 
acknowledges, closely associated with spectacle. 
In the Golden Fleece episode in The Brazen Age, then, it is no surprise 
that we find the curious stage direction 
 
Two fiery Buls are discouered, the Fleece hanging ouer them, and 
the Dragon sleeping beneath them: Medea with strange fiery-
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workes, hangs aboue in the Aire in the strange habite of a 
Coinuresse. (G2v) 
 
How do we interpret a stage direction that describes visual events as “strange” 
and what does this actually tell us about the staging of The Brazen Age?  What 
does Medea look like and why do the pyrotechnics require particular remark in 
this instance? 
The Tempest and the Age plays throw a light upon stage directions, 
proving them interesting documents of both performance and perception.  Work 
on stage directions by critics including Alan Dessen has encouraged us to view 
play-documents as theatrical scripts and not purely literary texts, while also 
being alert to questions over their authorial authenticity.  Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest has been the centre of a debate about the curiously detailed stage 
directions.  Jowett’s thorough treatment of the debate offers a number of 
(tentative) possibilities about the “literary” nature of the descriptions.  He 
proffers that Nicholas Crane was working from foul papers and hence had to 
elaborate on the directions in the play, that Crane may have seen performances 
of The Tempest at the Blackfriars and was building upon those witnessed 
performances (leading, perhaps, to the “perceptive” nature of the directions), 
and, tellingly, that some of the directions are borrowed from words in the 
playtext itself (like “strange”) (113).  Jowett also suggests other possibilities, 
including a third hand.  Either way, the interaction between the “literary” 
directions and the play’s performance remains intact—even if those directions 
are not theatrically sufficient, they are derived from the play’s original 
construction (likely for the Blackfriars—see chapter four) and bear the mark of 
past performances.  Furthermore, John Demaray notes, echoing Jowett, “Even 
if it is assumed that the stage directions were in part written by Crane or 
someone else, the directions may well have mirrored the second writer’s 
memory of early productions” (160).   
In the case of the Age plays, Heywood takes ownership of his work in the 
prefaces to each of the first three titles.  He also suggests that the printed plays 
are close to the plays as they were performed, having “already past the 
approbation of Auditors” (Golden A2r)—though his preparation for the press 
perhaps suggests why the stage directions in the Age plays appear equally as 
“literary” and “perceptive” as The Tempest’s. As with The Tempest’s, however, 
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those directions maintain a close connection to their original performances, 
however much they were elaborated and beautified for literary consumption.  
Heywood was deeply involved with staging: he was an actor and a sharer in his 
company, and would, like Shakespeare, have had intimate knowledge of 
playhouse and players; his plays are, again like Shakespeare’s, inseparable 
from the practicalities of the early modern theatre. 
The Medea stage direction is certainly teasingly literary—it is possible 
that a stage hand might understand what a “strange” firework would look like, or 
that a tailor could fashion a “strange habite,” but the direction seems unhelpful 
at best, if not downright impractical—exactly what Jowett thinks about the 
questionable “dramatic intelligibility” of some of The Tempest’s directions 
(120).31  The term “strange,” though, sheds some light on the possibilities of 
staging and on the wonder of stage devices. 
There have been attempts, at least since George Reynolds’s Staging of 
Elizabethan Plays at the Red Bull Theatre (1940), to understand something of 
the original staging of these plays.  Recently, David Mann has suggested that 
the Age plays were cobbled together out of older scripts, linking them back to 
plays performed at Henslowe’s Rose, where there was installed a “throne In the 
heuenes” in 1595 (7).  The Diary also suggests the expense spent on 
costumes, and the Bulls, Fleece, and Dragon are likely to have been, both at 
the Rose, and at the later Red Bull, physical props—Henslowe’s 1598 inventory 
includes “j gowlden flece” (319).32  In spite of this connection and the numerous 
flights required in the Age plays, though, Mann has called into question the use 
of flying equipment in early modern theatres—suggesting even if it were 
installed, as at the Rose, it was rarely used.  He wonders “why, if as so many 
scholars insist every amphitheatre was fitted with flying gear, are there so few 
records of its actual use in performance?” (184).  While evidence is frustratingly 
elusive across the stages of early modern England, Eva Griffith’s recent study 
of the Red Bull Theatre in Clerkenwell, where the Age plays are known to have 
been particularly successful, nevertheless argues for “a good, strong tiring 
house, with ambitious ‘heavens,’ braced with winching machinery” (103) (for a 
                                     
31 Ichikawa’s reference to the verbal stage direction, a cue from on-stage characters, also 
expands the literary possibilities of stage directions (Shakespearean).  See Dessen 
(Elizabethan Stage Conventions 22-25) on earlier critical considerations of authorial directions. 
32 Lomax notes the parallels with civic pageantry and medieval mystery plays in these props 
(27).   
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more detailed discussion of winching machinery and descents at the Red Bull 
and at the Globe, see chapters four and five of this thesis). How does the 
Medea stage direction help us judge what devices, winches, and attire featured 
in the play’s first performances? 
It cannot offer certainties to theatre history, but the stage direction and its 
“strangeness” suggests some of the effect desired and achieved by the Red 
Bull’s (and possibly Rose’s) stage devices.  Ben Jonson talks of the entire effect 
of the antimasque in the Masque of Queenes by deeming it “not . . . a Masque, 
but a Spectacle of strangenesse, producing multiplicite of gesture, and not 
vnaptly sorting with the current, and whole fall of the deuice” (Kkkk5r).  Though 
referring to the intellectual invention of the masque, a distinction made in the 
first chapter, Jonson nevertheless associates the visual effect of the scene with 
the wider spectacle of the show—including the music and the scenery: the 
whole fall of the device.  The full effect of the impressive show is, for Jonson, a 
spectacle of strangeness. 
Indeed, William Bourne’s invention book, Inventions or Devises (1589), 
refers specifically to material creation, illusion, and mechanical construction as 
a form of strangeness.  Talking of the construction of engines and devices, the 
table of contents explains that the final “devise” in the collection is 
 
as touching the making of strange workes, as the brasen head that did 
seeme to speake, or birdes of woode or mettall made by Arte to flie, and 
birdes made of woode or mettall to sing sweetely, as certaine hours 
appointed, &c., which the common people dooth maruell at. (A4r) 
 
In the list of automata and devices, Bourne notes that the strangeness that 
attends them is largely down to their mysterious and illusionary qualities.  If 
flying birds and doves seem relevant for the Age plays or for a performance of 
Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, then brazen heads are also features of the early 
modern theatre, featuring prominently in Robert Greene’s Friar Bacon and Friar 
Bungay (c.1590s), a play roughly contemporaneous with Bourne’s invention 
book.  Friar Bacon echoes Bourne’s interest in strangeness, exclaiming that his 
“head of brasse” will “yield forth strange and uncoth Aphorismes” (B4r).  Like 
the polyvalence of “device,” “strangeness” here seems to indicate a crossover 
between the moral and the material world—linking the brass head with abstract 
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aphorisms.  It fulfils a similar role, then, to the terms that materialise morality on 
the stage.  Yet while it is the mechanical head’s strangeness that associates it 
with the possibility of truths—the aphorisms that are a hallmark of early modern 
moral philosophy—it also obscures the full understanding of those truths, just 
as the “strange shapes” of The Tempest signal a “dumb discourse” that is 
unfathomable to Alonso and his company. 
For Bourne, a lack of understanding is integral to the “strange workes 
that the world hath maruayled at” (O1v).  Marvel and enchantment feature 
prominently, even in this mechanically-minded text.  The “strange” effect drawn 
from devices and inventions is because the “common people would maruell at” 
the effect, “thinking that it is done by Inchantment, and yet is done by no other 
meanes, but by good Artes and lawfull” (O2r).  Bourne approaches a form of 
mechanical deconstruction similar to Scot’s Discouerie of Witchcraft, discussed 
in chapter one, yet he argues for a reverse effect.  Like the confusing spirits in 
The Tempest and the obscure aphorisms of Friar Bacon, visual display, 
however materially focussed, has the force of marvel and enchantment.  
“Strange” suggests that there is a power in spectacle and in mechanical devices 
that can both obscure the arts behind their workings and also gesture to those 
workings’ presence, a recognition of their potency with only half-comprehension 
of their meaning—something common to machine books, as the following 
chapter shows, which fail to offer fully practical instructions for assembly.  
“Strange” in Bourne and Bacon is provocative, rather than passive, teasing at 
material and immaterial truths but threatening to dissolve into marvel. 
Its persistent presence in the Age plays, particularly with regard to what 
Jonson would call, were he feeling uncharacteristically generous, the 
“Spectacle of strangenesse” in the Medea scene, suggests that the plays 
contain significant “strange workes.”  Their theatrical stage devices enchant the 
audience—an enchantment particularly pertinent to the conjuress, Medea.  If it 
is not possible to ascertain precisely what stagecraft was employed in the 
original performances of these plays, either at the Rose or at the Red Bull (see 
Chapter Five for further discussion of Red Bull stagecraft), it is clear that it was 
noisy, loud, blazing, and amazing.  The fireworks, costumes, and the 
possibilities of flight and suspension suggest that Medea’s prominent role in 
The Brazen Age connects the special effects of the stage with a deep form of 
marvel and enchantment. 
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Strange divinity 
Heywood draws on the notions of marvel and enchantment, and on the 
effect’s purpose of signifying Medea’s otherworldly powers, to suggest that her 
conjuration is not “done . . . by good Artes and lawfull.”  “Strange spectacle” is 
connected to religious and moral imagery that moves between abstract and 
visual or material description.  Sermon writer Thomas Adams shares 
Heywood’s ambiguity about visual display and express that ambiguity through 
the term “strange.”  Invoking “the hidden power of Earth, Aire, Water, Fire” and 
“strong spels,” Heywood’s Medea exhibits a form of strange divinity—something 
that may be said to attend the fusion of classical gods and figures with Christian 
ideas in wider humanist writing. 
Indeed, strangeness is prominently associated with foreignness and 
heresy in the period, while inhabiting a borderland between moral and visual 
description.  The primary definition given by the Oxford English Dictionary for 
that period is of “persons, language, customs, etc.: Of or belonging to another 
country; foreign, alien” (1.a).  Hence, John Baret’s Alvearie, a protodictionary 
considered by T.W. Baldwin to be influential in “shaping the English definitions 
of Shakespeare’s generation” (qtd. Koppelman and Wechsler), gives numerous 
definitions for strange around the idea of alien customs, in a negative manner; 
one entry expands on strange through the terms and phrases “diuers, vnlike, 
not agreeable, another mans, none of ours” (Fff1r).  This definition can be taken 
further by the association of the term with ungodly, heretical, or Catholic 
practices.  “O strange diuinity!” William Crashaw cries in a 1607 sermon that 
attacks the “strange impiety” of papists—especially when it comes to their uses 
of images, for which casuistical Catholics offer “many . . . strange doctrines” 
(K1v, O1v, M1v). 
The Church of England preacher Thomas Adams is exceptionally fond of 
the term, and it appears with frequency throughout his tracts and sermons.  As 
in the Age plays, the term teases at visual appearance and moral judgements 
associated with display while avoiding any explicit visual or material description.  
Perhaps because of his “lively style” (McGee—ODNB “Adams, Thomas”), the 
flexibility of “strange” appeals to Adams.  He uses it to describe apostate, 
sinner, and devil, as well as to mark his own works: in the sermon, The white 
deuil, he apologises for “so strange a title” and uses patronage to claim his work 
is no “strange child” (the sermon is delivered, interestingly, the same year as 
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Webster’s “strange” play of the same title and published a year later).   In his 
moral and religious writings, Adams is happy to use the term to unmask moral 
(and specifically Catholic) sin, as in Englands sicknes (1615):  
 
First, the Deuill, who comes like an old dotart, neatly tricked and licked 
up: his wrinckled hide smoothed and sleeked with tentations; he comes 
euer masqu’d, and dares not shew his face. Take away his vizour, and 
the soule is worse then a witch that can affect him.  And as when hee 
temptes wretched Sorceresses to some reall couenant with him, hee 
assumes the forme of familiar and unfeared creatures; left in a horrid and 
strange shape they should not endure him.  So in his spiritual 
circumuentions, the more facile, slie and suspectlesse insinuation into 
mortall hearts; Hee transformes himselfe into an Angell of light. (C4r) 
 
His sermons delight in the play of colour and appearance, of the connection 
between vision and virtue.  The devil in Englands sicknes comes in disguise, 
and his “horrid and strange shape” suggests an uncertain but unsavoury true 
appearance.  His description is teasingly dramatic, performative, and even 
theatrical: he is “tricked and licked up” like a play-going gallant, “masqu’d” like a 
dancer, and adept at transformation.  Yet the reader is never offered any 
concrete image of his true, sinful shape.  Adams offers a half-way house in the 
materialisation of morality: it goes some way to describing sin in material terms, 
but avoids the clear, practical descriptions that would allow a reader to visualise 
it fully—quite unlike Florio’s visualising translation of Montaigne, discussed in 
chapter one. 
Such tension over appearances is matched in his sermon titles, from The 
white deuil and The blacke devil (1615) to The deuills Banket (1614) and it can 
be associated with “strangeness.”  The sermons themselves are presented as a 
form of dramatic presentation—something that Adams apologises for even as 
he insists upon its effectiveness in revealing and combatting sin.  He insists in 
The blacke devil that the colourful title is neither for “imitation” nor for 
“affectation” but rather to “shew thy selfe, and all other perusers, the blacknesse 
of Sinne; and among the rest, of Apostacie.  Would you not behold Impiety in 
the true colours: you may for beare” (A4r).  Here, Adams promises to reveal the 
sins beneath the surface through unveiling its “blacknesse,” but the “true 
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colours” that come shining through are in morally rather than literally descriptive 
terms.  In a period that asks questions of both ethics and optics, Adams’s 
idiosyncratic style suggests that uncertain visual forms can still signify certain 
truths.   
Throughout The blacke deuill (as in numerous of the period’s religious 
tracts), strangeness is linked with Catholic impropriety: “O strange inversion” 
(C1v); “How strange, and unproper a speech is this; a contentious lambe, a 
troublesome Minister!” (C4v).  Such uses exemplify a wider employment of the 
term in the Elizabethan and early Jacobean periods, where it represents a 
“foreign” religion, the heresy of apostasy. 
Yet Adams’s repetitions of “strange” go further in linking uncertain 
appearance and sin, and the term becomes a visual-moral epithet.  He 
caricatures the devil as a “strange pilgrim”—a means of indicating appearance 
without explicitly presenting the reader with colourful display or with words that 
might conjure up a definite image: “strange” seems to substitute a moral for a 
visual description, just as in the description in Englands sicknes of the devil’s 
“horrid and strange shape.”  Writing in a period where “‘Ethical’ instability had 
spawned perceptual instability, and vice versa” (Clark 285), Adams avoids the 
precarious and misleading certainties of visual description in order to shore up 
certainty in moral and religious instruction; he uses “strangeness” to signify a 
mixture of the perceptual and the ethical, and the term assumes visual and 
material terms within moral description. 
Medea’s “strange habite” and the “strange fiery-workes” assume some 
form of Adams’s moral-visual, description; after all, she is called in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, a major source for Heywood’s Age plays, “wicked Medea” 
(7.396).  Like Ovid’s soubriquet, Heywood’s directions indicate a judgement on 
her actions in the play, while also suggesting that “strange” in this context might 
be shorthand for a theatrical appearance of devilishness, deceit, treachery, with 
overtones of “strange divinity.”  Although the term does not appear in stage 
directions as a “theatrical point of view” (Ichikwa 18), their “fictional point of 
view” as a literary description nonetheless suggests a specific desired aesthetic 
effect in performance: the generation of “strange” spectacle.  The fact that such 
spectacle is not described in Heywood’s published playtext in precise, practical, 
theatrical terms ironically enhances its power: by combining visual description 
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with moral description, the Age plays ascribe moral and religious significance to 
their most spectacular moments. 
Strangeness and wonder 
 
Strange days have found us 
Strange days have tracked us down 
They’re going to destroy us 
--- The Doors 
 
Jenny Sager argues, with reference to early modern theatrical display, 
“that sensory delight and intellectual contemplation are not mutually exclusive, 
they are inextricably linked: spectacle provokes ‘wonder’, which in turn induces 
‘wondering’” (29).  Heywood’s “strange” spectacle and its literary descriptions in 
the stage directions suggest something of that wonder, but the use of the word 
“strange” in the Age plays moves response to spectacle beyond “wondering” 
and into (dubious or failed) attempts at describing, categorising, or explaining 
visual events.  
Criticism has recently paid significant attention to the meanings of 
“wonder” in the early modern period and in Shakespeare’s romance plays.33  
While closely related to “wonder,” strangeness elicits a peculiar form of moral 
and visual uncertainty; it is not a-logical or pre-evaluative, but is visually, 
intellectually, and philosophically provocative.  James Biester links the term 
“strange” with “wonder” in his exploration of lyrical, compositional, and rhetorical 
forms of admiration and literary ways of making wonder.  He notes the close 
connection between a number of English meanings that are derived from 
Classical equivalents: 
 
                                     
33 See James Biester, Lyric Wonder, Rhetoric and Wit in Renaissance English Poetry (1997), 
Peter Platt, Reason Diminished, Shakespeare and the Marvelous (1997), and T.G. Bishop, 
Shakespeare and the Theatre of Wonder (1996).  Stephen Greenblatt’s Marvelous 
Possessions: The Wonder of the New World also deals with the term and its contextual 
associations.  Helen Wilcox, in her recent study, is the exception; she notes the frequency of the 
term “strange” in The Tempest and devotes several paragraphs towards the recognition that 
“the play’s moral world turns on the meanings and consequences of these ‘strange’ and 
‘stranger’ impressions” (202)—a notion this chapter expands upon with deeper context and 
textual analysis. 
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The Latin adjective admirabilis and the Greek deinos register 
especially strongly the sense of a response to something that is 
powerfully affective either positively or negatively, something that 
so repulses or attracts, or repulses and attracts, that it renders the 
soul incapable of normal operation.  Deions has an enormous and 
fascinating range of meanings, including fearful, terrible, terrifying, 
terrific, mighty, powerful, wonderful, marvellous, strange, able, 
and, notably, clever. (6) 
 
Whilst Biester’s study suggests that there is a “verbal parallel” between 
strangeness, wonder, and admiration, his focus is on the meaning of the latter 
two and he neglects to interrogate meanings of strangeness.   
Wonder, morality, and strangeness, though, are prominently combined in 
the popular print of the period.  Indeed, the association between “strangeness” 
and the wrong religion underlines an equally (if not more) common relationship 
in the period between the “strange” and the “true.”  It is a relationship that is 
fraught, however, as indicated by Theseus’s lines in A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream: “More strange then true” (O2r).  The term’s rich polysemy means it 
always filters and reflects upon the meaning of “truth.”  It is therefore difficult not 
to detect a spurious note, if not also an acknowledged anxiety, in many of the 
contemporary pamphlets that purport to present “strange” and “true” reports 
(see the list below). 
The concept is often used in reference to providential signs and 
images—especially in “monstrous birth” pamphlets and broadsides, where it 
signals the “strange news” and “strange births” that should serve as warnings 
for a town or nation.  While strange practices might be considered foreign, 
foolish, and, dangerous, strange signs offer a crucial link between visual, 
physical anomalies and moral and religious truths—and the one might indicate, 
precipitate, or warn about the other.34  
One of the chief attractions for “strange” pamphlets is their supposed 
newness; claims of novelty, as suggested in Chapter 1, helped to sell 
ephemeral popular print.  Baret’s Alvearie links “Seldome and Strange,” giving 
the example “I am moued also with the newenes or strangenesse of the place,” 
                                     
34 For an outline of popular print and providential signs, images, and news, and its popularity 
and scholarly consideration, see Walsham, 32-51 and 167-224. 
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listing the synonyms “Not woont, new” (Fff1r).  Biester remarks that wonder 
signifies an “unstable mixture of repulsion and attraction,” and strangeness can 
be seen to have similar connotations—explored beneath in discussion of 
geographical and cultural discovery and The Tempest.  
Montaigne, in Florio’s translation, recognises the curious power of the 
term, noting that “strangenes it selfe doth first give credite unto matters” (K6r),35 
and indeed popular print adopts the term in many of the titles of broadsides and 
pamphlets to link, like Autolycus in The Winter’s Tale, the strange and the true.  
They frequently offer “strange news,” and pamphlets like Thomas Day’s 
Wonderfull straunge sightes seen in the Element, ouer the Citie of London 
(1583) represent the term’s importance to flashy titles that associate newness 
with both wonder and truth. 
Suspending a conjuress in the air and putting on eye-catching 
pyrotechnic wizardry (apparently more elaborate even than other Red Bull 
plays) certainly seem like novel experiences—and possibly Heywood’s stage 
directions attempt themselves to conjure in the reader a sense of the rarity and 
sensation of the performed play.  Yet the term also refers to visual, material, 
and bodily images of truth—notably portents and prodigies in popular print.  
Like dramatic spectacles, “strange” pamphlets and broadsides offer not merely 
the possibility of titillating novelty, but also, through visual wonder, the promise 
of moral illumination.  Moral associations with the term are to be found in the 
works of moralists, moral philosophers, and historians of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, where it suggests links between truth, strangeness, and 
curiosity.  Indeed, the wonder that accompanies strange historical tales or 
strangely presented displays is considered to be ethically illuminating; Thomas 
Elyot, in The boke named the Governour, deems histories to be “more strange” 
to readers than other forms of moral instruction, “and therfore I suppose more 
pleasant to the reder” (U5v).  Elyot’s understanding of the term seems to be 
linked, like Philip Sidney’s “delight,” to the pleasures of moral instruction.36 
In one large swathe of popular print, it is not history but the relation of 
prodigious monstrosities and occurrences that are thought to be “pleasant” to 
the reader.  In a period where portents can be linked to millenarian prophecies, 
through various forms of biblical exegesis, and also to warnings of sin and 
                                     
35 M. A. Screech also translates the term as “strangeness” (242). 
36 See James A. Devereux’s discussion of “delight” in Sidney’s Defence. 
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damnation, “strangeness” is both a worrying and a powerful term.  Walsham 
notes that “visual experiences seem to have been interpreted as forerunners of 
Armageddon” (184), but they are also there as moral symbols, images that 
serve to edify and improve one’s ways.  Strange newes out of Kent in 1609 
describes a “Monstrous and misshapen Childe,” linking the idea of strange 
occurrences with visual experience: “the abortiue and prodigious byrths from 
time to time, which many of us have bene eye witnesses of, may sufficiently 
summon vs from sinne  . . .” (A3r).  Indeed, the strange birth here offers a hope 
of redemption, providing a curious visual experience that awakes the mind from 
sinful sleep.  Day’s pamphlet also stresses the visual power of strangeness, 
exclaiming of man that “nothing can draw him, more forcibly vnto repentance, 
then the sencible sight and feeling, of fearefull and mighty plagues, heauenly 
threatninges, and strange and prodigious wonders . . .” (A2r).  The linking of the 
“strange” and the “wonderful” in the titles of popular print, and its attendant 
association with visual experiences in the works themselves, suggests that in 
popular print, as in Adams’s sermons, strangeness is a particularly spectacular 
term.  Indeed, Sager’s acknowledgement that “spectacle incites a continual 
cycle of wonder and wondering” (34) applies equally to monstrosity literature as 
it does to the film and theatre effects she discusses in her study. 
While inciting continual wondering, these strange images also demand to 
be read, in part, as prodigies.  Walsham notes that the “assumption that such 
aberrations of nature were metaphysical signs was common to both blackletter 
ballads and pamphlets and the erudite teratological writings of physicians, 
cosmographers, and divines” (194), though precise interpretations varied.  
Day’s Call of England in Wonderful Straunge Sights describes the various 
subjects of bizarre bodies and meteorological miracles, the basis for this large 
sector of popular print, as God’s fourth “forwarning” to man:  
 
The Lorde hath forwarned vs a great while, & yet doth not cease, 
so to doe stil, first by his Law, then by his gospel, thirdly by the 
benefites, that we haue continually receiued of him, fourthly by his 
creatures, and miraculous tokens, strange monsters, blazing 
commets, vnwonted enumbrations of waters, straunge fishes, 
perrillous warres, earthquakings, and last of all, firye constellations 
. . . . (A3v) 
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Such a conception of prodigies and portents illustrates Walsham’s claims that 
this thinking “sprang from a theocentric view of the universe, an intensely 
moralistic cosmology” (169).37  The “strange monsters” are therefore not merely 
spurious claims to “newness” (especially considering their long pedigree in oral 
and print tradition), nor simply foreign; instead the term holds a divine and 
symbolic charge—that of moral and religious forewarning—which is bolstered 
by its companionship, in The Call of England, with “miraculous.”38 
While noting that they are, in some way, a warning sign from on high, 
strange wonders in monster pamphlets also acknowledge, like Adams’s 
sermons, the ineffability of translating visual experience into verbal explanation, 
and vice versa: 
                                     
37 Although Walsham’s work draws a distinction between different forms of providential 
symbolism—noting that “prodigies and prophecies occupied something of a grey area in 
Protestant doctrine of providence” (176)—she also notes the “tension and interplay between 
Protestant theology and the pre-existing cultures of divination it sought to uproot and replace” 
(180). 
38 Miraculous is also a term, according to Biester, associated with wonder. 
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Fig. 16.  Strange Newes out of Kent (London, 1609; titlepage).  STC 14934. 
 
Despite the fact that the prodigy is presented in a large image on the front of 
Strange Newes out of Kent, the title insists twice on its unique “strangeness”—
suggesting, as in emblem books, that the image is unable to speak sufficiently 
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for itself.  Unlike emblem books, though, the pamphlet offers no precise 
framework or moral through which to understand or interpret the image or the 
occurrence.  In contrast to the materialised moral images of popular print, it is 
unclear even how to process the image that appears in a pamphlet like Strange 
Newes, let alone how explicitly to use it.  Instead, explication descends into a 
panic of strangeness and wonder: 
 
God . . . is highly offended with vs, in that hee thus changeth the 
secret workings of nature, as he lately shewed, in the strange birth 
of a monstrous childe brought into the World, at Sandwitch in 
Kent, the strange shape and vnnatural proportion thereof . . . 
caused much feare, fright, and wonder . . . . (A3v) 
 
The title and description suggest that visual signs and portents should be 
translated into a clearer description, both moral and material; as with Adams’s 
sermons, “strange” is flexible and imprecise enough to cover both.  Yet its 
imprecision belies an uncertainty about both translating the material world into 
moral terms, and vice versa, and about the veracity of moral and religious 
interpretation itself.  Such uncertainty is perhaps exacerbated, too, by the 
ambivalence of Elizabethan and Jacobean ministers and their anxiety “to 
restrain the popular impulse to derive specific, deterministic predictions from 
such occurrences” (Walsham 178-79).  Whereas emblem books promise some 
insight into the Book of Nature, monster pamphlets like Strange Newes out of 
Kent admit uncertainty about visual and natural occurrences—“the secret 
workings of nature.”  
Indeed, the relation of the events in Strange Newes uses the term so 
frequently—“strange & dreadful to behold,” “a most strange deformitie,” “a thing 
of strangenesse,” “this strange byrth,” “an accident most strange,” “this most 
strange birth,” “diuers straunge birds, and foules,” amongst others—in a 
pamphlet only eight and a half pages long, that it cannot simply be put down to 
lazy writing.  The same can be seen in other “strange news” pamphlets, 
including Strange signes seen in the aire (1594), translated out of Dutch, which 
includes a similar story about a headless child to the 1609 Kent incident.  It, too, 
litters the page with “strange” and “strangeness.” Unlike the associations of 
“wonder” explored by Biester and Bishop, “strange” signifies an attempt at 
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qualitative and analytical explanation.  The adjective fills a visual and moral 
gap, attempting description in the face of ineffability (and on top of what is 
supposedly, in Strange Newes from Kent, an accurate woodcut).  Similar uses 
can be found across numerous pamphlets in the period.39   
For Heywood’s Medea, then, it is not surprising that her appearance is 
aligned with the uncertain visual experiences of popular print.  Witchery is 
treated with the same “strange reports” as prodigious births, with titles like A 
Strange Report of Sixe most notorious Witches, who by their diuelish practises 
murdred aboue the number of four hundred small Children . . . (1601) and The 
most strange and admirable discouerie of the three Witches of Warboys (1593).  
Fittingly Medea offers “strong spells” to tame the savage monster—a dragon—
who is guarding the golden fleece, overcoming the “Vipers teeth” that will turn 
into ready-armed soldiers: Heywood calls them “strange seed” (G2v).  Popular 
print and practices associated with the “wrong religion” or irreligion attend 
Medea at the height of her supernatural powers. 
T.G. Bishop’s articulation of theatrical wonder is a useful way of thinking 
about “strangeness” here.  He notes that during the “labile moment” of wonder 
 
the intimate interrelations of emotion and reason are explored, 
and wonder becomes a kind of high-level ‘switchpoint’ for 
transactions between emotional and rational responses.  It is not 
the purging or conversion of wonder into something else that 
                                     
39 The term appears frequently across pamphlet literature: Strange and Wonderfull 
news of a woman which lived neer unto the famous city of London (c.1630, STC 20322.3) 
associates the term with a spectacular death by a devil; A strange and wonderfull 
prognostication (1624, STC 17183) links the term with fore-sight and with a visual sign that 
“betokens some strange thing” (B2r), similarly The man in the moone, telling strange fortunes 
(1609, STC 17155), More strange newes of wonderfull accident hapning by the late 
ouerflowings of waters (1607, STC 22916), and A wonderful and straunge newes (1583 STC 
982.5) charge natural meteorological signs with moral significance, and the latter suggests that 
raining wheat is a providential punishment “sent to moue us to speedy repentance”; Strange 
and wonderfull things outlines the experiences of Richard Hasleton on his travels, suggesting, in 
line with Baret, that the term can indicate foreignness and novelty (1595, STC 12925); Strange 
signes seene in the aire, strange monsters beheld on the land, and wonderfull prodigies both by 
land and sea (1594, STC 21321), A right strange and wonderful example of the handie worke of 
a mightie God (1585, STC 20127), and Strange newes of a prodigious monster (1613, STC 
15428) all associate “strangeness” with monstrous births and their signs: what the latter 
describes as “Nature . . . violated through the Corruption” (B1v); A most certaine report . . . of a 
most strange and huge fish (1595, STC 18895.5), A most strange and true report of a 
monsterous fish, who appeared in the forme of a woman, from her waste upwards (1604, STC 
11501.5), and A most strange and wonderfull herring (1598, STC 13239) all deal with the 
maritime manifestations of strangeness—a phenomenon discussed below in relation to 
discovery and the shock of the new in The Tempest.  
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theatre seeks, but the placement of that emotion in relation to an 
audience’s understanding of the action.  In particular, wonder 
registers not the audience’s analysis of the action, but something 
more like their sense of its significance.  Wonder, that is, is less 
directed to the acquisition of knowledge than to the perception of 
meaning. (4) 
 
Drawing on early modern approaches to Aristotelian theory—particularly of the 
importance of admiratio or wonder to tragedy (which, both Biester and Bishop 
note, is expanded in the period to all forms of literary and theatrical expression, 
including stagecraft itself)—Bishop suggests that wonder can effect a realisation 
of meaning but without the rational grasp of what that meaning is.  The 
connotations of strangeness explored above suggest a more intellectual, and 
therefore more reasoning, engagement with spectacle than even this complex 
definition of wonder permits.  Yet that sense of ineffability remains, challenging 
both perceptions of meaning and perceptions of the visual world—and all forms 
of knowledge that attend it. 
Almost exactly like “strange” popular print, the term fills the entirety of the 
Age plays, again often in response to spectacle, visual display, or eye-opening 
material.  In The Golden Age, Pluto builds a “strange city” (further linking the 
term to Hell and sinfulness), Calisto is described as a “strange deiected beauty” 
(D2r), Saturn suffers “strange perplexions” after an oracle, and at one instance 
it has the power to move a King to battle: 
 
Saturne makes suite for aide, shewes the King his models, his 
inuentions, his seuerall metals, at the strangenesse of which King 
Troos is moued, cals for drum, and collors, and marches with 
Saturne. (I4v) 
 
Heywood’s dumb show suggests that it is right to identify the power of 
strangeness to “move” men to credit and belief and it also echoes the power of 
strange devices or inventions, which enchant, seeming new and amazing.  In a 
dumb show description—even a literary or fictional rather than a practical, 
theatrical one—it might even suggest some form of actorly expression that 
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attends moments of strangeness on the stage: to be “moued” by 
“strangenesse.” 
The accumulation of “strangeness” in the plays compounds the term’s 
connection with wonder and marvel while also echoing the monster pamphlets’ 
loss of articulation.  The Silver and Brazen Ages follow this lead by filling 
dialogue and description with “strange” adventures, doubts, confusions, and 
visions, including Pluto’s “strange wagon” (H1r).  In The Brazen Age, another 
stage direction calls for a “strange confused fray” (D4v).  In the same way that 
popular print adopts the term to avoid literal terms and instead posit moral 
description, the Age plays’ strange frenzies alert us to the difficulty and 
limitations of verbal expression.  They also suggest a specific effect or aesthetic 
generated by spectacle: a “strangeness” that sits in between moral and visual 
description and that points to the ambiguous “moral” power of theatrical display. 
 
Strange scepticism 
The difficulty of verbal expression and questions over visual experience 
and visual description in monster pamphlets and the Age plays intimate a form 
of epistemological uncertainty and sceptical questioning, with its attendant 
distrust of sensory experience.  Indeed, “strangeness” prompts a sceptical 
interest in physical form that underlies the materialisation of morality.  Sager 
has recently explained how, in early modern plays as well as Hollywood films, 
“spectacle incites a continual cycle of wonder and wondering” (34).  Indeed, her 
definition of spectacle is “the sight of a strange or unfamiliar thing or person, 
which incites speculation” (30).  While Bishop suggests (using Descartes as a 
framework) that wonder is a transaction between the emotional and the rational, 
a “pre-evaluative contact with phenomena” (6), “strangeness” indicates a 
thwarted reflection on those phenomena, a failure of or substitute for analysis.  
It is not, as both Descartes and Stephen Greenblatt say of wonder, an 
“absolutely exigent, a primary or radical passion” (Greenblatt, Marvelous 17), 
but a response to, an attempt at processing, a coming-to-terms-with spectacle 
and spectacles.  It is post-evaluative. 
In the Age plays, certainty remains, like Medea, suspended.  “Strange or 
unfamiliar” things on the stage provoke wonder and judgement, without the 
promise of any certain conclusion.  They therefore inculcate, in characters and 
in the fabric of the plays themselves, a visual confusion and aporetic 
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questioning that is characteristic of scepticism—a philosophy that can be 
considered a perpetual process of “making strange.” 
Samuel Daniel associates “strange” directly with “manifold incertaintie” in 
his commendatory verse prefacing Florio’s Montaigne translation.  He worries 
about the “ouercharge” of words and the boundlessness of conceits or 
metaphors, an “Ocean without shore”: 
 
As if man labor’d with himselfe to be 
As infinite in words, as in intents, 
And drawe his manifold incertaintie 
In eu’ry figure, passion represents; 
That these innumerable visages, 
And strange shapes of opinions and discourse 
Shadowed in leaues, may be the witnesses 
Rather of our defects, then of our force. (¶1r) 
 
Again, knowledge—and the “opinions” associated with moral knowledge—is 
translated into visual terms, but those “strange shapes” are deceptive, 
“innumerable visages” that have no concrete number and whose appearance, 
“visage” suggests, is hallucinatory or illusory.  The passage is steeped in ocular 
imagery—with intents “drawn” and figures “represented” like emblematic 
images, with “witnesses” gesturing towards the ocular (and questionable) 
evidence of a law-court—evidence easily manipulated through “legal and 
literary feats of analysis and rhetorical power” (Schramm, Testimony 21).  
Daniel’s “drawing” of our own “incertaintie” in visual terms questions, like a true 
Pyrrhonic sceptic, even the knowledge of our own ignorance. 
Daniel’s poem perfectly encapsulates the philosophical scepticism 
contained within many of Montaigne’s essays—especially the discussion of 
perceptual uncertainty in the “Apology,” discussed in the first chapter.  He notes 
that Montaigne “Yeeldes most rich pieces and extracts of man; / Though in a 
troubled frame confus’dly set” (¶1v).  Indeed, for Montaigne, like Pyrrhus, sight 
guarantees no knowledge of an object’s “forme & essence” but yields “vnto our 
mercie” (“Apology” Ff1v)—the opinion of the viewer, itself dependent on 
circumstance.  The consequent “uncertainty and feebleness of our sences” 
means that all knowledge deriving from their “meane and intermission” is 
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subject to the possibility that the senses may “corrupt or alter” what they bring to 
us, obscuring the soul’s knowledge—and yet we have no other forms of 
experience against which to judge their veracity: “From this extream difficultie 
are sprung all these fantazies, which everie Subject containeth . . .” (“Apology” 
Gg4r).  Throughout Florio’s Montaigne, then, “strangeness” is associated with 
visual fantasies, apparitions, and uncertain shapes; the term is therefore closely 
linked to those shapes’ equally uncertain moral import—it represents, as Daniel 
perceived, the “shapes of opinions and discourse.”  In the opening of “Of 
Feare,” for instance, the term is scattered with almost equal frequency to a 
monster pamphlet, and it links the passions—those complex influences on 
one’s moral balance, as outlined in Chapter One—with the corruption of 
perception.  Not only does fear work a “strange passion,” it “begetteth many 
strange dazelings” and sometimes “representeth strange apparitions,” from 
ghosts to goblins and “good-fellowes” (D2r).  Again, the term represents a semi-
materialisation of morality; it stands poised between abstract and material 
description.  
Strange apparitions are part of Protestant popular print, especially the 
monsters of pamphlets and broadsides—and in part they are designed to instil 
fear of divine retribution and punishment.  Yet their uses of “strangeness” seem 
to be aligned with Montaigne’s own approach to strange descriptions, part of a 
wider sceptical project described by Clark as the construction of “a non-
dogmatic theory of vision” that is part of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
sceptics’ “ethical and political campaigns” (281).  While Montaigne’s “strange 
dazelings” of fear defy proper description and suggest a moral censure of 
superstitious beliefs in fairies and hobgoblins, they also have parallels with the 
ambivalent Protestant treatment of prodigies.  By using “Pyrrhonist arguments 
to strengthen the ‘fideistic’ argument that religious belief was beyond 
demonstration either by the senses or by reason” (Clark 282), Montaigne 
eschews literal description, just like Adams’s “strange” devils and England’s 
monster texts.  Clark sees Montaigne using the tropes of scepticism “to make a 
fundamental distinction between the religion of faith and the religion of rational 
belief—the one, divine, absolutely certain, universal, and unchanging, the other, 
merely human, relative, and in a state of permanent flux” (285).  “Strange” 
descriptions serve to replace the latter—the sensory basis of human 
experience—with a sufficiently mystical, imprecise, but morally charged 
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association with the former.  While the “strange apparitions” of fear do not serve 
as providential warnings, they nevertheless share a concern about visual 
illusion and moral delusion; a wariness of the sort of precise, picture-making 
prose that Daniel describes; and a sign or symbol that demands to be heeded—
for, after all, Montaigne admits “It is feare I stand most in feare of” (D2v).  The 
affections it works in the mind are “strange”: on an earthly level they defy 
certain perception, but they also signal moral importance. 
Certainly, throughout the Age plays, strangeness baffles and amazes 
and provokes doubt.  The uncertainty of descriptions like “strange confused 
fray” and characters’ constant repetition of “strangeness” and “strange” 
generate the combination of wonder—seen in the monster pamphlets—and 
questioning gestured at by Sager.  In both Heywood’s The Silver Age and for 
prominent sceptical thinkers like Montaigne, “strangeness” is puzzling. 
In The Silver Age, the First Captain expresses his confusion at Jupiter’s 
impersonation of his Lord, Amphitrio.  He claims 
 
My Lord, ther’s much amazement in the opening of these strange 
doubts, the more you seek to unfold them, the more they pusle us. 
(E1v) 
 
His remark suggests something of the importance of “strangeness” to the plays, 
directly reflecting the “incertaintie” that characterises sceptical thought.  Yet as 
with mechanical inventions and with wondrous prodigies, it is amazing, firmly 
linking doubt to visual experience.  Heywood’s stage directions and the plays’ 
repetition of the term serve as anti-emblems; like the monster pamphlets, they 
suggest that there is something important to “open” or “unfold” in the “strange” 
events, but they continually elude elucidation.  By contrast to emblems, which 
are puzzles that offer the reward of moral illumination, efforts to explain the 
“strange” events of the Age plays deny satisfaction and insistently remain 
puzzling.  Just as in Montaigne’s “Apologie,” the more one “unfolds” the 
inconsistencies of the human experience, the more uncertain one must be 
about human claims to knowledge.  In this sense, strangeness is opposed to 
the edifying effects of wonder as seen in Aristotelian thinking, which considers it 
the beginning of human knowledge: “for Aristotle, philosophy begins in wonder” 
(Biester 129).   
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The realisation that strange doubts are puzzling does not suggest, 
however, a form of relativism or an absence of moral significance.  Alongside 
the term’s charged meanings in pamphlets and print, Heywood places great 
value on the visual, theatrical experience.  The presence of “strangeness” in a 
sensational stage direction like Medea’s serves, therefore, as shorthand for a 
shortcoming of description but also, crucially, as a gloss on spectacle itself. 
In his Apology for Actors (1612), roughly contemporaneous with the 
publication of the Age plays, Heywood argues that  
 
A Description is only a shadow receiued by the eare but not 
perceiued by the eye: so liuely portraiture is merely a forme seene 
by the eye, but can neither shew action, passion, motion, or any 
other gesture, to mooue the spirits of the beholder to admiration: 
but to see a souldier shap’d like a souldier, walke, speake, act like 
a souldier: to see a Hector all besmeared in blood, trampling vpon 
the bulkes of Kinges. A Troylus returning from the field in the sight 
of his father Priam . . . Oh these were sights to make an 
Alexander. (B3v-B4r) 
 
Heywood believes that sights have the power to make a man great.  Unlike 
portraiture and, significantly, unlike description, the combination of seeing, 
speaking, walking, and acting can prove morally improving.  Perhaps the 
disjunction between description and perception explains Heywood’s fondness 
for “strange” as a stand-in descriptive term, filling the gap between performance 
and print.  It acknowledges the ineffability of visual perception while attempting 
to capture something of the material experience of performance—the 
uniqueness of theatrical display, especially as a moral mode. 
However, the term also intimates that while displays on the stage can be 
instructive, they are rarely straightforwardly so.  Heywood’s strangeness is a 
puzzle that asks a reader interested in spectacle to see the bigger picture, 
visually and morally, while never laying out all of the pieces.  Associations of 
“strange” with witchery and popery and connotations of frustratingly uncertain 
providential signs in popular print indicate that, while clearly of moral import, 
Heywood’s spectacles “pusle us.”  “Strange” sights—like those that dominate 
the Age plays—are less convincingly edifying than Heywood’s Apologie would 
 155 
like to suggest.  They attest to an ambivalence about spectacle, acknowledging 
its association with fears, superstitions, and passions, as Montaigne suggests, 
and also its proximity to illusion.  While moral force inheres in visual and 
material display, the earthliness of physical spectacle nonetheless remains 
unsettling.  As such, characters and stage directions in the plays channel visual 
scepticism, while attempting, much as the Apologie itself does, to prove 
spectacle to be efficacious.  The Tempest shares this approach to visual 
display, transforming stage devices into something rich and strange, insisting 
upon their power whilst recoiling from them as “insubstantial pageants.” 
Beating on strangeness in The Tempest 
The Tempest is more explicit than the Age plays in its acknowledgement 
of the contemporary resonances of “strange,” but it is also, at times, more 
abstract, more lyrical, and for it more poignant.  Most notable is the play’s entire 
feeling of strangeness—something that encompasses the novelty of the island 
and the extraordinary oddity of the events that take place over the few hours of 
fictional time, already suggested above, but also the language itself.  “Strange” 
syntax and rhetorical devices are discussed with respect to Cymbeline in 
Chapter Five, but the contorted verse and the fashioning of a “strange” style 
applies equally to The Tempest. 
Yet the language and style of wonder and strangeness is part of a wider 
cultural experience in early modern England.  Robert C. Fulton III has noticed 
the important influence of New World literature, specifically the Bermuda 
pamphlets, on the play—now a critical commonplace.  He states that “a 
complementary theme in Bermuda pamphlets” to the manner of the characters’ 
arrival “is the strangeness of the islands where the shipwrecked expedition finds 
itself” (4).  Yet while repeating the word himself, Fulton III does little to scrutinise 
its meanings or determine how it relates, directly, to the Bermuda pamphlets.   
One parallel is in the shipwreck and the arrival of the stranded on the 
island.  Prospero initially notes that it is “by accident most strange” that 
“bountiful Fortune / . . . hath mine enemies / Brought to this shore” (A2v).  His 
comment initially confuses providential fortune with Prospero’s own devices, 
which have engineered the storm itself.  His words echo A discovery of the 
Barmudas, otherwise called the Ile of Divels (Thomas Gates, George Summers, 
et al, 1610).  The pamphlet states that their “deliuery was not more strange in 
faling so opportunely, and happily upon the land, as our feeding preseruation, 
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was beyond our hopes, and all mens expectations most admirable . . .” (B2v).  
Admiration and strangeness also combine in The Tempest when Gonzalo 
realises the “rarity” of the island, the dryness of their garments, and the lush 
vegetation and sweet air (A3v-A4r).  The prospect of “feeding preseruation” is 
toyed with later in the play, when Ariel tempts them with a vanishing banquet 
that proves even more admirable and more strange. 
Indeed, a more prominent parallel of strangeness is to be seen in the 
play’s “strange shapes” and creatures.  The pamphlets are keen to express the 
strangeness of the natural world in the Bermudas.  A true declaration of the 
estate of the Colonie in Virginia (1609) describes the animals of the island in 
parallel with the ravens of the Bible:  
 
. . . as in the great famine of Israell, God commanded Elias to flie 
the brooke Cedron, and there fed him by Rauens; so God 
prouided for our disconsolate people in the midst of the Sea by 
foules: but with an admirable difference: unto Elias the Rauens 
brought meat, unto our men the foules brought (themselues) for 
meate: for when they whisteled, or made any strange noyse, the 
foules would come and sit on their shoulders . . . (D2v) 
 
The description is made more interesting in light of Stephen Orgel’s 
suggestions about the name Sycorax: both Orgel and Leah Marcus relate the 
name of Caliban’s mother to corax, the Greek for “raven,” and so to Medea, the 
classical witch who features prominently in Heywood’s The Brazen Age.  Orgel 
notes that Sycorax could perhaps be explained as Scythian Raven: Medea 
(Orgel 19 n.1).  Further, Demaray summarises how “the name Syorax has been 
etymologized from the Greek korax (raven), an apparent epithet in the 
Metamorphosis for Medea, the Scythian raven” (32). While the passage in A 
true declaration suggests no witchery, it nonetheless places ravens as part of 
the “wonder” in the “inchaunted pile of rocks” (D2r). 
The presence of strange fowl thereby produces a link between the two 
plays that associates the “magical” effects with new world creatures.  Such 
creatures also extend strangeness to wider descriptions of the new world, and 
specifically points to various creatures and happenings in The Tempest.  While 
engagement with the peoples of the new world has understandably taken 
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precedence40—and Mullaney has engaged with “strange things” from other 
cultures—Miguel de Asúa and Roger French’s recent exploration of European 
encounters with new world animals suggests a further source of newness.  
They note that 
 
the European powers set out to complete the settlement and 
exploitation of the recently discovered lands, and in the wake of 
this race for new sources of wealth and markets they had to cope 
with an alien and disturbing reality. . . A New World meant an 
exotic nature, new landscapes, new minerals, new plants and new 
animals. (xiii) 
 
Asúa and French’s study shows how responses moved from a linguistically- and 
culturally-formed imposition of expectations on the new world’s zoology to a 
more “scientific” response that describes in detail the animals encountered.  
This thesis, and this chapter with regard to strangeness, is particularly 
interested in advancing such a critical move that builds upon discursive and 
linguistic processes of “othering” by acknowledging concurrent technological, 
material, and scientific processes at work in estranging objects, individuals, and 
ideas.   
One of the most popular sixteenth-century accounts of new world 
animals is Peter Martyr’s collection of letters, published as Decades of the New 
World.  Asúa and French note that “The passages in which Martyr talks about 
the new animals were eagerly quoted, plagiarized and held as truth for two 
centuries, no matter how fantastic some of them were, judged by contemporary 
standards . . .” (53).  Notably, Richard Hakluyt, who had earlier published a 
Latin version of Martyr’s Decades, encouraged the final parts of the book to be 
                                     
40 Numerous critics, from Peter Hulme to Barbara Fuchs to Ania Loomba have made significant 
claims about the play’s engagement with new world colonialism—see Virginia Mason 
Vaughan’s and especially Brinda Charry’s chapters in The Tempest: A Critical Reader (2014) 
for a recent overview of such criticism.  For a critical overview and critique of “colonialist” 
studies of The Tempest, see G. A. Wilkes, “The Tempest and the Discourse of Colonialism.”  
Bartels discusses “strangeness” in this context as alien or “Other” characters, but with regard to 
Christopher Marlowe.  Her study examines how “strange” characters, which are formed from a 
variety of geographic locales, are made spectacular in Marlowe’s drama: “For Marlowe, the 
choice of settings from Africa to the Mediterranean to the East turns our attention to the key 
sites of England’s imperialist exploits and so to the issue of imperialism.  On a more symbolic 
level, however, his representation of those settings breaks down the barriers of difference, 
showing that the worlds out there are not so different from Europe” (15).   
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translated into English by Michael Lok and published in 1612 (Quinn 327), 
around the time of the composition and performance of The Tempest and of the 
other “strange” plays discussed in this thesis. 
A striking moment echoes The Tempest in the close of the seventh 
decade, which is described in a marginal gloss as “A strange tale of a 
prodigious monster,” revealing the proximity of new world animals to monstrous 
pamphlet literature.  In this strange tale, there is a “violent tempest of blustring 
whirlewinds” in the country of Camara: 
 
Through that violent tempest, they say two foules were brought 
into the country, almost like the Harpiae of the Ilands Strophades 
so much spoken of, for that they had the countenance of a virgin, 
with a chinne, mouth, nose, teeth, smooth brow, and venerable 
eyes and faire. (Oo2v) 
 
The Decades combines classical mythology with half-hearted taxonomy.  
Though this harpy violently attacks adventurers and is eventually killed by the 
Spanish, it echoes Ariel’s descent “like a Harpey” in The Tempest.  The wonder 
of the happy-to-be-eaten fowls in the Bermuda pamphlets is extended in 
Martyr’s book, still popular, it seems, among the publication of more reliable (or 
at least more verifiable) travel texts.  As with Adams’s devil-portraits and the 
attempt at visual-moral description in prodigy pamphlets, Martyr’s strange tale is 
inextricably associated with strange visual description, which notes the facial 
features and the “exceeding waight” that left “the verie print of her talons 
remained in the stones of the rockes where she went to perch all night” (Oo2v). 
“Brauely the figure of this Harpie” does Ariel perform (B1r) in 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest, and he and his “ministers” form part of the 
“obseruation strange” performed in the display.  In light of the creatures that link 
the new world setting of Prospero’s island with the bird-like Medea, Ariel’s 
descent in The Tempest appears to be a similar moment to Medea’s 
suspension in The Brazen Age, a strange dramaturgical echo.41  Lomax notes 
that the Age plays combine “familiar old effects of thunder and lightning with 
                                     
41 Both Prospero and Medea are conjurors or magicians, and this link suggests further the 
technological aspects of “strangeness” that govern their spectacular performances in the two 
plays.  The “aesthetic of strangeness” generated by stage technology—at the root of their 
“magic”—is discussed in the following chapter. 
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timing and newly acquired technical expertise,” thereby suggesting that “an 
awareness and a delight in artifice indicate links with private theatre practice 
and also show that Heywood has successfully modified a pageant device for 
the stage” (28).  The learned allusions shared with The Tempest as well as the 
performance of The Silver Age in court alongside Cymbeline compounds the 
connections between Heywood’s supposedly sensational outdoor theatre and 
Shakespeare’s sensory and sensitive Blackfriars plays.  The strange 
ornithological occurrences in both plays channel both the visually perplexing 
and the ostensibly exotic aspects of new world creatures, using spectacle to 
unite and represent a variety of cultural interests—from the flight of masque 
devices (see the following chapter) to proto-taxonomy.  
Indeed, like Martyr’s marginal gloss, the spectators’ observation in The 
Tempest is made strange by Ariel’s performance, prompting Gonzalo to ask 
Alonso “. . . why stand you / In this strange stare?”: a literal form of “obseruation 
strange” on the behalf of Alonso.  Like the sceptical uncertainty that attends 
vision in Heywood’s stage directions and his characters’ “strange doubts,” 
Alonso’s response to Gonzalo and his observation of the Harpy-Ariel is hesitant 
and fearful: 
 
O, it is monstrous: monstrous: 
Me thought the billowes spoke, and told me of it, 
The windes did sing it to me: and the Thunder 
(That deepe and dreadfull Organ-Pipe) pronounc’d 
The name of Prosper: it did base my Trespasse . . . B1r  
 
Mary B. Moore acknowledges that the “play’s characters insistently wonder: 
they question whether they have imagined or seen what appears before them” 
(498), and certainly Alonso’s interpretation here appears dreamlike.  One might 
go so far as to term it, repeating Sebastian, “a sleepy Language,” echoing the 
“strange drowsines” and “strange repose” that overcomes Alonso through 
Ariel’s art in the second act (A4v).  The effect is that the stage directions that 
explain Ariel’s actions and the “strange shapes” that bring in the banquet are 
thrown into confusion.  The dream-like reflection (Me thought) and the 
subjective interpretation of the spectacle causes retrospective doubt in the 
audience or the reader: how can one know what one has just seen?—Alonso 
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certainly does not.42  They resemble, in this sense, Heywood’s own impractical 
stage directions—directions that offer no visual certainty. 
That uncertainty is something that Greenblatt explores in Marvelous 
Possessions (1994).  He notes that European processing of the new world 
depended on the recognition of readable signs, on the detailing of salient 
features that can be processed in Western terms.   
 
But if the English infuse into their strange encounter their powerful 
confidence in the system of symbolic representation that they 
carried with them, their dream of the executive power of signs, 
their fantasy of plenitude and control, they continue to be haunted 
by the sense of emptiness that is paradoxically bound up with the 
imagined potency of their art. (116) 
 
Alonso’s and Gonzalo’s bafflement at the “monstrous” but acknowledgement of 
its “strangeness” captures this paradox—of legibility and illegibility.  Ariel’s 
verse, in its strangeness, also intimates the possibility of understanding coming 
into collision with confusion—the difficulty of its syntax and the overwhelming 
visual power of the scene, in accordance with the sceptical resonances of the 
term “strange,” challenge the onlooker’s knowledge (just as Heywood’s 
descriptive power is challenged in the Age plays): the whole scene culminates 
in “observation strange.” 
Shakespeare transforms the zoological curiosity of Martyr’s Decades (if 
not a direct influence on the play, then part of a cultural matrix of texts that 
reflect interest in “strange creatures”) into a moral spectacle of strangeness.  
The spectacle confirms, in theatrical terms, Mullaney’s suspicions about the 
wonder cabinet: “to speak of Renaissance curiosity or fascination with other 
cultures hardly begins to address what is odd in such anthropology, geared not 
toward the interpretation of strange cultures but toward their consummate 
performance” (69).  Yet incorporating the wider connotations of the “strange” in 
early modern culture, Shakespeare encourages a form of uncertain 
interpretation and interrogation of what exactly such a “strange” performance 
                                     
42 Martyr explains that the harpies appeared “through that foule tempest,” and Alonso too 
merges meteorological, material, and moral.  This conjunction is considered in the next chapter. 
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might mean.  The play draws on the admonitory overtones of prodigy print and 
combines them with the curious shapes of the new world—a new world that is 
difficult to process, confusing, and uncertain. 
Caliban is also drafted into the world of strange monsters and prodigies.  
Like the appearance of Ariel’s harpy, he is part of old world wonders and new 
world marvels.  If “strange” serves elsewhere as a substitute for visual 
description—a means of describing in moral terms without giving precise, literal, 
visual details—then references to Caliban throughout the play contain 
something of the strange.  Virginia Mason Vaughan notes that terms like 
“ridiculous,” “scurvy,” and all derivations and modifications of the term 
“monster”—his “most frequent sobriquet”—“do nothing . . . to clarify our picture 
of him”: “From this confusion of epithets no clear image emerges.  Shakespeare 
seems to have invited his actors and directors to see Caliban however they 
wished” (391).  Trinculo in the play calls him a “strange fish”: 
 
Were I in England now (as once I was) and had but this fish 
painted; not a holiday-foole there but would giue a peece of siluer: 
there, would this Monster, make a man: any strange beast there, 
makes a man: when they will not giue a doit to reliue a lame 
Begger, they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian . . . . Misery 
aquaints a man with strange bedfellows. (A5r) 
 
Trinculo explicitly associates Caliban with new world prints in and the popularity 
of monsters in England.  Malcolm Jones notes that fish were particularly popular 
in early modern print images (259), and as outlined above, there are plenty of 
extant examples.  A most strange and true report of a monsterous fish, who 
appeared in the forme of a woman, from her waste upwards (1604) contains a 
large woodcut of a mermaid, described as a “monstrous Fish”: 
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Fig. 17.  A most strange and true report of a monsterous fish . . . (London, 
1604; *1r).  STC 11501.5. 
 
Shakespeare thereby draws Caliban and his apparent formlessness into the 
same discourse as the monster pamphlets discussed above, combining the 
attempt at moralising with the failure of expression that attends new world 
discovery. 
Ironically, though, Caliban himself also takes Stefano and Trinculo for 
wonders.  He marvels, “these be fine things, and if they be not sprights.”  
Trinculo regards him as “a most ridiculous Monster, to make a wonder of a 
poore drunkard” (A5v)—though they, in calling the inebriated Caliban “monster,” 
do exactly that themselves.  Caliban’s role as a “strange beast” associates him, 
therefore, with Ariel—and certainly he has proven throughout the play and in its 
criticism to be, like Ariel’s strange spectacle, a moral puzzle.  Yet at the same 
time, Shakespeare’s Caliban encourages us to think of Stefano and Trinculo as 
“wonders”—they too are transformed into something rich and strange. 
It has long been recognised that Montaigne’s essays are a deep 
influence on The Tempest, and Arthur Kirsch notes that 
 
In the absence of a narrative source, Shakespeare’s organization 
of the action, as well as Prospero’s, seems unusually informed by 
 163 
the kind of working out of ideas that suggests the tenor of 
Montaigne’s thinking: inclusive; interrogative rather than 
programmatic; anti-sentimental but humane; tragicomic rather 
than only tragic or comic, incorporating adversities rather than 
italicizing them as subversive ironies.  The particular constellation 
of ideas in the play, moreover—the mutual dependence of virtue 
and vie, forgiveness, compassion, imagination—is habitual in 
Montaigne. (338) 
 
The doubling of Caliban with Trinculo and Stefano (something that happens 
both in the plot—with their plotting together—and in the language, here, of 
wonders) channels this thinking.  It reflects Montaigne’s own culturally-reflective 
essay “Of Cannibals”—long noted as a character source for the play (Gurr, 
“New Directions” 96).  Montaigne ponders a tribe of supposed cannibals in the 
new world, while noting that censure of their practices often obscures our own 
barbarity.  He writes that “there is nothing in that nation, that is either barbarous 
or savage, vnlesse men call that barbarisme, which is not common to them.  As 
indeede, we have no other ayme of truth and reason, then the example and 
Idea of the opinions and customes of the countrie we live-in” (K3r).  Montaigne’s 
cultural scepticism, here, suggests that conceptions of truth and reason are 
dependent upon experiences, rather than on a central, metaphysical truth, and 
the comedy of Trinculo and Stefano expresses a similar realisation: as Caliban 
is “strange” to them, so they are “strange” to him.  Indeed, Montaigne makes 
similar claims for some “cannibal” visitors to the court of King Charles XI; while 
he describes them frequently as “woondrous strange and remarkable,” they too 
remark that European practices, like answering to a beardless king, are “very 
strange.”  The patient tolerance of poverty is also thought to be “strange” (K5v).  
In “Of Cannibals,” the term is turned back against Western practices to make 
readers aware of their own barbarity.  The Tempest likewise casts strangeness 
upon the real strangers to the island, drawing not only the “marvels” of the new 
world into “strange” description but the fragile certainties of our own selves. 
In the same way that Heywood’s Age plays interrogate and defend 
theatrical display, The Tempest acknowledges the uncertainties of visual and 
moral experience while revealing their power.  The new world connects the 
“strange” aesthetic of The Tempest with the difficulty of processing the “new”—
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itself a synonym for “strange.”  Yet that sceptical impulse—the difficulty of 
explaining visual phenomena and the reluctance to claim knowledge—is also 
turned inwards, in the manner of Montaigne.  Shakespeare focusses 
“strangeness” on the shipwrecked survivors, in their responses and in their 
paths towards redemption.  Like Montaigne’s barbarism, moral knowledge is 
made to seem precarious and contingent, yet images and spectacles remain 
powerful means for self-realisation—they become, therefore, the play’s tools of 
repentance and redemption—just as Ariel’s “quient deuice”—the play’s most 
acute moment of “strangeness”—bases Alonso’s “Trespasse” (B1r). 
Visual strangeness makes audiences and characters alike aware of their 
own perceptual and conceptual shortcomings—escaping both description and 
comprehension—but it also proves a form of admonition.  It directly reflects 
Montaigne’s approach to cannibalism: “I am not sory we note the barbarous 
horror of such an action, but grieved, that prying so narrowly into their faults, we 
are so blinded to ours” (K4v).  Duly, Shakespeare turns the “strangeness” of the 
new to the old.  
 
*** 
 
“Strangeness” is a concept associated with both optical and ethical 
perception.  While it resists clear definition, it might broadly be described as the 
quality of a morally and visually ambiguous moment, feeling, perception, or 
aesthetic (sometimes simultaneously).  The term reflects the novelty of the new 
world of animals and people as well as the material world of devices and 
inventions.  The word is particularly prominent in the early 1610s, where it 
responds to the shock of the unknown, amidst the publication of new world 
pamphlets, ethical and optical scepticism, and prodigy pamphlets.  Helen 
Wilcox identifies 1611 in particular as a year characterised by the “the 
enormous verbal energies of Jacobean England, a period when the English 
language was rapidly expanding, and its expressive potential was confirmed 
both in new works and in translations of existing ones” (3).  Indeed, Wilcox 
recognises The Tempest as a play of its time: 
 
This tragicomedy of ‘strangeness’ and ‘wonder’—two recurrent 
concepts featuring prominently in the textual culture of the year in 
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which it was first performed—deploys magical visual effects and 
witty language, as well as the rhetoric of theme and variation on 
the adjectives ‘strange’ and ‘wondrous’ themselves, to bring these 
unusual elements to the fore in the play. . . (206) 
 
Her study recognises the rich cultures of translation, rhetoric, music, song, 
masquing, and wonder that dominate the printing presses in the year of 
Shakespeare’s late tragicomedy.  Wilcox’s short acknowledgement of The 
Tempest’s strangeness in particular recognises that “the play’s moral world 
turns on the meanings and consequences of these ‘strange’ and ‘stranger’ 
impressions” (202).  This chapter has expanded upon the moral importance of 
that term, exploring the deeper contextual associations and topical charges it 
represents and setting out its relationship to the spectacular. 
The crucible of literary activity described by Wilcox also includes 
Heywood’s theatrical alchemy, too often left out of the discussion.  Heywood’s 
interest in “strangeness” provides a template for what spectacle can achieve in 
the period: despite the habit of contemporaries and of critics to reduce the Red 
Bull theatre repertoire to simple sensationalism, Heywood’s Age plays actually 
insist upon the ethical and optical complexity of “strange” spectacles: “the more 
you seek to unfold them, the more they pusle us” (Silver E1v).  Not only can 
material spectacle be sensational, but it offers to “pusle” an audience; alert it to 
Jacobean culture’s web of “strange” sights; and contemplate the way such 
“impressions,” to use Wilcox’s term, affect the theatre’s moral and visual world. 
The Age plays and The Tempest echo each other through the verbal 
mention of the term but also through parallel moments of “strange” stage 
display, like Medea’s suspension and Ariel’s descent as a harpy.  Dramaturgical 
echoes as well as staging practices actually link the outdoor Red Bull theatre 
with the King’s Men’s Blackfriars.  Both theatres, at this moment, borrow from 
court display and masquing, but both reflect upon the purpose and efficacy of 
spectacle and draw on philosophical concerns about moral and sensory 
knowledge. 
As a term concerned with negotiating between the material and the 
moral world, “strangeness” demands an interrogation of spectacle.  Where the 
materialisation of morality enshrines abstract concepts in physical things, 
strange spectacle opens up doubts about such a presentation by showing the 
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fragilities as well as the force of theatrical effects.  The second chapter has 
shown how material and abstract use was united through popular print, and 
“strangeness” follows a similar model—serving as a term that stands for both 
physical and moral description, from Adams’s devils to Medea’s performance to 
Caliban’s appearance.  Yet where uniting material and abstract use shores up 
the certainties of household prints, “strange” spectacle hides the true “uses” of 
its devices in a puzzle that resists both moral and physical clarity.  Prominent in 
these plays of the early 1610s, it reflects the moment at which materialisation is 
becoming increasingly central to moral representation, while also critiquing such 
representation and reflecting upon the theatrical mode. 
The Tempest and the Age plays present spectacular display as a curious 
puzzle, a challenge to description and a marker of confusion, yet the plays’ 
“strange doubts” also offer moral significance and sometimes, on Prospero’s 
Island especially, moral illumination.  Alonso calls the events in The Tempest, at 
the close, “as strange a Maze, as ere men trod,” a description that aptly 
describes both plays themselves.  Both The Tempest and the Age plays tease 
audiences and readers towards conclusions and then frustrate them, unfold 
doubts through displays and then transform them back into puzzles, and 
Shakespeare and Heywood leave everybody, against Prospero’s instructions, 
“beating on / The strangenesse of this business” (B3v). 
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4. Strange Engineering: Stagecraft and Prospero’s Moral Technology 
 
“It doesn’t take away from believing.  I think you believe more.  You go 
with it.  ‘The Lion King’ proves completely that seeing the mechanics is 
the magic.” 
---Julie Taymor 
 
The previous chapter has shown that strangeness is intimately 
connected with exploration and discovery.  One of the earliest occurrences of 
the concept in The Tempest is in Prospero’s description of the storm itself, 
which he calls an “accident most strange” (A2r).  Yet the accident is not entirely 
providential; Prospero himself has a hand in conjuring the storm, with Ariel 
performing it “to point.”  What can we make of this man-made, spirit-made 
strangeness? 
In this chapter, I take the “aesthetic of strangeness” described in the last 
chapter as a point of departure, but rather than concentrating on the term itself, 
I look at the scenes in which “strangeness” is prominent and examine the way 
such an effect is created through material-moral exchange.  I therefore examine 
the play’s stagecraft as a conceptual form of “strangeness.”  A further link 
between Heywood’s and Shakespeare’s “strangeness” can be seen in the fact 
that both Medea and Prospero are “conjurors” or magicians, yet their power lies 
in “strange” special effects rooted in theatrical display.  This chapter 
concentrates on Prospero, because theatrical engineering is arguably more 
prominent in The Tempest, but “moral technology” can implicitly be read into the 
Age plays, and the final section of this chapter looks at Saturn’s inventions in 
The Golden Age.  I argue that engineering is the root of Prospero’s magic and 
the generator of the “strange” stagecraft that characterises The Tempest.  If 
“strangeness” precariously links the moral and material realms, then “strange 
engineering” charges technological devices, performances, and effects with 
significant admonitory force. 
Recent treatments of spectacle (notably Moving Shakespeare Indoors 
and Shakespeare and the Effects of Performance, discussed in the 
introduction) have pointed to the technology underlying display in early modern 
playhouses.  There remains limited discussion, however, of the way wider 
cultural functions of technological inventions—notably their moral and visual 
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power—are also present on stage.  The cultural and moral role of technology is 
especially prominent in plays where such technology is itself part of the 
playworld.  As such, this chapter builds on past engagements with the materials 
of the theatre, a critical move since before the turn of the millennium and new 
materialism, and of particular interest in the last five years, where the material 
thrust of theatre history has been closely allied with dramatic criticism in the 
work of Farah Karim-Cooper, Gwylim Jones, Tiffany Stern, and others.  As in 
previous chapters, I expand my range of evidence to combine theatre-historical 
interest in props and stage spaces (here, Blackfriars and the Globe) with 
cultural and intellectual history of early seventeenth-century inventions, their 
theories, and their representation as moral devices in images and pamphlets.  
Aligning stage spaces with contemporary philosophical contemplations of 
inventions and devices—particularly sceptical reflection upon material objects—
helps to open up a new and enabling reading of Jacobean stage spectacle and 
specifically The Tempest, one that demonstrates how the stage interrogates its 
own means of representation. 
Prospero’s role in conjuring the storm at the outset is described as a 
force of magic.  We learn of his tampering with the weather, both actively and 
by proxy, in his conversation with Miranda and his interrogation of Ariel, but he 
also gives credit to otherworldly beings in act five.  When renouncing his 
powers in his famous monologue, Prospero thanks the elves and demi-puppets 
of the island, 
 
by whose ayde 
(Weake Masters though ye be) I haue bedymn’d 
the Noone-tide Sun, call’d forth the mutinous windes, 
And twixt the greene Sea, and the azur’d vault 
Set roaring warre: To the dread ratling Thunder 
Haue I giuen fire . . . . (B2v) 
 
The monologue frames the action as Prospero’s; the active verbs are all his.  In 
this forceful manifesto of, and farewell to, his abilities, Prospero terms this 
transformation of nature “rough Magicke.” 
Such “rough Magicke” is the cause, then, of the spectacular 
meteorological events—and other moments of visual wonder—in the play.  This 
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chapter argues that such magic is tangibly, visibly, audibly, and olfactorily 
material.  As such, the moral power of Prospero’s spectacles—addressed in the 
previous two chapters—is rooted in technology.  Stephen Orgel notes that 
“many critics talk about Prospero as a Renaissance scientist, and see 
alchemical metaphors in the grand design of the play” (9); while Prospero is 
often considered a form of alchemist, he is rarely conceived of as an engineer.  
Shakespeare’s The Tempest shows in enchanting fashion that the early modern 
fascination with human engineering has a deeply important moral element.  
Edmund Spenser uses a technological metaphor to describe The Faerie 
Queene’s aim to “fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle 
discipline” (Pp1r); at moments of strange spectacle, The Tempest literally crafts 
moral admonition, advice, revelation, and instruction, combining Prospero’s 
science with the engines of theatre to produce powerful moral-material displays.  
This goes further than the materialisation of morality discussed in the previous 
chapters and suggests that moral messages can be not only transformed into 
material forms but can be born from them. 
The Tempest displays scepticism’s interest in material proof; it 
embarrasses the idea of theatrical illusion by alluding to and then making 
manifest the technologies that lie behind its freak weather and frightening 
spirits.  Yet those technologies are never fully deconstructed; as such, the 
play’s engineering channels the ambivalent descriptive power of “strange” 
spectacle, which sits between material and abstract explanation.  Further, the 
power of technological moral spectacles to counter sceptical doubt is also 
undermined by the ephemerality of these displays.  If moral admonition comes 
not from transcendent powers but from earthly engines, they are subject to the 
fact that all material and especially theatrical creations “dissolve”: “the gorgeous 
Pallaces, / The solemne Temples, the great Globe it selfe” (B2r).  Prospero’s 
moral technology is subject to the mutability of all material things. 
This chapter explores the association of magic with technology in the 
medieval and early modern periods, before suggesting the extent of 
technological display and invention in Jacobean England.  It then addresses the 
conjunction of the playworld and the theatre in The Tempest, examining 
Prospero’s use of stage technology in “strange” moments of spectacle.  I 
explain the moral significance of storms on the early modern and specifically 
Jacobean stage, before demonstrating how the technologies of The Tempest 
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are crucial moral tools.  The chapter ends by considering the implications of 
Prospero’s moral mechanics. 
 
Magic, Machinery, and The Tempest 
There is a burgeoning scholarly interest in early modern technological 
advance, with important studies from Jonathan Sawday (2007) and Jessica 
Wolfe (2004) outlining the intellectual significance of the period’s developing 
machine culture.  Literary studies have also sought to map out the significance 
of these developments, with provocative edited collections including Wendy 
Beth Hyman’s The Automaton in English Renaissance Literature (2011) and 
more focussed studies from Stephen Orgel’s “Prospero’s Wife” (1984) to Kevin 
LaGrandeur’s Androids and Intelligent Networks in Early Modern Literature and 
Culture (2013) suggesting that artificial craft on the page or the stage 
interrogates “ambivalence” about humanity’s “innate technological abilities,” 
from “the danger of our intellectual products” to “the power and potential of 
techne and human artifice” (LaGrandeur 1-2).  Little consideration has been 
given, though, to the more precise moral functions of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century technology, which this chapter addresses with regard to 
The Tempest. 
Critics, most notably Frances Yates (see The Last Plays and The Occult 
Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age), have noted that the arcane, the occult, the 
mysterious, and the magical are traits closely associated with Prospero.  
Machinery and technology must also be a part of this association; they are often 
considered throughout medieval and early modern Europe as branches of 
magic, conjuration, or alchemy.  It is important to note at the outset that, in 
Wolfe’s words, 
 
While there are many texts depicting mechanical devices, there is 
little if any categorical distinction between mechanics and other 
intellectual disciplines.  In an era preoccupied with the 
classification and arrangement of knowledge, objects which from 
our contemporary standpoint appear to belong to a discrete 
category cannot predictably be located in any particular place. (6-
7) 
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Though this is the case, machines and mechanics nevertheless become a 
significant part of discussion from practical matters to more experimental, 
mysterious, occult, or natural-philosophical preoccupations; indeed, the 
polyvalence of technological creations in the period draws engineering into line 
with forms of magic.  “In the Renaissance,” Sawday states, “magic had become 
linked to mechanics through the supposed ‘discovery’ of the works of Hermes 
Trismegistus, the ‘author’ (so it was believed) of 30,000 volumes of esoteric law.  
For the occult writer Henry Cornelius Agrippa, drawing on this well of mystical 
lore, mechanism and magic were inseparable from one another” (Engines 186).  
These associations can be linked, too, through Hero of Alexandria, whose 
automata were known in the medieval and early modern periods.  William 
Eamon has explored the wider explanations for these associations and the 
peculiar historical situation: 
 
Technological progress, both in terms of greater sophistication of 
techniques and wider application of them, was exceedingly rapid 
between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries.  Nor did 
this surge of technological innovation go unnoticed by 
contemporaries: the output of writings on technology was larger 
than at any time previously, and by the beginning of the 
seventeenth century European intellectuals praised the new 
inventions that they believed had made Europe vastly superior to 
antiquity and to other cultures of the world.  Yet despite these 
dramatic changes, belief in magic did not correspondingly wane . . 
. magic underwent an unprecedented revival in the Renaissance. 
(172) 
 
Eamon suggests that magic lent a theoretical context to technological 
development, as well as providing a backdrop for the aims of engineers who 
wished to use human art to dominate, manipulate, and control the natural world: 
“the ‘technological dream’ of the late-Middle Ages and the Renaissance was 
largely a product of the magical world view” (172). 
Hermes Trimegistus and the association of magical lore with engineering 
(explored, for instance, in Frances Yates’s Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic 
Tradition, 1964) can be combined with the rise of “mysteries,” which sought to 
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protect craft secrets, lending these forms of physical, manual, and technological 
craft an aura of actual mystery.  Eamon notes, for instance, that the presence of 
engineered objects in medieval literature as “enchanted” devices are often 
“unmistakably references to mechanical devices” (174).  As such, commonplace 
references to technologies become suffused with notions of magic and occult 
power. 
The medieval and early modern technological progress is compounded 
in the advance of mechanical engineering, specifically in forms of automata.  
Clocks, for instance, burgeoned from the fourteenth century—especially “clock-
jacks” or “Jacquemarts,” which included moving figurines.  LaGrandeur places 
these clocks among “the chief technological wonders of their day,” claiming that 
“those who worked with them were the equivalent of our nuclear scientists” (35).  
Indeed, there are a number of surviving automata (what LaGrandeur calls 
“clockwork androids,” and he lists eight extant examples, 37) from the period 
that were arguably inspired by these early clock automata, from master 
engineers Hans Bullmann of Nuremberg and Gianello Torriano de Cremona, 
both of the early to mid-sixteenth century.  Importantly, for this discussion, 
Torriano was suspected of witchery by monks and others who objected to the 
construction of these “self-moving” toys (LaGrandeur 37). 
Further forms of technological construction—especially of humanoid 
creatures—are also associated with witchery.  Humanoids, golems, and 
mechanical automata receive great interest in the medieval and early modern 
periods.  The alchemical roots of golems and homunculi and the “technological” 
developments involved in mechanical automata are regarded as a form of 
magic.  From the discoveries of Hero of Alexandria through the scientific 
experiments of Roger Bacon to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
developments in machine technology, any form of humanoid or lifelike machine 
“has its roots,” LaGrandeur explains, “and its clearest early expression in actual 
scientific theory of the Renaissance, called natural philosophy—a philosophical 
system in which magic and the beginnings of modern empirical science were 
bound together” (48-49).  Indeed, there is little distinction in these writings 
between a philosophy interested in scientific progress and alchemical magic: 
both were seen as forms of technological creation, in the ability to fashion gold 
from baser materials and in the possibility of creating through this “magical-
scientific” art a humanoid creature, miniature man, homunculus, or golem.  
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Practitioners of science and technology did not all encourage this occult 
reading of their works.  One of the enduring names of occult practices, Roger 
Bacon, eloquently distanced his interest in scientific development from wizardry, 
yet he remained famous into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries chiefly as 
a conjuror or juggler.  He offers Eamon’s “ ‘technological dream’ of the Middle 
Ages” in a famous list of potential inventions, De nullitate magiae (1260-80).  
The list appears in the prose history The Famous Historie of Fryer Bacon 
(which, though it first appeared in the sixteenth century, exists in extant form 
only as early as a 1627 edition).  That edition, which evidences an enduring 
interest in earlier technological fantasies into the seventeenth century, includes 
a series of crafted marvels, which the supposed writer Bacon emphatically says 
are “performed by Art and Nature, wherein shall be nothing Magicall”: 
 
. . . by the figuration of Art, there may be made Instruments of 
Nauigation without men to rowe in them, as great Ships to brooke 
the Sea, onely with one man to steere them, and they shall sayle 
farre more swiftly then if they were full of men. . . .an Instrument 
may be made to flye withal, if one sit in the midst of the 
Instrument, & doe turne an Engine, by which the wings being 
Artifically composed, may beat ayre after the manner of a flying 
Bird. (C4r) 
 
These dreams of unmanned boats and aeroplanes (or ornithopters) (and an 
interest in flight characterises Jacobean inventions, which is discussed below) 
are firmly considered “Art” and distanced from magic.  Yet as the complicated 
meanings of “natural philosophy” suggests, exactly what “Art” encompasses 
remains open to interpretation. 
Despite Bacon in The Famous Historie arguing for the purely scientific 
invention of these wonders, Robert Greene’s popular stage play represents 
Bacon’s “Art” as a form of conjuring.  The titlepage on the 1594 printing calls the 
play The Honourable Historie of Frier Bacon, at once suggesting that it is less of 
a fantastical imaginative fiction than a form of drama akin to the prose history 
on which it was based; as such, it gives credence to the magical interpretations 
of Bacon’s “Art” by drawing its spectacular occurrences into line with the 
mysterious, magical wizardry that haunts other history plays in the period, not 
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least Shakespeare’s Henriad.  It is a play that shows Bacon defending the claim 
that he is 
 
read in Magicks mysterie, 
In Piromancie to diuine by flames, 
To tell by Hadromaticke, ebbes and tides, 
By Aeromancie, to discouer doubts, 
To plaine out questions, as Apollo did. (B1v) 
 
Indeed, he practises a vanishing act on a rival “magician” and manages to craft 
a brazen head that speaks (though he is too busy sleeping to notice it) and then 
shatters.  Greene’s transformation of “instruments devised” (as associated with 
Bacon in the prose history) into “spells conjured” could not be clearer, and the 
popularity of the magical rather than the “Art-ful” is demonstrated by a riotous 
crowd, sometime between 1611 and 1615, calling for “‘Friars, Friars’” at the end 
of a play at the Curtain (Sager 141). 
Eamon notes that “By the fifteenth century, many of the ‘miraculous’ 
inventions in Bacon’s famous letter were commonplace items in technological 
treatises.  Whether they were actually built or not, medieval engineers were 
clearly speculating on designs for submarines, flying machines, automobiles 
and ‘unheard-of engines’” (185), yet the authors of those machine treatises 
“were often the ones for whom the idea of technology as magic held the 
greatest appeal” (186).  While this is not always the case with engineers of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the second chapter of this thesis has 
shown that William Bourne’s Inventions or Devises (1589) encourages the idea 
of “strange” inventions as something to prompt marvel; similarly, William 
Blagrave’s The Mathematical Iewel (1585), a treatise on an astrolabe, obscures 
the more sober scientific rigour of its contents through its bold title-page, which 
argues for its “wonderfull dexteritie . . . The use of which Iewel, is so aboundant 
and ample, that it leadeth any man practising thereon, the direct pathway (from 
the first steppe to the last) through the whole Artes of Astronomy, 
Cosmography, Geography, Topography . . .” and so forth.  By making such 
large claims, the “Arte” itself is, like Bacon’s own, drawn into question: the 
robustness of the jewel’s mathematics becomes conflated with larger claims 
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about mastery over terrestrial and extra-terrestrial matter.  It almost appears to 
be magical. 
Prospero as Engineer 
Precisely such a tension between the mysterious and the mechanical 
exists in The Tempest.  It cannot be argued that Prospero is transparently an 
engineer, not least in light of the alarming magical practices he claims in his 
monologue, discussed above.  Yet those ostensibly magical developments are 
partially undressed in the play by the repeated references to technology and by 
the inevitable visibility of that technology on the Blackfriars or the Globe (or the 
Whitehall) stages.  Moreover, the King’s Men’s repertory opens up Prospero, 
played by Richard Burbage, to interrogation; “The Alchemist, remaining in the 
repertory,” Keith Sturgess observes, “would inevitably colour not only Burbage’s 
playing but also an audience’s reception of Shakespeare’s play about a 
conjuror.  Subtle is the other side of the coin—magician as charlatan” (75).  
Prospero’s “magic” is less charlatanism than acknowledged use of theatrical 
technologies to achieve his “magic.”  Like the Janus-figure of Friar Bacon, 
Prospero is a “techno-mage.”  He may claim the capacity for wizardry, but he is 
practically an engineer and technologist. 
 
Prospero’s engineering begins with the world of technological objects—
like those listed above—that surrounds his abilities.  Though not all of these 
objects are explicitly present in the play, they nevertheless saturate its “magical” 
moments.  Indeed, while the “elves” and “spirits” of the island provide some 
form of mystery to Prospero’s control of the weather—the play’s “accident most 
strange”—contemporaries would be well aware of the claims of engineers and 
scientists to begin to master nature.  Blagrave’s Iewel, as above, makes a 
number of large claims for its device.  More spectacularly, though, the years 
immediately surrounding The Tempest—the 1600s and the 1610s—also saw a 
fascination with the notion, or myth, of “perpetual motion.”  Wolfe has suggested 
that such an obsession with perpetual motion and like devices, which served as 
both exemplars and as amusing or titillating spectacles, springs from a moral 
philosophical interest in court behaviour and manners drawing on models set 
out in texts along the lines of Castiglione’s The Courtier (trans. Hoby 1561): 
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These oxymoronic demands for a constancy-in-change and a 
versatile steadfastness are fulfilled by the machinery of 
Renaissance court spectacle—the stage machines, clocks, and 
perpetual motion machines that are both steady and responsive to 
change. (Wolfe 25) 
 
The moral framework of mechanics accords with Prospero’s own use of techno-
magic in The Tempest; as discussed below and in previous chapters, he seeks 
to reform the wayward courtiers stranded on the island by his mechanical 
displays. 
In 1607, Cornelius Drebbel presented at King James’s court a perpetual 
motion machine; he returned to London in 1612, promising to show how the 
machine worked.  In the same year, a witness of the demonstration, Thomas 
Tymme, published a tract entitled A dialogue philosophical: Wherein natures 
secret closet is opened, and the cause of all motion in nature shewed. . . .  Yet 
the text quite contrastingly “enshrouds the device in both hermetic and political 
secrecy” (Wolfe 66).  The account does not, despite its titular promise, explain 
the workings of the machine, though it does associate Drebbel’s creation with 
“Naturall Philosophie,” suggesting that it links both divine and earthly 
manufacture—a connection compounded by the explanation of God’s own 
works as a form of “wonderfull workmanship” (Tymme A3r).  His tract explains 
that Drebbel has constructed an “instrument” that is “perpetually in motion, 
without the meanes of Steele, Springs, & waights” (I2v); an annotated diagram 
is included, where the speaker explains the ability of the machine to tell the 
proportion and act “like a perpetuall Almanacke,” as well as setting forth the 
“particulars of Celestiall motion” (I2v).  Despite Tymme’s “coniecture” in 
explaining how a fiery element was extracted from mineral and placed within 
the device as an “imprisoned spirit” to make its “continuall rotation or 
reuolution,” the precise engineering remains a “misterie” known only to Drebbel 
(and disclosed by him to King James) (I3v).   
Tellingly, though, its applications in natural philosophy are also 
considerably practical; it acts as a shipping forecast, with a “Cristall Glasse” 
within “representing the Sea, which water riseth and falleth, as doth the floud, 
and ebbe, twise in 24 houres” (I2v).  A mastery over the elements can, it is 
claimed by Drebbel and Tymme, be achieved through engineering (albeit, to 
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readers, mysterious engineering).  It is not necessarily through magical means, 
then, that Prospero is able to have such intimate knowledge of and control over 
the elements.  Like Drebbel’s machine, Blagrave’s Iewel, or Bacon’s 
technological dreams, the mixture of “misterie” and machinery suggests that 
technology is itself a form of “rough Magicke.”  Indeed, Tymme’s conjectural 
explanation of the perpetual motion machine uses the language of Elements, 
“fierie spirits,” and of “imprisoned spirit” (I3v).  The double meaning of spirit is 
especially acute when considering The Tempest as a play that concerns the 
technological as much as the supernatural; although Ariel is more closely 
associated with water than fire, he is nevertheless able “to diue into the fire,” to 
have “flam’d amazement” and to “burne” (A2r); he was also, as a delicate spirit, 
“imprisoned” by Sycorax.  Ariel’s ability to work as one of Prospero’s “demi-
puppets,” then, brings him close to an alchemical property allegedly used by the 
likes of Cornelius Drebbel the engineer. 
Ariel’s alchemical qualities suggest an important intermixture of science 
and magic.  More crucially for Prospero’s role as “engineer,” though, Ariel’s 
puppet-likeness lends him a mechanical aspect.  Not only are he and the other 
spirits termed “demi-puppets” by Prospero (B2v), but throughout the play they 
are characterised by being controlled like puppets.  These properties associate 
Ariel with mechanical automata and, more specifically, mechanised puppets. 
Tiffany Stern has pointed out the range of puppetry in early modern 
England, specifically with regard to the theatre.  She explains that there is a 
long tradition of “making puppet versions of major theatrical characters” (“If I 
could see” 343) and, importantly, “Fundamental to the entertainment aspect of 
puppet-shows were squibs and firecrackers” (348), drawing the spectacular 
roles performed for Prospero by Ariel into a deeper dramatic parallel with 
puppetry.  Indeed, while there may be no squibs in the opening storm of The 
Tempest, the language—as with other effects in the scene—serves to 
supplement visual and material stagecraft, something that Gwilym Jones has 
explored (“Storm Effects”).  The notion of spectacular puppetry therefore 
complements Ariel’s verbal recreation of his performance and associates his 
presence with the flashes and bangs of other modes of theatre.  Furthermore, 
puppets are closely associated with mechanical automata and mechanised 
theatres.  Hero of Alexandria (10-70 C.E.) designs and describes a number of 
miniature theatres in his Pneumatics; these theatres run through pulleys and 
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ropes (much like effects at the real theatre, discussed below).  Hero’s designs 
contain spontaneous combustion and figures that move backwards and 
forwards, dance, and complete other motions like puppets.  They had great 
influence upon the inventors of the early modern period, who were interested in 
recreating such artificial movement and who had access to texts like Hero’s 
discussion of automata-construction. 
Indeed, Ariel’s casting of the storm in The Tempest mirrors puppet 
performances and automatic theatres, drawing him into line with the demi-
puppets thanked by Prospero towards the close of the play.  Prospero ensures 
that the spirit has “Performed to point” the storm and Ariel assures him 
 
I flam’d amazement, sometime I’ld diuide 
And burne in many places; on the Top-mast, 
The Yards and Bore-spritt, would I flame distinctly, 
Then meete, and ioyne . . . . (A2r) 
 
While Prospero’s thanks to the elves and demi-puppets is, as noted above, in 
defiantly first-person form, making all the active verbs his own, Ariel’s 
“performance” is described as though he himself were the very special effects of 
the theatre.  The craft-like construction of both ship and theatrics are gestured 
to in the pun on “ioyne,” which combines with the sensational description of 
combustion—the “fire, and cracks / Of sulphurous roaring” that strongly suggest 
the fireworks of both the London theatres and of puppetry.  Richard Flecknoe, in 
a mid-seventeenth-century character description, describes the “Ring-leaders of 
the Iansenists blown up like crackers in a Puppet play” (H6r), and the effect of 
squibs—firing and flaming—is how Ariel describes his own “performance.”  He 
seems to embody the acts of mechanised puppets, controlled by Prospero, and 
duly plays his largely material/visual part by flaming and burning.  The 
spectacular nature of puppetry connects Ariel’s performance to the visually 
arresting mechanics of automata “performances” so intriguing for early modern 
engineers. 
The allusions to and echoes of puppetry in The Tempest suggest that 
Prospero is both a puppet-master and a proto-engineer, two roles that overlap.  
“The inanimate figure as represented by the puppet or mechanical image,” 
Philip Butterworth explains, “is linked to the substitution, or partial substitution, 
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of bodies and/or their limbs” (Magic 5).  As such, Ariel and his spirits become 
the partially-mechanised, partially-flammable “limbs” of Prospero himself. The 
Tempest’s interplay of human body with mechanical objects can be described in 
light of a French medieval and early modern theatre tradition that used 
inanimate figures.  Laura Weigert explains that 
 
human, sculpted, woven, or painted figures were all seen within a 
similar set of circumstances.  The same types of temporary 
structures . . . were erected to contain them. . . . [I]n addition to 
these practical and linguistic overlaps, a conceptual parallel 
between static and living materials also emerges in the 
descriptions.  Animate and inanimate figures were considered to 
create the same constellations of meaning or to prompt 
homologous experiences on the part of their audiences.  Bodies of 
human beings and those fabricated from other materials could 
potentially create the same scenario. (39) 
 
Ariel and Prospero also offer a conceptual parallel between static and living 
materials.  The bodies of both actors merge with technological, theatrical, and 
scientific devices in both the language and implied stagecraft of The Tempest—
acutely, here, with the exchange between puppets, mechanics, and players, but 
also with regard to the stage machinery discussed below.43  
The convergence of Prospero’s humanity with technology, beings, and 
technological-beings is rooted in the theatre(s) and can be associated with the 
moral potential of dramatic performance.  While LaGrandeur has explored how 
the uses of the “servant network” in The Tempest are related to Aristotelian 
                                     
43 Jennifer Parker-Starbuck’s conception of “cyborg theatre”—a form of performance that 
integrates bodies and technologies—provides a parallel twenty-first-century framework to this 
early modern exchange of player, puppet, and technology.  She defines the cyborg as “a 
‘cybernetic organism’ comprised of part organic/living organism and part synthetic/technological 
material” (1).  Prospero’s relationship with the island’s supernatural figures begins to look, in 
part, like such a synthesis; LaGrandeur argues that Prospero’s use of his servants in The 
Tempest is more like a “network” that bears “closer resemblance to the modern idea of a vast, 
networked computer system or supraorganism than they do to robots” (105); yet LaGrandeur 
also states that Prospero’s use of “servants” represents a form of “prosthetic apparatus that 
symbolizes the dangers of new thinking and scientific innovation” (105).  By drawing on 
contemporary moral and technological anxieties, The Tempest provides “strange engineering” 
that approaches an early modern form of “cyborg theatre,” one “created through an 
intertwinement and negotiation between organic and non-organic materials, the body and 
technology” (Parker-Starbuck xiv). 
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notions of servitude and employs scare quotes around the notion of “machines” 
and “engines” in the play—“arguing that the island becomes a “sort of ‘engine’” 
(116)—there are also literal aspects to Prospero’s use of technology and literal 
forms of “engine” on stage.  Ariel’s and Prospero’s language concerning 
puppetry and performance places them, perhaps obliquely, within the discursive 
realm of mechanics, and that realm is physically and metaphorically present 
within the theatre itself.  
The technologies of the early modern theatre are often on display, as the 
second chapter of this thesis demonstrates.  Such technologies play an 
important role in confirming the moral power of theatrical display and are tied in 
with metaphors and allegories of theatre and performance.  It is common in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to regard the theatre as a microcosm of 
the world, most famously evident in the name of the Chamberlain’s Men’s 
theatre, The Globe.  What is also increasingly common in the period is the 
conception of the theatre as a ship.  It is a conception that draws mechanical 
and practical technologies into line with the work of the theatre while offering a 
moral framework for performances. 
“By 1611,” Douglas Bruster notes, “the trope of theatre as ship had 
become commonplace” (37).  Bruster argues that The Tempest concerns most 
immediately the theatre of the Blackfriars (and its relationship with the Globe) 
itself: 
 
Because The Tempest relies on elements of and working histories 
associated with each theater, it is important to keep both in mind.  
To begin with the beginning: the opening scene of The Tempest 
incorporates Shakespeare’s experiences of the Blackfriars 
playhouse, a private theater known for its elite, sometimes 
pretentious clientele.  The confusion of authority and division of 
labor on the deck of the ship respond to what it must have been 
like to work as an actor on the Blackfriars’ stage. (37) 
 
Further, there are numerous references, Bruster points out, to the theatre-as-
ship in plays and prologues of the period, from Jonson’s Every Man in His 
Humour to the conflation of clapping and rope-pulling in the Prologue of Robert 
Daborne’s A Christian Turned Turk (1610): “Our Ship’s aflote, we feare nor 
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rockes nor sands, / Knowing we are inviron’d with your helping hands” (A4r).  
“The metaphor,” for Bruster, “is in every way a natural one” (37), because 
 
Playhouses are like ships in many ways.  Both are wooden 
structures packed with people.  Both are sites of labor where work 
is usually concentrated and frantic.  Both rely on intensive 
cooperation: ships and their sailors’ hands; actors and their 
audiences’ hand-clapping—and, in a common trope, windy shouts 
of acclaim. . . . In early modern London, people took boats to 
playhouses—the Blackfriars as well as the Globe. (37) 
 
These similarities, I argue, are compounded by the demands of place and 
imagination required by the more extravagant plays put on at the theatres—
those vast travels in time and space scorned by the likes of Philip Sidney and 
Ben Jonson: 
 
Now you shall have three Ladies walke to gather flowers, and then 
we must believe the stage to be a garden.  By and by we heare 
newes of shipwrack in the same place, then we are too blame if 
we accept it not for a Rock. (Sidney H4r-v) 
 
While Sidney considers unconvincing effects to belittle the force of storms, 
those storms nevertheless hold important narrative and symbolic power.  
Thomas Heywood laments in 1 The Fair Maid of the West that “Our stage so 
lamely can expresse a Sea, / That we are forst by Chorus to discourse / What 
should have beene in action” (H3r), and precisely that discoursing occurs in his 
earlier play, The Four Prentises: “Imagine now yee see the aire made thicke / 
With stormy tempests . . .” (C1r).  Such feats of the imagination demand that the 
audience draw parallels between the practical work of the theatre and the 
fictional playworld—those associations between clapping and sailors’ hands, 
wind and shouts identified by Bruster.  By combining the material realities of the 
playhouse with the imagination, the technological basis of spectacle is proven 
to be “strange” in the early modern sense mapped out in the previous chapter: it 
blurs the boundaries between abstract and physical representation. 
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Stage tempests—in their conceptual and their technological respects—
also encourage metaphorical associations with the imagery of moral 
philosophy, because stage storms are both visceral and allegorical.  While the 
“global” model of theatre has its own moral connotations—with the “heavens” 
providing a framework, literal and metaphorical, for ethical appeal and deus ex 
machina intervention—imagery of ships, shipwreck, and navigation are also 
crucial aspects of early modern moral philosophy.  Their moral symbolism maps 
onto the work of dramatic display, making the theatre a symbol of admonition 
and exploration from the didactic to the provocative.  
Theatrical experience is often conceived of in moral-tempestuous terms, 
by comparing the narrative structure of the play with perilous navigation.  Roger 
Ascham’s influential Scholemaster describes the achievement of nobility in 
exactly these terms: 
 
But Nobilitie, gouerned by learning and wisedome, is in deede, 
most like a faire shippe, hauyng tide and winde at will, under the 
reule of a skilfull master: whan contrarie wise, a shippe, carried, 
yea with the heist tide & greatest winde, lacking a skilfull master, 
most commonlie, doth either, sinck it selfe upon sandes, or breake 
it selfe upon rockes.  And euen so, how manie haue bene, either, 
drowned in vaine pleasure, or ouerwhelmed by stout wilfulnesse, 
the histories of England be able to affourde ouer many examples 
unto us.” (G1r) 
 
Ascham characterises the common use of this metaphor in moral philosophy, 
most notably its resonances of stoical steadfastness in the face of violent 
storms, keeping one’s passions under rule much like the captain of a ship 
keeps the tide and wind under control.  On the other hand, those unable to 
govern themselves through learning and wisdom are metaphorically overrun by 
the force of the tempest, sunk, beached, or broken.   
This allegorical model is common throughout the period and appears in a 
variety of different texts.  John Aubrey describes Francis Bacon’s garden as 
having “curious pictures,” including an emblematic image of a ship and a 
representation of Tiphys, the helmsman of the Argo in Virgil’s Aeneid (82); 
indeed, something approaching that emblem is to be found on the frontispiece 
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to Bacon’s Advancement of Learning in the first English translation of 1640.  
More traditional metaphors for the moral life of man also use this imagery, with 
William Perkins likening the world to an ocean: “Now, we all are as passengers, 
the worlde is an huge sea through which we must passe: our shippe is the 
conscience of euery man” (A discourse of conscience L7r).  Naturally, emblem 
books adopt the image, too; Peacham’s collection, Minerua Britanna (1612), 
roughly contemporaneous to The Tempest, uses the image of a tempest to 
liken man’s constancy to a rock and mutable opinion to a ship in peril, “Whose 
Pilot’s Pride, & Steeresman Vaine Desire, / Those flames Hot Passions, & the 
World the sea” (Z1r): 
 
 
Fig. 18.  “Nec igne” from Peacham’s Minerva Britanna (London, 1612; Z1r).  
STC 19511. 
 
These commonplace metaphors suggest that audiences literate in either moral 
philosophy or basic moral iconography might read the opening of The Tempest 
both literally and metaphorically; even before the backstories of the 
shipwrecked passengers are told, it can be gleaned that they are in some 
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considerable moral as well as physical distress.  The opening scene of The 
Tempest ties together the conception of a storm as a moral metaphor with the 
theatrical space itself—a space often likened to ship and that shares some 
nautical practical details.  Playgoing is imagined as a material and a 
metaphorical experience—a “strange” event—in which a play’s metaphorical 
moral framework joins with the ship-like technologies of the playhouse.  Those 
technologies are an essential part of The Tempest’s “strange spectacle.” 
 
Playworld, theatre, and ship in The Tempest 
Unlike, for instance, Shakespeare’s earlier storm in Pericles, the 
“accident most strange” or the meteorological events of The Tempest are 
presented less as divine creations than as the effect of human craft and 
technological ingenuity—both fictionally, through Prospero, and literally, in the 
effects of the theatre.44  The opening storm brings, remarkably, the ladder 
tackles and canvas climbers that feature verbally in Pericles onto the playhouse 
stage.  Andrew Gurr notes that “there are no real precedents anywhere in 
earlier plays for mounting a storm complete with shipwreck on stage” (“The 
Tempest’s Tempest” 95).  The audacity of representing shipwreck is bold and 
innovative: “Mercy on us. / We split, we split, Farewell my wife, and children, / 
Farewell brother: we split, we split, we split” (A1r).  Both Gurr and Raphael Lyne 
argue that the intentional literal-mindedness of this scene makes more powerful 
the revelation that it is all dramatic illusion, provided when Prospero owns up to 
conjuring the storm and when the shipwrecked arrive on land dry (in marked 
contrast to their entrance “wet” in the first scene).  Yet that “illusion” is 
essentially a very real form of engineering brilliance—a theatricality constructed 
within the playing venue.  The construction of the tempest brings theatrical 
illusion and reality closer together, because the “unreal” tempest is in fact the 
demonstration of real playhouse technologies. 
The opening scene of The Tempest blurs the lines between the 
playworld and the theatre by mirroring the technologies used in both—
                                     
44 The cumulative feel of the weather in Pericles is one of heavenly design, from the thunderbolt 
that strikes down the incestuous king Antiochus (“a fire from heauen”) to the play’s summation 
in Gower’s epilogue: “Vertue preser[v]ed from fell destructions blast, / Lead on by heauen, and 
crown’d at last” (I4r).  Choric interventions implore audiences to “imagine” a ship, but, unlike 
The Tempest, there is little explicit technological representation. 
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especially ropes.  Eva Griffith notes, when considering the technologies of the 
Red Bull playhouse, that “land-bound sailors found employment at theatres 
because of their expertise in pulling ropes” (105).  The pulleys and 
requirements of the early modern theatre liken it further, and more literally, to a 
ship to the degree that familiarity with one meant a certain familiarity with the 
other.  Not only is there a “structural analogy between stage and deck, balcony 
and mast, tiring house and cabin” (McInnis 118), but ropes were also seen, on 
occasion, on stage, especially in fights at sea.  “It appears to have been 
normal,” Stern observes, “to bring a rope or, more usually, a rope-ladder on 
stage” (“‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’” 27).  Gurr ponders this question 
with regard to The Tempest and concludes that, due to the multiple exits and 
entrances, the size of the Blackfriars stage, the difficulty of removing ropes after 
the scene, and the limits of cast numbers, it is unlikely that the rope-pulling 
would have been visible in the play’s opening scene: “All the hauling, therefore, 
must have happened offstage” (“The Tempest’s Tempest” 97).  Yet it is also 
quite possible that some form of descent machinery is present throughout the 
performance.  It makes at least one, possibly two, appearances—certainly 
when “Iuno descends” during the marriage masque (B1v) and arguably, if 
following Clifford Davidson’s claim, “the aid of a flying machine” is “elsewhere 
used in the play by Ariel” when he enters “like a Harpey” (B1v) (13).  This would 
answer Gurr’s unease about where the ropes would go if they were present on 
stage (without visibly ridiculous removal for the scene immediately following), 
because they would already be part of the stage machinery and could 
presumably be hoisted up to wherever they were fixed.  Gurr suggests that “The 
ropes could not be hauled up silently into the music room without someone first 
releasing them and making such a public and all-too-visible readjustment look 
silly” (97), but presumably the machinations of stage effects in these later 
scenes would in that case be visible too, making it a moot point.  One might 
also ask why ropes should be hauled “silently” at all. 
Winching machinery could be both practical and aesthetic technology for 
The Tempest.  The presence of flying machinery in the theatres and in which 
particular theatres remains a debated subject; David Mann argues that Juno’s 
entrance suggests a walk-on from the stairs and claims that there is no proof of 
flying in theatres in Shakespeare plays (or more generally in any outdoor 
theatres at all up to 1613), including Cymbeline, whose descending entrances 
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could derive from court performances.  The Blackfriars requires such 
technology, not only for The Tempest, arguably designed for that particular 
theatre, but also to transfer the other spectacular descents in plays like 
Cymbeline. Given the range of mechanical demands, there seems no reason 
why even a small theatre might not be equipped with flying machinery.45  
A parallel moment of staging to The Tempest suggests that ropes in 
moments of spectacle were both visible and audible.  In 1613, two years after 
The Tempest was first performed, Thomas Campion’s Masque of Squires was 
presented at Somerset House.  The agent of Savoy, who attended the masque, 
wrote back to Spain unimpressed at the visible and audible mechanics of the 
stage effects: 
 
In the cloud there were twelve niches all in a group, where the 
twelve masquers sat, and when it came down one could see the 
ropes that supported it and hear the pulleys or rather wheels, 
making the same noise as when they raise or lower the mast of a 
ship. (trans. Orrell 304) 
 
The Tempest requires similar machinery and other forms of spectacular rope-
and-pulleys constructions.  While Campion’s masque was constructed by a 
Florentine engineer in Inigo Jones’s absence, whatever his failings he had 
considerable money and materials at his disposal with which to furnish the 
masque.  A theatre operated on a much tighter budget than a lavish private 
masque—especially in a space that had to accommodate numerous other 
plays.  Although different levitation machinery is employed in court and 
masquing spectacles (i.e. post-and-beam levitation devices, as opposed to the 
“dangling” descents of the former—see Demaray 90), Squires demonstrates 
that even in this ostensibly more sophisticated effect the construction of the 
display shows through.  It is possible, perhaps likely, that the sounds and sights 
of the theatre’s arguably more rudimentary machinery would likewise have been 
advertised to an audience. 
Even if no ropes were visible, the sounds of ropes “making the same 
noise as when they raise or lower the mast of a ship” could accompany the 
                                     
45 See Stern (“This wide . . .” 19); Davidson (“Masque” 13); McMullan (Shakespeare 98), and 
Ichikawa (“Continuities” 80) for support, and Chapter Five of this thesis for outdoor descents. 
 187 
opening scene in The Tempest—part of the “confused noyse within,” perhaps, 
or the taking in of the topsail.  Gurr and Gwilym Jones argue that storm scenes 
are largely dependent upon sound rather than sight on the early modern stage: 
“The technical aids available for creating a storm amounted to little more than 
the offstage noises . . . .  Fireworks or rosin for lightning flashes were available 
at the amphitheatres but unpopular at the halls because of the stink” (Gurr, “The 
Tempest’s Tempest” 95).  Jones concurs that The Tempest displays a more 
subtle use of effects than in grander outdoor plays like Julius Caesar.  He 
argues that “A tempestuous noise of thunder and lightning heard” at the 
opening of the play refers only to sound, and that lightning here, as it 
sometimes does in the period, signifies an aural rather than a visual effect. 46  
He concludes that the opening scene “depicts a ship in a storm by using 
                                     
46 I am not entirely convinced that fireworks were wholly absent from the indoor theatres, though 
in the opening scene of The Tempest the stage directions imply noise only.  There are 
instances of indoor plays prior to the King’s Men occupation of the Blackfriars using squibs and 
fireworks.  Ben Jonson’s Cynthia’s Revels, a play from 1600, refers metatheatrically at several 
points to the effect of fireworks on its indoor audience, gesturing to the stench it might create 
inside the Blackfriars: 
 
MER. S’lid, what rare fireworks be here? flash, flash. (V1r) 
 
MER. Peace, good squib, goe out. 
CRI. And stinke, he bids you. (X1v) 
 
Middleton’s The Ladies’ Tragedy, written for the Blackfriars, also contains the stage direction 
“On a sudden in a kind of noise like a wind, the doors clattering, the tombstone flies open, and a 
great light appears in the midst of the tomb” (4.4.43-45).  The “great light” could, as with a 
recent Sam Wanamaker Playhouse production of The Duchess of Malfi, be candlelight, but 
would be considerably more impressive if it were a form of firework.  Philip Butterworth’s 
Theatre of Fire (1998) also suggests a range of ways in which fireworks could be used—while 
not necessarily as loud and large as outdoor effects, indoor fireworks could be constructed in a 
number of ways (being handheld or fixed in tapers to create a variety of visual effects).  The 
King’s College Mundum Book of 1552-53, for instance, shows a list of payments for gunpowder 
to achieve a thunder and lightning effect (to present Hippolytus, presumably in the hall), and 
money paid to a certain Thorpe “pro factura Fulminis tempore Ludorum”—“for the making of 
lightning at the time of the plays” (REED Cambridge 1.179-80, trans. 2.1126). 
Further, it is clear that a number of plays with spectacular effects—including The Devil’s 
Charter, Macbeth, and the Age plays, to list only a few—were performed not only in outside 
theatres but at court.  Masques, also performed indoors at court, also required flames, bangs, 
flashes, and squibs.  If the court can stomach noisome sulphur in the name of spectacular 
entertainment, why would theatre audiences be so averse to it—especially in light of Stern’s 
remarks about the “smoky Blackfriars atmosphere” (“‘Taking Part’” 45)?  In this light, while 
indoor audiences might find the “stinke” unsavoury, it is nevertheless possible that such effects 
were present on the indoor stage.  What would happen, otherwise, to Jove’s lightning strike in 
Cymbeline when it moves inside to the Blackfriars?  As a crucial narrative and symbolic moment 
in the play, and combined with allusions to firework use of various kinds in indoor atmospheres, 
it seems highly unlikely that the lightning bolt would have been only “noise.”  
In The Tempest, therefore, it is possible to accept Jones’s argument that the opening 
scene might only contain the “noise” of thunder and lightning, but there seems to be no reason 
why Ariel’s banquet could not have the full visual effect of thunder and lightning—something 
that Sturgess entertains, describing it as a moment of “Jovian judgment” (93). 
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nautical terminology, rather than relying on conventions of stage practice” 
(“Storm Effects” 41, 43).  Yet Campion’s masque and the use of ropes show 
that nautical terminology can be complemented by the “stage practice” of the 
playhouse. 
The work of the fictional sailors is combined with that of the stagehands, 
themselves possibly former sailors, and the technical nautical terms resonate 
within the theatre as part of its own labour.47  There is therefore no reason to 
see why the opening scene should necessarily be “dependent upon the 
language of the scene more than upon the stage effects of thunder and 
lightning” (Jones 45, emphasis added) in a play where artificial technologies 
and effects are central.  The sound and exposure of ropes or any form of 
technical effect in the opening scene would not shatter a “realistic” illusion 
because the technological materials of the theatre are akin to those required by 
the Boatswain, the Master, and his crew.  If the language of the Boatswain 
depends on the “absence of metaphor,” as Jones characterises it (44), then 
there is no reason why stage technology should interfere because it too is 
literal.  The gap between the theatre and the fictional “ship” vanishes. 
The revelation that Prospero has “engineered” this storm therefore paints 
him as a technologist as much as a mage, something furthered by the common 
critical association of Prospero with a playwright figure.  Without encouraging a 
reading of Prospero as a form of William Shakespeare himself—a mythologising 
tendency critiqued by Gordon McMullan in his study of “late writing”—
Prospero’s connection with the work of a playwright can certainly be extended 
to more practical aspects of play construction.  In his character, the playworld 
and the theatre-world converge.  Creating the storm at the opening, after all, 
involves not magical incantation but practical and noticeable use of technology; 
he is the arch-stagehand, the playwright.48  My reading of The Tempest, here, 
therefore goes beyond current approaches to spectacle that treat technology as 
a tool merged with language—what has been conceived as a “contribution” of 
the physical aspects of theatre to “textual” theatre (Karim-Cooper and Stern 1).  
                                     
47 “Striking the topmast in heavy weather was fairly new technology in Shakespeare’s day” 
(Gurr, “The Tempest’s Tempest” 97), suggesting both that the play is closely aligned with the 
practicalities of sailing and that theatre effects might mirror the development of naval 
technologies as both develop throughout the Jacobean period. 
48 This parallel is brought to the fore by a production like the American Shakespeare Center’s 
2011 performance of The Tempest: “In a particularly effective bit of stage business, the 
American Shakespeare Center’s 2011 production had Prospero (James Keegan) clearing the 
stage of the properties associated with the ship and storm of the first scene” (Farabee 133-34).   
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Rather than the hierarchy implied by the term “contribution,” reading Prospero 
as an engineer suggests that The Tempest is a play in part about and of 
Jacobean technology. 
Bruster reads the relations between characters in The Tempest as 
metaphorical representations of theatre business; “Miranda’s relation to 
Prospero is in part that of an idealized spectatorship to what is perhaps an 
equally idealized playwright” and “Ariel relates to Prospero as boy actor to adult 
dramatist or stage director” (44).  Further, Patricia Parker’s work on the tropes 
of joining and joinery in A Midsummer Night’s Dream connects symbolic 
theatrical work to artisanal craft.49  More literal connections with the theatre can 
also be established if we consider Prospero as both playwright and engineer.  
Playwrights use forms of technology in the construction of plays; Gurr and Keith 
Sturgess both believe The Tempest to have been purpose-written for the 
Blackfriars, with several scenes including the shipwreck and the harpy moment, 
for Sturgess, showing “Shakespeare’s confidence in the staging ability of the 
Blackfriars company” (80).  Others, more recently, also entertain the 
likelihood—including Stern and Evelyn Tribble.  Demaray argues, in contrast, 
that the play should be considered in light of Whitehall staging conventions, 
rather than the private theatre, because the only two known performances of 
the play are documented at the Masquing House.50  Regardless, the play was 
almost certainly played at the Blackfriars and was part of the King’s Men’s 
repertory—though the crossover between court and commercial theatrical 
devices are essential aspects of its stagecraft.  The Tempest, as Demaray’s 
study shows, uses a number of elaborate masque-like effects that shows the 
influence of court spectacle technology on the construction of the play—
                                     
49 While indoor venues similar to the Blackfriars might remain a little more “fixed,” Griffith’s study 
of the Red Bull does show that replacing, for instance, trapdoors on the floor or rearranging the 
stage bespoke for different plays could be done “at not that much extra cost” (106). 
Craftspeople, carpenters, or workmen were therefore integral to stage business. 
50 Demaray’s argument rests on the notion that Whitehall “stage effects were far more subtle 
than those in the public and private theatres” (82), but this has no bearing on the more or less 
certain production of The Tempest in the Blackfriars and the Globe.  While quarreling with 
Jowett’s and Orgel’s views on the play’s staging in a theatrical setting (as opposed to a court 
one), the production of the play in the court’s Masquing House does not preclude the likelihood 
of similar (if less sophisticated) effects in the King’s Men’s commercial settings; Demaray 
therefore provides little evidence to challenge the critical commonplace from Kermode to 
Bruster to Gurr that the Blackfriars was the venue around which The Tempest was designed 
and where its special effects could happily be realised.  Although court spectacles were more 
lavish and possibly more visually impressive, Demaray himself concedes that a Blackfriars 
production could make good use of “‘dangling’ descents” at “the end of a wire or more likely a 
rope from a fly gallery in a roof representing the heavens” (82). 
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technology that the Blackfriars certainly had the capacity to exploit (see, 
separately, Sturgess, Davidson, and Orgel, “Introduction”). 
Those capacities are part of The Tempest in numerous ways.  Miranda’s 
recognition that the tempest was created by Prospero’s “art” is, like Ariel’s 
description of his flaming, saturated with theatrical terminology: 
 
If by your Art (my deerest father) you haue 
Put the wild waters in this Rote; alay them: 
The skye it seems would powre down stinking pitch, 
But that the Sea, mounting to th’ welkins cheeke, 
Dashes the fire out . . . . (A1v) 
 
Like Ariel’s references to fireworks and puppetry, Miranda notes the stinking 
pitch associated with squibs and so with spectacular displays and storms on 
outdoor stages.  Her reference to the “welkins cheeke” also gestures towards 
the heavens—perhaps more specifically to the ceiling of Blackfriars.  While Jon 
Greenfield believes that, despite examples of coved ceilings, “complex ceiling 
shapes in surviving Jacobean examples . . . generally have flat, coveless 
ceilings” (55), the Blackfriars building and its plays nevertheless gesture 
towards the theatre’s heritage as a monastery (Stern, “‘A Ruinous Monastery’” 
104); crucially, it contains a covered ceiling.  Consequently, the “welkin,” “The 
apparent arch or vault of heaven overhead; the sky, the firmament” (Oxford 
English Dictionary, “Welkin” 2.a), suggests the indoor theatre’s “heavens.”  The 
past contexts of the overhead ceiling in the Blackfriars recall the vaulted ceilings 
of gothic monasteries, friaries, and cathedrals still part of the English 
landscape—ceilings that architecturally gestured towards “heaven” by directing 
the gaze upwards.  Such a metatheatrical reference in Miranda’s speech 
thereby accords with the references to the Globe and the Blackfriars later in the 
play (in Prospero’s renunciation speech) and closer aligns theatre technology 
with The Tempest’s tempest. 
References to books in the play also connect Prospero to theatrical 
technology: “Burne but his Bookes, / He ha’s braue Vtensils (for so he calles 
them) / Which when he ha’s a house, hee’l decke withal” (A6v).  The “braue 
Vtensils” could refer to magical paraphernalia, as the editors of the Norton 
edition suggest (3095 n.9), but they could also (and simultaneously) be a term 
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for the books themselves.  By drawing books, either directly or indirectly, into 
the world of domestic or household objects, they become a part both of 
mathematical technology and of the theatre itself.  Bruster sees the play’s 
interest in books as part of the “local relations of actors at the playhouses” with 
which Shakespeare was associated: “It is as though Caliban . . . is thinking of a 
cache of playbooks—a collection of oppressive works owned by an acting 
company and stored in their ‘house.’”  Similarly, Prospero’s singular “book” is 
the promptbook for the particular play itself (49).  These references to books 
being part of the playworld and the theatre at the same time also link to 
technological developments.  The metaphorical transformation of the book into 
a tool, utensil, or invented object complements notions about texts prevalent in 
the early modern era.  Neil Rhodes and Jonathan Sawday’s edited collection 
The Renaissance Computer (2000) encourages critics to think of books as 
though they were a technological network or system akin to modern digital 
systems.  The means for Prospero’s knowledge—his books—are essentially 
technological tools themselves.  Prospero’s conjuration of the storm and its 
descriptions, then, relate directly to theatrical practice and the technology that 
enables it. 
 
“Accident most strange”: Moral mechanics and meteorology 
Prospero’s “art” is in part, then, the creation of stage effects.  Connecting 
with his “network” of servants-cum-puppets and “commanding” the theatre’s 
technologies to move, Prospero acts as a Blackfriars engineer.  His 
technological control over the theatre/playworld subverts the traditional moral 
symbolism of the stage storm and places admonition and ethical confusion in 
the hands of his technologies.  The opening storm of The Tempest—the play’s 
foremost “strange accident,” reveals that both shipwreck and safety lie in 
Prospero’s machines. 
Indeed, if magic and technology are closely associated and confused in 
the early modern period, then critics who have sought to find traces of the great 
Elizabethan mage John Dee in Prospero should also detect a significant degree 
of skill in nautical engineering.  William Sherman’s study of Dee seeks to re-
position him, in contrast to Yates’s “magical” figure, as a complicated but 
important figure for a variety of “disciplines”: 
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By equipping himself with a humanistic education in the recovery 
and analysis of textual information, by pursuing all practical (and 
most speculative) knowledge, by assembling his country’s largest 
and most valuable library and museum, and by developing a wide 
range of courtly and commercial contacts, Dee fulfilled a powerful 
and challenging role.  Setting himself up in what was perhaps the 
first English think tank, he acted as a retailer of special (often 
secret) knowledge, an ‘intelligencer’ in the broadest sense. (xiii) 
 
If “the European courts of the late Renaissance fostered hybrid roles, which 
drew on skills from the arts and the sciences, and favoured at once the 
polymath and the pragmatist” (25), Dee’s role in engineering and nautical 
technology must be rescued from, or married to, his (critical and early modern) 
reputation as a conjuror. 
Dee’s “Mathematicall Preface” extols the virtue of mechanics, in all its 
forms practical and theoretical.  He particularly singles out a number of 
“necessary Mechanicall Artes”: “Namely, Howsing, Fortification, and Naupegie. 
. . .”  The latter, the building of ships, shows how issues of practical craft are 
related to things of wider importance.  It is linked, in the following paragraph, 
with “The Arte of Nauigation,” which 
 
demonstrateth how, by the shortest good way, by the aptest 
Direction, & in the shortest time, a sufficient Ship, between any 
two places . . . assigned: may be conducted: and in all stormes, & 
natural disturbances chauncying, how, to use the best possible 
meanes, whereby to recouer the place first assigned. (D4v) 
 
Prospero’s abilities are thereby associated with magicians like Dee, who have a 
practical, mechanical interest in nautical matters.  Like Drebbel’s perpetual 
motion device, contemporaneous with the play, which contains a glass 
“representing the Sea, which water riseth and falleth, as doth the floud, and 
ebbe, twise in 24 houres” (I2v), any associations with Dee also link Prospero’s 
magic with the practical knowledge to master the sea and sky. 
Dee himself displayed a convergence of mathematical precision with 
theatrical display when he staged Pax at Trinity College in 1546, 
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with the performance of the Scarabeus his flying up to Jupiter’s 
palace, with a man and his basket of victuals on her back: whereat 
was great wondering, and many vaine reports spread abroad of 
the meanes how that was effected. (“The compendious rehearsal” 
5-6) 
 
In a text designed to dispel vicious rumours of his necromancy, Dee’s 
autobiography connects such a theatrical performance with his pursuits in other 
areas, mathematical and mechanical.  While flying deities might be less 
wondered at in the Jacobean theatres than in 1546 Cambridge, Dee’s 
insistence throughout all of his works that such displays and performances are 
rooted in practical areas of engineering and mathematics supports the notion 
that his aims were practical and pragmatic rather than spiritual—or “magical” in 
the twenty-first-century sense.  It also connects the earlier type of “techno-
mage” represented by Dee with Prospero through their interest in performance 
and effects, even if Prospero’s storm wears its “meanes” on its sleeve in the 
opening scene. 
Such technological and technical ingenuity by both figures brings 
mechanics onto the stage and so suggests its power both within and without the 
playworld.  A few pages earlier than his discussion of navigation in the 
“Mathematicall Preface,” Dee uses the term “Menadrie” to explain 
 
how, aboue Nature’s vertue and power simple: Vertue and force 
may be multiplied: and so, to direct, to lift, to pull to, and to put or 
cast from, any multiplied or simple, determined Vertue, Waight or 
Force: naturally, not, so, directible or moueable. (D1r) 
 
For Wolfe, the concept “characterizes mechanical power as auxiliary and 
compensatory in that it enables the triumph of the weak over the strong” (9).  
Mechanics provides opportunities to govern nature.  That is precisely what 
Prospero’s stage mechanics achieve in The Tempest; the convergence of the 
playworld with the theatre allows audiences to see precisely—and threateningly 
literally—how practical craft might control natural forces.  Prospero’s is a tour de 
force of mechanics before it is illusion or magic. 
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If the opening of the play shows how mechanics can control nature, the 
symbolism of stage storms links it to the manipulation of human nature, too.  
Dee’s multiplication and manipulation of “Vertue and force” relates to 
mathematical qualities, but “vertue’s” dual meaning in relation to mechanics is 
explored in The Tempest, where Prospero’s engineering controls the sea storm 
but also brings moral fear and the promise of redemption to those whose ship 
he has both wrecked and, in Dee’s terms, “recovered.”  His technology 
combines “Vertue and force” in mathematical and moral senses. 
The storm is unique chiefly in the sense that it is an engineered storm 
and not a providential, external, natural, or divine creation.  In The Tempest, 
traditionally providential events are placed in human hands.  Lyne 
acknowledges that “the goddesses in The Tempest are, extraordinarily, there to 
fill up time—taking the sense of slight extraneousness found around the 
classical gods in the other romances a stage further” (48).  Elsewhere in the 
play, the force of human virtue and technology over ostensibly natural or divine 
events compounds that “extraneousness.”  The storm, chiefly, calls into 
question traditional interpretations of meteorological events by suggesting that, 
in the same way as Dee or Drebbel, human beings might be able to manipulate 
weather and perform extraordinary feats of navigation, without divine 
assistance. 
Such manipulation of meteorology has symbolic importance, too, 
connecting the “force” of mechanics with the “virtue” of morality.  If storms are a 
moral trope in both the moral philosophy and the drama of the period, they are 
also signs of divine warning in popular print.  In 1615, John Taylor, the water 
poet, describes a tempest much like the one that opens Shakespeare’s play, 
with the Boatswain calling to “lower, the top-saile” (B2r) and the sea instantly 
reverting to calm, but the poem is suffused with the imagery of classical gods 
and the escape from danger is put down to “Heaun’s fauour” (B3r).  Likewise, 
pamphlet writers see storms as legible warnings from God—building on the 
moral associations with the storm discussed above to suggest a divine source 
for freak weather. 
Prospero’s “strange accident” draws on these providential storms.  A 
1607 pamphlet, More strange newes, addresses the unusual amount of flooding 
across England that year, as well as considering tempests at sea and the 
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fortunes and miseries they bring.  The author explains the dual nature of 
meteorological occurrences: 
 
Albeit that these swellings up, and ouerflowings of waters 
proceede from naturall causes, yet are they the very diseases and 
monstrous byrths of nature, sent into the world to terrifie it, and to 
put it in mind, that the great God (who holdeth storms in the prison 
of the Clouds at his pleasure, and can enlarge them to breede 
disorder on the Earth, when hee growes angry) can aswell now 
drowne all mankind as hee did at the first. (B2v)51 
 
The revelation that Prospero engineered the storm in The Tempest, then, 
charges man with divine capabilities and theatrical engineering takes on the 
moral charge associated with providential storms.  The rest of this chapter 
concentrates on the “Vertue and force” of mechanics, which become a capacity 
for “moral engineering” in the play’s “strangest” moments.  If the storm 
represents a tendency in the “late plays” to displace divine power and promote 
human action (Lyne 47), Prospero is the supreme example of this 
demythologising.  More acute than the storm—and more explicit in its moral 
functions—is Ariel’s harpy scene, which transfers supernatural power to a form 
of “strange” pseudo-technology. 
 
Mechanising moral admonition in Ariel’s harpy 
The harpy scene has been examined in previous chapters as a form of 
moral reformation and an example of moral strangeness.  Here, those aspects 
are associated with the technologies surrounding The Tempest and used within 
its performance, which like “strangeness” associate the spectacles of theatre 
with both moral power and with scepticism. 
The second chapter introduced the “machine books” popular in the early 
modern period and influential in stagecraft and in masque design.  Not only do 
machine books express an interest in the visual staging of knowledge that 
associates them with anatomical textbooks, they are also linked to the 
                                     
51 Strachey’s account, A True Reportory, and other new world expeditions also look to God as 
the cause of meteorological affliction.  More broadly, other pamphlets also espouse a similarly 
providential explanation—see the list given in the previous chapter. 
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materialisation of morality.  They link the mechanics of technological production 
with abstract ideas through their symbolic imagery and both tease at and then 
withhold full comprehension of their workings—characteristics, following the 
previous chapter, that mark such mechanics as conceptually “strange.” 
Jacques Besson’s Théâtre des instruments mathematiques et 
mechaniques (1569), for instance, presents a series of mechanical devices that 
are explained to be useful for labour, and in the 1578 edition (it first appeared in 
1569) the items are lengthily glossed at the beginning with a description of their 
mathematical design and physical construction by François Béroalde de 
Verville.  The figures of illustration, however, contain a degree of visual 
symbolism that complicates, or enriches, the sober mechanical explanations of 
the introduction.  Importantly, Knoespel explains that “[w]hile Beroald’s 
description provides remarkably detailed measurements for thinking about the 
engine, it does not supply knowledge sufficient for its construction” (107).  The 
descriptions and the illustrations, therefore, are not instructive diagrams—and 
any similarities they share with Reginald Scot’s deconstruction of beheading, 
discussed in the second chapter, seem to dissolve here, as the machines in 
Besson’s theatre teasingly suggest ways towards their mechanical assembly 
while never being helpfully explicit.  Rather, they are closer to emblematic 
drawings, and Knoespel notes that the illustrations “invite us to view these 
machines as visual puzzles” (105). 
Sawday’s comparison of machine-illustrations with anatomy textbooks is 
a helpful parallel.  One can go further than Sawday, who claims that they copied 
anatomical texts’ keying systems and “opened up a world of interior mechanical 
invention which was analogous to the interior world which the magnificent 
Vesalian and post-Vesalian books of anatomy laid before their wealthy readers” 
(“‘Forms . . .” 178).   Crucially, Besson’s images also contain visual echoes that 
charge the illustrations with moral and spiritual concerns.  In Vesalius’s De 
Humani Corporis Fabrica (1543), sketches of the human body appear in Christ-
like suffering, as grotesques of earlier religious suffering paintings. 
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Fig. 19.  Plate 7 of Book 7 in De Humani corporis fabrica . . . (Basle, 1543; Q5v 
[190]). 
 
The form and parts of man are often stretched out across a backdrop of nature 
to monstrous sizes, associating the images with hieroglyphical (and hence 
emblematic) representation.  Like hieroglyphs—and like their counterparts in 
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emblem books—Vesalius’s oversized organs and inflated corpses appear as 
signs that might reveal the hidden truths of the natural and spiritual worlds.  
William W.E. Slights remarks that in these anatomical drawings, “moral and 
aesthetic concerns intersect with technical matters such as perspective, 
proportion, and surface textures” (40).  Besson’s machines approach a similar 
intersection of moral and aesthetic with mechanical and mathematical 
representation: 
 
 
Fig. 20.  Wheelbarrow from Theatre des Instrumens Mathematiques & 
Mechaniques . . . (Lyon, 1579; plate 15).  
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Like Vesalius’s anatomies, the new wheelbarrow—with which one man can 
carry a burden that otherwise requires two to three men—is presented whole 
and in proportion in the foreground, but its skeletal figure is also stretched over 
the horizon like the hand of god. 
 
 
Fig. 21.  “Hic . . .” from Peacham’s Minerua Britanna (London 1612; C4r).  STC 
19511. 
 
Fig. 22.  “Quae plantui irrigabo” from Peacham’s Minerva Britanna (London, 
1612; D2r).  STC 19511. 
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In echoing emblem images that distort the relation of symbolic figures to nature, 
in refusing to reveal the precise method of mechanical construction, and in 
linking back to the morally-charged images of anatomy textbooks, machine 
images suggest that their technologies are symbolically a part of the natural 
world.  They are therefore connected with the moral truths that lie behind nature 
and that can be read through it—in much the same way as emblems interpret 
that natural world as a book of signs.  These machines offer to reveal 
something about the world, and as such beg both physical and moral 
deconstruction. 
Machine images inhabit equally the two meanings of “device” laid out in 
the second chapter: they are technological engines and symbolic 
representations.  It is telling that Guillaume La Perrière’s emblem book Le 
Théâtre des bons engins is translated into English in the 1590s as The Theater 
of Fine Devices (and again in 1614—for the existence of a 1590s translation, 
see Daly, “Case”).  The original French title seems to imitate machine-books 
like Besson’s (crucially titled Théâtre des instruments) and indeed Hollyband’s 
1593 French-English dictionary gives only the meanings “an engine or 
instrument” for the entry “engin.”  The translation “device,” though, also 
maintains both the mechanical-material and the moral meanings for the term.  It 
is clear that technology and moral images are closely connected, and again 
these texts reveal that any distinction between materials and morality seems to 
collapse with the terms “engine” and “device.” 
These machines are important in the harpy scene in The Tempest and 
draw the illusion of the playworld and the material realities of spectacle close 
together.  The descent machinery likely used in Blackfriars (or court) 
performance contributes to the presence of mechanics on the stage—especially 
if, following the account of Campion’s masque, such mechanics audibly and 
visibly place pulleys and ropes before the audience and mimic the sound of 
seafaring technology.  Furthermore, the harpy, and the stage spectacle with 
which it is associated, is connected to the Jacobean interest in mechanised 
birds and artificial flight.  Roger Bacon’s technological dream considers flying 
birds as part of its world of futuristic, practical inventions.  More detailed is 
Agostino Ramelli’s popular machine book, Diverse e Artificiose Machine (1588), 
which presents mechanical birds sat atop a statue.   
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Fig. 23.  Plate 186 from Ramelli’s Le diverse et artificiose machine . . . (N.p., 
1588; Cc3r).   
 
Ramelli explains that the water moving through the pipes pushes air to the 
birds’ mouths, causing them to “sing” with different sounds; he also states that 
“les oyseaux se meuuent quand ils seignent leurs chants” ‘the birds move when 
they start bleeding their songs’ (Cc1v).  The beak is made in such a way that it 
moves when the birds sing, and they appear as though alive (Cc2r). 
Most significant, perhaps, is a manuscript plan of proposed inventions by 
Henry Reginald, held in the British Library.  The early seventeenth-century 
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manuscript (c.1603) sets out a number of inventions (though without specific 
details of their construction and closer to Bacon’s technological fantasy than 
Ramelli’s half-plans) for the distribution of information; they are mechanical, as 
the reference to mathematics on the title makes clear, terming it a 
“mathematicall invention for briefe speedie and secrete Intelligence, without 
messenger or Letters sent” (f.154).  Reginald describes in Latin that “Nuncius 
Volucris, quae, novae facultatis novitatem sapere videatur” ‘A flying messenger 
will be seen, with a taste of its new powers’ (MS 4403 f.154).  In a separate 
manuscript dedicated to King James, in presentation copy and dated 1603, 
Reginald lists six inventions, one of which will be useful “In matters of great 
mome[nt] and Causes of expedit[i]on” to return “secure and most swift 
answer”—and “in ten times more speedie ma[n]ner, then by the flying of any 
Feathered fowle” (MS 4384 f.72a).  Read together, the two “inventions” attest to 
the late-Elizabethan and Jacobean interest in mechanising avian abilities 
through technology.  Both prototypes are “messengers” that are able to transmit 
important and secret messages with a built-in security system.  Although 
Reginald’s plans are unlikely to have been realised, they do show that 
technology is closely connected with politics and court communication and 
display a belief that the “powers” of mechanical flight can supersede those of 
nature. 
This form of mechanical flight interrupts The Tempest at one of its most 
critical moments.  Ariel, a spirit who is closely associated with images of flight 
throughout the play, enters the stage “like a Harpey” and “claps his wings upon 
the Table, and with a quient deuice the Banquet vanishes” (B1r).  In a recent 
essay, Peter Holland contrasts this moment with the “realism” of the opening 
scene, claiming that it is “undeniably seen as a moment of the supernatural” 
(186-87).  Rather, this spectacular event continues the merging of playworld 
and stage technology introduced at the play’s outset.  Rather than appearing as 
an illusionistic mythological monster, Ariel is part of a world of mechanical 
technology.   
He acts in the scene as one of Prospero’s messengers, approaching 
precisely the kind of “Nuncius Volucris” “invented” by Reginald; “a grace it had 
deuouring / Of my Instruction,” Prospero praises Ariel, “hast thou nothing bated 
/ In what thou had’st to say” (B1r).  Performing his role as a flying messenger, 
albeit a particularly spectacular and fearful one, Ariel is again associated with 
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mechanical imagery.  Just as elsewhere in the play his “performances” come 
close to both stage technologies (flaming amazement) and automata or 
puppets, the “figure of this Harpie” that he has “perform’d,” as Prospero puts it, 
is also described in terms of engineering: 
 
Me thought the billowes spoke, and told me of it, 
The windes did sing it to me: and the Thunder 
(That deepe and dreadfull Organ-Pipe) pronounc’d 
The name of Prosper . . . . 
 
In his response to Ariel’s moral admonition and call to reformation, Alonso 
conflates the spirit’s voice with the elements.  Crucially, the “Organ-Pipe” also 
associates Ariel’s speech with mechanised song—perhaps indicating the tone 
of the play’s “strange music.”  “[O]rgans and sufflators,” Wolfe explains, create 
“an uncannily anthropomorphic effect” and serve to “blur the precarious 
distinction between human and mechanical instrumentality”:  
 
‘Organ’ can denote the instrument of the human voice, as in the 
‘shrill pipes’ of Shakespeare’s Viola, but it can also denote the 
mechanical imitation of natural human speech.  As Raymond 
Williams has illustrated, the terms ‘organic’ and ‘organicall’ carry a 
spectrum of meanings during the Renaissance which includes 
their own opposites: ‘organicall’ can signify a natural sound or 
physical structure, but it can alternatively signify the reproduction 
of that sound or structure by means of mechanical artifice. (114) 
 
The dual meaning is clearly intended in The Tempest.  Its use, though, in a 
scene that relies heavily on stagecraft—from the banquet’s quaint device52 to 
Ariel’s entrance to the imitation of thunder—puts the whole of Ariel’s 
performance within the world of engineered mechanisms.  As in the opening of 
the play, which channels the auditory effects of theatre technology (like the 
                                     
52 See Gurr (Shakespearean Stage 176) and Dessen (Recovering 261 n.1) for the staging 
possibilities of the table; Gurr suggests “a kind of reversible table-top with dishes fastened to 
one surface and the other bare” and Dessen links the scene to the manuscript play of the 
1630s, The Wasp, in which appears the stage direction “The table turns and such things 
appear” (176; 261 n.1).  Sturgess argues for a more rudimentary sleight-of-hand, in which 
Ariel’s harpy wings cover the actors while they turn the table (92). 
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ropes and pulleys of descent machines to echo mast-raising), Ariel’s “deepe 
and dreadfull Organ-Pipe” does not distinguish the playworld from the theatre or 
create the illusion of otherworldly sound.  Instead, technology is at the root of 
the “strange” effect of the scene, from music to mechanised tables to vanishing 
acts.   
The previous chapter connected Ariel’s harpy scene with the moral 
significance of “strange” events, suggesting its material importance but linking it 
with moments of providential and moral import.  Ariel’s mechanical performance 
emphasises the materiality of the scene’s moral advice; “my meaner ministers / 
Their seuerall kindes haue done,” Prospero declares, and states triumphantly, 
“my high charmes work” (B1r).  Those charms are exactly the form of 
technological instrumentality associated with his role in the play as engineer.  
His ministers certainly take on the aspect of a “network,” as LaGrandeur 
identifies, but they also take on more literal, material forms of technology.  By 
figuring Ariel’s “performances” and his own “natural magic” as a form of 
technological ingenuity, Prospero utilises “stage” mechanics to induce guilt and 
moral censure and extends his power beyond the human body and into his 
automata/puppets/harpies/flying messengers/machines.  The engineer’s “high 
charmes” reveal, spectacularly, the ability to mechanise moral advice, 
admonition, and spectacle. 
 
Scepticism and moral mechanics 
The technological underbelly of The Tempest’s strange spectacles forms 
another facet of the play’s scepticism.  While the materialisation of morality 
displayed in the play helps to temper scepticism, providing ready material 
answers for the strange occurrences on the island, it also destabilises traditional 
ideas about “moral signs.”  In the world of The Tempest, technology is not 
merely an expression of morality; it is its arbiter.  Shakespeare—through 
Prospero and his network of stage-hands dressed up as elves, shadows, 
nymphs, and spirits—presents technology, not providence, as the root of moral 
revelation.  The play toys with the illusionary power of spectacle and suggests 
that what lies behind its forms of visual-moral power is material craft.  In the 
midst of a period of social and industrial advance in and fascination with 
machinery, The Tempest shows that human engineering has the power not only 
to cut the messenger from messaging, to ease agricultural labour, to prompt 
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marvel at hydraulic decorations, and to strengthen an army through tricks of 
warfare, but can begin to engineer the soul, too. 
“Machines are means, not ends,” Wolfe writes, and “The most ineffectual 
or impractical machines are often more compelling to Renaissance culture than 
machines that ‘work’ in the modern sense of the term” (237).  The technologies 
in The Tempest and Prospero’s engines are also means and their effect would 
largely be derived from the visibility of their mechanics.  While the Agent of 
Savoy is not amused by the visible pulleys and ropes in Campion’s masque, he 
nevertheless, quite literally, considers it something to write home about—even 
making a forceful comparison with the masts of ships.  The stage technologies 
of The Tempest, which become part of the playworld itself, likewise prompt 
spectators to consider the means of power and persuasion in the play.  Far 
from being aloof, mysterious, magical forces, Prospero’s “charmes” are present, 
material, mechanical.  Their moral efficacy is therefore placed before an 
audience who can ponder both the means and the ends of technological 
devices. 
Yet the materiality of strange moral “devices” in The Tempest opens up 
philosophical questions about the roots of moral judgement and its origins and 
authority.  After all, what the play suggests is that Prospero can manufacture 
miracles and mechanise his ideas of moral censure.  Such issues suggest that 
technology is at the heart of a debate about morality, its materialisation, and 
sceptical concerns about worldly and spiritual knowledge. 
Scepticism and science, the first chapter of this thesis shows, are 
concerned with physical proof, wary of metaphysical truths that have no 
material basis, but are equally uncertain about sensory evidence when it is 
available.  Technology contributes to such an empirical but anxious mindset.  
Sawday notes that “the scientific devices that were gaining currency in the 
period also announced the inherent fallibility of the undisciplined or untutored 
senses,” with technological precision underlining the sceptical distrust of organic 
sensory experience.  By the time Robert Hooke’s microscopes are able to focus 
on the minute composition of nature in the mid-seventeenth century, the 
material basis of the world is crucial: 
 
For Hooke . . . the deployment of instruments, machines, and 
gadgets that rendered nature measurable, had become a part of 
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his intellectual being.  His ‘refined’ speculations were to become 
the very essence of the mechanical philosophy.  For if a 
phenomenon could be observed, then it could be measured, and 
only when it had been measured was it truly comprehensible. 
(Engines 221-22) 
 
Mechanical movement—from its medieval origins onwards—brings a form of 
motion, construction, and action before the eyes of observers.  In the Jacobean 
period, such forms are not wholly obscured by notions of magic or illusion; after 
at least half a century of printed machine books, technological displays at court, 
and stage machinery, the “Vertue and force” of mechanics is visible. 
The visibility, audibility, and tangibility of technological displays offer a 
more concrete alternative to abstract or metaphysical motion.  Jacobean 
engines, as suggested in chapter two, parallel sceptical interests in anatomy.  If 
the anatomist is “the sceptic par excellence” because of his pursuit of 
“empirical—and specifically visual—knowledge about the insides of the human 
frame” (Hillman 33), then the frames of machines also offer the promise of 
knowledge.  The rejection of “blind faith” that is a hallmark of scepticism 
(Hillman 28) is displayed in The Tempest, where the source of freak weather or 
flying monsters can be visibly recognised as an adept engineer.   
Any reassurance about the constructed nature of Shakespeare’s island, 
though, is shaken by the realisation that, thanks to technology, external or 
eternal influences are largely redundant.  Prospero’s art reveals that strange 
signs traditionally taken as moral warnings or providential punishments can 
actually derive from the human hand, and so their messages become crafted, 
potentially arbitrary, forms of morality. 
Sawday identifies early modern tensions between “progress” and 
“negativity” that accompany industrial development.  The images of mechanical 
culture in the period are underpinned by 
 
that great reservoir of classical myth and narrative to be found in 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, in which human inventiveness is 
imagined as part of a history of decline.  In the distant Golden 
Age, Ovid writes, there was no need for the arts of civilization, the 
skills of the miner, the blacksmith, or the ploughman . . . . But with 
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the coming of the ‘age of hard iron’, and with it the technological 
arts of mining and husbandry, the innocent pastoral world was 
shattered for ever. (Engines 9) 
 
If, for some, “the presence of the machine would come to symbolize all that 
humanity had lost in losing Eden” (295), for others it represented an opportunity 
to recraft such a paradise.  Dekker’s image of creating a new Eden and an ark 
from the craftwork of a pageant, discussed in Chapter Two, suggests that 
mechanics might be married to Edenic ideals.  Further, in direct contrast to 
Ovid’s images of a nonmechanical utopia, Thomas Heywood makes Saturn’s 
Golden Age the dawn of technology: 
 
Let his vertues speake for himself: he hath taught his people to 
sow, to plow, to reape corne, and to skorne Ake-horns with their 
heeles, to bake and to brue: we that were wont to drinke nothing 
but water, haue the brauest liquor at Court as passeth.  Besides, 
he hath deuised a strange engine, called a Bow and Arrow, that a 
man may hold in hand, and kill a wilde beast a great way off, and 
neuer come in danger of his clutches. (The Golden Age B4r) 
 
It is not merely “Time” that Saturn invents; in Heywood’s The Golden Age he is 
the source of engines and devices. In marked contrast to a history of decline, 
Heywood’s plays paint technology as a “vertue,” and Saturn duly enters after 
this panegyric, “with wedges of gold and siluer, models of ships, and buildings, 
bow and arrows, &c.” (B4r).  Heywood is clearly very familiar with Ovid and 
traditional accounts of the Golden Age, yet he represents Saturn as a master 
engineer, capable of refining gold from “Grosser metals” and making brooks 
and rivers “by practise Nauigable” (B4r-v).  The term “virtue,” here, also links 
technology with practice, drawing on moral philosophical notions about activity 
and practical use crucial to the early modern moral life. 
The Golden Age and its sister plays are of course deeply interested in 
technologies of the stage, rooted in their thirst for “strange” spectacle.  Yet 
Heywood’s Saturn also offers a contemporaneous comparison with Prospero, 
as a Kingly presence whose “vertues” not only speak for themselves, but act for 
themselves.  The contemporary importance of technology is represented by 
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Saturn’s interest in “models of ships” and Prospero’s own control over weather 
and sea, and both connect to the pressing issues of navigation in the early 
1610s (with new world ventures and reports being published and circulated).  
Yet they also demonstrate an interest in the source of power and “vertue.”  
Prospero appears God-like, just as Saturn is proclaimed to contain “A God-like 
spirit” and, as one Lord proclaims, he “is a God” (B4v).  The chief reason for 
such deification is because “Saturnes inuentions are diuine, not humane” (B4r).  
While Prospero is not deified and rather renounces his powers and 
returns to Milan at the close of The Tempest, his charms suggest to an 
audience that craft is indeed the source of “vertue.”  Its products strike fear and 
repentance into the heart of Alonso, through wings, descent machines, thunder 
and lightning, and organ pipes.  Prospero’s engineering extends Dee’s notion of 
“Vertue and force” and combines it with the “vertues” of Heywood’s Saturn.   
Such a glorification of technology celebrates the contemporary world of 
machinery, to be seen in the crafts of London and in the very theatres 
themselves.  It also suggests that engineering has the “force” to destabilise 
traditional moral categories and craft its own “vertues.”  Prospero and Saturn 
are both “engineers” of the early modern theatre, and their craft advertises 
theatre’s moral force as well as the material basis of its spectacles—both of 
which are prominent in the plays’ “strangest” moments. 
Prospero’s strange engineering, however, opens up an extreme sceptical 
anxiety at the same time as it satisfies a form of scepticism.  The Tempest’s 
moral messages and tropes—from the ship to the harpy—are born from 
material construction and so are ultimately subject to the decay and mutability 
that writers of the period so fear.  Spenser’s Mutabilitie shows concerns about 
decay: 
 
What man that sees the euer-whirling wheele 
Of Change, the which all mortall things doth sway, 
But that therby doth find, and plainly feele, 
How MVTABILITY in them doth play 
Her cruell sports . . . (Hh4r) 
 
Likewise, Montaigne’s images of custom affect conscience and soul: 
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The lawes of conscience, which we say to proceede from nature, 
rise and proceede of custome . . . And the common imaginations 
we finde in credite about us, and by our fathers seede infused in 
our soule, seeme to be the generall and natural. (“Of custome” 
F1v-F2r) 
 
Montaigne’s view of custom shows a number of signs of cultural relativity, and 
the creation, development, and change of “all mortall things” suggests that even 
aspects of the moral life are merely customary.  In light of such concerns about 
the “soule,” Prospero’s inventions show custom-as-craft to be the governor of 
guilt, admonition and warning—central aspects of moral popular print; his 
devices are the most visibly mortal of all moral customs, because they have 
frame and body. 
The Tempest’s concerns with illusion and its ephemerality are equally 
pertinent with regard to the moral powers of technology, especially in light of the 
conjunction of playworld and theatre set forth in this chapter.  Prospero’s lament 
about the spirits melting “into Ayre, into thin Ayre” confirms the mortality of 
material construction: 
 
And like the baseless fabricke of this vision 
The Clowd-capt Towres, the gorgeous Pallaces, 
The solemne Temples, the great Globe it selfe, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolue, 
And like this insubstantiall Pageant faded 
Leaue not a racke behinde . . . . (B2r) 
 
Stern has pointed out that, like the widely recognised metatheatrical reference 
to The Globe, “Temples” might also refer to the Blackfriars (“‘A ruinous . . .” 
104).  Here, after the final spectacular display of the masque scene, Prospero 
makes a last gesture towards the material realities and technologies that 
underpin the play.  Traditionally read as a wisp of cloud, “racke” also has 
connotations and echoes of “rock” and “wreck” (the latter often spelled “wrack” 
as in “shipwrack”); the verbal echoes alone pull the ship-theatre metaphor into a 
powerful statement of mutability.  Whatever engineering might achieve in the 
realm of “Vertue” or “force,” it is a troubling indication that the “engineer’s” moral 
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authority is a temporary, fleeting, ephemeral thing.  Like the ship at the 
beginning, everybody is metaphorically at sea. 
The epilogue finally overthrows Prospero’s “Charmes,” but Prospero’s 
craft carries over into the audience.  The technological realities of theatre and 
playworld are reduced to the custom of applause, Prospero begging the “helpe 
of your good hands” to set him free: playhouse and fiction combine at the very 
end in the audience’s manual labour.  As part of the theatre’s work, the 
audience are consequently part of its ephemerality.  They will, like the whole 
vision itself, dissolve and “Leaue not a racke behinde.” 
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5. Making Rhetoric Matter: Rhetorical Strangeness in Cymbeline and The 
White Devil 
 
How strange these words sound? 
--- The White Devil (F4r) 
 
Strangeness is at the heart of the crossover between the theatre’s 
material and poetic registers.  This chapter explores the term’s relevance to 
rhetoric while focussing on two “strange” plays that exemplify the early 
Jacobean interest in merging verbal and material construction: Shakespeare’s 
Cymbeline and John Webster’s The White Devil.  Both of these plays evoke the 
term “strange” repeatedly, Cymbeline second only in occurrences in 
Shakespeare’s corpus to The Tempest.  They share, likewise, an interest in 
rhetorical construction that, I argue, is at the root of their mentions of 
“strangeness”—both plays also demonstrate repeated interest in the term 
“matter,” which is at the root both of technological display and rhetorical 
construction.  As such, these two plays (both current in 1611-12), while different 
in plot and ostensibly different in tone (though see below for their shared 
generic features), both cultivate a rhetorical strangeness.  That verbal style is, 
for both Shakespeare and Webster, integral to the plays’ visual representation: 
in moments like dumb shows or tableau-like stage-effects, strange rhetorical 
invention plays a reciprocal role in cultivating visual, moral, and narrative 
uncertainty. 
Webster’s play is marked by outbursts of “strangeness”—from the 
“strange tongue” (E2v) of the law court to the simple outburst by Francisco, 
“strange!” (F1r)—as if the term itself were enough to mark Vittoria’s testimony 
as morally dubious.  Flamineo’s distracted ramblings are “strange,” his intrusion 
on the court a “strange incounter,” and he a “strange creature” (F4r).  The term 
features in the rest of the play to mark morally questionable action.  Francisco 
describes the “strange doctrine”53 of Monticelso’s “Black Book” of murderers 
(G1v), moments before a visitation of Isabella’s ghost—a moment that 
essentially manifests “strange doctrine” on stage.  Shakespeare’s play shares 
Webster’s strangeness, and at three key moments characters remark of the 
                                     
53 See the discussion of “strange divinity” in Chapter Three for the religious connotations of this 
description. 
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action, “It’s strange” (Cloten’s death, aaa6v) and “’Tis strange” (Posthumus’s 
absence and Pisanio’s being “perplexed,” bbb2r, and Posthumus’s remarks 
about death following his capture by the Britons, bbb3r).  The term is also 
invoked to describe the play’s “strange chance” and the “strangely” turning 
vicissitudes of fortune (bbb3r, bbb2v). 
In these strange plays of the late 1600s and early 1610s, rhetorical 
devices are transformed into stage devices.  This chapter brings together the 
different aspects of this thesis by addressing the moral effects that attend a 
conjunction of verbal, visual, and material media in theatrical spectacle.  I 
employ a critical approach that combines historically-minded close reading with 
recent critical attitudes towards spectacle, by reading rhetorical style as part of 
the visual and material world of the playhouse.  As noted above, recent work in 
early modern theatre studies has made some broad gestures to the way in 
which poetic and verbal effects are linked with the practical theatrical work of 
the playhouse (Bruster; Jones; Stern; Karim-Cooper).  Rhetoric and rhetorical 
style have also been subject to renewed scholarly interest, with increasing 
attention to the formal features of verse, style, and expression (Richard Meek; 
Russ McDonald; Christopher Pye; Mark Robson). Little has been done to date, 
however, to explore the direct connection between staged spectacle and the 
features and effects of early modern rhetoric.  This chapter seeks to remedy 
that critical division by showing the explicit relationship between formal 
rhetorical devices and material stage devices, as well as exploring the broader 
cultural relationship between rhetoric and material display, and the moral 
significance of that relationship in early modern England.  These issues are at 
the fore in Cymbeline and The White Devil—two plays where tricks and tics of 
rhetoric are at the heart of the playworlds’ crises of moral judgement and visual 
certainty.  
By giving verbal models a physical form—through the staging of a 
thunderbolt or the incorporation of chiaroscuro into both language and 
dramaturgy—“strange” drama underlines recent claims that there is “no binary 
between the materiality of theatre and the emotional, metaphorical and poetic 
registers of the plays themselves” (Karim-Cooper and Stern 3).  The previous 
chapter noted that such recent treatments of spectacle describe a “contribution” 
made by “physical theatre” to “textual theatre” (1), but I argue in this chapter 
that it is in fact a reciprocal exchange, where rhetoric is integral to stage display 
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and where visual occurrences and spectacle also infuse verbal style.  That 
exchange is rooted in questions of morality, and as such this chapter continues 
above chapters’ merging of materially-orientated theatre history with cultural 
and intellectual history and contemporary philosophical questions.  The 
materialisation of verbal effects in the theatre reflects and comments upon 
contemporary moral anxieties surrounding rhetoric and indicates a broader 
evolution of the concept in the early seventeenth century.  This chapter thereby 
explores further the materialisation of morality introduced in Chapter Two, but it 
examines the way the stage materialises moral anxieties rather than moral 
axioms. 
Through what I term “rhetorical strangeness”—a deliberate contortion, 
confusion, and suspension of certainty that mirrors the “strange” material effects 
of stage devices—Shakespeare and Webster push the traditional, Elizabethan 
model of rhetoric to its limits.  Francisco remarks in Webster’s play, “How 
strange these words sound” (F4r), and the comment can be taken to refer to the 
style of the play’s prose and verse as well as its narrative arc.  Rhetorical 
strangeness pervades Shakespeare’s late style and Webster’s drama and is in 
line with contemporary conceptions of rhetorical construction that desire 
“strange” effects.  Shakespeare’s late style is, as is widely noted, “audacious, 
irregular, ostentatious, playful, and difficult” (McDonald 1).  Webster is likewise 
interested in working uncertainty into the verbal texture of his plays.  Critics 
have noted the “sharp modulations of language” that characterise his writing, in 
which “The frontier between prose and verse is rapidly crossed and recrossed” 
(Berry 27).  Shakespeare’s late style and Webster’s famously contorted verse 
offer a useful comparison through which to approach the connected rhetorical 
and moral uncertainties of the period. 
The 1600s and the 1610s are marked by a move away from “tragedy” as 
the fashionable genre and into a variety of forms, not least the popular 
tragicomedy.  It is perhaps in the light of the experimental dramatic forms 
developing in the period that “strangeness” becomes an important factor in the 
theatre’s visual and verbal construction.  Indeed, the intertextual references, 
linguistic self-awareness, and dramatic structure in an ostensible tragedy like 
The White Devil have led critics to note its parallels with the more popular 
tragicomic form of its day: 
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The White Devil expands and tests a tragic structure by adding elements 
we might associate with tragicomedy: clashing tones, ironic repetition, 
ambiguity of characterization, theatrical self-consciousness, and a critical 
treatment of the rhetoric it uses. (Pearson 71) 
 
It is the latter that forms the basis of this chapter and that provides clear 
similarities to Cymbeline.  Critics have long recognised the “likeness . . . to 
Shakespere’s romances” in Webster’s style, with E. E. Stoll noting the 
“tendencies lyrical, spectacular, and symbolical” that resonate with 
Shakespeare’s “late style” (105-06).  Both visually and tonally, I suggest, The 
White Devil offers parallels with Cymbeline. 
The verbal-visual character of both plays is reflected in their interest in 
formal oratory and in the way in which truth is derived from rhetorical 
construction.  Webster’s concern with legal rhetoric stems from his residence at 
the Inns of Court and is reflected in the elaborate court scene in The White 
Devil and in the play’s wider probing of appearance, truth, and the troublingly 
transformative power of language.  Shakespeare’s Cymbeline is also concerned 
with matters of evidence, persuasion, and proof, from the second-hand 
information that underpins most of the play’s action to the explicitly “legal” 
language of the wager scenes.  Their forensic nature prompts Subha Mukherji 
to address both plays’ image-making language and relationship with “things.” 
Explicit interest in the narrative and persuasive power of rhetoric is 
complemented by Cymbeline’s and The White Devil’s self-awareness and 
artificiality, which encourage audiences and readers to reflect on the language 
of playworld and theatre.  Shakespeare and Webster repeatedly refer to 
“matter”—a charged term that itself holds both physical and abstract meanings 
simultaneously.  The word’s force throughout the plays draws attention to the 
nature of formal oratory, where “matter” is an important term, and also to the 
material spectacles that characterise both plays: as with The Tempest, dramatic 
“constructedness” brings to the fore the theatre’s technological as well as its 
verbal contrivances. 
This chapter concentrates on the spectacular murder scenes and the 
appearance of Isabella’s ghost in The White Devil and on Giacamo’s evidence 
and Jupiter’s entrance in Cymbeline.  These scenes all advertise their own 
constructedness through elaborate stage technology, archaic conventions, and 
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formal rhetorical speech.  They also demonstrate how speech can be given 
material form, through the crossover between verbal and visual “invention,” 
through dramatising emblems, and through literalising the metaphors used to 
describe rhetorical tropes.  The “strange” manner of that materialisation adds to 
the plays’ senses of moral uncertainty, doubt, and confusion.  
Cymbeline is variously dated from between 1609-10, though it is clear 
that the play was performed at the Globe in 1611, when Simon Forman records 
the plot in his diary.  The White Devil was first performed the following year at 
the Red Bull.  Reading Cymbeline’s and The White Devil’s rhetorical interests 
alongside the implied stagecraft of their early performances reveals the intimate 
relationship between the language and technologies of theatre (as well as the 
affinities between different playhouses and companies) and suggests how that 
relationship is rooted in contemporary developments regarding morality and 
materialisation. 
Amazed with matter 
Both plays alert readers and audiences to their self-conscious concern 
with verbal construction by the repetition of the term “matter.”  This section 
explores the material and verbal significance of “matter” in early modern 
England and in the two plays specifically.  The following section then moves 
onto the wider moral status of rhetorical ornamentation and its role in early 
modern England, in order to provide the contextual backdrop for my discussion 
of rhetorical strangeness. 
Stylised or ornamental language is a hallmark of early modern rhetoric, 
which depends upon “matter” for the subject of discourse.  Matter features in 
both Cymbeline and The White Devil—and it features both explicitly, by verbal 
reference, as well as implicitly, by allusion, echo, and association.  The term 
draws in both rhetoric and early modern “science” from technology to anatomy.  
Chiefly, it signifies “an event, circumstance, fact, question, state or course of 
things” (OED, 1.a)—something that can broadly be extended to remarks, 
current throughout all early modern English discourses, along the lines of 
“what’s the matter?” (The White Devil B2v).  The term is a major demonstration 
of the plays’ acknowledged artifice, which places explicit emphasis on the 
rhetorical construction of the playworlds and their narrative fragilities. 
Critics often observe that both Cymbeline and The White Devil are 
theatrically self-conscious.  The conventions of repetition and saturation of 
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contrived symbolism in Shakespeare’s romance has been noted by critics as 
diverse as Leah S. Marcus, Raphael Lyne, and Anne Barton.  Jacqueline 
Pearson makes similar observations of Webster’s play: 
 
An important part of the play’s undermining of tragedy lies in its 
deliberate theatrical consciousness.  It is very rich in play-
quotations, theatrical allusions, and images of stage and 
performance.  ‘Plot’, ‘act’ and ‘auditory’, ‘part’, ‘revels’, ‘tragedy’ 
and ‘tragic’, are used repeatedly to remind us of the fictional 
nature of what we are watching. (Pearson 71) 
 
What has been less discussed, however, is the way in which rhetorical terms 
function as a form of theatrical consciousness in both Cymbeline and The White 
Devil, and the way in which rhetorical self-awareness feeds into the plays’ 
concerns about veracity, visual representation, and language. 
Five times in Cymbeline, a character asks, “what’s the matter?”  In one 
instance, the wording is simply, “The matter?” (bbb1r).  Indeed, the question 
appears in the fifth line of the play (in the Folio), part of the exposition in which 
two gentlemen discuss Imogen’s engagement.  Here and throughout, “matter” 
indicates the play’s narrative and rhetorical substance.  From the very opening, 
rhetorical construction underpins the structure of the play, because “matter” 
signifies an important stage in classical oratory.  Loosely, it is synonymous with 
the “subject” about which one speaks, as when George Puttenham talks of the 
“matter or subiect of Poesie” (E1v).  For Thomas Wilson, the author of the most 
popular English manual of rhetoric in the early modern period, matter is any 
form of subject that enters into the discourse at hand; more precisely, the most 
useful matter is what should be sourced.  This sourcing of relevant material is 
the first stage of classical rhetoric—and here Wilson borrows from his ancient 
forbears Quintilian, Cicero, and the anonymous and influential author of the ad 
Herennium.  His list of the five key stages of oratory is as follows: 
 
i. Inuencion of matter. 
ii. Dispocisicion of the same. 
iii. Elocucion. 
iv. Memorie. 
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v. Utteraunce. 
 
As such, the diagrammatic structure presented here and elsewhere in rhetorical 
manuals places “matter” at the heart of all rhetorical construction.  Wilson states 
that the “finding out of apte matter” is also called “Invention,” which is a 
“searchyng out of thynges true, or thynges likely, the whiche maie reasonably 
sette furth a matter, and make it appere probable” (A3v).  Gathering pertinent 
“material” on a subject forms the building blocks—the invention—of rhetorical 
construction. 
Wilson’s definition of “invention” as the “finding out of apte matter” hovers 
over the first scene’s use of the word, making the term of crucial importance to 
the playworld’s action—both the audience and characters await the “matter” of 
the play.  It is therefore also of crucial importance to the nature and status of the 
fiction itself, where probability and improbability, likeliness and uncertainty are 
paramount, and in this light Shakespeare’s constant reference to the building 
blocks of rhetoric indicates a self-conscious recognition of Cymbeline’s artifice, 
engaging with the essence of “truth” and moral certainty that arise from early 
modern Europe’s fascination with rhetorical ornament.  Just as The Tempest 
refers audiences and readers to the world of the theatre itself, through its 
combination of the terms of theatre practice with the language of the fictional 
world, so the repetitions of “matter” advertise the rhetorical “constructedness” of 
Cymbeline and alert audiences to its various elaborate “inventions”—
mechanical, rhetorical, theatrical.  
The conjunction of theatre and playworld is evident in King Cymbeline’s 
own interest in the term.  When he declares himself to be “amazed with matter” 
(bbb2r), Cymbeline refers both to the updates about the war just delivered to 
him but he also speaks for the audience, which has seen material horrors in the 
preceding scenes—not least with a the decapitation of the semi-royal Cloten, 
the Queen’s son.  Cymbeline is an oddly quiet character in his eponymous play, 
featuring most significantly as an auditor and “audience” (as well, like the 
audience, as judge or jury) in the extended recognition scene at the close, and 
as such his alienation from the action and his alarmed attempts to make sense 
of the “matter” present him as a spectator in his own play.  In the final scene, 
Cymbeline’s urgency to “Come to the matter” and his surprise, “New matter still” 
(bbb4v, bbb5r), emphasise the court(room) overtones of the play’s anagnorisis; 
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the drama’s “evidence” and “proof”—as well as its plot—is re-presented to a 
stage that is a King’s court but is also, momentarily, a courtroom.  Cymbeline’s 
references to the term transform the “matter” of the play’s preceding action into 
the “matter” of legal rhetoric and blur the distinctions between the verbal and 
the material world. 
Matter’s capacity to signify both verbal and material significance is 
suggested by the wider connotations of the term.  The rhetorical conception of 
“matter” draws on Aristotelian definitions, which are widely understood 
throughout the medieval and early modern periods.  For Aristotle and his 
numerous followers, syncretisers, and borrowers, “matter” forms the building 
blocks of physical objects in the world, just as it forms the building blocks of an 
oration in rhetoric.  “Substance”—the primary, most basic state of physical 
existence—is the jointure of “matter” with “form.”  An analogy: matter is the 
Plasticene; the “form” is the mould (i.e., of a house): when combined, they 
generate the substance of a house.54 
Aristotelian “matter,” then, is physical—by its very etymological 
association, it is “material.”  The verbal or mental meanings of the term to the 
rhetorician Wilson are effectively “material” metaphors; although more hidden, 
they bear the traces of the early modern and medieval predilection for 
conceptualising the abstract in terms of the physical world, seen in the practical 
visualisation of memory as a house or a theatre.   
The combination of matter with physical craft is also seen in feats of 
technology in the Jacobean period.  Cornelius Drebbel’s perpetual motion 
machine, discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, is described in 
Thomas Tymme’s pamphlet, A Dialogue Philosophicall (1612).  The dialogue 
concerns how motion is derived from matter and form, and Drebbel’s creation of 
his machine is described in terms of the manipulation of matter:  
 
Cornelius, by his practise in the vntwining of the Elements . . . extracted 
a fierie spirit, out of the mineral matter, ioyning the same with his proper 
Aire, which encluded in the Axeltree, being hollow, carrieth the wheeles, 
making a continual rotation or reuolution . . . . (I3v) 
 
                                     
54 Like Plasticene, Aristotelian matter is endlessly recycled into various different substances by 
combining with different forms. 
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In Tymme’s dialogue, matter combines the metaphor of the “workman”—a God-
like creature who can mould essentials and elements—with its literal, mundane, 
workaday meaning: one who creates and crafts objects.  Mineral matter is 
linked with wheels and axles, and the notion of “matter” as a building block is 
literalised. 
In creating his perpetual motion machine, Drebbel brings an alternative 
meaning to the “invention of matter.”  Wilson’s rhetorical notion of true or likely 
“thinges” is, in Tymme’s pamphlet, composed of physical, external “things.”  
Even the term “invention” has its associations with mechanical technology, with 
titles along the lines of William Bourne’s Inuentions or deuises (1590) and, later 
in the century, John Evelyn’s library collection devoting a category to 
“inventions Mechanic, Trades, Work, Vasal &c.” (Evelyn Papers). 
Francisco draws on these double physical and rhetorical meanings of 
“matter” in The White Devil: 
 
One summer she will beare unsauory fruite. 
And ere next spring wither both branch and roote. 
The act of bloud let passe, onely descend, 
To matter of incontinence. (F1r) 
 
He means that the court should address Vittoria’s sexual “incontinence,” but the 
disjunction between his sententious message, emblematic in its imagery and 
rhyming couplet, and the formal presentation of new legal “matter” suggests a 
more literal meaning, too—“matter” as physical flesh.  Vittoria’s response, “I 
decerne poison, / Under your guilded pills,” only underlines the wordplay over 
the term “matter”—it alludes to medical or physical issues as well as 
preoccupations of the courtroom. 
The physical associations of “matter” are extended in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries when it begins to find currency not only in terms of 
scholastic philosophy but also as part of anatomical discourse. Crooke 
describes the body as being “made of sublunary and elementary matter”—a 
condition that he claims enables sensory knowledge (B3v).  Indeed, corporeality 
itself is described throughout his anatomical work as a condition of “matter”: 
“For the matter of mans body, it is soft, pliable and temperate, readie to follow 
the Workeman in euery thing, and to euery purpose . . .” (B3r).  While matter 
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clearly retains its Aristotelian connotations, it begins to signify by itself an 
“object” or corporeal “thing” in the physical world.  The familiar metaphor of the 
workman suggests God’s own moulding of matter and his creation of 
substances, but it also associates the term with craft and with flesh and 
physicality. 
Indeed, Francisco’s lines, “The act of bloud let passe,” contain the echo 
of bloodletting, a common medical practice, but they also foreshadow the 
following line’s jibe about “passing” and sexual promiscuity.  “Incontinence” 
means, in this context, the inability to control bodily appetite.  When he urges 
the courtroom to “descend, / To matter of incontinence,” then, Francisco infers 
that Vittoria herself is that matter.  His oration effectively “invents” her as 
“incontinence” incarnate, echoing anatomical and moral as well as legal 
discourse.  It is a rhetorical practice of “invention” that abounds throughout the 
play, repeated with the image of devil, sin, and whore.  Francisco’s conflation of 
the legal subject (of incontinence) with human subject (Vittoria) suggests that 
abstract rhetorical language can also have material significance. 
In the early 1610s, then, “matter” (and, indeed, “invention”) has both 
rhetorical and physical associations.  Cymbeline and The White Devil exploit 
the concept of matter by inventing, transforming, and literalising it.  Both plays 
depend on and experiment with rhetoric, using “matter” as a means of 
demonstrating their artifice.  Matter is at the root of early modern culture’s 
discussions about rhetoric in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, 
particularly concerning the worrying power of extreme rhetorical artifice and its 
moral effects. 
 
Morality and rhetoric 
The rhetorical self-consciousness that characterises Cymbeline and The 
White Devil reflects a wider acknowledgement of the artifice of rhetorical 
construction and its power.  One can detect in Shakespeare’s and Webster’s 
continual references to the polysemous term “matter” a reflection of 
contemporaneous writing on verbal construction. 
Rhetoric is of supreme importance to literate sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Englishmen and Englishwomen; it is taught early in school and 
underpins almost all forms of verbal construction, from debates in the law courts 
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to dramatic dialogue and structure.55  The development of ornamental rhetoric 
from the sixteenth century begins to suggest that both language and man are 
pliable.  Rhetorical instruction is embedded in secondary and university 
curricula.  Quentin Skinner has explored the impact of rhetoric on education and 
its ongoing presence in early modern culture in Reason and Rhetoric (1996), 
which provides a comprehensive introduction to its place and problems in early 
modern England, as does Peter Mack’s thorough Elizabethan Rhetoric (2002). 
From a young age, when beginning to learn more advanced Latin texts, 
students are invited to engage with rhetorical forms of influence.  They learn to 
speak in utramque partem—that is, arguing on both sides of a controversial 
argument.  Such practices open up the possibility early on in education that a 
subject has two sides, which can both be convincingly put forward.  Students 
also learn moral philosophy after acquiring skills of rhetoric, and the two were 
closely connected.  The association of moral precepts and sentences 
(Sententiae pueriles) is especially important in rhetorical instruction and in the 
ultimate end of practical rhetorical use (in statecraft, reading, writing, and so 
forth), where they can be advantageously deployed and manipulated (see 
Mack, Elizabethan 11-12).  “They were told that virtues were important values of 
morality,” Markku Peltonen explains, but “at the same time . . . schoolmasters 
inculcated virtues as a significant part of rhetoric and rhetorical persuasion.”  
The result is that moral virtues become an exercise in expression, and are seen 
as “not so much intrinsic values of morality as instrumental values of rhetoric” 
(“Virtues” 159).  In this light, moral concepts early on in education become 
subject to a form of possible relativism, in which successful rhetorical 
persuasion begins to be closely tied to the ideas of virtue. 
Cicero’s Topica,56 for instance, was a particularly popular textbook 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England.  Cicero claims 
elsewhere, in the de Oratoria, that “orators are bound to possess the 
intelligence, capacity and skill to speak both pro and contra on topics of virtue, 
duty, equity and good, moral worth and utility, honour and disgrace, reward and 
punishment, and like matters” (qtd. Reinhardt 11).  Consequently, the Topica 
itself, which teaches the rhetorical practice of argumentation, presents a “grid of 
                                     
55 Lorna Hutson, Subha Mukherji, and Quentin Skinner, amongst others, have all shown the 
importance of legal and formal rhetoric to early modern playwrights.  This is discussed beneath 
in relation to The White Devil. 
56 On the text’s role in teaching dialectic at Oxford and Cambridge, see Mack (55).  
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conceptual ‘viewpoints,’ as it were, each offering a different perspective upon 
the matter at hand” (Altman 50).  Indeed, the basis of classical rhetorical 
oratory, Cicero explains, is to move away from particular persons and instances 
to “a discussion of a general issue” termed “thesis,” which requires an argument 
that attends to both sides of “the question ‘What was the nature of the act?’ by 
the principles of right and wrong” (qtd. Reinhard 4).  Rhetorical argumentation 
therefore involves itself with at the very least debating, and so potentially 
opening up disagreements over, questions of right and wrong. 
Such a method of rhetorical invention and argumentation is designed not 
only to help improve rhetorical skill but to find out the truth of the matter at 
hand.57  The approach is exemplified in the early seventeenth century by 
Bacon’s “new learning” in The Advancement of Learning (1605), where he 
encourages the use of “Antitheta,” that is “Theses argued, pro & contra, wherin 
men may be more large & laborious” (Rr4v).  In the extended Latin version of 
the text, De Augmentis Scientiarum, he also encourages the topics to be 
“exaggerated both ways with the utmost force of the wit, and urged unfairly, as 
it were, and quite beyond the truth” (qtd. in Altman 41).  The list that follows, an 
“Antitheses of Things,” is a series of “fors” and “againsts” for major themes 
including “fortune,” “nobility,” “beauty,” and so forth.  Altman has noted that 
“[many] of these appear in identical form in the Essays,” which suggests that 
those essays are themselves “active, ongoing ponderings, rather than digested 
presentations” (41).  By extending Ciceronian pro and contra into matters “civill 
and morall,” Bacon’s Advancement and his essays attempt to balance 
opposites in order better to determine a truth, and indeed the essays demand 
perpetual questioning rather than any certain judgement.  In this sense, they 
represent a practical application of Cicero’s rhetorical technique, but they also 
leave moral topics at the “general” level firmly in doubt and up for debate. 
In remaining partial rather than whole, Bacon’s antitheta also threaten to 
be partial in another sense; on the preceding page in the 1605 Advancement, 
he claims that persuasive rhetoric should “differ according to the Auditors,” 
going so far as to suggest that the same topic should be spoken of in different 
                                     
57 Cicero, Quintilian, and other classical rhetorical instructors all stress that an orator should be 
a good man, with his character providing virtue to his oratory.  Bacon too echoes this sentiment 
(see below).  There is regardless, though, the implication that matters of virtue can be disagreed 
upon, and that the way of truth and justice is unclear and must be mediated by contrived forms 
of language. 
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ways depending on the listener; he therefore questions whether such a practice 
should come under the heading of “Policie” rather than rhetoric (Rr4r).  The 
term “policy” is morally complex, and Bacon uses it in many complex ways in 
his writing (as he does with Machiavelli, too), but it is nevertheless often 
associated from the 1580s with perceived Machiavellian behaviour, “cunning, 
and altogether amoral conduct based on expediency, deceitfulness—especially 
after the massacre of St Bartholomew” (Rubinstein 54).58  Although Bacon is 
writing in the 1600s, the term retains its currency (as Ennis Rees shows with 
regard to Chapman’s Jacobean plays).  For and against argumentation 
therefore lends rhetorical practices not only to the possibility of opening up 
debates over moral issues, but, for Bacon, it also makes possible the 
manipulation of those issues depending on one’s audience—something that 
approaches, even if in practice it never quite attained it, a form of “politic” 
relativism. 
Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique (1553), true to its sources in Quintilian, 
Cicero, and the unattributed Rhetorica Ad Herennium, also encourages making 
speeches “appere probable” (A2v).  Barbara Shapiro explains that “probability 
in the rhetorical context did not refer to particular pieces of evidence in the 
modern sense but rather to the likelihood, verisimilitude, and persuasiveness of 
the general account of the case presented to the decision-maker” (55).  As 
such, it is necessarily removed from external and physical fact.  Cicero’s De 
inventione suggests that an orator should, in deliberative rhetoric, “ground his 
case on either honesty or utility, or on both” (Peltonen, “Virtues”164).  The 
option to link rhetorical expression to moral virtues therefore arises.  Yet one 
could equally choose utilitas as a motivation, making rhetoric a tool rather than 
a means of expressing moral truth.  This concern over rhetoric as a useful craft 
rather than a noble art is something that begins to be more explicitly discussed 
in rhetoricians’ approach to truth-twisting figures. 
The idea of rhetoric as a “tool” is also linked to the notions of “artificial” or 
“inartificial” proofs.  The former are the persuasiveness, probability, and 
circumstantial factors related to the matter at hand (arguments and strategies of 
rhetoric).  The latter are the more concrete aspects of proof (testimony, 
                                     
58 Machiavelli does not warrant full exploration in the context of this chapter, but it is worth 
noting that his “politics” are also closely associated with forms of rhetorical presentation and 
argumentation (see Skinner, Reason 170-72). 
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documents, etc.) (see Eden 13).  Aristotle and classical rhetoricians privilege 
artificial proofs over inartificial proofs.  In purely oratorical terms, it is 
consequently rhetorical style and effectiveness that become of primary 
importance.  It is the skill of rhetorical elocutio—the “appliyng of apte words and 
sentences to the matter, founde out to confirme the cause” (Wilson A3r)—that is 
also essential in influencing the judgement of truth or falsehood, virtue or vice. 
Although Wilson stresses that all five elements of rhetoric are necessary 
and none is to be considered more important, Gérard Genette observes that the 
concentration of such rhetorical texts upon “figures” rather than on a more 
“general” application develops from the early medieval period, “because the 
rhetoric of the trivium, crushed between grammar and dialectic, soon came to 
be confined to the study of elocution, the ornaments of discourse, colores 
rhetorici” (“Rhetoric Restrained” 104).  These two aspects—the privileging of 
artificial proof and the emphasis on ornamental rhetoric—inevitably create a 
divide between truth and oration.  The purpose of rhetoric is not to convey 
moral truth but rather, in Wilson’s words, to “make our sayinges appere lykely, 
and probable . . . & frame our inuencion accordyng as we shal thynke them 
most willyng to allowe it, that haue the hearyng of it” (P3r).  Indeed, the 
suggestion that matter need not be “true” but simply “likely,” repeated 
throughout The Arte of Rhetorique, problematises the meaning of “knowledge,” 
which need not be objectively “known” but rather rhetorically convincing. 
That confusion over “knowledge” is compounded when Wilson admits 
that “the knowlege of a Metaphore, shall bryng men to muche knowledge” 
(S2v).  His verbal obfuscation suggests that rhetorical elocution is associated in 
some way with moral truth; “knowledge” itself is inextricable from rhetorical 
ornament.  Webster expresses precisely such a concern through Flamineo’s 
final speech and the figure or trope of “mist”: 
 
I doe not looke 
Who went before, nor who shall follow mee; 
Noe, at my selfe I will begin and end. 
”While we looked vp to heauen wee confound 
”Knowledge with knowledge. ô I am in a mist. (M2r) 
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Mist represents both a psychological and a physical struggle with death, but the 
punning in the speech adds to the confusion over moral and visual knowledge, 
not least in the various meanings of “look.”  In the final throes of life, Flamineo 
visualises the purgatorial “mist” of near-death—a literal image—but that vision is 
also what Milton would later call “the common gloss / Of theologians” (5.435-
36)—the “mist” that surrounds “spiritual or physical matters” (OED “Mist” n.2).  
The duality is continued in the two uses of “knowledge,” which are visually and 
aurally identical while intimating a difference between material and abstract 
understanding.  Webster’s verse and its characteristic incorporation of 
quotations precisely parallels Wilson’s use of “knowledge” in his rhetorical 
treatise, where he associates material “truth” with rhetorical ornament.   
Considering that the period held conversation to be “the beginning and end of 
all knowledge” (Guazzo, D6r), ornaments of expression come to be substituted 
for facts.  If legal and moral proof rests on rhetorical exercise, avenues of 
subjective dissent and disagreement open up.  Those possibilities generate 
concerns that rhetoric could make wrong of right and right of wrong.  While it is 
linked to negotium and the similar drive in educational treatises towards the vita 
activa, rhetoric is also at risk of relativising concepts of duty (see chapter one).  
Rhetorical speech begins to take on an almost supernatural power, with 
indications that words themselves can be forces of creation.  Henry Peacham, 
in his exploration of rhetoric, The Garden of Eloquence (1577), claims that an 
orator with amplified rhetoric59 has the power to “draw the minds of his hearers 
whether he will, and wynde them into what affection he list . . . .  The Oratoure . 
. . eyther breaketh all in peeces, like a thunderbolt, or else by little and little, like 
the flowing water, creepeth into the minds of his hearers . . .” (N2v).  Peacham’s 
God-like imagery indicates the potency with which rhetorical persuasion and 
eloquence are regarded.  Skinner identifies the association of this powerful 
persuasion with concerns about a Machiavellian approach to truth and virtue: 
“the good orator is . . . seen as someone who seeks so far as possible to teach 
the truth, but who seeks at the same time by every possible means to impel or 
persuade us to accept it . . . .  The art of rhetoric stands in an equivocal 
                                     
59 Amplification is defined as “a certain affirmation very great & weighty, which by large & 
plentifull speech, moueth the minds of the hearers, & maketh them to beleeue that which is 
said” (Peacham, Garden N2r).  Skinner identifies a wider trend in the use of the term by early 
modern rhetoricians, noting that it can be used “to cover the whole process of arousing the 
emotions by way of stretching the truth . . .” (Reason 136). 
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relationship with the truth” (Reason 102-03).  Despite claims that echo Bacon’s 
optimism—that ornamentation is more apt to furnish truth than falsehood—
concerns about the potential deceptiveness of ornamental or amplified 
rhetorical speech abound in early modern England. 
Peacham, despite his praise for amplification, argues that some figures 
are able to reclothe virtues as vices and vice versa.  At the root of this concern 
was the figure of paradiastole, or rhetorical redescription: 
 
. . . it is when by a mannerly interpretation, we doe excuse our 
own vices, or other mens whom we doe defend, by calling them 
vertues . . . This figure is used, when vices are excused. (Garden, 
N4v) 
 
Although Peacham’s definition presupposes the existence of vices and virtues, 
merely renamed by rhetoric, rhetoric opens the possibility of making vice 
acceptable.  George Puttenham offers a more favourable definition in The Arte 
of English Poesie (1589), in which he describes paradiastole as the “moderation 
of words” that “tend to flattery, or soothing, or excusing.”  He colloquially names 
it the Curry-fauell, “as when we make the best of a bad thing, or turne a 
signification to the more plausible sense: as to call an vnthrift, a liberall 
Gentleman.”60  Nevertheless, the figure retains the possibility of “moderating 
and abating the force of matter by craft” (X3v).  The perversion of “matter” by 
artifice indicates the power of rhetorical redescription to bend “truth.”  It also 
conflates physical and verbal terms, inferring that “matters” occurring or that 
have occurred in the physical world might be manipulated by language. 
Writers and dramatists lament the link between ornamental language 
and moral obscurity in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  
Montaigne, for instance, reels against the vanity of words and their ability to 
assault “our judgement; and to bastardize and corrupt the essence of things” 
(“Of the vanitie of Wordes” P5r).  In the play Lingua, Lingua himself claims that 
“delightful speeches” and “sweet perswasions” (A4v) earn him the right to be 
accounted a sense, and he explains how he deceives the senses with “sugred 
words, to delude Gustus taste”: 
 
                                     
60 See Skinner (Reason 165) for the meanings and origins of this phrase. 
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And oft embellisht my entreatiue phrase 
With smelling flowres of vernant Rhetorique 
Limming and flashing it with various dyes 
To draw proud Visus to me by the eyes. (A4v) 
 
By attacking each sense and its weakness for linguistic embellishment, Lingua 
exploits concerns about the association of rhetoric with imagination and 
impression.  Attacking the senses’ weaknesses in those areas, the play 
exposes how easy it is for language to exploit affection and passion through 
rhetorical amplification, or “sugaring” and rephrasing.  If redescription has the 
ability to make us see facts in “a different moral light” (Skinner 145) then the 
possibility of endless contradictions, disagreements, and paradoxes (beloved in 
the period) arises.61 
 
Rhetorical Strangeness 
Strangeness serves as a talisman for the contemporary concerns about 
rhetorical power discussed above.  It also materialises abstract moral concerns 
about rhetoric by combining the various meanings of “matter” and drawing on 
the connotations of the concept “strange” already explored in previous chapters 
of this thesis. 
The “matter” that is at the root of contemporary concerns about rhetoric 
combines with ornamentation in Cymbeline and The White Devil, where 
Shakespeare and Webster push the notion of Elizabethan rhetoric to its limits 
through “rhetorical strangeness.”  By extending and exaggerating the elements 
that form the Elizabethan concept of “rhetorical” composition and exploiting the 
room for redescription, amplification, and ornamentation, both playwrights 
infuse the very style of the plays with some of the anxieties over truth and 
certainty that plague early modern rhetoric.  
Employing recognisable legal rhetoric, Cymbeline’s Giacamo attempts to 
convince Posthumus that his wife has been unfaithful by providing a legal-
oratorical list of artificial “proofs.”  That rhetorical delivery is later in the play 
                                     
61 Casuistry is sometimes associated with this trend, although its significance is chiefly religious; 
for a discussion of its relationship to scepticism and to Machiavelli, see Condren (Argument 
174-225).  Rosemary Colie and Peter G. Platt have written on “paradox” and its mark on 
Renaissance rhetoric and culture. 
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criticised by Pisanio, who exclaims of Posthumus, “O Master, what a strange 
infection / Is falne into thy eare!” (Aaa2v-Aaa3r).  The exclamation could equally 
well characterise the whole play’s versification, style, and syntax—a marker of 
Shakespeare’s “late style.”  The late plays generate worlds of epistemic anxiety, 
balanced between certainty and uncertainty, understanding and confusion; as 
such, the drama presents a number of moral complexities that are rooted in 
Shakespeare’s language. 
Numerous critics have identified what Frank Kermode calls “a new 
rhetoric” (16), which challenges detailed comprehension but retains a haunting, 
lyrical power to convey meaning and music in even the most opaque and 
oblique manner.  Indeed, as Kermode notes, “Sometimes it takes the poet 
beyond the limits of reason and intelligibility” (16).  While “late style” ultimately 
fails to unite these plays as a group, as Gordon McMullan has shown 
(Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing, see esp. 104-26), “strange style” 
provides a framework that foregrounds wider theatrical and cultural contexts 
than, say, genre, author, or “lateness” and accommodates the multiplicities and 
difficulties of the language.  Certainly, “late Shakespeare” contains various rich 
challenges, largely due to its key features, which are detailed by Russ 
McDonald and are worth quoting in full: 
 
Ellipsis exerts a constant pressure on the sound and sense 
as the poet concentrates expression, omitting phonemic and 
verbal units that in an earlier phase of composition he would have 
retained.  Connectives between clauses are sometimes removed, 
creating the effect of asyndeton: the words and phrases that 
remain make the verse sound unusually ‘distilled.’  Syntax 
becomes convoluted, often confusingly so, and even though word 
order in early modern English is much less standardized than it 
has since become, the number of deformed phrases, directional 
shifts, and intricately constructed sentences is exceptional for the 
period and exceptional for Shakespeare.  Related to this 
grammatical complexity is the dependence on parenthesis, what 
one critic refers to as ‘parenthomania, the alarming outbreak of 
brackets.’ Repetition of various units—letters, words, phrases, 
rhythms—becomes more prominent and sometimes almost 
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obsessive, patterning heard clearly in the incantatory doublings in 
Macbeth and resounding most audibly in the extraordinary 
echoing effects of The Tempest. Blank verse, usually a guarantor 
of order and regularity, is now aggressively irregular, 
encompassing enjambments, light or weak endings, frequent 
stops or shifts of direction, and other threats to the integrity of the 
line.  Metaphors tend to be introduced and often succeeded 
rapidly by others, not articulated at length. Finally governing all 
these technical features is a pervasive self-consciousness, an 
artist’s playful delight in calling attention to his own virtuosity. (33) 
 
Critics and editors have long realised these challenges, with Kermode and 
Anne Barton, in their respective editions of The Tempest, acknowledging the 
play’s “remarkably intense” language: “Over and over again, the verse achieves 
an uncanny eloquence by way of what it omits or pares away” and through “the 
brusque juxtaposition of two words neither of which appears to modify or to be 
syntactically dependent upon the other in any normal sense” (Barton, 
“Introduction” 13, 14).  Despite the numerous critical considerations of 
Shakespeare’s Tempest-uous verse, Kiernan Ryan—though not writing from an 
historicising or contextualising angle—insists that a neglect of the peculiar 
rhetorical style of late Shakespeare still bars a full understanding of its working 
and effects, something of consequence to all critical approaches to the plays: 
 
it is to the deliberate detail of the language and form that we must 
look, if the late plays are to be released from both the 
retrospection of old and new historicism and the abstractions of 
the allegorists.  For it is by dislocating the dramatic narrative and 
contorting conventional poetic discourse that Shakespearean 
romance articulates its alienation from its own age and its 
commerce with futurity.  What makes these plays still strike us as 
enigmatic and elusive is neither their engrossment in recondite 
topical allusions nor their veiled subscription to the perennial 
mysteries of myth and religion.  It is the fact that we have not yet 
mastered their formal grammar and poetic idiom, and so have not 
yet learned how to read them. (18) 
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I make no claims in this chapter to mastering that formal grammar, but I suggest 
that the contortion of “poetic discourse” is part of a contrived effort to effect and 
enhance the aural, visual, and moral “strangeness” associated with the world of 
the romances.  Shakespeare’s verse is an extraordinary achievement of 
paradox and juxtaposition, in form and effect—it is both sceptical and magical, it 
both conveys and confuses.62 
McDonald’s analysis of the “patterns and fractals” in these plays 
convincingly demonstrates that “they signify or function as carriers of meaning” 
(29).  He notes that Shakespearean rhetoric in the romances often follows the 
pattern of the romance mode itself, with its “managed complexity” generating “a 
feeling of pleasurable uncertainty,” eliciting anxiety and then security through 
the sentence structures as well as the plot structures.  The effect is to make one 
aware of the contrived language, and to appreciate that the “matter” of rhetoric 
is not hidden or elided but is conspicuously present.  Indeed, one can turn to 
the closing of Cymbeline to support this notion of strange syntax validating and 
mirroring the strange occurrences in the fiction, with its disjunctive happy-ever-
after ending.  Jupiter tells Posthumus, 
 
Whom best I loue, I crosse; to make my guift 
The more delay’d, delighted. (bbb3v) 
 
Serving as an exquisite definition of Jacobean tragicomedy itself, Jupiter’s lines 
omit connectives, muddy the syntax, and repeatedly delay meaning itself until 
the second half of each phrase, after the caesura (I crosse, delighted).  The 
association of poetic devices or deliberate verbal artifice with wider thematic or 
narrative purpose can be taken further by the association of “delight” with early 
modern literary theory—not least in Philip Sidney’s Defense of Poesie (1595), 
                                     
62 The features of paradox are deemed “strange” by early modern theorists of rhetoric; Henry 
Peacham describes paradox as “a forme of speech” used when something is “so strange, so 
great, or so wonderful, that it may appeare to be incredible . . . . This figure is then to be used, 
when the thing which is to be taught is new, straunge, incredible, and repugnant to the opinion 
of the hearer” (Q4v).  John Florio’s A Worlde of Wordes (1598) echoes Peacham’s definition, as 
Peter G. Platt recognises (Shakespeare and the Culture of Paradox 19), when he describes the 
Italian paradosso as “a maruellous, wonderfull and strange thinge to heare” (Y3r).  Indeed, 
Platt’s survey of early modern English definitions of “paradoxy” frequently turns up 
“strangeness” as a description, cause, and effect of the trope.  The trope itself, like an extreme 
form of strangeness, can cause a reader to “become ineffectually—perilously—lost in doubt” 
(Platt, Shakespeare 12). 
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where it is used to marry pleasure to practical instruction.  Jupiter’s words serve 
in miniature as an emblem of the play’s own delaying of meaning, clarity, and 
delight and reflect contemporary considerations of rhetoric and its effects on or 
obfuscation of moral “truth.” 
McDonald argues that a recognition of such correspondences “between 
minute grammatical particulars and broad organizational principles helps to 
show how style makes meaning” (40).  Accordingly, such “strangeness” in the 
verse of Cymbeline connects with strangeness elsewhere in the play; 
Cymbeline contains numerous references to the term, second only in 
Shakespeare’s corpus to The Tempest.  The “more delay’d, delighted” remark is 
preceded and foreshadowed by the Lord’s comment earlier in the scene about 
the “rediscovery” of the King’s sons: “This was strange chance” (bbb3r).  Both 
the “chances” of the play’s action and the sound of its speech are marked by a 
“strangeness” that complicates straightforward providential, moral, or generic 
interpretations.  The idiosyncratic style also prompts a reflection on and studied 
consideration of language in the play, adding to the self-consciousness that 
underlines the playworld’s “matter.” 
Webster’s writing shares similarities with Shakespeare’s in wearing its 
rhetorical techniques on its sleeve.  Ralph Berry remarks on the way in which 
“the movement of Webster’s language . . . constantly forces the listener to 
readjust, to experience more intensely, in a word to involve himself in it.”  The 
“frequency, variety, and abruptness” of his “transitions” from one mode to 
another, from verse to prose, and from full line lengths to stunted expression 
contribute to a particularly idiosyncratic style (29).  Leah S. Marcus observes 
that, “if Webster’s verse often sounds like prose, his prose is often almost 
indistinguishable from verse” (“Introduction” 83).  Even the “literary” effect of the 
Quarto does not prevent Webster’s “strangeness” from entering the page.  
Marta Straznicky notes the “literary” qualities of “every” Red-Bull-performed play 
that is printed in quarto: “In addition to continuous printing, features that signal 
an awareness of drama as a literary genre include author attribution, Latin on 
the titlepage, a dedicatory or other prefatory epistle, a list of speakers or 
dramatis personae, and regular division into acts” (148-49). The White Devil 
Quarto accordingly seeks to make lines fully “poetic” through continuous 
printing: ensuring that the full ten syllables, on average, fit into a single line (and 
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therefore lines are arranged so that different characters’ speeches run into each 
other). 
Yet there remain moments in which such “tidying” of Webster’s verse 
does not stick: 
 
LOD. In taffeta lininges; that’s gentile melancholie, 
Sleepe all day.  FLA. Yes: and like your melancholike hare 
Feed after midnight. 
Wee are obserued: see how yon couple greue. 
LOD. What a strange creature is a laughing foole, 
As if man were created to no vse 
But onely to shew his teeth. . . . ( F4r) 
 
Flamineo speaks often in prose, aside from occasional poetic meditations and 
sententious couplets, yet here, in the middle of his own speech, a line of five 
syllables is given preference and a new line begun.  This choice is not a space-
saving measure, as the page contains stage directions that are placed on the 
same line as verse, where they are elsewhere given a line to themselves.63  
The strange flow of the metre in Flamineo’s exchange with Lodowick, where 
one line reaches eleven syllables (in confused metrical arrangement) and the 
following is stunted at five, therefore strikes in print as well as in performance, 
where what Berry terms the “modulations” of Webster’s language are of course 
audible. 
Puttenham actually argues that strangeness can infuse the “sound” of 
speech, as it would do in the theatre.  He links the term to metre and sound 
(both in feet and in line length), remarking that 
 
by diuersitie of placing and situation of your measures and 
concords, a short with a long, and by narrow or wide distances, or 
thicker or thinner bestowing of them your proportions differ, and 
                                     
63 Marcus, in a recent edition of The Duchess of Malfi, detects authorial intervention in the 
printing of Webster’s Quartos (where a ditty in a revised issue of Malfi is explicitly said not to be 
by “the Author”) (73-78).  Although this does not conclusively prove any involvement in the 
printing process, it does show that Webster was in dialogue with the printers of his work.  The 
Quarto of The White Devil is printed over ten years earlier than Malfi, but the impulse to ensure 
poetic “quality” is present in the paratextual material, suggesting that Webster may have had an 
enduring interest in the presentation of his work in print. 
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breedeth a variable and strange harmonie not onely in the eare, 
but also in the conceit of them that heare it. (M1v) 
 
The sound or “harmonie” of language is, according to Puttenham’s influential, 
foundational text of English prosody (see Hardison Jr.) made “strange” through 
the variation of line length or metre.  The sound of verse is enough to suggest a 
meaning, separate to its content.  Further, appreciation of measure and concord 
shows that “strangeness” can suffuse a play like The White Devil even aside 
from direct visual or verbal references to the concept.  It is, effectively, a verbal 
“style.” 
Most crucial for the performance of Cymbeline and The White Devil, 
however, is the way in which rhetorical “performance” infuses not only the 
audible parts of a play but its material aspects.  Keir Elam detects an 
“epistemological shift” within rhetoric in the early seventeenth century (70-71) in 
which language and physical action are drawn together (77).  It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that drama in these years of rhetorical revolution displays a 
close connection between rhetorical and physical construction.  Elam argues 
that Thomas Wright’s treatise Passions of the Mind (the expanded edition of 
1604) situates the verbal demonstration of passion “on the borderline between 
elocutio in its schematic guise and actio, performance” (72).  As such, language 
and action are closely linked, and Elam proceeds to argue that Shakespeare 
develops, from Macbeth, a “syntactic inelocutio”: utterances or passionate 
exclamations that explore “the relationship between the private expression and 
public simulation of passion, and which experiments an extraordinary and in 
many ways revolutionary rhetorical expressionism” (77).  Shakespeare’s 
“strange style” connects with a wider development of rhetoric that puts the 
emphasis on both the physical and rhetorical aspects of “matter.” 
What is interesting about Wright’s treatment of rhetoric is the level of 
emphasis on embodied speech.  While gesture has always been a part of 
oration, Wright makes it central to his discussion, displacing even elocutio—the 
figures and tropes that dominate early modern interests in rhetoric.  He 
“dedicates his whole discussion to syntactic devices and their phonetic, 
intonational and gestural orchestration in rhetorical performance” (Elam 72).  
This emphasis, building on classical advice to orators to frame their physical 
action to fit the words, is for Elam essential to acting on the early modern stage: 
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It is the playhouse that makes an art of the interaction between 
the rhetorical figure and the acting and moving figure of the 
speaker, literally giving body to discourse through the corporeal 
orchestration of speech, with the institutional purpose of creating 
effects or affects in an audience.  The stage player acts out, 
kinesically, but above all phonetically, syntactically, and even 
punctuationally the movement of the passions. (75) 
 
As such, the precise elements of style have material equivalents; one is 
logically led to assume, for instance, that the rhetorical uniqueness, metrical 
ruggedness, and syntactic circuitousness of Shakespeare’s romances have 
their duplicate in body. 
Wright’s emphatically material conception of verbal expression echoes 
earlier conceptions of rhetorical strangeness by stating that an orator 
“questionlesse may effectuate strange matters in the mindes of his Auditors” 
(B2r).64  Rhetoric has the ability to inculcate a form of “strangeness” in a 
listener, suggesting the force of verbal power by drawing on the moral 
implications of the term.  The association with “matter” also implies a physical 
aspect to early modern oratory.  Wright stresses that with the rules of action 
allied to pronunciation, “how much more liuely it representeth the conceits and 
affections of the mind, because that thorow both the eares and the eyes of their 
auditors, they intend to imprint them in their soules the deeper” (I6v).  His new 
conception of expression frames the moral force of rhetoric in explicitly physical 
terms and adds a visual aspect to oratory.  The language of “imprinting” is 
common in both antitheatrical and protheatrical treatises of the period, and 
Peter G. Platt has noted that moral transformation is associated with verbal 
display in oratory and taken further in anxieties about the public stage: “able to 
imprint on souls, ‘words and actions’ were even more potent when placed on 
the stage” (Shakespeare 190).  If rhetoric itself is explained in explicitly physical 
                                     
64 George Puttenham notes that one should fashion “language and stile, to such purpose as it 
may delight and allure as well the mynde as the eare of the hearers with a certain noueltie and 
strange maner of conueyance, disguising it no little from the ordinary and accustomed” (Q3r).  
More precisely, Thomas Wilson puts the emphasis on strangeness when discussing the figure 
of amplification (see above).  For Wilson, “In praisyng, or dispraisyng, wee muste exaggerate 
those places towardes the ende, whiche make menne wonder at the straungenesse of any 
thyng” (N3v).  The “truth-twisting” figure of amplificatio had long before Wright been associated 
with enhancing the “strangeness” of matter.   
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metaphors, from “imprinting” to effectuating matter, it is unsurprising that 
stylised or deliberately ornamental language on the stage should be coupled 
with spectacular “strangeness.” 
Rhetorical and Material Construction in The White Devil 
There is a concentration of “strangeness” around the dumb show 
murders and their discussion in the arraignment scene, but this section 
considers the implicit conceptual strangeness of The White Devil.  Rhetorical 
strangeness represents a particular style, medium, and moment in Jacobean 
drama that merges verbal effects and stage effects.  Webster’s use of 
chiaroscuro as both a dramaturgical and a verbal trope shows on a primary 
level how verbal and visual elements combine in a theatre.  The White Devil 
also dramatises “absent” figures and events in the dumb show murders and the 
ghost scene, where verbal “conjuring” materialises the immaterial or the 
invisible.  The White Devil’s stagecraft, like Cymbeline’s, mirrors developments 
in rhetoric in the late 1600s and early 1610s, while self-consciously showcasing 
its own rhetorical strangeness.  This chapter’s rooting of stage effects in their 
immediate philosophical and intellectual context provides an important 
extension to the physical facts of theatre history and to current understandings 
of the relationship between spectacle and verbal effect.  The following sections 
therefore set out the pertinent physical theatrical evidence for these plays’ early 
stagings and read them against contemporary approaches and attitudes 
towards verbal construction.  Exchanges between verbal and physical “matter” 
in Cymbeline and The White Devil underline the period’s anxieties about 
rhetorical construction, adding to the moral uncertainty that characterises the 
precariously artificial worlds of both plays. 
 
The dumb shows in The White Devil have long been recognised as a 
“strange technique,” in the phrase of Dieter Mehl, whose study of dumb shows 
marks Webster as one of the first to combine two traditional facets of the 
device: a staged murder and a performance for on-stage characters (139-40).  
More recently, Katherine M. Carey sees these scenes as a marker of 
“hypermediation”—“multiplicity which makes multiple acts of representation 
visible” (73)—something that connects it with the rhetorical technique of 
ekphrasis, discussed below.  More widely, Marion Lomax has observed the way 
in which “Webster juxtaposes previously established, and sometimes old-
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fashioned stage techniques with experimental contemporary effects,” though 
her study barely touches on The White Devil (127).  Subha Mukherji has shown 
how the play’s “coloured” language connects it with rhetorical, legal, and moral 
description (see especially 139-46) and Martin Wiggins’s attention to the many 
“ghost” characters—those figures who are frequently on-stage but not an active 
or speaking part of the action—raises questions over “what could be effectively 
communicated in performance” (458) in its original staging (drawing parallels 
with Ben Jonson’s Sejanus).  Wiggins points out that “there are six leading 
roles” (457).  The saturated stagecraft is at its pinnacle in the court scene, 
where the stage directions note the most actors onstage, but is perhaps most 
complex during the dumb shows, where Bracciano and the Conjuror form a third 
layer between the ephemeral image of the murders and the murderers watching 
Isabella—the “hypermediacy” detected by Carey.  Faced with a mass of 
distractions that compete for the foreground, audiences are forced to make 
visual priorities.  George F. Reynolds long ago noticed the possibility that the 
two dumb shows each took place on different sides of the Red Bull stage (139), 
making visual “decentring” a forceful aspect of performance and contributing to 
the visual and moral doubt that characterise the play. 
Some understanding of the early staging of the play must be established, 
as far as possible, in order to explore how strange rhetorical devices are 
merged with stage devices.  Critics generally agree that The White Devil was 
staged in the Red Bull theatre in Clerkenwell, 1612.65  Contextual knowledge 
about the Red Bull theatre, its repertory, and its surroundings reinforce the 
appropriateness of the play to its venue.  Although Webster expresses disdain 
for the audience and the playhouse in his address “To the Reader,” The White 
Devil suits the Clerkenwell milieu well.  Although he brought Malfi inside to the 
Blackfriars, there is no reason to suggest that Webster was unaware of the 
staging capacities and the audience tastes of the Red Bull, having already been 
an apprentice on and co-author of several plays.  I see no reason to disbelieve 
that The White Devil was written for the Red Bull and that the Quarto reflects in 
                                     
65 Griffith’s recent study of the playhouse and the Queen’s Servants, who performed the play, 
acknowledges possible doubts.  The Queen’s Servants, although based at the Red Bull, also 
made use of the Curtain, and because Webster’s play has no playhouse affiliation on the 
Quarto—only a company affiliation—Griffith warns that “we are left with the possibility that what 
Webster describes [in his ‘To the Reader’] is not the Red Bull at all but the Curtain in 
Shoreditch.”  Nevertheless, continuing critical convention, Griffith concludes that “it is more 
likely it was performed in Clerkenwell” (208).  
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some ways its performance at that theatre.  The area around the theatre is “a 
focal point for legal activity against crime” (Griffith 23)—acting as a “Sessions 
House for the hearing of criminal cases for the entire Middlesex area”—and it is 
an ironic echo of Webster’s play that in 1615, a short distance from the 
playhouse, a house of correction called the “Clerkenwell Bridewell” was erected.  
In 1612, the year of the play’s original performance, a “whole building was 
erected for the purpose of hearing cases” (Griffith 21).  The White Devil’s 
concerns with legal matters and trials make the immediate surroundings of the 
Red Bull theatre an apt real-world setting. 
Webster’s tragedy also chimes with plays at the Red Bull in the Queen’s 
Servant’s repertory. There is a wide interest in legal matters, with a number of 
trial scenes, noted by Reynolds and reinforced by Griffith.  Two plays performed 
either side of The White Devil, Greene’s Tu Quoque (Cook, 1611) and Swetnam 
the Woman-Hater, Arraigned by Women (1618-19), both contain a possibility for 
“slots in the stage into which a post might be placed along with, perhaps, further 
slots for a wooden stall area standing for a court” (Griffith 106, 140); as such, 
the oratorical performances of legal rhetoric in the Red Bull may well have been 
accompanied by physical stage props that signalled the place of a law court, 
establishing dramaturgical echoes of rhetoric as a feature of the stage.66  The 
White Devil, however, as Reynolds recognises, remains more akin to a “council 
scene,” as there is no explicit stage direction requiring the presence of a “bar” 
(82-83).67 
The prologue to a 1619 play, The Two Merry Milkmaids (published 
1620), also seems to suggest that features of The White Devil are part of the 
Red Bull’s “characteristic” repertory, and intimates its own connection between 
rhetorical and physical performance.  The prologue warns Red Bull audiences 
that Milkmaids contains no squibs or battles, as the stage usually represents: 
 
This Day we entreat All that are hither come, 
                                     
66 Swetnam features a title-page woodcut that Griffith considers “the closest representation we 
have of the actual staging of a Red Bull play during the Queen’s Servants’ time there” (145); it 
therefore suggests possible echoes of The White Devil’s own arraignment scene, and shows 
the brick tiring house wall and paved floor of the theatre.  If considered an accurate 
representation of the stage, it prompts consideration that there may not be any permanent 
recess space at the centre rear of the stage—see below for further discussion. 
67 This does not preclude the possibility that a more formal “legal” staging was initially favoured, 
a feature that did not translate onto the page—see below for a discussion of the Quarto’s 
“literarification” of the play. 
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To expect no noyse of Guns Trumpets, nor Drum, 
Nor Sword and Taruet; but to heare Sence and Words, 
Fitting the Matter that the Scene affords. (A4v) 
 
The sense of “matter” as material stagecraft is punned upon, suggesting that 
the “scene” (both a literary marker and a term used for the rear of the frons 
scenae) is rather more interested in “Sence and Words”—its rhetorical 
incarnation.  Nonetheless, the play does “haue in’t a Coniurer, a Devil, / And a 
Clowne too . . .” (A4v).  Listing stock figures of the Red Bull stage, a conjuror 
draws to mind Webster’s earlier play, despite its lack of success at the venue, 
and at the very least the prologue is evidence that Webster’s mixed-mode 
drama was in fact not unusual fare for the audience of so-called “ignorant 
asses” (Webster A2r). 
Aspects of its early performance can be detected in the Quarto itself, 
despite Webster’s “literarification.”  Recent work on the playhouse and its 
published plays shows that, “With their detailed stage directions, theatrically 
oriented prefatory material, and carefully arranged songs, Red Bull quartos 
serve as encapsulations of performance, rather than displacements of it” 
(Munro 105).  Such “encapsulations” are simultaneously and self-consciously 
transformed into literary products, as Marta Straznicky has established.  Red 
Bull Quartos can therefore be said to combine performance and print, reflecting 
the one while fitting themselves for another.  Straznicky also suggests that the 
two markets—performance and print—are not necessarily opposed, and “that a 
seemingly ‘low’ or popular theatrical repertory is not sufficient evidence of the 
social or educational make-up of its audience” (144).  Popular and critical 
conceptions about a “lower-class” audience at the Red Bull cannot therefore be 
assumed—especially in a period when the playhouse was only in the process of 
receiving its “citizen”-orientated reputation (Griffith 107, 110).  Further, 
Webster’s interest in literary presentation is not unusual and does not 
distinguish the play from its fellow Red Bull productions: “every . . . play with a 
Red Bull attribution has some combination of elements that imply literary 
distinction” (Straznicky 149).  The fact that The White Devil conspicuously lacks 
a Red Bull attribution on the titlepage and contains a scathing critique of the 
theatre in its “To the Reader,” however, suggests that the Quarto represents a 
mixture of enshrined performance and an attempt to distance itself from its 
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Clerkenwell origins.  Its detailed stage directions nonetheless offer considerable 
evidence for original staging, a fact recognised by Reynolds, who marks the 
play as an “A” in his grade scale for the likeliness of a printed play reflecting 
performance at the Red Bull. 
The features that define The White Devil’s performance show an 
exchange between rhetorical and stage devices.  Subha Mukherji explores the 
play’s interest in seeing, and in “‘colour’ in its legal, rhetorical, theatrical, 
theological and physiognomical senses” (135), making reference to its 
“persuasive force in a particular circumstance” (142).  Chiaroscuro is one 
aspect of the play’s chromatic scale that reflects both lyrical and dramaturgical 
techniques, foreshadowing the uses of light that characterise Malfi and that 
mark the repertories of candlelit indoor theatres. 
Chiaroscuro is already, though, a significant feature of the outdoor-
performed The White Devil.  The play repeatedly riffs on the binary opposition 
of black and white, just as it does with other “painted” images—from “whore” to 
cosmetics: 
 
I shall bee playner with you, and paint out 
Your folies in more natural red and white. 
Then that upon your cheeke. (E3r) 
 
 The colour imagery is a sign of rhetorical ornamentation, because, by the late 
Elizabethan period, “by extension, the figures or tropes of rhetoric . . . 
themselves came to be known as the ‘colours of rhetoric’” (Mukherji 140).  
Indeed, “ornamental” styles of rhetoric might be said to “over-flower” as much 
as overflow with verbal inventiveness; the verbal-visual power of speech is 
often characterised as “flowers,” from Cicero’s flosculi in the classics, and in 
rhetorical texts framed as “gardens” as in Henry Peacham’s Garden of 
Eloquence (1577). 
The black-and-white images of the play are mirrored in its stagecraft.  
The moral language, so steeped in colour, is accompanied by staged darkness, 
signified by the presence of torches on stage and by the explicit references to 
dimness: “Come sister, darknesse hides your blush” (B4v).  Marion Lomax 
notes how 
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actual or implied darkness is an important feature of both The 
White Devil and The Duchess of Malfi.  [R. B.] Graves draws 
attention to the fact that Webster was the only dramatist of the 
period to stage the removal of lights for scenes involving illicit 
love.  As a rhetorical figure, the idea was well-known, but as a 
dramatic action, it was previously untried. (147) 
 
The play’s chiaroscuro doubles visual and verbal figures, making rhetorical 
devices into stage effects.  Later, in the murder scene, a similar doubling of 
darkness occurs, with Bracciano entering “at midnight” and watching his wife 
“feed her eyes and lips / On the dead shadow.”  The stage directions imply that 
hand-held “lights” illuminate the scene.  Indeed, one of the most spectacular 
elements of the murders is the perfume-fire that burns before the picture and is 
put out by the Doctor and Christophero before Isabella enters: 
 
. . . and then burne perfumes afore the picture, and wash the lips 
of the picture, that done, quenching the fire, and putting off their 
spectacles they depart laughing. (D4v) 
 
At the outdoor Red Bull, burning perfumes signal a contrast between lightness 
and darkness and work as a stage effect that doubles the language’s 
preoccupations with light and dark.  R.B. Graves explains that “the most typical 
light source for an afternoon performance at the amphitheaters was an overcast 
sky producing an evenly distributed illumination from above” (532).  He 
suggests, because both amphitheatres and hall theatres had a “steady, overall 
illumination” that enabled audiences to “see and respond to the visual media of 
the actors’ craft,” that “the staging at the indoor and outdoor playhouses may 
not have been so different in regard to the particular aspect of stage production 
that one might have thought would define the principal difference between 
them” (542).  Plays began at about two in the afternoon, according to Thomas 
Platter’s account of London theatregoing, and at the end of the second act, the 
murder dumb shows would fall at three quarters of an hour to an hour in, at 
around three o’clock (with plays generally said to be around two to two and a 
half hours long).  Webster notes himself that the play was “acted, in so dull a 
time of Winter, presented in so open and blacke a Theater” (A2r), suggesting, 
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as all British residents know, that afternoon gloom can easily encompass and 
darken an outside venue, not least one surrounded by tall brick buildings as 
was the Red Bull and shrouded in tallow smoke.  Despite Webster’s complaint 
about the conditions, the theatre’s “blackness” shows that even on the outdoor 
stage, light sources like the burning perfumes are visible and therefore perfectly 
effective dramaturgy.68   
The murder of Isabella is also, it is implied by the stage directions, 
featured in a discovery space or recess, adding to the scene’s darkness.  It is 
very difficult to be certain of exactly how and when a discovery space at the 
Red Bull would be used: “All tests of the use of a discoverable space are . . . 
open to more or less question” (Reynolds 158).  Such a view has been 
reinforced more recently by Tim Fitzpatrick, whose study of space and 
dramaturgy proposes that “discoveries” need not always indicate a central 
discovery space, that doors at the side of the stage could be used with 
hangings for moments of discovery or action, and that the “place in the middle” 
need not necessarily have access to the tiring house and so could act solely as 
a “concealment” space (and one of his studies in the appendix is Webster’s 
Duchess at the Globe and Blackfriars) (29, 264-66).  Griffith actually questions 
the desire to find a “constant discovery space involving a curtain” (104)—
something that would be reinforced if the title-page woodcut for Swetnam 
(1620) shows the centre-rear of the stage, containing two windows set into a 
brick wall—although Reynolds does entertain the possibility that there “may 
have been removable structures” (155); his recognition that the stage direction 
“sounds like a special curtain hiding only the picture” makes it possible that 
neither of the dumb shows occur in a recess/discovery space.  The “vaulting 
horse” murder of Camillo seems likely to have been on the front stage, as the 
“horse” is at least two yards high (described during the following trial scene) and 
there are rushes on the floor, requiring a certain amount of space (Reynolds 
139; Webster E3v).  Nevertheless, Griffith entertains the possibility that a 
“tower” tiring house, visible in a sketch of the playhouse from the 1660s, was in 
use earlier; it would be particularly useful to the “tower” stagecraft in Heywood’s 
roughly contemporaneous Age plays (97, 104-05), and perhaps offers dramatic 
possibilities for The White Devil.   
                                     
68 Griffith offers three possible orientations for the stage, depending on which building is 
believed to be the tiring house: north-east, south-west, or south-east (99). 
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Reynolds also makes a series of informed assumptions about what might 
have occurred in such a recess space, should it exist, which include the picture-
murder of the dumb show: “four or five scenes in a curtained space: ? a picture 
with a curtain, a trial; two scenes before, then in, a bedchamber; five persons 
discovered behind a traverse” (159).  The list of possible recess moments in 
The White Devil alone—without listing the considerable wider dramatic 
connotations of a discovery space(s), from The Spanish Tragedy to Othello—
shows the liminality of that part (or parts) of a playhouse.  It introduces a “moral 
chiaroscuro” to the action, which complements both the language of darkness 
and the physical darkness of the scene.  Sex and death are intertwined in the 
space(s), which often represents a bedchamber but is also used to discover or 
to act as backdrop to scenes of murder and death.  Richard Madeleine explains 
that action may not always occur in a recess, but that the space of darkness 
has symbolic significance.  Further, he notes, such stage locations 
“emblematize as well as . . . sensationalize passion and violence and their 
psychological and moral connections” (160).  The two are conjoined in The 
White Devil (as they also are, for instance, in Othello) when Bracciano enters, 
dying, “presented in a bed” (K1v), shortly before his murder.  It is a piece of 
stagecraft that echoes his illicit encounters with Vittoria and his murderous 
action earlier in the play—what Madelaine identifies as a “Renaissance poetics 
of punishment” that “recognized the value of executing malefactors near the site 
of their crimes” (160)—and so the blocking suggests a moral arc that results in 
a retributive poetic justice. 
When Bracciano is first shown to be intimate with Vittoria, the Quarto has 
him “Enter” (B4v); however, there is no direction for him to exit earlier in the 
scene.  Christina Luckyj, in a recent edition of the play, takes this to mean that 
Bracciano “withdraws,” presumably to a stage recess, rather than exits the 
stage, and then subsequently “comes forward” (1.2.44.1; 1.2.179.1).  In such an 
interpretation, Flamineo’s line “Come sister, darkness hides your blush” (B4v; 
1.2.180) draws together the moral connotations of adultery that characterise the 
play’s language of “darkness” by exploiting the meanings of a recess. It 
becomes a space where the play’s black-and-white rhetoric physically 
shadows—shrouding Vittoria’s “blush,” Bracciano—and also foreshadows: 
Bracciano’s move forward from the “discovery space” charges the shadowed 
recess with sexual hunger (which he makes explicit by making jokes about his 
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“jewel”) and associates it with nefarious activity, including the coming murders 
of their partners and their own demise. 
Sowing the seeds for those murders, Vittoria’s “foolish idle dreame” (C1r) 
at this moment links the light/darkness of the evening chamber scene with the 
liminality of a dream world that makes interpretation, meaning, and vision 
uncertain.69  That liminality is drawn to the fore with the visions of the murders 
in the dumb shows, which occur in a similar “dream world” and are witnessed 
only thanks to the “charmed” nightcap worn by Bracciano.  The “dreamlike” 
aspects of the dumb shows are especially significant, because they channel 
concerns about interpretation and proof associated with rhetorical invention and 
also make use of “blackness.” 
Bracciano’s response to the murders conflates the physical staging of the 
scene with rhetorical and legal language: 
 
’Twas quaintly done, but yet each circumstance 
I taste not fully. (E1r) 
 
“Circumstance” inflects the scene and becomes important in “colouring” the 
murders; it is a legal-rhetorical term concerned chiefly with persuasion and not 
necessarily with proving “truth.”  Wilson’s Arte impresses the importance of 
“circumstance” in setting out “any matter, and to amplify it in the uttermost” 
(C2r), as strong supplementary evidence; he also indicates that it testifies to 
“profe of his purpose” (C2v).  The following scene immediately makes the legal 
connotations of the term clear: 
 
. . . we have nought but circumstances 
To charge her with, about her husband’s death; 
Their approbation therefore to the proofs 
Of her black lust.  (E1r) 
 
The “black lust” draws attention back to the intimate bedchamber scene and the 
dumb show murders, both of which represent “black lust” by drawing on the 
                                     
69 Mukherji notes Bracciano’s recognition that the dream is a “rhetorical artefact,” signalled by 
the use of the word “invention” (139). 
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sex-and-death connotations of the recess through a combination of black-and-
white language and stagecraft. 
Activity in and around the recess, however, is tellingly inflected with the 
rhetorical devices and terminology of the law court.  The word “circumstance” 
links the dramatic activity witnessed in the dumb shows with rhetorical 
presentation.  Mukherji explains that the dumb shows probably “prospectively 
show Bracciano, and us, what is to happen” while simultaneously “presenting in 
formulaic form what is actually happening at that moment” (144).  They 
radicalise the dumb show formula by making the scene self-consciously artificial 
and constructed.  What is ostensibly a window onto the murders is coloured by 
the indirectness of the scene: the audience (and Bracciano) do not witness the 
murders, because they are presented as “dream concepts.”  They are an 
attempt to construct an event and not unmediated access to it. 
By terming the dumb shows “each circumstance,” then, Bracciano marks 
the attempted construction as rhetorical as well as material.  “Circumstance” 
does not represent “truth” but rather the quality of persuasion; Jan-Melissa 
Schramm notes its judicial function as “evidence of a subsidiary fact from which 
the existence of the primary fact may be inferred” and explains that “if testimony 
as to the main fact can be criticised as incomplete or misleading, then so can 
the testimonial presentation of circumstantial evidence” (Testimony 19, 20).  
Wilson aligns the word with ornamental styles of rhetoric—not least the figure of 
amplificatio (which makes “men wonder at the straungeness of any thing”) 
(N3v).  The charmed nightcap acts as its own form of “amplification,” translating 
the “circumstances” of a law court into a material performance on the stage.   
Webster effectively exploits the conventions of the early modern English 
dumb show to destabilise the order and status of evidence, proof, 
demonstration, and circumstance.  Jeremy Lopez characterises the effect of 
dumb shows on a viewer:  
 
Watching a dumb show, you must not only work vigorously to 
interpret gestures that are almost necessarily of a different size 
and style from gestures elsewhere in the play; you must also put 
the act of interpretation into a kind of suspense, waiting for later 
action, accompanied by words, to help you sort out meanings: 
does this dumb show represent something that has happened, is 
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happening, or is going to happen?  Is its action expository, 
imaginary, or allegorical?” (294) 
 
The later court scene therefore reflects on scenes that may or may not have 
happened, that may be imaginary or allegorical, or that may simply be entirely 
illusory.  As such, the representation of the murders in a dumb show questions 
their truth-status and the theatrical device inextricably links the rhetorical oration 
of the law court with the material performance of the murders.  In this sense, the 
dumb shows do not serve as the cause for the arraignment scene that follows; 
they represent, in material rather than verbal from, the same attempted 
construction of proof.  Legal rhetoric and theatrical dumb show are two sides of 
the same coin.  Both are marked by levels of obfuscation: through a mediated 
“dream” effect in the dumb shows and in court through the speaking of Latin 
and the comically verbose Lawyer (“this debausht and diversivolent woman”)—
what Vittoria terms the “strange tongue” of the court (E2v). 
Webster’s introduction of a “dream concept, a reality beyond the 
characters’ living reality,” Carey notes, “enables layers of media—a perspective 
of ‘seeing through’” (77).  The interpretation offers parallels with circumstantial 
rhetoric—which offers a second-hand testimony of “seeing through” rather than 
primary access—and it also links to wider aspects of rhetorical construction, 
especially the verbal device of ekphrasis.  The device contributes to the power 
of verbal construction in the early modern period and forms part of what Jean 
Hagstrum calls “pictorial imagery” (xx).  Ekphrasis is a poetic description of a 
work of art, important in establishing 
 
relationships between words, images, and imitation: prior to the 
invention and spread of engraving techniques capable of the kind 
of detail appropriate to the reproduction of fine art, it was the 
principal means by which copies of works of art were made, and 
the only means by which lost, often ancient, works of art were 
reconstructed.  (Acheson 91) 
 
It can be strictly defined, in late-twentieth-century terms as “the verbal 
representation of graphic representation” (Heffernan 299), though Joel Altman 
has noted its “wider purview” in early modern England, where it encompassed 
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and was sometimes confused with an array of rhetorical categories (274).  I 
discuss two of those important categories (enargeia and energeia) in relation 
with this more recent, narrow critical conception of ekphrasis.  As a part of the 
paragone tradition that often sees visual and verbal modes in competition, 
ekphrasis closely connects and even threatens to unite picture and poetry. 
While the word only appears in English as a critical term in the eighteenth 
century, critics including Hagstrum, James A. W. Heffernan, and Katherine 
Acheson have acknowledged its continuing presence throughout verbal and 
visual exchanges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Heffernan 
acknowledges its potential to offer “a radical critique of representation,” not least 
in its use of “one medium of representation to represent another” (304, 300).  
The device therefore mirrors the dumb shows in Webster’s The White Devil, 
which themselves collapse distinctions between visual and rhetorical 
representation by referring to the performances as “circumstances.”  They 
represent rhetorical persuasion as a material performance—a reverse 
ekphrasis—thereby radicalising the dumb show as a representative technique 
and not only enabling “layers of media” (Carey 77) but troubling the distinction 
between verbal and visual representation. 
More significant and appropriate to this conjunction of rhetorical and 
material performance in The White Devil is enargeia (also known in the Latin as 
evidentia).  Enargeia signifies a powerful visual, pictorial quality in verbal or 
poetic description—one that is “highly natural” (Hagstrum 12).  Hagstrum 
explains that the term “originated in rhetoric, where it was used to describe the 
power that verbal visual imagery possessed in setting before the hearer the 
very object or scene being described” but that it came to be part of later 
antiquity’s and succeeding centuries’ tendency “to blur the distinction between 
poetry and rhetoric” (11).  In the early modern period, the term retains 
significance.  Puttenham describes it in conjunction with its homonymous sister 
term, energeia.  The latter describes full potency, “the achievement in art and 
rhetoric of the dynamic and purposive life of nature” (Hagstrum 12), making 
comparisons with painting unnecessary.  Puttenham describes all “ornament 
poeticall” as falling into these two categories: 
 
one to satisfy and delight the ear only, by a goodly outward show 
set upon the matter with words and speeches smoothly and 
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tuneably running; another by certain intendements or sense of 
such words and speeches inwardly working a stir to the mind.  
That first quality the Greeks called enargeia, of this word, argos, 
because it giveth a glorious lustre and light; this latter they called 
energeia, of ergon, because it wrought with a strong and virtuous 
operation.  And figure breedeth them both: some serving to give 
gloss only to language, some to give it efficacy by sense, and so, 
by that means, some of them to serve the ear only, some the 
conceit only and not the ear. (135) 
 
Gavin Alexander explains that Puttenham is the first to give these terms the 
centrality they receive here but that he somewhat misrepresents enargeia, 
which generally relates to “compelling description” that appeals to the eye of the 
mind (381 n.3).  Nonetheless, the ear is delighted in Puttenham’s description by 
an “outward show,” likening listening to looking.  Enargeia provides the 
delightful visual aspects and energeia, it is suggested, provides the strength 
and force of the “matter”; yet both are so closely connected that they threaten to 
be indistinguishable—a result, perhaps, of Puttenham’s less than accurate 
rendering of these classical terms.  Indeed, energeia uses the “sense of such 
words” (emphasis added) and so exploits the double meaning of “sense”—at 
once signifying “meaning” and so appealing to “conceit” but also meaning 
“sensory” and so, like enargeia, delighting the ear and the eye.  Both the 
pictorial quality (enargeia) and what Hagstrum calls the “effectual working 
power” (12) of poetry (energeia) are joined in sensory terms in Puttenham’s 
descriptions. 
The White Devil’s dumb shows exploit the sensory aspects of these 
rhetorical ornaments.  Mukherji argues that the play offers “a radical hierarchy 
of proofs that defies institutional morality” (Mukherji 135), but Webster arguably 
uses rhetoric to de-hierarchise the distinction between artificial and inartificial 
proofs.  Certain physical or visual proof is often unavailable in law courts, and 
Mukherji explains that The White Devil showcases Vittoria’s own image-making 
“artificial” proofs during the trial scene, as opposed to the “documentary 
evidence, objective facts, testimonies, oaths, depositions, confessions under 
torture or rumour” that constitute Aristotelian inartificial, or atechnic, proofs (162-
63).  The staged murder scenes contain both circumstantial rhetoric (artificial) 
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and physical, visual “evidence” (inartificial).  The doubleness of the dumb shows 
is reinforced by the manner in which the Conjuror redescribes the action, upon 
Bracciano’s request.  He is told, “O ’twas most apparent,” but the events of the 
dumb show are then relayed in verbal terms, offering an enargeia-ic and almost 
ekphrastic description of the material performance.  Even the visual experience 
of the event itself is described in rhetorical terms.  The Conjuror stops his 
description to state, “your eye saw the rest, and can informe you / The engine of 
it all” (E1r).  The words detach Bracciano’s eye from his understanding, and his 
vision “informs” in a verbal manner. 
Aligning material and rhetorical performance in this way adds a level of 
moral complexity to the dumb shows, which are marked as subjective, 
persuasive, and constructed performances.  Such lack of objectivity connects 
with contemporary ideas about the “physical” aspects of rhetoric.  Wright’s 
influential treatise on the passions considers actions—and dumb shows in 
particular—to be closely related to rhetorical matters.  He links oratory and 
action by way of comparison with the theatrical device: 
 
The internall conceits and affections of our minds, are not only 
expressed with words, but also declared with actions: as it 
appeareth in Comedies, where dumbe shewes often expresse the 
whole matter . . . . (I6v)  
 
The dual meaning of “matter” is telling, making dumb show performances both 
rhetorical and physical.  As such, internal “conceit” and “affection” are projected 
outward, just as rhetorical expression is used to externalise inward thoughts.  
When dumb shows are linked to rhetoric in this manner, they further complicate 
the veracity and impartiality of the display, because like “words” they express 
not external, empirical reality but necessarily internal “conceits.”  
The play repeats the materialisation of “internal conceits” later, by 
coupling the language of verbal construction with dramatic effect.  When 
Francisco muses on revenge for his sister and contemplates the uses of 
Monticelso’s “black book” of villains, Isabella’s ghost appears: 
 
Call for her picture: no; I’le close mine eyes, 
And in a melancholicke thought I’le frame 
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Enter Isabela’s Ghost. 
Her figure ‘fore me.  Now I --- ha’te how strong 
Imagination workes! how she can frame 
Things which are not! me thinks she stands afore me; 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Were my skill pregnant, I could draw her picture. (G2r-v) 
 
Mukherji suggests that “we are left in little doubt as to the reality-status of the 
apparition,” placing it firmly as an image.  Yet Francisco’s terminology suggests 
that imagination becomes so strong that it borders on material creation—for the 
ghost can only be embodied in theatrical terms by the actual, bodily presence of 
the actor representing Isabella’s ghost.  The language of framing and “making” 
that governs the soliloquy is powerful enough to suggest that words themselves 
create a material “image.”  That Francisco may “draw her picture” links the 
projection to rhetorical acts of description and echoes Puttenham’s definitions of 
enargeia and energeia—the ghost is vivid (being visible) and the language 
proves so potent that the image of Isabella actually appears on stage.  
Francisco’s “imagination” performs a rhetorical act and the ghost materialises 
from it.  The stage direction in the original Quarto intrudes mid-line after “frame,” 
meaning that, textually and in performance, the ghost is born in between the 
spoken lines as if produced by the words.  
Despite the presence of Isabella on stage, Francisco wonders how 
imagination “can frame / Things which are not!”  The projection of the ghost 
from his “imagination” is called into question, and there remains a disjunction 
between what Francisco “thinks” and what he (and the audience) sees.  With 
his eyes shut, the figure of the ghost symbolises his subconscious, but it 
parallels the murder scene—where Bracciano must wear a “charmed” cap in 
order to witness the spatially removed murders of Isabella and Camillo.  Both 
Bracciano and Francisco are and are not seeing the figures they witness.  Such 
sensory uncertainty underlines the ambivalent attitude towards moral, mental, 
and material knowledge in a play where rhetoric shapes meaning. 
The slippages of meaning attendant on the term “circumstance” reveal 
an anxiety that persuasive rhetoric is more powerful than “truth,” and the murder 
scenes and the appearance of Isabella’s ghost show that rhetorical “framing,” 
“making,” and “engineering” have a reciprocal relationship with the material 
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world.  The murders of Isabella and Camillo materialise the possibilities of 
circumstantial legal rhetoric just as Francisco’s “imagination” conjures the form 
of his sister’s ghost.  Yet uncertainties over these “visions” leave questions 
about where the line is drawn between the “verbal” and the “real” world.  The 
play’s most strange and spectacular moments mirror moral anxieties about the 
relationship between rhetorical persuasion, probability, and truth.  The rhetorical 
strangeness of the play’s verbal style bleeds into the moral tensions 
surrounding its narrative and stagecraft, where what can be described as 
conceptual “strangeness” marks Webster’s blurring of the abstract, verbal, and 
material realms. 
 
Rhetorical and Material Construction in Cymbeline 
Cymbeline also shares an interest in legal, rhetorical, and material 
invention—especially in the reciprocal relationship between linguistic and 
physical construction.  Earlier, when attempting to “prove” to Posthumus his 
wife’s infidelity, Giacamo relies on the sort of verbal descriptions associated 
with the law courts: 
 
Sir, my Circumstances 
Being so nere the Truth, as I will make them, 
Must first induce you to beleeue . . . . (aaa1v) 
 
Like the rhetorical-material constructions in The White Devil, Giacamo explains 
that he is “making” the circumstances and attempting to fashion a belief in his 
auditor, Posthumus.  The language of construction in his “proof” captures 
Shakespeare’s preoccupation with the boundaries of material and verbal 
images in Cymbeline. 
Critics acknowledge these boundaries.  Mukherji stresses the 
“voyeurism” essential to Cymbeline’s “exploration of tokens” (51).  They are 
corporal signs of proof, and “what makes these objects convincing to 
Posthumus is their visual vividness” (Mukherji 52).  However, Maurice Hunt 
sees those objects not in the play’s enargeia, the vivid speech of description, 
but in the things themselves. For Hunt, the play’s objects take on the status of 
an “Idea,” because “once a material object expresses values, those values are 
subsequently known chiefly in terms of the object” (329).  It is this argument that 
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Jason Scott-Warren has recently extended to “people,” contending that the play 
merges subject and object:  
 
People invest their emotions in things, most notably love-tokens, 
and in so doing they render those emotions hostages to fortune, 
since love-tokens can be exchanged, stolen or lost.  People 
repeatedly materialize the immaterial, as when Imogen ‘pawn[s 
her] honour’. (233) 
 
Perhaps Shakespeare’s material impulse in Cymbeline explains why Giacamo’s 
oration is so successful.  He describes the tapestry to Posthumus in terms that 
intimate the rhetorical force of descriptive energeia: 
 
So bravely done, so rich, that it did strive 
In workmanship and value; which I wondered 
Could be so rarely and exactly wrought, 
Such the true life on’t was. (aaa3r) 
 
The “workmanship” that is “rarely and exactly wrought” reflects back on 
Giacamo’s own oration, deeming his rhetoric a form of “making,” as he claims 
ten lines earlier (“as I will make them”—see above); the doubling of this 
language of construction suggests that his ekphrastic description of the artwork 
in the chamber has a material force of its own.  Although Posthumus refuses to 
accept these descriptions as proof, the language of “things” invades his own 
speech.  He tells Giacamo that his descriptive speech “is a thing” he might have 
heard elsewhere, but that “thing” then turns into the very moral virtue at stake.  
His outburst, “This is her honour!” (aaa3r), takes “this” to refer both to the 
abstract, rhetorical “matter” at hand as well as the physical matter with which 
Giacamo’s speech is crammed.  Accordingly, such “making” rhetoric paves the 
way for Posthumus’s too ready acceptance of the ring as a token of “proof.” 
Rhetoric’s ability to influence and modify one’s mental, moral, and 
sensory perception of the world is the cause of great anxiety in and beyond the 
early modern period, and it marks concerns about “certainty” in legal 
proceedings and presentation, as critics Terence Cave and Schramm 
recognise.  Cave notes (talking of the infamous sixteenth-century French legal 
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case of Martin Guerre) that “protracted legal proceedings” inevitably 
“demonstrated . . . [a] failure of legal authority to establish a certain basis for 
judgement” (13).  Schramm relates fictional forms of recognition to such 
uncertainty, acknowledging that while “the emotional veracity of imaginative 
literature . . . suggests the power of poesy to generate the most effective and 
‘truthful’ anagnorisis . . . it also betrays anxiety that such an imposture, so 
evidently parodic and weakly imitative, nevertheless almost succeeded” 
(Atonement 201).  The closing of Cymbeline, with its concentration on the play’s 
“matter,” delivers precisely such anxieties about the constructed rhetoric 
performed and “invented” by Giacamo.  Not only do the physical language and 
material metaphors surrounding rhetorical “proof” in the play challenge certainty 
of judgement, they open up wider epistemological questions about sense 
experience, representation, and moral knowledge. 
In Cymbeline, as in The White Devil, rhetoric moves between verbal and 
material manifestations.  The conspicuous stagecraft of Jupiter’s entrance on 
an eagle actually offers parallels with stagecraft at the Red Bull theatre in its 
use of self-conscious devices.  Shakespeare’s Jupiter 
 
descends in Thunder and Lightning, sitting uppon an Eagle . . . . 
(Bbb3v) 
 
Its dramaturgical affinities with Heywood’s The Golden Age (1611) are clear: 
 
Iupiter drawes heauen: at which Iris descends and presents him 
with his Eagle, Crowne and Scepter, and his thunder-bolt.  Iupiter 
first ascends upon the Eagle . . . . (K2v) 
 
Roger Warren suggests Heywood’s stagecraft is borrowed from Cymbeline by 
offering a number of verbal echoes in Heywood’s play (66-67), but both plays 
were current by 1611 and offer a possible shared sensational special effect 
across theatres.  The King’s Men were playing at both the indoor Blackfriars 
and the outdoor Globe, meaning that such an effect may have been possible in 
both theatres—though this remains the subject of debate (the previous chapter 
discussed the flight capabilities of the indoor Blackfriars). 
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With regard to the Globe, John Astington argues that descent machinery 
would be inexpensive and available in any purpose-built Elizabethan theatre 
(whether a heavens were present or not), but Gabriel Egan argues against such 
“scholarly wish fulfilment,” by pointing out that “no Globe play uses flying” 
(“Reconstructions of the Globe: A Retrospective,” Shakespeare Survey 52 
(1999): 1-16: 7) (something not necessarily true of Cymbeline, which is 
considered by many scholars and by Warren’s dating as a Globe play).  
Alexander Leggatt points out that 
 
It may be that neither the Boar’s Head nor the first Globe was so 
equipped, but the evidence for this is negative—a lack of stage 
directions in extant plays—and if the vision of Jupiter was part of 
the original text of Cymbeline as acted at the Globe, and not a 
later addition, then the first Globe had such machinery. (Jacobean 
Public Theatre 24) 
 
Considering the obvious ability of the Red Bull to install and exploit such 
technology, and considering the similarities with the contemporaneous 
Heywood play that suggest the Cymbeline stage direction dates from the period 
1610-11, rather than being a later addition, it remains possible that the Globe 
was indeed able to present Jupiter’s descent.  Both Heywood’s The Silver Age 
and Cymbeline were performed at court in 1611, before returning to their 
respective public/private theatres; even if the precise stage directions do not 
reflect their respective theatre practice exactly, their billing and the wider 
similarities between the Age plays and Shakespeare’s Blackfriars drama implies 
some dramaturgical affinity.  Indeed, some manner of flying in Cymbeline 
(performed, Roger Warren suspects, at both the Blackfriars as well as the 
Globe, 2-3) and the Age plays and their wider sharing of “strange spectacle” 
aligns the stagecraft of Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull and the King’s Men’s 
theatres.  Their visual strangeness offers to lessen the sharp distinctions 
sometimes made between “outdoor” and “indoor” stagecraft.  It also adds 
credence to the likelihood that The White Devil belonged in the outdoor Red 
Bull.  Ultimately, like the dumb shows in Webster’s play, the spectacular 
stagecraft in Jupiter’s descent draws attention to the self-consciousness of both 
language and visual effect while manifesting the strangeness of both. 
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Jupiter’s bizarre deus ex machina entry in Cymbeline and his spoken 
judgement on the action illustrate a particularly acute moment of rhetorical and 
visual strangeness: 
 
No more you petty Spirits of Region low 
Offend our hearing: hush.  How dare you Ghostes 
Accuse the Thunderer, whose Bolt (you know) 
Sky-planted, batters all rebelling Coasts. 
Poore shadowes of Elizium, hence, and rest 
Vpon your neuer-withering bankes of Flowres. 
Be not with mortal accidents opprest. 
No care of yours it is, you know ’tis ours. (bbb3v) 
 
While these lines are mostly in perfect iambic pentameter, ruggedness certainly 
breaks through at moments, to ripple the smooth flow of the line: the first (“No 
more”) and the sixth line (“Vpon”) of Jupiter’s speech overrun ten syllables.  
One must bear in mind the observation made about the essential variation of 
iambic pentameter by George T. Wright, for whom the “varied rhythmic 
interplay” between metre and phrase “constitutes the great beauty of the form” 
(10-12, 54-56, 149-84).  Yet the lines fit with the speech, and the tongue can 
run over the extra syllables with only a heightened sense of Puttenham’s 
“variable and strange harmony.”  Wright’s observation of this facet of 
Shakespearean language captures the effect exactly: 
 
Like Wyatt, he [Shakespeare] may have realized that a line could 
gain in richness of sound and sense if its meter trips hurriedly over 
some syllables as if the thought or feeling of the speaking 
character were fuller than its words could quite articulate.  To write 
ten-syllable lines that have, in a sense, eleven or twelve syllables 
(or eleven and a half) is to crowd the air with meanings only half-
spoken, partly concealed.  The hypermetrical half-syllables imply 
that, just as the line contains more in the way of syllables than the 
meter promises, so too in the meanings conveyed by the words 
there is more than meets the ear. (158) 
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Jupiter’s “strange” presence requires such a sense of “partly concealed” 
meanings, linking his descent and his speech with the allegorical text he 
deposits in the jail cell. The moment’s “strangeness” provides a link between the 
dramaturgy and the speech in the same way that Webster’s dumb shows link 
“circumstance” with performance.70 
Shakespeare signals the importance of spoken riddles with the delivery 
of a book.71  Leah Marcus notes the significance of this moment, recognising 
that the cryptic text “is read twice during the action—the only text so privileged 
in all of Shakespeare’s plays—and in the Folio it is printed exactly the same 
way both times like a properly ‘authored’ document” (Puzzling 120).  Marcus 
associates it with “emblematic ‘texts’” (120).  The effect is to centre not just 
interpretation but also action on the written (and spoken) word: 
 
Let thy effects 
So follow, to be most unlike our Courtiers, 
As good, as promise. (Bbb3v) 
 
Shakespeare makes rhetorical “effects” synonymous with the consequences in 
the “real” world.  The “strange style” of the play in this scene particularly, and of 
Jupiter’s speech, only heightens the importance of rhetorical “effect”; the riddle 
itself fits into the play’s strange rhetorical mode: 
 
When as a Lyons whelpe, shall to himself vnknown without 
seeking finde, and bee embrac’d by a peece of tender Ayre: And 
when from a stately Cedars hall be lopt branches, which being 
dead many yeares, shall after reuiue, bee ioynted to the old Stock, 
                                     
70 Puttenham also gestures to “meanings only half-spoken” when he suggests that “strange 
harmony” breeds not only in the ear but also in the “conceit of them that hear it.”  Conceit can 
signal both imagination and mind—as Alexander glosses it (126)—but it also has literal 
rhetorical associations of pretty “devises” or manners of expression (OED 8.a).  It is 
occasionally used in titles of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as a byword for 
verse, poem, or “riff,” as in Thomas Churchyard’s A pleasant conceite penned in verse (1593) or 
the ballad Collins conceite (1625, STC 5559).  Puttenham’s suggestion that verse might 
impress both ear and “conceit” with strangeness implies that rhetoric—and more specifically the 
sound and rhythm of poetry—has conceptual power. 
71 There is no stage direction for placing the book in the Folio, so most editors insert it 
somewhere towards the end of Jupiter’s speech, but Posthumus recognises its appearance with 
the words, “A book?” (Bbb3v). 
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and freshly grow, then shall Posthumus end his miseries, Britaine 
be fortunate, and flourish in Peace and Plentie. 
 
Indeed, the style of the riddle itself is hardly differentiated from the ellipses and 
omissions that characterise Posthumus’s own response: 
 
’Tis still a Dreame: or else such stuffe as Madmen 
Tongue, and braine not: either both, or nothing, 
Or senseless speaking, or a speaking such 
As sense cannot vntye.  Be what it is, 
The Action of my life is like it, which Ile keepe 
If but for simpathy. (Bbb3v) 
 
His language foreshadows Prospero’s “dream” speech in The Tempest, which 
shares concerns about the relationship between material and immaterial “stuff.” 
The riddle proves quite the opposite of “senseless speaking,” and 
Posthumus’s recognition that the “Action” of his life is like it recalls Thomas 
Wright’s interest in embodying rhetoric, marrying “words” with “actions” through 
a comparison to a dumb show.  Lomax recognises the parallels between the 
deliberately archaic form of a dumb show and the descent in Cymbeline, noting 
that Shakespeare’s scene resembles a dumb show: “a silent, dream-like 
sequence, befitting the spirit of the play as a whole.  This old-fashioned service 
also conveys a sense of reliving history and of looking back to another 
dimension in time” (31).  The parallels with The White Devil are striking, and 
Webster’s dumb shows likewise feel like they are in another (at least spatial) 
dimension and also have the feel of a dream or a projection of the imagination, 
reinforced by Bracchiano’s rhetorically-conscious language.  In this moment in 
Cymbeline, words and actions are linked through implicit rather than explicit 
attention to rhetorical construction.  While Wright’s embodied rhetoric refers to 
the display of internal “passions,” he associates oration with gesture and, 
similarly, Jupiter’s book in Cymbeline channels the conceit of the whole play by 
linking verbal “effects” with “Action.” 
Jupiter’s riddle falls under what Tiffany Stern has labelled “scrolls”—
“papers that are to be delivered onstage” (Documents 174).  The stagecraft 
therefore naturally associates rhetorical delivery with the visual and physical 
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presence of a prop.  Stern suggests that the preserved feature of the scroll in a 
printed text reflects the way the stage prop itself would look, its appearance in 
print making it a “would-be stage property and sometimes a preserved one 
(Documents 179).  As a focal point for the spectacular entrance and oration of 
Jupiter, a physical version of the scroll is a central part of the scene’s stagecraft, 
already drawing verbal modes into “Action.”   
The nature of the printed or scribed scroll connects not only to Wright’s 
embodied rhetoric, but to an earlier “epistemological shift” that transforms 
rhetorical models into physical and spatial illustration.  Walter Ong’s seminal 
work on Ramism and the birth of print culture shows how spatial logic attends 
the development of movable type.  The emergence of printed books 
corresponds with a rise in thinking “of knowledge and of expression, in terms 
more committed to space” (308).  Puttenham’s Arte, for instance, certainly has 
elements of Ramist methodology in its presentation of metrical style.  When 
describing how to breed the “variable and strange harmonie” in both the ear and 
the mind, he accompanies the description with an illustration: 
 
 
 
Fig. 24.  Diagram from Puttenham’s Arte (London, 1589; M1v).  STC 20519.5. 
 
This illustration of poetic metre can be considered a form of instruction, and as 
such falls, in part, under Acheson’s category of “diagrams and illustrations of a 
technical nature,” which “insinuated ways of thinking in their audiences” (2).  
While it is not strictly a dichotomous table, it is set out in such a way as to echo 
such diagrams, family trees, or biblical tables, with the separate measurements 
(in concord—feet—or in measure—line length) split between the left and the 
right.  The “strange harmonie” and its impact on one’s imagination are 
translated into explicitly visual terms—Puttenham calls it an “ocular example”—
and as such the illustration can be categorised as an “epistemological form” 
(Acheson 6).  At the same time as it follows a tradition of print logic and Ramist 
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instruction, Puttenham’s illustration challenges modes of representation in the 
same way as ekphrasis: it turns a vocal representation into a visual one.  
Though such a conception is familiar to twenty-first-century readers, the 
illustration in Fig. 24 and the versions that feature throughout the subsequent 
pages of Puttenham’s Arte all appear at a time when diagrams and illustrations 
in printing are developing and newly expanding. 
The diagrams of Puttenham’s rhetorical treatise also align with scientific 
modes of representation, as Henry S. Turner realises.  They are abstract 
conceptions of line length and of rhyme and metre.  They equally mirror other 
developing diagrams of the period’s print culture, especially military tactics, 
garden design, and technical works.  Turner notes that transformations of 
verbal units into pictorial lines are “gestures that reproduce exactly the 
expository and practical techniques of geometrical manuals” (123).  His work on 
English prosody and rhetoric shows parallels in the way that poetic construction 
and instruction are heavily influenced by contemporary thinking in trade, 
technology, and mathematics: “Puttenham positions the reader as a kind of 
poetic artisan who is taught not a series of rules or precepts—not a theory of 
poetry—but is guided through a set of practical techniques according to the 
methods of the workshop” (125).  All such genres of diagrams “are schematic 
and abstract” and are based on practical mathematics: 
 
They use devices of abstraction that encode elements of the 
physical world in disproportionate and non-realistic figures. They 
imagine the physical world as it is measured, traversed, and used, 
not as it is conceived of mythologically, metaphorically, or 
ontologically. (Acheson 5) 
 
While sound is inevitably somewhat abstract, the hallmarks of these diagrams 
are shared by Puttenham’s verse illustrations; Ong’s claim that “the visual is the 
area most proper to science” (in its broad sense) seems pertinent to a rhetorical 
treatise in which “Reduction to spatial form fixes everything, even sound” (109).  
Rhetoric—and specifically, here, poetry—is aligned with other design works that 
have such an impact on the stage, not least Bourne’s Inventions or devises, 
discussed in previous chapters, which includes technical illustrations and tables.  
Emphases in Puttenham’s and Wright’s works on physical and spatial 
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manifestations of rhetoric show that verse and style participate in the material 
world.  Jupiter’s performance in Cymbeline achieves precisely such a 
combination, linking rhetorical delivery with his elaborate entrance and delivery 
of a scroll, a physical prop that unites the visual and verbal aspects of the 
scene’s strange spectacle. 
 
Embodied Emblems in Cymbeline and The White Devil 
Emblems provide an important parallel to the conjunction of material and 
verbal construction discussed above.  While they have often been used to read 
plays symbolically (see Daly, Literature) or presentationally (Lomax; Lunney; 
Michael Neill “What strange . . .”), little work has been done to unpick the way in 
which their rhetorical-visual construction and connected moral message is 
echoed in early modern theatrical display.  Rhetorical strangeness mirrors the 
early modern emblem’s combination of abstract and physical description, 
puzzle and explication, and matter and meaning. 
If Shakespeare’s rhetorical strangeness manifests itself through a 
combination of spectacle and physicalised speech, Webster infuses the 
meaning of words with strangeness.  Francisco reacts to Bracciano’s comments 
to the court by remarking, “How strange these words sound? what’s the 
interpretation?” (F2v).  The questions capture the concerns about speech in a 
playworld where the interpretation of words borders on the manifestation of 
words.  Indeed, “strange” words are the occasion for the murder and the play’s 
emblematic riddles prove to have material consequences.  The emblem thrown 
in at Camillo’s window contains “a stag . . . hath shed his hornes / And for the 
losse of them the poor beast weepes” (D3r).  His query, “What should this 
meane,” is answered in the following murder scene, which alludes to the 
cuckoldry of the “emblem”: mounting the “vaulting-horse” and falling beneath it 
suggests that the emblem’s interpretation has become manifest.  Shedding 
horns implies a lack of sexual virility on top of the initial cuckoldry (perhaps 
compounded by Francisco’s question, “Haue you any children”).  The sexual 
connotations of “vaulting” and his apparent failure, placed “as ‘twere under the 
horse” (D4v), implies that the murder is an embodied and enacted version of 
the emblem—a correlation between words and action that perverts Wright’s 
“strange” effectuating.  
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Emblems themselves are widely regarded as rhetorical exercises in early 
modern Europe.  The tradition’s rhetorical roots are captured in Claude 
Mignault’s celebrated preface to the 1616 Lyons edition of Alciato’s Emblemata, 
which associates the genre with ekphrasis: 
 
Itaque metaphoric[..] hic Emblemata vocantur carmina, quibus 
imagines, agalmata, pegmata, & id genus alia scite adinuenta, 
varie & erudite explicantur 
[And so verses in which pictures, sculptures, tapestries, and other 
things knowledgeably devised of like kind are variously and 
learnedly explained, are here metaphorically termed Emblems] 
(A8r). 
 
As verse, emblems are able to unfold knowledge and learning (“scite”; 
“erudite”), and Mignault thereby pins the didactic benefits of emblem writing on 
its rhetorical qualities.  He emphasises that, just as emblems can be set for 
ornaments on floors, walls, vases, bowls, and clothes, they are also a part of 
the rhetorical arts: 
 
Sed & oratio variis verborum rerúmque pigmentis & lenociniis 
Rhetoricae artis elaborata Emblematis referta dici figuratè potest. 
[But also, discourse that is elaborated with various colourings of 
words and matter, and with the allurements of the Art of Rhetoric, 
can figuratively be said to be crammed with Emblems] (A8r). 
 
Mignault’s “oratio . . . referta,” discourse “crammed” with emblems, neatly 
associates rhetorical play with the emblem genre, and vice versa.  It explicitly 
gestures to the importance of “colouring” in discourse, drawing ornamental 
rhetoric and emblems together.  Camillo’s verbal emblem represents another 
instance of rhetorical play turned into material fact; it projects the “colourings of 
words and matter” implicit in its wordplay into the physical colours and matter of 
the dumb show.  The play’s materialised rhetoric proves both dangerous and 
dangerously deceptive, resisting interpretation and making “strange” words into 
the murderous spectacle of the dumb show. 
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Cymbeline’s conjunction of “Action” and speech is also troubling and 
provocative.  The book or scroll delivered makes claims to be of great weight 
and importance, including the revelation of Posthumus’s “full fortune.”  The 
rhetorical device in the scroll-riddle essentially promises access to the book of 
nature and comprehension of providence, just as Webster’s dumb shows 
(spuriously) offer the “full circumstance” of the crimes.  As such, the rhetorical 
qualities of Jupiter’s descent become even more apparent.  Michael Bath 
explains the connection between rhetoric, nature, and meaning in the emblem 
tradition: 
 
the emblem was conceived both as an art of rhetorical invention in 
which novel or witty connections were suggested between signifier 
and signified, and at the same time as an art which used inherent 
meanings already inscribed in the Book of Nature by the finger of 
God. (3) 
 
Henry Peacham’s Minerua Britanna (1612) includes an emblem that makes 
precisely those associations explicit.  Though possibly a coincidence, the 
collection is printed a few years after Cymbeline was first performed and its 
symbolism fits the scene of Jupiter’s descent perfectly: 
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Fig. 25.  “Poulatim” from Peacham’s Minerva Britanna (London, 1612; N4r).  
STC 19511. 
 
The emblem warns reader-viewers not to resist fate: 
 
By violence who tries to turne away, 
Strong natures current, from the proper course, 
To mooue the Earth, he better were assay, 
Or wrest from Ioue, his thunderbolts perforce . . . . (N4r) 
 
Shakespeare’s Jupiter’s delivery of a rhetorical riddle, or emblem, suggests that 
divine rhetoric allies with matter to construct the “proper course” of the play.  
Indeed, the figure of the lion in Peacham’s image conveniently links Jove with 
Shakespeare’s Posthumus Leonatus.  Peacham was a known playgoer who 
drew a sketch of a performance of Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, making it 
perfectly possible that Peacham drew the inspiration for this emblem from a 
performance of Cymbeline.  Yet even ignoring such conjecture, the 
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extraordinary similarity in structure and composition show Shakespeare’s 
dramaturgical appropriation of visual, rhetorical, and emblematic traditions. 
The delivery of the book itself marries the expressive “dumb show” 
quality of Jupiter’s descent with his “strange” stylised speech through what is 
presumably a form of firework described as thunder and lightning—indeed the 
combination of thunder and lightning links verbal and visual effect: 
 
Iupiter descends in Thunder and Lightning, sitting vppon an Eagle: 
hee throwes a Thunder-bolt.  The Ghostes fall on their knees.  
(bbb3v) 
 
The visual symbolism detailed in this stage direction aligns the figure of a God 
with the figures of rhetoric, especially amplificatio, in which orators “breaketh all 
in peeces, like a thunderbolt” (Peacham N2v)—a device at the centre of the 
period’s moral anxieties over rhetoric.  Certainly, amplification is employed at 
this moment in Cymbeline in order to heighten the power of the spectacle: “a 
certain affirmation very great & weighty, which by large & plentifull speech, 
moueth the minds of the hearers, & maketh them to beleeue that which is said” 
(Peacham N2r). Wilson also views amplification in visual-aural terms, noting 
that “Uehemencie of words full often helpe the matter forwarde, when more is 
gathered by cogitacion, than if the thing had been spoken in plaine words.  
When wee heare one say . . . The Preacher thundered in the Pulpite . . .” (S2v).  
“Vehemencie” and use of non-plain words begins to echo the “strange” effects 
that Wilson and Puttenham desire in a good oration.  As a metaphor for 
vehement (or “strange”) speech, thundering is made quite literal in Cymbeline 
through its use as a visual-aural prop: Jupiter’s rhetorical style becomes a 
special effect.  Certainly, the language—Jupiter’s, the tablet’s, Posthumus’s—is 
decidedly removed from “plaine words,” effectively making the deity’s descent a 
piece of “strange” rhetorical stagecraft. 
When the text is read again shortly afterwards, Posthumus encourages 
the Soothsayer to interpret it: “Let him shew / His skill in the construction” 
(Bbb6r).  The final instance of interpretation is framed as an act of “making,” 
following the play’s preoccupations with creating material things from language.  
“Construction” refers, as it is usually glossed, to the Soothsayer’s interpretation, 
but it draws on geometric uses of the term to describe a figure drawn to solve a 
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problem.72  It therefore calls to mind the manufacture of the riddle itself: its 
rhetorical “matter.”  Being read out for a second time, the prop/riddle takes an 
audience back to the text’s delivery, a moment of defiantly constructed 
stagecraft that draws attention to the invention of its verbal as well as its visual 
devices.  It is a creation that mirrors the playwright’s own craft, whose 
profession is described by the very word playwright as a craft, one that insists 
on the wider technological, practical, and hence material aspects of theatrical 
production (see Stern, Documents 1).  Even in the play’s final moments of de-
construction—when all should be interpreted—Cymbeline reminds us of the 
nature of its visually and verbally spectacular matters: they are constructions.  
The words serve as a gloss on the playwright and stagehands themselves and 
emphatically prove Lomax’s description of Cymbeline as “a fluid play” in which 
“boundaries dissolve between the metaphorical and the literal” (126).  Its 
“matter” is derived from the jointure of rhetorical and material construction. 
 
* * * 
 
Anne Barton recognises that “in the romances, characters continue to 
misconstrue or be baffled by the evidence presented to their eyes,” although 
she claims that “it is rare, now, for such uncertainties to result in moral 
confusion” (“‘Enter . . .” 189).  Nevertheless, with specific reference to Jupiter in 
Cymbeline, “in a theatre with technical resources comparatively recently 
developed, the plot material to which Shakespeare now seems to have been 
drawn encouraged him to re-think the function of the eye in determining ‘belief’” 
(196-97).  The close connection with rhetoric in the stage business of the 
romances, and Cymbeline in particular, suggests that the technical resources 
do in fact combine with “moral confusion”—something that is anyway, as the 
opening chapters of this thesis demonstrate, inextricable from visual confusion.  
Dena Goldberg notes a similar critical interest in the The White Devil’s 
scepticism—of vision and of moral philosophy: “Modern criticism has been 
especially sensitive to the poignancy of Webster’s dramatic recreation of a 
dying culture, a society without workable values” (1), something evident from 
Robert Ornstein’s conservative consideration to recent editions and 
                                     
72 See Henry Billingsley’s translation of Euclid’s The elements of geometrie (1570) (C4r-v). 
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introductions that touch on the play’s “cynical” Jacobean hallmarks.73  In their 
shared tonal dissonance, verbal construction, and visual confusion, Cymbeline 
and The White Devil generate playworlds of sceptical uncertainty, only 
exaggerated by their self-referentiality and acknowledgement of theatrical (and 
narrative) artifice.  Rhetorical strangeness and its presence in stage “matter” are 
at the root of such moral and epistemological confusion. 
Chloe Porter has recently examined “dramatists’ engagements with 
processes of visual construction as metatheatrical moments of reflection on the 
significance of representational activity” (1).  Both Cymbeline’s rhetorical texts 
and The White Devil’s visions offer such a reflection, and they also interrogate 
the veracity of visual and rhetorical representation.  The conjunction of rhetoric 
and material stagecraft explains in part the plays’ interest in “strangeness.”  In 
questioning understanding, troubling notions of “truth,” and threatening to 
“construct” matter from imagination and proof from “invention,” Shakespeare 
and Webster present a forceful “strange” aesthetic.  As chapters Three and 
Four examined, the term can link the material and the moral realms of early 
modern England and is particularly charged in the late 1600s and the early 
1610s, when scientific and technological developments, geographical 
exploration, and advances in stagecraft present new means and materials for 
understanding the world.  These elements of “strangeness” are reflected 
through the term’s rhetorical connotations: The White Devil’s concerns with 
legal rhetoric prompt characters to question their surroundings and give them 
the scope to translate moral images from emblems to the material world.  The 
sceptical uncertainty associated with “strangeness” is also poetically reflected in 
Cymbeline, where the difficult rhetorical style matches a “revolution” in rhetoric 
in the early years of Jacobean England, which sees the development of more 
“embodied” orations. 
Exchanges between rhetorical construction and the material world 
therefore “materialise” the moral anxieties associated with rhetoric, especially its 
relativising and truth-twisting capacities.  Framed as stagecraft, these capacities 
simultaneously convince and confuse, revealing the persuasive power of 
rhetorical ornament while also acknowledging its ability to “effectuate strange 
matters in the mindes of . . . Auditors” (Thomas Wright B2r).  The “strange 
                                     
73 See, for instance, David Coleman’s conception of Webster as an “aesthetic relativist” (2), in a 
study that draws on a wide range of criticism on the playwright. 
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matter” of these plays produces a profound moral and material uncertainty, but 
it also represents the moment at which the verbal and the material combine.  
Strangeness offers a model in which rhetorical style can be read as part of the 
visual and material world of the playhouse. 
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Conclusion. 
 
In recent years, scholars including Richard Meek and Christopher Pye 
have argued for a move away from materialist concerns and towards an 
appreciation of aesthetic values.  A seminar on “Early Modern Aesthetics” at the 
43rd annual meeting of the Shakespeare Association of America in Vancouver in 
2015 began with the hosts Katherine Attie and Joel Slotkin pushing for an 
“aesthetic turn” in literary criticism, one that incorporated formal ideas of beauty 
and style.  This thesis implicitly engages with that notion by suggesting that 
aesthetic ideals demand consideration but are necessarily affected and 
influenced by their cultural and material surroundings.  Yet there also remains 
room to explore more explicitly the complex aesthetic qualities of strange 
Jacobean drama.  “Strangeness” represents an interest in the aesthetic, and it 
sometimes comes close in the plays to describing a specific aesthetic effect, but 
it remains united with material and cultural concerns.  In a sense, “strangeness” 
offers to combine burgeoning academic interest in the “aesthetic” with the now-
established “material turn”—a body of scholarship with which this thesis has 
been continually in dialogue. 
Building on the research in this thesis will advance the debate about 
aesthetics in Jacobean drama.  This thesis has chiefly sought to explore a 
prominent use of spectacle in early Jacobean England and a series of “strange” 
reactions to and descriptions of such spectacle.  What emerges is a model for 
understanding visual display’s inextricable intellectual, moral, and aesthetic 
elements.   
I have argued for a shift in moral-philosophical thought and presentation, 
one that converts abstract thought into material terms.  The first Part of this 
thesis explored the contexts of early modern England’s ideas about morality, 
and the way in which visual and dramatic forms played an important role in 
disseminating and presenting moral ideas.  England underwent a “moral-
material” turn in the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean period, exploiting the 
tangibility of “things” in order to shore up moral axioms, and the materialisation 
effected by popular print is in turn interrogated on the stage.   
Part Two established the stage’s complex interaction with the 
materialisation of morality.  In the theatre, spectacle is treated with ambivalence 
and anxiety, but it is also shown to be powerful, provocative, and morally 
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efficacious.  In a period in which spectacle is under discussion, the “strange” 
plays of the 1610s explored in this thesis present powerful interrogations of 
visual display on the stage.  Heywood’s Age plays, far from being sensational 
but shallow, interrogate the complex puzzles that attend visual representation in 
the same ways as Shakespeare’s more discussed island play.  Similarly, 
Webster’s The White Devil and Shakespeare’s Cymbeline have long been 
recognised as plays concerned with visual and material symbols, but they also 
share a self-conscious materialising of verbal style.  The rhetorical and cultural 
contexts of Heywood’s, Shakespeare’s, and Webster’s plays all combine with 
“strange” stagecraft, in which practical matters of staging are imbued with 
philosophical doubt.  The six plays discussed in this thesis present powerful 
examinations of sensory experience and scrutiny of their own mode of 
representation, but they are also of their age, reflecting a moment early in the 
seventeenth century in which faith and scientific reason, superstition and 
scepticism, are held in tension. 
“Strangeness” sits at the intersection between the material and the 
abstract—chiefly by offering both moral and visual description.  As such, it 
constitutes an important extension of Lisa Hopkins’s “drama on the edge,” 
forming part of the “cross-border traffic” between physical and non-physical 
realms (2).  Spectacle becomes a locus for a host of anxieties in a period in 
which modern science and technology emerge and evolve and in which 
scepticism offers a popular philosophical platform for undermining 
epistemological certainty.  The strange 1610s merge scepticism and stagecraft, 
puzzling audiences with displays and opening up questions about visual 
experience.  Consequently, “strangeness” itself imbues spectacle with a range 
of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic qualities that push stage display beyond 
mere sensationalism.   
Both building on and challenging some of the conclusions of repertory 
studies, I have shown in Part Two that different theatres share commercial and 
aesthetic and intellectual interests.  I have read Heywood’s and Webster’s 
Queen’s Servants’ plays at the Red Bull alongside Shakespeare’s King’s Men 
at the Globe and Blackfriars theatres.  While there are important differences in 
form, style, and tone, the two companies nonetheless display aesthetic interests 
in visual display as well as a concern for putting spectacle under the 
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microscope, holding it up to the light (sometimes literally), and asking its 
spectators to puzzle out meanings.   
In critical terms, “strangeness” thereby offers an alternative to “lateness” 
in reading Shakespeare’s Jacobean plays—a concept Gordon McMullan has 
shown to be anachronistic and ideologically inflected by notions of “late writing” 
in general (Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing): “a construct, ideological, 
rhetorical and heuristic, a function not of life or of art but of the practice of 
reading and appreciating certain texts within a set of predetermined 
parameters” (5).  A model of “strange Shakespeare” helps to counter ideas of 
Shakespeare as an exceptional, isolated genius.  The term shows that his later 
drama is enmeshed with the concerns of his contemporaries.  “Strange 
Shakespeare” is equivalent and related to “strange Heywood” and “strange 
Webster,” all of whom share an approach to spectacle, rhetoric, technology, 
and an interest in the moral force of visual display. 
Shakespeare’s “late style” has been the subject of sustained literary 
critical interest, but I suggest that it can be read as a “strange style” partly in 
tune with other, non-Shakespearean drama.  While idiosyncratic, 
Shakespeare’s style is therefore also a product of his historical moment.  
Further, I have shown that “strange” verbal style significantly participates in 
Jacobean theatre’s visual effects.  The final chapter of this thesis combines 
rhetorical studies and theatre studies with intellectual and cultural history, and 
“rhetorical strangeness” presents a new critical model for understanding the 
connection between speech and stagecraft. 
Indeed, reading these plays with strangeness in mind provides a means 
of appreciating drama’s and the theatre’s aesthetic qualities while ensuring they 
remain rooted in contemporary cultural considerations.  “Strange Shakespeare” 
thereby offers an alternative to new historicist readings that are sometimes 
blinkered by the ideological aspects of a play like The Tempest while also 
avoiding a Romantic reading of Shakespeare rooted in ideas of “late writing.”  
Because the concept of strangeness mapped out in this thesis combines 
rhetorical and visual effects, it is able to unite formal aesthetic concerns with the 
practical aspects of performance. 
 “Strangeness” therefore offers an important contextual, conceptual, and 
critical lens through which to analyse drama of the period.  This thesis has 
concentrated on plays that frequently and explicitly invoke and reference 
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“strangeness” and the “strange.”  Yet the lens may be expanded to read other 
drama in these years, from The Winter’s Tale (Globe/Blackfriars, 1611) to 
Dekker’s If This Be Not a Good Play, the Devil Is In It (Red Bull, 1611)—plays 
also deeply concerned with spectacular display.  “Strangeness” affords a way of 
reading Jacobean stage spectacle that places it in its intellectual, aesthetic, and 
material contexts.  It therefore provides a platform from which to interrogate the 
intellectual as well as commercial concerns of London’s repertories, ambivalent 
attitudes towards spectacle, and engagement with changes in technology and 
travel in a variety of contemporary plays. 
The concept connects the stage to the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic 
contexts of the early seventeenth century—a period fraught with various forms 
of uncertainty—while offering audiences a glance at the ineffable and the 
incredible. The “strangeness” of these plays offers a fascinating example of one 
way in which a culture processes major change in a period of newness, doubt, 
and aesthetic and linguistic development. 
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